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The Word Is All That Is The Case: A reading of Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-*

Philosophicus

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Ian Mulholland

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Declaration

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

Abstract

This thesis was inspired by an article in *Science* that claimed that reading literary fiction improves one's ability to accurately form an opinion on another's state of mind. In my reading of this scientific discourse I came to question the ways in which the ability to test and measure an outcome not only limits what can be discussed but defines the direction of further discourse.

Asking these questions led me to investigate the theoretical basis of current scientific discourse and, eventually to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus*. This small volume has been one of the most analysed philosophical texts of the twentieth century and this interpretive effort show no sign of slowing in the twenty-first century. My own contribution to this work is a close reading of a large section of the *Tractatus* and a part of Cora Diamond's 'Throwing away the ladder'. I have linked these interpretations to my readings of critics such as Jacqueline Rose and Jacques Derrida.

In this thesis I have explored the *Tractatus'* claims concerning sense and nonsense and the scholarly conversation surrounding these claims. While I can make no claim to completeness, I believe this thesis offers a perspective on the *Tractatus* that is not present in the pre-existing Wittgenstein scholarship. My reading questions the underlying assumptions of an extra-textual author and an extra-textual world to which the *Tractatus* is often understood to refer and in doing so opens a space for a different understanding of this text.

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Introduction

In proposition 6.53 of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (for the sake of brevity hereafter referred to as the *Tractatus*) Wittgenstein writes that 'The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: 'to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing do with philosophy…'[1]

Ninety years later Stephen Hawking, in the introduction to *The Grand Design* asks 'How can we understand the world in which we find ourselves? How does the universe behave? What is the nature of reality? Where did all this come from? Did the universe need a creator?' Hawking's answer might be read as the fulfilment of Wittgenstein prescription for the 'correct method in philosophy':

> Traditionally these are questions for philosophy, but philosophy is dead. Philosophy has not kept up with modern developments in science, particularly physics. Scientists have become the bearers of the torch of discovery in our quest for knowledge.[2]

However, the issue with reading this as the completion of Wittgenstein's project in the *Tractatus* is that in the next, penultimate, proposition, 6.54, Wittgenstein writes that '[m]y propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb up

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[1] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge Classics, 2001) p.89 Further references to the *Tractatus* are given in parentheses in the text.

[2] Stephen Hawking and Leonard Mlodinow, *The Grand Design* (New York: Bantam, 2010) p.10

beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.'[3]

If the *Tractatus* is not to be read as one of the foundational texts of the kind of analytic philosophy that leads to the death of the discipline, how else might it be understood? Perhaps we might try some continental philosophy instead. Slavoj Zizek said recently that if we were to ask 'somebody like Michel Foucault' whether there is an objective morality they would say that 'to raise such a question is only possible within a certain episteme'.[4] I would argue that this answer might also be given to Hawking's question about how we can understand the world.

The first proposition in the *Tractatus* is 'the world is all that is the case'. If we read this in the traditional way, one that is aligned with analytic philosophy, and shared by scholars such as Russell, A.N. Ayer and Max Black. In a footnote relating to proposition 1 Black asserts that 'World: = "universe"'[5], then the world is the universe that is 'out there' to be discovered by intrepid scientists and then described using a language that has the same shape and structure as 'the world' because it is derived from the world. While the signs used within language might be arbitrary, what they do and how they fit together is determined by how 'the world' is. Thus, 'the world' can be divided into simple objects to which simple names are attached and, as P.M.S. Hacker writes: 'The meanings of the simple names are

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[3] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* Translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuinness (London: Routledge Classics, 2001) p.89
[4] Slavoj Zizek, 'How philosophy got lost', The Institute of Art and Ideas, Youtube, https://youtu.be/06KiOj6gjbs , accessed 19th May 2023
[5] Max Black, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus',* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964) p.29

the simple objects in reality for which they go proxy. The logico-syntactical form of a simple

name mirrors the metaphysical form of the object in reality that is its meaning.' [6]

However, as I read it, all that we can know about 'the world' from the statement '[t]he

world is all that is the case' is that it, 'the world', 'is all that is the case'. There is no claim to

an out there, beyond the text, to which these words point.

How is it then that the traditional and, until recently, most widely accepted reading of the

Tractatus is one where language mirrors the real world? One possible answer is to be found

in the description of 'the extreme compression of Wittgenstein's often oracular remarks'[7].

The *Tractatus* is variously described as being 'written in sybilline, marmoreal sentences'[8],

'dauntingly severe and compressed'[9] 'epigrammatic'[10], 'gnomic'[11], 'aphoristic'[12], 'condensed

[6] P.M.S. Hacker, 'Wittgenstein' in *The World's Great Philosophers*, edited by Robert L. Arrington, (Malden: Blackwell, 2003) P.319

[7] Max Black, *A companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964) p.1

[8] Ted Honderich, General Editor, *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy*, New Edition, 'Wittgenstein, Ludwig Josef Johann' (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) p.960

[9] Robert Audi, General Editor, *The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy*, 'Wittgenstein, Ludwig', (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) P.977

[10] Frank P. Ramsey, 'Review of 'Tractatus'' in *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, (Bristol: Thoemes Press, 1993) p.9

[11] Liam Hughes, 'If there is any value that does have value, it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case.' (*Tractatus 6.41)* in *In Search of Meaning: Ludwig Wittgenstein on Ethics, Mysticism and Religion*, edited by Ulrich Armswald, (Karlsruhe: KIT Scientific Publishing, 2009)p.41

[12] George Pitcher, *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964) p.17

and laconic'[13], 'highly compressed'[14], and 'the syncopated pipings of Herr Wittgenstein's

flute'[15]. Wittgenstein himself said that 'Broad was quite right when he said of the *Tractatus*

that it was highly syncopated. Every sentence in the *Tractatus* should be seen as the

heading of a chapter, needing further exposition'[16].

There is, as I read it, a similarity among these descriptions of the *Tractatus*: the book is

shorter than it's meaning. If I take Wittgenstein's description of the *Tractatus* as a series of

chapter headings, then it appears that the 'real' meaning of the text is somewhere outside

the text itself.

When Hacker writes that in the *Tractatus*, 'what can be described in language coincides with

what is possible in reality. In this sense, the *Tractatus* espouses a form of modal realism.

What is metaphysically possible in reality is language-independent, but is necessarily

reflected in what makes sense in language. The bounds of sense necessarily coincide with

the limits of possible worlds'[17], what I read is the claim that language points to, and is

defined by, a reality beyond itself. This, however, is already assumed in the claim that the

Tractatus is syncopated, compressed and so on. I would therefore like to suggest that, in

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[13] Kamen Dimitrov Lozev, Wittgenstein's Tractatus as a Constructivist Work, in *Notabene*, issue 38 (Blagoevgrad: Southwest University, 2017 <notabene-6g.org> accessed September 2023)
[14] Ben Ware, *Dialectic of the Ladder*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2017) p.9
[15] C.D. Broad, *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949)
[16] M. O'C Drury, 'Conversations with Wittgenstein', in *Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections*, Edited by Rush Rhees, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981) p.173
[17] G.E.M. Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus,* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996) p.12
[17] P.M.S. Hacker, 'Wittgenstein' in *The World's Great Philosophers*, edited by Robert L. Arrington, (Malden: Blackwell, 2003) P.319

assuming that the *Tractatus'* sentences point to something beyond themselves, their real

un-compressed meaning, the critics cited all appear to accept a particular transcendent view

of language before they start reading and then claim that this is what the text tells them. Or,

as Denis McManus writes 'our posing of the question and our sense of what an answer

would be like actually take for granted the "feat" we thought we were trying to explain.'[18]

There are a few other places where meaning is sought beyond the text. One is in the

philosophers who are said to have influenced Wittgenstein. Anscombe, for example, writes

that one could not really understand Wittgenstein without reading Frege because

Wittgenstein 'takes it for granted that his readers will have read Frege'.[19]

Another is in Wittgenstein as the author. In almost every scholarly text on Wittgenstein's

work there is a list of notebooks, lecture notes, lectures, letters and conversations from *The*

Blue and Brown Books, to *Zettle*. These other writing are often used to understand what

Wittgenstein was thinking when he wrote the *Tractatus.* For example, Hacker writes,

concerning the nature of objects in the *Tractatus*, that 'Wittgenstein gives little clue in the

book as to what kinds of items simple objects are – that would belong to a treatise on the

application of logic. But it is clear from his notebooks, both before and after the writing of

the book, that the kinds of things he had in mind are spatio-temporal points'[20]. I am

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[18] Denis McManus, *The Enchantment of Words*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010) p.214
[19] G.E.M. Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus,* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996) p.12 It is interesting to note that Wittgenstein 'kept his distance from classical philosophy' and was 'once told by a professor in Russia that he should read more of [Hegel]', Terrry Eagleton, Against the Grain (London: Verso, 1988) p.99
[20] P.M.S. Hacker, 'Wittgenstein' in *The World's Great Philosophers*, edited by Robert L. Arrington, (Malden: Blackwell, 2003) P.318

concerned here not with the nature of simple objects, but rather with the source of Hacker's claims. The process is to read the notebooks and then to construct Wittgenstein's mind based on that reading and then to ascribe to that mind a content: 'what he had in mind'. Wittgenstein's mind in this example seems to me to be a construction based on a reading of Wittgenstein that tells us how to read Wittgenstein. There is an element of circularity in this reasoning that might be problematized if Wittgenstein were to change his mind. Which is, I would argue, why there is a need for an early, middle and later Wittgenstein who, while they disagree with each other, can be claimed to be internally coherent.

The first aspect of my approach in the body of this thesis has been to limit my reading to the text of one translation of the *Tractatus*, the 1961 English translation by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness. The English alternative would be the 1922 Ogden and Ramsay translation and, of course, I could have chosen to read the German text. I chose this translation because it is the most recent and because it is the translation with which most of the more recent scholarship in English is concerned. While it would be a fascinating exercise to compare the German text with the two dominant English translations,[21] that is beyond the scope of this thesis.

The second aspect of my approach that differs from the other scholarship I have mentioned is that, rather than seeking to understand what Wittgenstein 'had in mind' when writing the

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[21] Professor Kevin C. Klement at the University of Massachusetts Amherst has published a very useful selection of side-by-side translations of the *Tractatus* in various formats at: https://people.umass.edu/klement/tlp/

Tractatus I have tried to draw my readings solely from the text of the *Tractatus*. Thus, in reading '[t]he world is all that is the case' I can only claim that 'the world is all that is the case' and in the following proposition that '[t]he world is the totality of facts not of things' and therefore, by a process of substitution, that 'what is the case' is 'the totality of facts, not of things'. I would contrast this reading with that of Max Black who's reading of proposition 1 is 'World: = 'universe' (a use more common in German than in English)'[22]. Thus, as I read Black, the 'world' in the *Tractatus* is not one that is contained within the text. It is a picture of reality outside of language because, as Anthony Quinton puts it, in the *Tractatus* 'language is limited to a representation of what is outside language'.[23]

The final aspect of my own reading that differs from that of other readers of the *Tractatus* is that I have not read the narration of the text as Wittgenstein. This seemed to me such an unproblematic reading that I was quite surprised when asked to explain why I have, throughout the body of this thesis, referred to 'the narration here' rather than using the more familiar formulas 'Wittgenstein writes' or 'Wittgenstein claims'. Yet when I tried to explain my decision I found myself struggling to articulate my reasoning. The practice of referring to the narration of any text as narration is, for me, founded in reading Children's literature. It is important to differentiate between the 'I' in *Black Beauty* and Anna Sewell or to distinguish among the various narrations in *Frankenstein* and between them and Mary Shelley.

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[22] Max Black, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus'*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964) p.29 Note 1
[23] Anthony Quinton interviewed by Bryan Magee in a BBC series called Men of Ideas broadcast in 1978 and available on YouTube: https://youtu.be/cI6OcAC97RI. Accessed September 2023

If one accepts that the 'I' in a text might not point to an extra-textual author or that it can refer to multiple narrations in the same text in fiction, then it is a short step to asking whether the 'I', 'me', 'we' and 'us' in the *Tractatus* can also be read, not as a reference to something 'outside language' or beyond the text but rather, as part of the text. This is my reading of what Foucault calls a 'being of reason'. For Foucault this is not a 'being' with 'realistic status' but is, rather, 'a projection, in more or less psychologizing terms, of the operations we force texts to undergo, the connections we make, the traits we establish as pertinent, the continuities we recognize, or the exclusions we practice'[24].

David Pears writes that 'Wittgenstein is concerned with *The World as I found it'* to explain that Wittgenstein is not an exponent of a 'dogmatic metaphysics'[25] but is rather concerned with the 'phenomenal world'. However, as Pears points out, *'The World as I found it'* is a quotation from the *Tractatus'* proposition 5.631*. The proposition and the one that follows are:

> There is no such thing as the subject that thinks and entertains ideas.
> If I wrote a book called *The World as I found it,* I should have to include a report on my body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will, and which were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could *not* be mentioned in that book. (5.631)

> The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world. (5.632)

[24] Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley and others, (New York: The New Press, 1998) p.213-214
[25] David Pears, *The False Prison*, Volume 1, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997) p.5

As I read it 'If I wrote a book called *The World as I found it'* is not a claim made by Ludwig Wittgenstein to have written a book about the world as he found it. It is an 'I' narration describing what would be required 'if' that book were to be written.[26]

Also in these propositions I read that 'in an important sense there is no subject' and that 'the subject does not belong to the world'. The 'I' here is the 'subject' that is 'a limit of the world'. In this reading then, the 'I' of the narration is specifically described as not belonging to the world. So, if, as the traditional reading of the *Tractatus* would assert, the text is a description of an extra-textual 'real world' and the 'I' is Wittgenstein, then Wittgenstein is not part of the world.

Having outlined the differences between my own approach and what I have read elsewhere I will continue by delineating the two main currents of Wittgenstein interpretation as I understand them. This account will be necessarily partial and I make no claim to covering the vast and growing body of work that deals with Wittgenstein's life and philosophy.[27]

The traditional reading of the *Tractatus*, also referred to as the 'standard', 'orthodox', 'ineffability' and 'metaphysical' reading, is based upon a particular understanding of 'saying'

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[26] My reading of 'If I wrote a book called *The World as I found it'* is that the 'I' has not written 'a book called *The World as I found it'*. If one accepts that the 'I' here is Wittgenstein, as Pears seems to do, then what Wittgenstein is saying is that he hasn't written a book called *The world as I found it* which contradicts Pears' reading.

[27] Anat Biletzki, *(Over)Interpreting Wittgenstein*, (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003) offers a fascinating story of Wittgenstein scholarship which contains at least eleven different interpretations, each of which can be further subdivided.

and 'showing'. Adherents of this reading assert that certain things cannot be said in language but they nevertheless have meaning and can be shown. As Anscombe writes, there are things in the *Tractatus* that 'it would be right to call them 'true' if, *per impossible,* they could be said; in fact they cannot be called true, since they cannot be said, but 'can be shewn' or 'are exhibited' in the propositions saying the various things that can be said.'[28] Of course, neither I nor anyone else, can explain what these truths, for example 'the logic of the world' or 'the truth of solipsism', are in language. They are, according to Anscombe, 'unsayables'.

These 'unsayables' are defined as such by their being excluded from what can be said. What can be said can be said because of the underlying structure of language, thought and the world. In the traditional reading what can be said is that which pictures the world in such a way that the picture can be compared to the world and seen to be either a true or false representation. It is this relationship of picturing that allows language to represent the 'real' objects in the 'real world'.

What connects the 'real' and language in this reading is 'thought'. A.C. Grayling writes that 'some philosophers have suggested that we should think of a proposition as "the *thought* conveyed by a use of a sentence"'. 'In this reading "it is raining","'il pleut", "es regnet" and "xia yu" all express the same proposition'[29].

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[28] G.E.M. Anscombe, *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus,* (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 1996) p.162
[29] A.C. Grayling, Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.20

The 'traditional' reading of the *Tractatus* has, in the past few decades, been somewhat supplanted by what is often called the 'resolute' or 'austere' reading. In outline, the resolute reading is one which takes the narration of the *Tractatus* at its word and accepts that that which the narration terms 'nonsense' is 'nonsense' rather than assuming that it has some hidden or 'unsayable' meaning. In order explore the resolute reading in more detail I will spend the bulk of the rest of this introduction in reading one of its foundational texts, Cora Diamond's 1998 work: 'Throwing away the Ladder: How to read the *Tractatus*' [30].

The title 'Throwing away the Ladder' is partly an excerpt from proposition 6.54 of the *Tractatus*. So, before I begin reading the Cora Diamond text I will examine that proposition. The narration of the proposition is a 'me' and refers to the propositions of the *Tractatus* as 'my propositions'. As 6.54 is one of 'my propositions' it follows that any description of or prescription for how to read 'my propositions' would apply to this proposition as well as those that surround it.

The 'he' who 'understands me' could be, as I read it, 'someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in [this book] – or at least similar thoughts'(TLP, p.3). I write 'could be' in the foregoing sentence not only because the 'I' of the preface is not the 'me' of proposition 6.54, but, more importantly, because the claim in the preface is that 'perhaps the book will be understood' and in proposition 6.54 I read in 'anyone who understands me' a similar uncertainty around whether anyone will 'understand me'.

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[30] Cora Diamond, *The Realistic Spirit*, (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991) pp.179-204

However, there is also a difference in that in the preface it is 'this book' that might be understood, whereas in proposition 6.54 it is 'me'.

In 'my propositions serve as elucidations' I read that 'my propositions' remain 'my propositions' but 'serve as' something else: 'elucidations'. I wonder if this might be similar to Gayatri Spivak's reading of Levi-Strauss's notion of 'bricolage'[31] in that the 'propositions' are pressed into service to do something other than their 'original' function.

The way in which the 'propositions serve as elucidations' is explained as 'anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them'. Having read 'my propositions serve as elucidations in the following way' one might expect to read an explanation of how 'my propositions serve as elucidations'. However, as I read it, what follows is more like a description of what happens at the end of the process when the propositions have been understood. One might read that 'my propositions serve as elucidations' 'when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them'. But this, to me, reads as a further deferral: 'propositions serve as elucidations' when they are 'used' as 'steps'.

Perhaps a different approach will yield a more satisfying reading. The OED defines 'elucidate' as 'to render lucid; now only *figurative* to throw light upon, clear up explain...'[32] I am particularly interested in the 'now only *figurative* to throw light upon'. In proposition

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[31] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) p.li
32 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "elucidate, v.", July 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1103906803>

6.54 it is not the propositions that are illuminated but perhaps it is 'he' who climbs beyond the propositions that is illuminated. This reading would tend to support Ben Ware who takes '*both early and late* Wittgenstein's philosophical aim [to be]… a *therapeutic* one'[33]. This reading suggests that while the 'propositions' will be 'recognized' to be 'nonsensical' they do nevertheless serve some purpose in the initial reading.

In this proposition I wonder if 'recognize' might be read as a repeated cognition in the sense that I read in the preface that 'this book will be understood only by someone who has himself had the thoughts that are expressed in it – or at least similar thoughts' (TLP, p.3). If I follow this reading then the therapeutic action of the text is somewhat complicated. Assuming that 'someone' understands the *Tractatus* this will 'perhaps' rely upon them having already had 'the thought that are expressed in it' and therefore having the thoughts will not, on its own, have a therapeutic effect. There is then something in the repetition of having those thoughts, of re-cognition that may bring this 'someone' (TLP, p.3) into the light. I wonder if it is the different use: thoughts as thoughts will not elucidate, but thoughts expressed as proposition that are used as steps in some way enable elucidation.

If the 'someone' is able to use the 'steps' and to 'climb up beyond them' (6.54) what is it they have climbed beyond? In the preface I read that it is not possible to 'draw a limit to thought'(TLP, p.3) I would think it is unlikely that the 'someone' could 'climb up beyond' 'thought'. Might it then be 'the expression of thought' that the 'someone' 'climb[s] up beyond? If that is the case then what he climbs into would be 'simply nonsense' being, as it

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[33] Ben Ware, *Dialectic of the Ladder*, (London: Bloomsbury, 2017) p.32

is, 'what lies on the other side of the limit' (TLP, p.3) between language that expresses a thought and nonsense. As I read it, this would place our 'someone' in 'nonsense' but outside language and, from this perspective 'he will see the world aright' (6.54).

This brings me to the parentheses which contain the phrase used in the title of the Cora Diamond chapter: '(He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed it.)'(6.54). This statement is, as I read it, elaborated upon in the next sentence: 'He must transcend these propositions, and he will see the world aright.' So, 'to throw away the ladder after he has climbed it' is to 'transcend these propositions'. Yet the narration does not say 'he must throw away the ladder' but 'he must, so to speak, throw away the ladder'. I read in 'so to speak' that to 'throw away the ladder' is a metaphorical way of expressing something other than what is written. If, for a moment, I accept the traditional reading of the *Tractatus* where from the perspective of that reading language and reality are isomorphic and that only the 'propositions of natural science' 'can be said' then in order to make 'sense' of 'throw away the ladder' I would have to assume that the narration here is saying that 'he' must throw away a real ladder. Given that neither I nor anyone I've read thinks that this is the case, I would argue that to 'throw away the ladder after he has climbed it' is itself nonsensical from the perspective of this narration.

Having briefly set out what I read to be at stake in throwing away the ladder I will now move on to read Cora Diamond's chapter. The second half of the title of the chapter is 'How to read the *Tractatus*' which suggests to me that from the perspective of this title there is a correct way to read the *Tractatus*.

The opening sentence of the chapter is:

> Whether one is reading Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* or his later writing, one must be struck by his insistence that he is not putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses; or by his suggestion that it is only through some confusion one is in about what one is doing that one could take oneself to be putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses at all.[34]

What I am initially struck by is that 'one' is repeated five times in this sentence. As I read it 'one' is both the narration and, also, anyone else who 'is reading Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* or his later writing'. The OED, among a great many definitions of 'one', offers 'any person of undefined identity'[35]. Thus 'one' here may be a multitude!

I also read that 'one' here is not indivisible since 'one can take oneself to be putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses' when 'one' is not. Here then, 'oneself' is not only not 'one' but appears to be doing something that is, according to this reading of Wittgenstein, impossible.

Whoever 'one' is, 'one must be struck' when 'reading Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* or his later writings' by something that he insists upon. So, a 'one' here is both more than one in that it applies, as I read it, to any reader of Wittgenstein's work and also simultaneously not entirely one because 'one' and 'oneself' are separate. In my reading I cannot pin down

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[34] Cora Diamond, 'Throwing Away the Ladder: How to Read the *Tractatus*' in The Realistic Spirit, (Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1991) pp. 179-204, p.179. Further references to this text will be given in parentheses in the text.
[35] Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. "one, pron., sense VI.17.a", July 2023. <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/5272948046>

whether 'oneself' is a part of 'one' or a supplement to 'one' that is not entirely in one's control.

Interestingly, while 'one could take oneself' to be doing something one is not doing, the impact upon 'one' of 'reading the *Tractatus* or his later works' is inescapable: 'one must be struck by his insistence that he is not putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses; or by his suggestion that it cannot be done'. Thus being 'struck' is, in this narration, unavoidable, but one is 'struck' either 'by his insistence' 'or' 'by his suggestion' and 'one' is not, as I read it, 'oneself' so whether both 'one' and 'oneself' are struck is not clear to me.

> It is only through some confusion one is in about what one is doing that one could take oneself to be putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses at all. (Diamond, p.189)

Here 'one' is 'in' 'some confusion', the confusion is 'about what one is doing' and it is 'only through' that 'confusion' that 'one could take oneself to be be putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses at all'. 'one[s]' perspective here is, as I read it, 'in a confusion' that distorts one's vision of what 'oneself' is 'putting forward' to the extent that one believes 'oneself' to be 'putting forward' that which cannot, according to this reading of Wittgenstein, be put forward. The narration of this passage is able to 'see' this confusion yet is also, as I read, part of the 'one'.

> I think that there is almost nothing in Wittgenstein which is of value and which can be grasped if it is pulled away from that view of philosophy. (Diamond, p.179)

The narration here is an 'I' rather than the 'one' which I read earlier as all readers of 'Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* or his later writings'. This is no longer a perspective on a group of readers but is now a perspective on the 'I' that 'think[s] there is almost nothing in Wittgenstein which is of value…'. That there is 'almost nothing' is, as I read it, also a claim that there is something 'in Wittgenstein' even when 'it is pulled away from that view of philosophy', which suggests a question about what that something might be. What the 'I' thinks here is not concerning 'Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* or his later writings' but 'Wittgenstein'. So, is this the Wittgenstein to whom the 'writings' are attributed or is 'Wittgenstein' here an amalgamation of those 'writings'? Here I am reminded of Foucault's description of the 'author function' which both serves to define and is 'defined as a field of conceptual or theoretical coherence'[36]

What 'I think' here is that there is 'almost nothing in Wittgenstein which is of value and which can be grasped if it is pulled away from that view of philosophy'. Thus there might be more than 'almost nothing in Wittgenstein which is of value' 'if it is pulled away from that view of philosophy' or more than 'almost nothing in Wittgenstein…which can be grasped' 'if it is pulled away from that view of philosophy'. It is the combination of that which has 'value' and 'can be grasped' that is 'almost nothing' when 'it is pulled away from that view of philosophy'. What the 'it' is here is difficult to ascertain, 'it' is, as I read it, constituted by being 'almost nothing' 'if it is pulled away from that view of philosophy'. But, what 'it' is

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[36] Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley and others, (New York: The New Press, 1998) p.214

when 'it' is not 'pulled away' is only defined here by not being 'almost nothing'. It could then be 'something' or nothing, all I can read here is that it will not be 'almost nothing'.

> But that view of philosophy is itself something that has to be seen first in the *Tractatus* if it is to be understood in its later forms, and in the *Tractatus* it is inseparable from what is central there, the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown. (Diamond, p.179)

'[That] view of philosophy' is the view in which 'putting forward philosophical doctrines and theses' is what 'one' mistakenly believes 'oneself' to be doing because 'one' is confused and Wittgenstein insists he is putting forward neither. 'One' is unavoidably 'struck' by 'his insistence' on 'that view of philosophy' in the '*Tractatus* or his later works'. However, to be 'struck' is neither to have 'seen' or 'understood' 'that view of philosophy'. If we imagine someone who reads *The Philosophical Investigations* that reader would, according to this narration, be 'struck' by 'that view' but because they have not read the *Tractatus* they would neither see nor 'understand' that by which they were 'struck'.

To see 'that view' in its 'later forms' one must first have 'seen' it in the *Tractatus*. That 'view' that 'has to be seen first in the *Tractatus'* is also available to be 'understood' in Wittgenstein's later works where it is in different 'later forms' but is still, from the perspective of this narration, the same 'view'. The narration here is then a perspective on a thinking about a view on a confusion!

The 'it' that 'in the *Tractatus*' 'is inseparable from what is central there' is, as I read it, 'that view of philosophy'. What it is 'inseparable from' is 'the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown.' The claim that the 'distinction' and 'that view' are

'inseparable' in the *Tractatus* is one that seems to me tautological. If they are both part of the text of the *Tractatus* then removing either would make a new smaller text that would not be the *Tractatus.* If we separate *Hamlet* into two different Hamlet and Ophelia texts what we have left is two texts neither of which are *Hamlet.*

Perhaps it is these two 'inseparable' elements, 'that view' and 'the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown', that make the *Tractatus* the only place where one can 'see' 'that view of philosophy'. This reading suggests that in some sense 'the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown' and 'that view of philosophy' are mutually constitutive. Perhaps they can only be 'seen' together.

There are a great many different aspects of communication in this first paragraph: 'one' might be 'struck', something can be 'grasped', a 'view' can be 'seen' in one text but not in others where it is present in a different 'form', the same view can be 'understood' in some texts but only if it has been first 'seen' elsewhere, what can be 'said' is distinct from what can be 'shown', and one can 'take oneself to be putting forward' something that one is, in fact, not 'putting forward' 'at all'.

The second paragraph of 'Throwing Away the Ladder' begins with the question: 'Now what about that distinction?' To answer that question the narration introduces Peter Geach, or more accurately, the narration introduces a reading of what Peter Geach has written. According to this narration Peter Geach has written that [this distinction] has its source in 'the great works of Frege'. The 'it' here is, as I read it, 'the distinction between what can be said and what can only be shown' and, according to this narration's reading of Geach 'the

distinction' has its source elsewhere, in 'the great works of Frege', in Frege's discussion of contrasts 'like that between function and object'. Whether the claim that what is central in the *Tractatus* has its source in Frege is a claim attributed to Peter Geach or the narration is making this claim following on from the quotation from Geach is unclear. In Frege's *Collected Papers: On Mathematics, Logic, and Philosophy* there are papers entitled 'Function and Concept' and 'On Concept and Object' which are perhaps 'discussions of contrasts <u>like</u> that between function and object'[my underlining] without actually being discussions of the contrasts between function and object.

> The difference between function and object comes out in language, but Frege, as is well known, held that there are insuperable problems in any attempt to put that difference properly into words. (Diamond, p.179)

That 'function' and 'object' are different does, as I read it, come out in language, in the simple sense that 'function' and 'object' are different words. However, what I read this sentence to be concerned with is not that 'function' and 'object' are different, but rather the 'difference' that exists 'between' them. To use a mathematical example: the difference between 2 and 7 is not that they are not the same, it is 5. For this narration then, this 'difference' 'comes out in language'. I wonder if 'the difference between function and object comes out in language' in the same way that the difference between 2 and 7 is 5 'comes out' in arithmetic. If so, is the difference in each case dependent upon what it 'comes out in'? In topology, for instance, would there be no difference between 2, 7 and 5 in that they can all be deformed into each other without breaking?

In this reading of Frege 'there are insuperable problems in any attempt to put that difference properly into words'. Thus, 'that difference' 'comes out of language' but cannot be 'put properly into words'. Perhaps this illustrates the distinction between showing and saying, with showing occurring when the distinction 'comes out of language' and saying would be to 'put [the distinction] properly into words'.

This next sentence begins 'we cannot properly say what the difference is, but it is reflected in the features of language'. Here I read that to 'properly say' is also to 'properly put into words'. The 'difference between function and object' that 'comes out in language' is 'reflected in the features of language'. The 'difference' here is outside the 'features of language' but is 'reflected' in them. Is to 'come out in' to be 'reflected in'? What are the 'features of language' in which this reflection takes place?

This sentence continues, 'and what holds of the difference between function and object holds too of other distinctions of logical category'. As I read it, the claim here is that while 'distinctions of logical category' are the same as 'the difference between function and object'. The distinctions and difference cannot be 'properly put into words' but do 'come out in language' and are 'reflected in the features of language'.

> Geach is right that we can best understand what the *Tractatus* holds about saying and showing if we go back to Frege and think about what the saying/showing distinction in its origin looks like there. (Diamond, p.179)

Earlier in this text I read that 'that view of philosophy' is 'inseparable from what is central' in the *Tractatus*, which is 'the distinction between what can be said and what can only be

shown'. I also read that 'that view of philosophy' 'is something that has to be seen first in the *Tractatus* if it is to be understood in its later form'. Here I read that 'we can best understand' what is central to the *Tractatus* if we 'go back to Frege'. This is a further deferral in that to understand the 'later works' one must have first seen in the *Tractatus* what can be best understood if we 'go back to Frege'.

'If we go back to Frege and think about what the saying/showing distinction in its origin looks like there' then, as I read it, the 'we' of this narration will have ended this line of deferrals and reached the 'origin' of this 'distinction'. What is it to 'go back to Frege'? Is it to be read as a return to Frege in that the 'we', having begun with Frege, now return to Frege? This seems to me a valid reading of the text. However, I would argue that this is not a 'going back' of the 'we' to an earlier reading of Frege. I read it as a going back to the 'origin' of the 'saying/showing distinction'. This is important because it places the 'saying/showing distinction[s]' in Wittgenstein's 'later works' in a line of signification where the 'distinction' in the 'later works' refers back to the 'distinction' in the *Tractatus*, which, in turn, refers back to the 'saying/showing distinction in its origin'. If the language of the *Tractatus* is taken to refer to things beyond that text in this case, then it is reasonable to assume, based on that reading that, in this perspective, 'The world' of the first proposition of the *Tractatus* is not in the *Tractatus* but is in an extra-textual 'back' towards its 'origin' to which the text points.

The 'saying/showing distinction' is not, in this narration, its own origin. The 'we' are not, 'if we go back to Frege', going back to think about the original saying/showing distinction. Rather, the 'we' 'go back' to 'think about what the saying/showing distinction looks like

there'. As I read earlier, the 'distinction' can be 'seen' in the *Tractatus* and 'understood' in the 'later works'. So, as I read it, the 'distinction' is present in these texts in different forms. '[I]n its origin' 'we' will be able to 'think about what it…looks like there'. Thus, what the 'saying/showing distinction' 'looks like' is dependent upon where 'we' look at it.[37]

Furthermore, when 'we' 'go back' to Frege 'we' will not be looking at the distinction alone. 'We' will be looking to see 'what it looks like there'. Does this mean that 'we' will be seeking to find similarities between something elsewhere and the 'saying/showing distinction in its origin'? An example of this might be to compare the 'distinction' in the *Tractatus* with the 'distinction in its origin'. Or perhaps 'we' are looking for things 'in its origin' that are similar to the 'saying/showing distinction' as 'we' see it there. In this case 'we' would be seeking things in the Fregean origin that 'look like' the 'saying/showing distinction' in 'the great works of Frege'.

> Geach actually makes a stronger claim: he says that "a great deal of the *Tractatus* is best understood as a refashioning of Frege's function-and-argument analysis in order to remove [from it the] mistaken treatment of sentences as complex names." (Diamond, p.179)

The 'stronger claim' made by Geach is that 'a great deal of the *Tractatus* is best understood as a refashioning of Frege's…' If I take 'refashioning' to be the change of form that I read earlier in the narration then, as I understand it, this could be likened to an amount of unfired clay that has been fashioned into a bowl. This clay can then be 'refashioned' into a

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[37] This is a description of the perspective of the narration in the texts from the perspective of this narration. For Diamond's narration here, Wittgenstein and Frege give different views of the same extra-textual 'distinction'.

mug with a different form, but the same clay. As I read it here, 'a great deal of the *Tractatus*'

has the same content as 'Frege's function-and-argument analysis' with a different form.

Wittgenstein's work in writing 'a great deal of the *Tractatus*' was the 'refashioning of

Frege's function-and-argument analysis'. However, this 'refashioning' also took place 'in

order to remove [from it the] mistaken treatment of sentences as complex names'. I read

the 'it', which I read to be an insertion in to Geach's text by Diamond, here to be 'Frege's

function-and-argument analysis'. This 'analysis' undergoes 'refashioning' in order to remove

a part of it and, therefore, my reading of what 'refashioning' must undergo an alteration.

This is not just a change of form that leave the content unaltered, it is a change of content.

The 'mistaken treatment of sentences as complex names' is removed, because, I assume, it

is 'mistaken' from the perspective of the narration of the *Tractatus* as read by Geach.[38]

> The last point of Geach's, about how to understand the *Tractatus*, splits into two points if you think about it. Wittgenstein is trying to hold on to Frege's insight that there are distinctions of logical category, like that between functions and objects, or between first and second level functions, which cannot be put into words but which are reflected in the distinctions between the signs for what is in one category and the signs for what is in the other. (Diamond, pp.189-190)

Geach's 'last point' 'splits into two if you think about it'. Thus the 'last point of Geach' can

be altered, become two points, if a 'you' which is part of the narration of the Diamond text,

'think[s] about it'. Rather than the meaning of this text being found by going back to an

origin, here it is the action of the 'you' 'if you think about it'. The first of these 'points' is that

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[38] The 'treatment of sentences as complex names' is 'mistaken' here, but it is difficult to pin down exactly from which perspective it is 'mistaken'. Cleary it is not 'mistaken' in Frege's narration, so is it 'mistaken' from the perspective of Wittgenstein, Geach, Diamond or some combination of the three? Also, in order to know that it is 'mistaken' some perspective here must have the 'correct' 'treatment of the sentences' with which to compare the 'mistaken'.

'Wittgenstein is trying to hold on to Frege's insight that there are distinctions of logical category like that between functions and objects'. Here the narration is making a claim about what Wittgenstein is 'trying to' do and later in this passage what he 'wants to hold on to'. In this narration then what Wittgenstein 'wants' and is 'trying' can be read out from the text of the *Tractatus*.

'Frege's insight' is 'that there are distinctions of logical category, like that between functions and objects, or between first and second level functions'. As I read it here then, these 'distinctions of logical category' are 'like' the one 'between functions and objects' 'or' 'like' the distinction 'between first and second level functions'.

What 'Wittgenstein' is 'trying to hold on to' is a 'distinction of logical category' which is 'like' that 'between functions and objects' but is not the 'distinction between functions and objects'. Frege's insight here then is of a similarity between 'distinctions of logical category' and distinctions 'between functions and objects'. '[O]r', alternatively, a similarity between 'distinctions of logical category' and distinctions 'between first and second order functions'.

As I read it, there are, according to 'Frege's insight' as read in this narration, two different 'distinctions': one that is similar to distinctions 'between functions and objects' and another that is similar to the distinction 'between first and second level functions'. Hence the distinctions between 'functions and objects' and between 'first and second level functions' are different distinctions.

The 'distinction of logical category' differs from the other two distinctions cited in that it is a 'distinction of' rather than a distinction 'between'. I wonder if this is the difference that makes the distinctions 'similar' but different and distinguishable from one another.

A further similarity among these 'distinction[s]' is that they 'cannot be put into words', but they are 'reflected in distinctions between the signs for what is in one category and the signs for what is in the other'. These distinctions 'cannot be put into words' so, as I read it, they exist outside 'what we can talk about' (TLP, p.3) in what Wittgenstein's Preface to the *Tractatus* describes as 'nonsense' (TLP, p.3). Alternatively, I can read that these 'distinctions' 'cannot be put into words' for other reasons, perhaps they are already in words, or perhaps because 'distinctions of' or 'between' functions or 'functions and objects' are about identifying the gap, or the difference, between what is in, or can be 'put into', 'words'.

These unsayable 'distinctions' are, however, 'reflected in the distinctions between the signs for what is in one category and signs for what is in the other'. In order to be 'reflected in' these 'distinctions between signs' I read that the 'distinctions between functions and objects' must exist outside of the 'distinctions between signs', as must the perspective that can 'see' this reflection. If, for the moment, I assume that 'pen' is the sign for an 'object' and 'to write' is the sign for a 'function' then there must be, in this narration, an object to which the sign 'pen' points and a function to which the sign 'to write' points. Thus there is an assumption in this example and, as I read it, in the Cora Diamond narration, that the 'sign' must point to something beyond itself. The narration is of a 'sign' that refers to, or is 'for' a 'what' that is 'in one category' or 'in the other'.

Thus, to read something as a 'sign' is to call into being a 'what' to which that sign refers. The sign requires a signified.

If the meaning of the sign is given to it by that which is signified, in a similar fashion to the way that 'Frege's great works' contain the 'origin' of the 'saying/showing distinction' in the *Tractatus*, then there is a reversal here. The 'distinctions between signs for what is in one category and the signs for what is in the other' are distinctions between 'signs' for different 'what[s]' that reveal which 'what' belongs to which 'category'. In my pen/to write example one might read that in 'to write' it is the word 'to' that marks 'to write' as a function, and so 'pencil', lacking a 'to' must belong to the other category and be an object. If the act of writing in an extra-textual realm was the source of the meaning of 'to write' then the distinction between 'pencil' and 'to write' would have been put into words, in this case the word 'to'. However, in the Cora Diamond narration distinctions 'cannot be put into words'. Therefore, as I read it, it must be the 'sign' that defines which category the signified belongs to.

> He wants to hold on to that, and at the same time to get rid of the assimilation of sentences to proper names. (Diamond, p.180)

'He' here is, as I read it, 'Wittgenstein' and 'He' is read to 'want to hold on to' the foregoing. Simultaneously, 'He' 'wants to' 'get rid of the assimilation of sentences to proper names'. I read 'assimilation' here as a making similar. Frege has made 'sentences' similar to 'proper names'. In the quotation from Geach I read earlier, this 'getting rid' is the removal of the 'mistaken treatment of sentences as complex names'. So, 'assimilation' here is to treat

'sentences' as 'names' ('complex' or 'proper'). Thus, the similarity comes from Frege's 'treatment' of 'sentences' and 'names'.

> So for Wittgenstein a sentence will count as a wholly different sort of linguistic item from a proper name or any other kind of name (Diamond, p.180)

This sentence supports my reading that whether a 'sentence' is similar to or 'a wholly different sort of linguistic item from a proper name' depends upon the perspective of the narration. In Frege's perspective they are similar, whereas, in Wittgenstein's perspective they are 'wholly different'.

> But if you are holding on to Frege's insight that fundamental differences in kinds of linguistic expression are the way fundamental differences in reality show themselves, differences in reality that cannot be put into words – and if you are also saying, against Frege, that sentences are a wholly different linguistic category from any kind of name, that will make sense if you are also saying that there are features of reality that can come out only in sentences, in their being the particular kind of signs they are, in contrast with names. (Diamond, p.180)

There is a 'But' at the beginning of this sentence which, as I read it, marks, from the perspective of the narration here, a necessary outcome. If 'you are holding on to Frege's insight' and 'saying that sentences are a wholly different linguistic category from any kind of name' then 'that will make sense' only if you are also 'saying' that there 'are some features of reality that can come out only in sentences'. Here, rather than being 'reflected', 'features of reality' 'come out'. The 'you' in this narration is 'Wittgenstein' and, therefore, 'Wittgenstein' is 'holding onto Frege's insight'. That 'differences in linguistic expression are the way fundamental differences in reality show themselves' and that there are

'differences' in reality that cannot be put into 'words' supports my reading of this account of 'Wittgenstein' and 'Frege'.

Here, differences in 'reality' are mediated through language, but not 'in words' since these 'differences' 'cannot be put into words'. What 'Wittgenstein's' refashioning of 'Frege's' work does here then is to assert that 'there are features of reality that can only come out in sentences'. This is, as I read it, because of the 'particular kind of signs' that sentences are. There is something in the 'features' of 'sentences' that is in some way isomorphic[39] with the 'reality' that these 'sentences' are 'signs for'. As I read it then, 'reality' is accessible only via 'kinds of linguistic expression' that are the 'way fundamental differences in reality show themselves'. The 'refashioning' of 'Frege' by 'Wittgenstein' makes this 'way' through language the 'sentence' rather than the 'proper' or 'complex' 'name'. Thus there is 'reality' which 'shows' itself or 'come[s] out' through being 'reflected in the features of language'. This, as I read it, raises a question about how 'reality' can be compared with what 'come[s] out' or is 'reflected' in 'names' or 'sentences' to ascertain which 'kinds of signs' are most 'accurately reflective'.

From the 'Fregean' perspective 'sentences' are 'treated as complex names' and, therefore, 'complex names' are where 'reality' is best reflected. For 'Wittgenstein', 'sentences' are 'a wholly different sort of linguistic item'. Thus, in this narration of 'Frege' and 'Wittgenstein' the disagreement between the two is whether the features of one 'linguistic item' reflect

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[39] Denis McManus discusses this in detail in *The Enchantment of Words*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010)

more accurately than another a 'reality' to which neither has access. I am reminded of a

scene from Blackadder:

> Percy: You know, they do say that the Infanta's eyes are more beautiful than the famous Stone of Galveston.
> Edmund: Mm! ... What?
> Percy: The famous Stone of Galveston, My Lord.
> Edmund: And what's that, exactly?
> Percy: Well, it's a famous blue stone, and it comes ... from *Galveston*.
> Edmund: I see. And what about it?
> Percy: Well, My Lord, the Infanta's eyes are bluer than it, for a start.
> Edmund: I see. And have you ever seen this stone?
> Percy: (nods) No, not as such, My Lord, but I know a couple of people who have, and they say it's very very blue indeed.
> Edmund: And have these people seen the Infanta's eyes?
> Percy: No, I shouldn't think so, My Lord.
> Edmund: And neither have you, presumably.
> Percy: No, My Lord.
> Edmund: So, what you're telling me, Percy, is that something you have never seen is slightly less blue than something else you have never seen.
> Percy: (finally begins to grasp) Yes, My Lord.[40]

Like Percy, neither 'Wittgenstein' nor 'Frege' can have seen 'reality' directly and thus the

comparison between it and 'features of language' is somewhat lacking.

The Cora Diamond text continues:

> Here is how Geach's point splits into two:

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[40] Rowan Atkinson and Richard Curtis, 'The Queen of Spain's Beard', in *Blackadder*, series 1, Episode 4. Accessed on 23rd September 2023 at
<https://www.patrickmin.com/british_comedy/blackadder/quotes.php?ep=spain >

(1) In the *Tractatus* treatment of Frege's insight, sentences are no longer assimilated to complex names.

(2) Making that break, separating sentences off that way from names, is linked with the possibility of treating the distinctive features of reality, features that can only be reflected in sentences and that cannot themselves be *said* to be features of reality. Such a treatment of sentences would then be radically different from Frege's but could nevertheless be said to be deeply Fregean in spirit and inspired by Frege. (Diamond, p.180)

Beginning with point two of Geach's split point I will first consider the 'features of reality, features that can only be reflected in sentences and that cannot themselves be *said* to be features of reality'. The first question I have is: what is it to be *'said'*? As I read it, to be 'put into words' is, in this narration, to be '*said*' and, therefore, the claim here can be read as: 'features of reality' that can 'only be reflected in sentences' cannot be '*said'* because they cannot be 'put into words'. However, these features can be 'reflected' in 'sentences' or, alternatively, they are in sentences because the features of sentences are always already reflective of the features of reality.

If sentences are isomorphic with reality then, in this reading, there would appear to be a pre-existing isomorphism which 'Wittgenstein' has discovered. Yet, the problem remains that in order to be able to make this discovery Wittgenstein would need unmediated access to 'reality' in order to make the comparison between the 'features of reality' and the 'features…reflected in a sentence'.

The 'break' that 'Wittgenstein' makes with 'Frege' here is the first of Geach's points. It is to treat sentences in such a way that they are 'no longer assimilated to complex names'. 'Such a treatment of sentences would then be radically different from Frege's, but could

nevertheless be said to be deeply Fregean in spirit and inspired by Frege.' In this narration of Geach's claims 'radically different' does not, as I read it, mean that 'Wittgenstein's' treatment of sentences is different at its root from 'Frege's'. Indeed, if it were it would seem to contradict the description of the *Tractatus* as a 'refashioning' of 'Frege'.

> Geach himself gives some detail of what is included in Wittgenstein's getting rid of the assimilation of sentences to names; but he has rather less on what I am talking about: the applying of Frege's insight to sentences by taking their distinctive and essential characteristics to be the reflection of something in the nature of things that cannot be put into words. (Diamond, p.180)

Setting aside what the narration has to say about what 'Geach gives' I will examine what the 'I' of the narration is 'talking about'. As I read it, what 'Wittgenstein' is credited with here is the 'application of Frege's insight', which I will paraphrase here as: names have features that reflect the features of reality, and applying that 'insight' to 'sentences'. These 'sentences' have 'distinctive' and 'essential' 'characteristics' which are taken to be the 'reflections of something in the nature of things'.

Wittgenstein's refashioning of Frege then is to say that 'names' and 'sentences' are not to be assimilated and that only 'sentences' truly 'reflect' 'reality'. This, for me, raises the question of what this 'something in the nature of things' that 'cannot be put into words' might be. This 'something' is not, as I read it, a 'thing' like the other 'things' but is 'in the nature' of those 'things'. This is a further deferral, what is reflected in sentences is not things but something in their nature.

But now to get back to where I was at the beginning: if we want to know why Wittgenstein thinks that there cannot (in some sense) be philosophical doctrines, we need to see the apparent doctrines of the *Tractatus* as they will look if we go further down the road that Geach points out as a road. (Diamond, p.180)

The 'beginning' to which the 'I' is returning is the claim that 'all must be struck by [Wittgenstein's] insistence that he is not putting forward philosophical doctrines' and that anyone who thinks that they are doing so is labouring under 'some confusion' about what they are doing. In 'If we want to know why Wittgenstein thinks…we need to see the apparent doctrines of the *Tractatus*' the narration has altered from an 'I' to a 'we'. The explanation of how this 'we' can 'know why Wittgenstein thinks' what this narration claims he thinks is that 'we need to see' 'apparent doctrines' from a different perspective to the one 'we' currently occupy. In the beginning of this text 'this view of philosophy', one that denies the possibility of putting forward philosophical doctrines, was something that 'has to be seen first in the *Tractatus*'.

Indeed, according to this narration, 'one must be struck' when reading the *Tractatus* or Wittgenstein's later writings 'by his insistence that he is not putting forward philosophical doctrines or theses'. So, having been 'struck by' this 'view of philosophy' 'we' must 'see the apparent doctrines' of the *Tractatus* in a new way, from 'the road that Geach points out as a road' in order to know why Wittgenstein 'thinks' that this view is correct. How is it that 'doctrines', which as I read it in this narration are not 'doctrines' at all, and which, according to this narration are not intended by Wittgenstein to be 'doctrines' can be 'apparent doctrines'? To whom are they apparently doctrines? As I read it here, neither 'I', 'we', 'one', 'Wittgenstein', nor 'Geach' would 'see' doctrines or theses in the *Tractatus.*

However, here the narration says that in order to 'know why Wittgenstein thinks that there cannot (in some sense) be philosophical doctrines' 'we need to see the apparent doctrines of the *Tractatus* as they will look if we go further down the road that Geach points out as a road'. Here the narration suggests a new perspective that is in the future, this is not how the 'apparent doctrines' look now, but 'how they will look' from an as yet 'down the road' position. The 'road' here is not apparent to the narration until 'Geach' 'points [it] out as a road'. Thus the 'we' will be looking at 'apparent' but non-existent 'doctrines' from a 'road' that 'we' could not recognise as such until it was pointed out by Geach.

> That is, we need to see what kind of sign Wittgenstein took a sentence to be and how, by being that kind of sign, it can show things that cannot be said. But there is something that has to be done first. And one convenient way of doing it is to go back to Geach. (Diamond, p.180)

What 'we need to see' is not how a sentence can show what cannot be said, but rather 'what kind of sign Wittgenstein took a sentence to be'. As I read it, this might be re-phrased as: we need to see sentences from Wittgenstein's perspective. However, in this narration 'we' must first 'go back to Geach' for something else.

> I have so far followed Geach in his way of putting the Fregean insight. As he puts it, various *features of reality*[41] come out in language but it cannot be said in language that reality has those features. (Diamond, p.180-181)

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[41] There is a difference between 'features of reality' and '*features of reality*'.

Here then is another 'way' to add to the 'way fundamental differences in reality show themselves' and the 'road' that Geach points out. I am struck that much of this narration is concerned with routes through which reality shows itself. Also, in this passage[42], I read that 'it cannot be said in language that reality has those features' is tautological in that 'reality has those features', in this text, is a saying in language of what 'cannot be said in language'.

> Geach is here following both Frege and Wittgenstein in an important respect. Wittgenstein, throughout the *Tractatus*, when he speaks about what shows itself but cannot be said, speaks of these things as features of reality. *There is*, he says, what cannot be put into words. Even the linguistic form *"what* cannot be put into words," the words *"das unsagbare," "das undenkbare"* – such ways of talking refer, or must seem to, to features of reality that cannot be put into words or captured in thought. (Diamond, p.181)

If Geach here is 'following both Frege and Wittgenstein' then the 'road that Geach points out as a road' could be read as a 'road' already pointed out by 'Frege and Wittgenstein'. If this is the case then the narration, as I read it, would need to 'see' where 'Geach is…following both Frege and Wittgenstein'. So, whilst the 'road' is one that this narration can see that 'Wittgenstein and Frege' are on, and can recognise that 'Geach' is following them, the narration cannot 'see' that this is a 'road' until Geach points it out as a 'road'.

'[W]hat cannot be put into words' are 'features of reality' in this reading of Wittgenstein. The narration says that '*what* cannot be put into words' is a 'linguistic form', whereas '*das*

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[42] Interestingly 'passage' might also be read as a route. Perhaps the structure that this perspective on language and reality, with roads and ways and features, sets up makes certain assumptions more likely.

unsagbare' and *'das undenkbare'* are words. I here translate *'das unsagbare'* as 'the unsayable', or perhaps 'the unspeakable', and 'das undenkbare' as 'the unthinkable'.

In this narration these 'ways of talking refer, or must seem to, to features of reality that cannot be put into words or captured in thought'. There is a lot to think about in this short passage. I will begin with *'das undenkbare'*, the unthinkable, 'features of reality that cannot be…captured in thought'.

In the preface to the *Tractatus* the problem that I read in *'das undenkbare'* is made explicit: 'in order to be able to draw a limit to thought we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought' (TLP, p.3). If something cannot be 'captured in thought' is read to mean that it cannot be thought then from any perspective that is derived from thought it cannot be. In the *Tractatus* 'language' is 'the expression of thoughts' and, therefore, what cannot be thought cannot be said. If I accept, for the moment, the narration's claims to be able to 'know why Wittgenstein thinks' certain things and that 'features of reality' can be unthinkable then, as I read it, 'Wittgenstein' cannot have thought about the unthinkable 'features of reality'. From 'Wittgenstein's' perspective these 'features of reality' cannot exist to be narrated.

The perspective that I read in this text is that 'Wittgenstein' is a man external to the text. However, this is not a perspective I share. As I read it any 'Wittgenstein' that is constructed from a reading of the *Tractatus* or any other text or group of texts is an artefact of those readings. The issue with relying upon a 'Wittgenstein' to inform one's readings is that any

reading will be influenced by one's idea of what 'Wittgenstein thinks'[43]. Throughout this thesis I have been careful to try to read the narration as a narration in that place rather than to defer to an imagined 'Wittgenstein' behind the text.

To return to the text with that in mind, even without a 'Wittgenstein' to think I can read that, for the narration of the preface of the *Tractatus*, language is the expression of thought. Therefore, *'das undenkbare'* cannot be said, or written (Saying and writing are, as I read it, synonymous in Cora Diamond's text and in the preface to the *Tractatus*.) and would also not be 'nonsense' which is thought that cannot be expressed in language. So, what is the unthinkable? As I understand it, the unthinkable must be beyond any perspective and yet it is discussed in this text.

'[D]as undenkbare' is, according to the Cora Diamond narration, one of the 'ways of talking' that 'refer' to 'or must seem to, to features of reality…' However, *'das undenkbare'* is a way of talking that cannot refer to a thought and therefore, according to my reading of the preface to the *Tractatus*, it is 'nonsense'.

Perhaps this is why the narration here contains the phrase 'or must seem to'. In this phrase I read that the narration holds two, or three perspective simultaneously: the first is the perspective from which 'such ways of talking refer…to features of reality', from this perspective this is simply the case; from the second perspective 'such ways of talking' do

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[43] Geoffrey Bennington discusses the problems of 'reading for' in his article 'Inter' in McQuillan, Purves and Macdonald, *Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999)

not 'refer…to features of reality'; and finally, from the third perspective it can be seen that the second perspective is correct and that the first is mistaken. In this way the narration can 'see' what these 'ways of talking' 'must seem to' do from a perspective that is not its own highest level perspective.[44]

If 'das undenkbare' is beyond 'nonsense' then it would follow that 'das unsagbare' is 'simply…nonsense'. The unsayable is, as I read it here, that which can be thought but not said. Given that it is not 'in language' and that it is 'only in language that the limit can be drawn' it is, 'nonsense' as defined in the preface to the *Tractatus.*

> Propositions and reality have something in common that cannot be put into words. (Diamond, p.181)

This 'common' 'something' shared by 'reality' and '[p]ropositions' is, as I read it, either reality or textuality. The assumption that I read to underlie the difficulty in finding what the 'something in common' among '[p]ropositions and reality' is that propositions are not 'real' in themselves but 'stand for' a 'reality' that is elsewhere. If it is assumed that propositions are representations of 'reality' then the question of how that representation happens arises. However, if, for example, 'The world' in proposition 1 of the *Tractatus* is taken to be 'The world' in proposition 1 of the *Tractatus* and not to refer to something other than itself then the question does not arise.[45]

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[44] I have written 'highest level' here to describe the final perspective from which the narration 'views' the other perspectives it describes.

[45] I am reminded here of the forgetting and explanation described in the conclusion to McManus' *Enchantment of Words.*

> Frege in speaking of the distinction between first and second level functions describes it as founded deep in the nature of things, and it is evident that he would say exactly the same about the distinction between function and object. (Diamond, p.181)

Here I would only say that to say that an explanation is 'deep in the nature of things' is not really an explanation at all. It is a series of deferrals. The explanation of the 'distinction' is not in 'first and second level functions', nor is it in 'things', nor upon the surface of the 'nature of things'. So, while the narrations claim that 'Frege…would say exactly the same about the distinction between function and object' might be a valid reading of Frege, what 'Frege…would say' amounts to very little by way of an explanation.

> There is a question how to take this sort of talk: the use of words like 'reality,' 'the nature of things,' 'what there is,' and so on in specifying what cannot be put into words. (Diamond, p.181)

I would agree and add that there are multiple questions about '"reality," "the nature of things," "what there is," and so on'. However, my questions are about 'reality', 'the nature of things', 'what there is' 'and so on' and not about 'words like' these or this 'sort of talk'.

> The problem is particularly acute in Wittgenstein, given the passage at the end of the Tractatus (6.54): "whoever understands me eventually recognizes [my propositions] as nonsensical , when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it." The problem is how seriously we can take that remark, and in particular whether it can be applied to the point (in whatever way it is put) that some features of reality cannot be put into words. (Diamond, p.181)

'The problem' at the beginning of the quoted text here is, 'the question of how to take this sort of talk'. That is, how to take the claim that '"reality"…and so on' is used

to specify 'what can be put into words'. This problem is 'especially acute in Wittgenstein' because of proposition 6.54. However, at the end of the quoted text 'the problem' is also 'how seriously we can take that remark', that 'remark' being, as I read it proposition 6.54.

Given that this passage is a discussion of proposition 6.54 I will cite that proposition in full:

> My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them – as steps – to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.)
> He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. (6.54)

Setting aside the difference in translation between 'anyone who understand' in the Pears & McGuinness translation and 'whoever understands' in the Ogden translation, the differences between what is cited in the Cora Diamond text and the *Tractatus* are the last sentence and '[m]y propositions serve as elucidations in the following way:'. As I read it, the omission of '[m]y propositions serve as elucidations in the following way:' is important because what is being explained in this proposition is not simply that 'whoever understands me eventually recognizes [my propositions] as nonsensical' but that this is how the proposition of the *Tractatus* 'serve as elucidations'.

I will read proposition 6.54 here in full because it has a bearing on my understanding of the Cora Diamond text. The proposition begins, '[m]y propositions serve as elucidations in the following way'. These are 'my propositions' which, in the Cora Diamond narration, is read as Wittgenstein's propositions. However, as I read it, 'my' here is the narration. I will, throughout this thesis, be discussing my readings of narration and perspective in the text rather than discussing Wittgenstein and what Wittgenstein thought. I do so because any discussion of what Wittgenstein thought will, for me, be based only upon what I read in the *Tractatus* and other texts written by Wittgenstein. The risk, for me, of an approach to reading that is based on Wittgenstein and his thoughts is that it requires the construction of an extra-textual Wittgenstein 'behind the text' that is based upon one's readings. Having built a Wittgenstein in this way one is liable to reading 'for'[46] what this Wittgenstein thinks and thereby losing the shift in perspective that are often the starting point for my readings.

Another issue I read with constructing a Wittgenstein from one's readings is that in Wittgenstein scholarship these Wittgenstein's tend to proliferate: early Wittgenstein, late Wittgenstein, Middle Wittgenstein, pre- and post-*Tractatus* Wittgenstein, the Wittgenstein of the *Philosophical Investigations* and so on. This occurs because readings of what Wittgenstein thinks create and then rely upon a single perspective (The 'author function' as defined by Saint Jerome in Foucault's

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[46] Geoffrey Bennington discusses the problems of 'reading for' in his article 'Inter' in McQuillan, Purves and Macdonald, *Post-Theory: New Directions in Criticism*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999)

'What is an Author' is 'a field of conceptual or theoretical coherence.) Thus, if one's constructed Wittgenstein appears to change his mind a new Wittgenstein is required for the sake of his coherence.

The benefit, for me, of reading narration is that I make no claim to knowing what Wittgenstein thought or even to a correct reading of the *Tractatus*. In fact I do not believe that a correct reading is possible. Thus, if I read the narration to contradict itself in some way this can be noted as a shift in the narration or a change of perspective without the need to go beyond the text I am reading.

The downsides of this approach are, perhaps obviously to my readers, the necessity for some convoluted phrasing and the risk of assuming that in removing Wittgenstein as the author one has dealt with questions around the author function[47].

To return to the text, 'my propositions' are the propositions of the *Tractatus* numbered 1 to 7 and include the one I am reading here, proposition 6.54. In '[m]y propositions serve as elucidations' I read that the 'propositions' are not 'elucidations' but rather they 'serve as' such. I am here reminded of Derrida's 'bricolage'[48]. What is it that these 'propositions' serving as 'elucidations' make lucid?

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[47] Michel Foucault, *Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology*, edited by James D. Faubion, translated by Robert Hurley and others, (New York: The New Press, 1998)
[48] Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, Translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997)

Here 'propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as nonsensical…' As I read it, the propositions themselves are elucidated. The 'anyone who understands me' has initially cognised these 'propositions' as sense bearing sentences. If, however, the 'anyone' comes to 'understand' the 'me' they will 'eventually recognise' the 'propositions' as 'nonsensical'. However, whilst they are, from the perspective of 'anyone who understands', 'nonsensical' they also remain 'elucidations'.

The narration continues, 'when he has used them-as steps–to climb up beyond them'. Here the 'propositions' that 'serve as elucidations' are 'used…as steps'. As I read it these 'steps' allow the 'he', who is no longer 'anyone', 'who understands me' to 'climb up' beyond the nonsensical, elucidatory 'propositions' to somewhere beyond 'nonsense'.

The next part of the proposition is the parenthesis: (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) There is in '[h]e must' an imperative that I have not read earlier in this proposition. Whilst understanding and 'climb[ing] up beyond' are things that 'anyone' might do, once the climbing has been accomplished, '[h]e must – so to speak – throw away the ladder'. It is this 'throw[ing] away the ladder' that is central to the argument put forward in the Cora Diamond chapter, to which I will return shortly.

The final sentence of proposition 6.54 is '[h]e must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright'. Here, in this penultimate proposition the

narration returns to '[t]he world', which is where Proposition 1, '[t]he world is all that is the case' begins.

The final proposition of the *Tractatus* is proposition 7: '[w]hat we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence.' I wonder here if the 'we' who 'must pass over in silence' might be read as the narration and the 'he' who 'understands me'. If I accept this reading then their ability to 'pass over' would be a result of them having 'climbed up beyond' the 'nonsensical' propositions.

Again, there is the imperative 'we must pass over' which is, as I read it, an instruction that only applies to 'he' who 'understands me'. This proposition too, according to my reading of proposition 6.54, 'nonsensical'. The problem of how one is to read a text which claims that it is 'nonsensical' brings me back to Cora Diamond's 'Throwing Away the Ladder'.

The Cora Diamond narration raises a similar problem to my own: '[t]he problem is how seriously can we take that remark and whether it can be applied to the point (in whatever way it is put) that some *features of reality* cannot be put into words'. As will be seen in this thesis, my own reading requires that I take every remark seriously even when it is 'nonsensical' from its own perspective. In the parenthesis '(in whatever way it is put)' I read that the 'way it is put' is not as important as the 'point' that 'some *features of reality* cannot be put into words'. The 'way that it is put' is, as I read it, the narration. And the narration is all I, or other readers, can access.

For 'in whatever way it is put' to make sense one must accept that it is not the narration that is important, but rather the thought behind the narration to which the narration, 'in whatever it is put', points. This is, for me, one of the fundamental differences between my reading and those of the Wittgenstein scholars I have read. Since I cannot access the 'real' beyond the narration I must assume that the narration itself is important.

The text continues, '[l]et me illustrate the problem in this way. One thing which according to the *Tractatus* show itself but cannot be expressed in language is what Wittgenstein speaks of as *the logical form of reality*.' (Diamond p. 181) This reading is particularly relevant to proposition 4.121:

> Propositions cannot represent logical form: it is represented in them.
> What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent.
> What expresses *itself* in language, *we* cannot express by means of language.
> Propositions *show* the logical form of reality.
> They display it. (4.121)

The first sentence here draws a distinction between what it is for a proposition to 'represent logical form' and for 'logical form' to be 'mirrored' in propositions. The OED gives, among several definitions, that to 'represent' is to 'stand in for'[49] whereas, as I read it, to be 'mirrored' is perhaps a duplication of a particular aspect that which is 'mirrored'. Setting aside what a 'proposition cannot' do, I will concentrate on what it is here for 'logical form' to be 'reflected in' 'propositions' here.

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[49] "represent, v.[1], sense I.3.a". Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, July 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/4112191379>

What finds its reflection in language, language cannot represent. (4.121)

To do so, I will turn first part of this sentence into a question: '[w]hat finds its reflection in langauge'? As I read it, what is reflected is also that which is 'mirrored', 'logical form'. I see two possible readings of this new question. The first is that there is a 'what', that is not 'logical form' that 'finds' the 'reflection' of 'logical form' in 'language'. The second reading, and the one that I find more convincing, is that 'logical form' finds its own 'reflection in language'.

If I follow this second reading I can rephrase the sentence from proposition 4.121 as follows: Logical form finds logical form's reflection in language, [and therefore] language cannot represent logical form.

I read here a perspective on the perspective of a 'logical form' that can 'find its [own] reflection'. The sentence in proposition 4.121 is, as I read it, a general assertion that anything that 'finds its reflection in language, langauge cannot represent'. This brings me to the conclusion that 'logical form' is something that can 'find its reflection' and this ability to 'find its reflection' is what makes this something that 'language cannot represent'.

It is also 'language' here that 'cannot represent'. Which, as I read it, is distinct from the use of language that I read in the next sentence: '[w]hat expresses *itself* in

language, *we* cannot express by means of language.' Here it is not 'language' that 'cannot express' but '*we'* who 'cannot express by means of language'.

Here again I will assume that the 'what' at the beginning of the sentence is, perhaps among many other things, 'logical form'. With that assumption in place, 'logical form' cannot only 'find its reflection' but can also 'express itself in language'. In this sentence I read that it is the fact that, in my example, 'logical form' 'expresses *itself* in language' that means that '*we* cannot express' 'logical form' 'by means of language'. I wonder if this might be because that which expresses itself in language has already been expressed in language and therefore cannot be expressed again by means of the language in which it is already expressed.

The words '*itself*' and '*we*' are in italics in the Pears/McGuinness translation of the *Tractatus*. I wonder if this similarity in font might be read as a link between these two words. Perhaps this might support a reading that when something 'expresses *itself*' '*we*' cannot subsequently express it. If this is the case then perhaps this might be read as something as simple as 'we can't open a door that has opened itself'.

The final sentences of proposition 4.121 are '[p]ropositions *show*' the logical form of reality. They display it.' Is this proposition to be read as a series of repetition of '[p]ropositions cannot represent logical form: it is mirrored in them'? If that is the case then to be 'mirrored' is to 'find its reflection', to 'express itself' and also to 'show' and 'display'. It seems to me that a text so often described as compressed is unlikely to simply repeat the same claim four times in the same proposition. Such a

reading would require one to accept that this is the same claim 'in whatever way it is put', which brings me back to Cora Diamond again.

In the narration of 'Throwing Away the Ladder' 'the logical form of reality' 'shows itself but cannot be expressed in language'. This is not the text of proposition 4.121, as I have read. There it is propositions that '*show* the logical form of reality'. Further, the claim in the *Tractatus* is not that that which shows itself cannot be expressed in language, but rather '*we* cannot express by means of language' that which 'expresses itself'.

The Cora Diamond narration continues, '[s]o it looks as if there is this whatever-it-is, the logical form of reality, some essential feature of reality, which reality has alright, but which we cannot say or think that it has' (Diamond, p.181). In 'looks as if' I read the negation of what is to follow. If 'this whatever it is' 'looks as if' it is something then, according to my reading of this narration, it is not, it just 'looks as if' it is that something. Thus, for this narration, there is not 'this whatever-it-is' which 'reality has alright'. This avoids the paradox in the claim to be speaking and thinking about this 'whatever-it-is…which reality has alright' that 'we cannot say or think that it has'.

> 'What exactly is supposed to be left when we have thrown away the ladder?'
> (Diamond, p.181)

In my reading of proposition 6.54 it is the 'propositions' that have 'served as elucidations' and allowed 'anyone who understands me' to 'climb up beyond them' that constitutes the 'ladder' that 'he must, so to speak, throw away'. Thus what is

left of the *Tractatus* after 'we have thrown away the ladder' of propositions will be anything that is not a proposition. In my paper copy of the *Tractatus* that would be the index and various advertisements for other books from Routledge Classics and the back cover text at the end of the book. At the beginning of the book I read the front cover, several reviews of this edition, the publication, translation and copyright notices, a contents page, the translators preface, Introduction by Bertrand Russell and Wittgenstein's preface to the *Tractatus*. In the main body of the text, the section taken up for the most part by propositions, there is the footnote to proposition 1 and, on each page the page number and at the top of each page the words 'TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS' in upper case letters and a different font to the body of the text. So, if I were to 'throw away' or at least delete the propositions from my copy of the *Tractatus* I would be left with what is listed above and an otherwise blank book.

However, this is the answer to a slight different question to the one asked by the narration in the Cora Diamond text. The question I have answered is: what is left when we throw away the ladder? Whereas the question asked is 'what is supposed to be left when we throw away the ladder?' Which raises the question: who is doing the supposing?

> Are we going to keep the idea that there is something or other in reality that we gesture at, however badly, when we speak of "the logical form of reality", so that it, what we are gesturing at, is there but cannot be expressed in words?
> *That* is what I call chickening out. (Diamond, p.181)

As I read that for this narration there is not a 'whatever-it-is' that is the 'logical form of reality' then it would follow that we are not going to 'keep the idea that there is something or other in reality that we gesture at…when we speak of "the logical form of reality"'.

So, it is no surprise that the narration does not 'keep the idea'. Indeed, it is the keeping of the idea of this 'what we are gesturing at' that I read to be the '*That*' when the narration continues '*That* is what I call chickening out'.

However, whilst my reading of the *Tractatus* also suggests that there is not an unknowable, unspeakable essence to an extra-textual reality in the *Tractatus* this is not because the final propositions say that I should throw away that 'idea' but rather because my whole reading leads me to the conclusion that there is no extra-textual reality to which the *Tractatus* refers. And, of course, if there is no extra-textual reality then it cannot have an unknowable 'logical form'.

Having briefly explored the field of Wittgenstein scholarship, what follows is a reading of the *Tractatus* in line with the principles layed out in this introduction. These principles are, first, that I will, as far as is possible, take the text as I have defined it to be self-contained and not as a pointer to a reality that exists outside the text. Secondly, rather than assuming that the narration is Wittgenstein, or 'Wittgenstein' as an author function, I will limit my readings to what is available in the text.

Thus, my research question for this thesis is: what happens when, instead of adopting the 'episteme' of the existing Wittgenstein scholarship in its entirety, I read the *Tractatus* in the manner described above?

My reading of the Cora Diamond text serves as an introductory demonstration of this method of reading.

Chapter 1 - Preface

I will begin this thesis by reading the Wittgenstein's 1918 preface to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The text begins:

'Perhaps this book will be understood by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it- or at least similar thoughts.'[50]

The first word in the preface to Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is 'Perhaps'. Thus, the narration here does not claim to know how or by whom 'this book will be understood'. As I read it, there is a possible future where 'this book will be understood by someone' and in this future it might be that the 'someone' in question has 'already had the thoughts that are expressed in it'. For the narration here 'thoughts' are 'expressed' 'in this book'. However, the thoughts in question might only be 'understood by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it'. The narration does not claim to know that these 'thoughts' must have been already thought in order to be understood, but 'perhaps' this is the case.

'[S]omeone' in this case is a him and a him that 'has himself'. This unknown male 'someone' is, 'perhaps', not coming to the 'thoughts' expressed as new information – he will have already had the 'thoughts' and, in the first instance, not thoughts like the ones expressed but rather these 'thoughts'. Leaving aside 'or at least similar thoughts' for the moment, I

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[50] Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, translated by D.F. Pears and B.F. McGuiness (London: Routledge, 2001) p.3 All further references to this text will be given in parentheses in the text.

would like to think about what it would mean for someone to have already had the thoughts expressed in 'this book'.

If I can assume that *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is the first time that the 'the thoughts that are expressed in it' are expressed, that is, that there is not an identical text that precedes 'this book'. Then, according to this narration 'thoughts' and their 'expression' are separate things.

In order to work through my reading of this claim I will use the metaphor of a map. In this preliminary working through the 'thoughts' would be the terrain and the text the map of that terrain. Thus, according to this narration the map will only be understood by someone who already knows the terrain, or at least very similar terrain. Thus, those who have already had the thoughts will see them expressed and learn only that when expressed their thoughts look like the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Those who have not had the thoughts 'or at least similar thoughts' will not understand.

I would also note that, in this narration, there is no question that any uncertainty arises from the expression of the thoughts. Thus 'this book' is the expression of the 'thoughts'. In changing from 'thoughts' to 'book' nothing is lost in translation.

I infer from this that the question around whether anyone will understand 'this book' is not one that arises from any problem in translating the text into thoughts and comparing them with one's own thoughts. Since 'this book' contains 'thoughts that are expressed' and they will be understood 'perhaps' by 'someone who has already had the thoughts that are

expressed in it' then as I read it there is no room for linguistic uncertainty. The task of understanding this book is the matching up of pre-existing identical thoughts using the book as a medium of pure transmission.

Returning to my metaphorical map for a moment, both 'someone' and the narration have visited the same terrain. The narration has drawn a map of that terrain and, upon looking at the map, the 'someone' understands that the map expresses his own experience of the terrain. At this point the map becomes redundant because, having expressed what was already known by the narration and the 'someone', expression becomes unnecessary. What is shared is the knowledge that 'I' and 'someone' shared thoughts prior to their expression.

'-So it is not a textbook'. In the 'so' here I read the foregoing sentence to be an explanation of why 'it is not a textbook'. While this is a purely negative definition, I can say that from the perspective of this narration that a textbook is not a book that will 'perhaps…be understood by someone who has already had the thoughts that are expressed in it.'

The narration goes on to explain that 'its purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it'. As I read it the 'it' in question is 'this book' and the purpose here is not the author's or the narration's but is ascribed to the book itself.

The narration of the fulfilment of the book's purpose is a retrospection on a possible but uncertain future. I have read that the book may only be understood by 'someone' who has already thought the same, or at least similar, thoughts to the one's expressed. In order to know retrospectively that the book has achieved its purpose the 'someone' must have

recognised in the text a pure repetition of their own prior thoughts and must have understood and derived pleasure from that repetition.

I write 'pure repetition' with some hesitation because a pure repetition as I conceive it would be a repetition that was indistinguishable from the initial event, which would mean that no repetition could be seen. However, the narration here is that 'this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it'- or at least similar thoughts'. I can see how 'similar thoughts' might be compared with the thoughts expressed in the book and be seen to be a repetition because in similarity there is also difference. But similar thoughts are 'at least' what will 'perhaps' lead to understanding. As I read it, the most likely person to understand the book is 'someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it'. In which case the thoughts are not similar, the narration and the 'someone' have had 'the thoughts'.

> The book deals with the problems of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood. (TLP, p.3)

What is it to 'deal with the problems of philosophy'? To trade with the problems? Or perhaps to do something about a problematic situation? Also, are the problems of philosophy those problems with which philosophers concern themselves? Or are the 'problems of philosophy' those that arise from the faults in the way philosophy is done? Perhaps these questions will become moot since the 'I' of the narration 'believes' that the book 'shows' that 'the reason why these problems are posed is that the logic of our language is misunderstood'. The 'and' in this sentence is, as I read it, important. 'The book

deals with the problems of philosophy and shows…' Therefore 'dealing with the problems of philosophy' is separate from showing 'the reason the problems are posed'.

However, as I read that the 'problems are posed' because 'the logic of our language is misunderstood'. If the 'I' is correct and the book 'shows' that these questions arise from misunderstanding the logic of our language then when the logic of our language is understood the problems of philosophy need no longer be posed or dealt with. The language whose logic is misunderstood is 'our language'. That is, the language of the 'I' of the narration, the 'someone' who will perhaps understand the book and, as I read it, those by whom 'the logic of our language is misunderstood'. Given that the 'I' believes that the book 'shows' that 'the logic of our language is misunderstood' I would argue that the narration sees the 'logic of our language' as it is misunderstood, that is the 'I' is capable of misunderstanding as part of the 'our' to whom the language belongs. However, the narration also occupies a perspective from which that misunderstanding can be seen and shown.

If a 'we' exists within the framework of a language that 'we' all misunderstand ('we' here is my imagining of a perspective of the 'our' in the text) then that includes the 'I' of the narration. However, as the group 'our' is defined by its misunderstanding of the logic of our language then the 'I' that can show the misunderstanding must have a perspective beyond 'our' perspective. In this extended perspective the 'I' can compare its understanding of the logic of our language with 'our' misunderstanding and show that it is from this 'mis' that the problems of philosophy are posed. If our misunderstanding was an understanding of the logic of our language, then we would no longer pose the problems of philosophy.

The someone who will perhaps understand this book will perhaps already have this perspective and will therefore not have posed the problems of philosophy because he already understands that they arise from other people's misunderstandings.

> The whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence. (TPL, p.3)

Here I return to my assumption that 'the book' referred to by the narration in this preface is the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and that it includes this preface. The preface, written in 1918 and signed L.W. cannot be describing my, rather dog-eared, copy of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* which was published in in 2001 and is based on the 1961 Pears & McGuiness English translation. 'This book' from the perspective of the narration cannot be the book that I have on my desk. With that in mind it is clear to me that all that can be known about 'this book' from the perspective of the narration must be read from the narration.

There is, however, a problem that arises from my reading of the preface. If 'the whole sense of the book might be summed up in the following words: what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence' then that summation, as I read it, does not contain 'it is not a textbook' or the claim that 'the logic of our language is misunderstood' or indeed any of the other things that I have been reading in this preface.

Is the preface part of the book? If so, then is the preface something being said clearly, or

things being passed over in silence? If it is things being said clearly then it is a clarity with a

degree of overdetermination. But, perhaps, I am reading too carefully. If the 'whole sense of

the book might be summed up' in twenty-two words then perhaps my reading as an

attempt to understand is a misunderstanding in itself.

As I have read that 'this book' is within the narration I must now ask what it is to have 'said'

or to 'talk' in this text? Does the narration constitute itself as talking and/or having said

something? Or is the narration a passing over in silence? I certainly don't hear anything

when I read the text, so from my perspective there is a silence. Further, what is clear is clear

from the perspective of the narration, who has already had the thoughts expressed in this

book, so my failure to understand what has been said clearly means that I am not the

'someone' who will understand this book. However, the counter-argument, that the preface

is not something that can be 'said clearly' and therefore should be passed over in silence

seems to me equally persuasive. The question then remains: does this preface exist within

the misunderstanding of the logic of our language or is the narration here from beyond that

misunderstanding?

> Thus, the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather – not to thought,
> but to the expression of thoughts… (TLP, p.3)

The 'purpose' and 'aim' of the book are different. Earlier I read that the 'its purpose would

be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it'. Here the

narration asserts that the 'aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought' but then it

contradicts that assertion: 'or rather not to thought - but to the expression of thoughts'.

Here 'thought' as a singular is, as I read it, an activity. Leaving aside the question of whether an assertion followed by its contradiction is an example of something being 'said clearly', I have read the narration as saying that this book has 'thoughts expressed in it' and therefore those expressions must exist within the limit of the expression of thoughts.

What is still unclear to me is whether the narration of the preface is the expression of thoughts, or whether, because it is not, as I read it, part of what is 'summed up' it falls beyond the limit of 'the expression of thoughts'.[51]

The aim is initially to limit 'thought' and then 'not thought' but the 'expression of thoughts' The first two, 'thought' and 'not thought' are not only on either side of the initial boundary, they are also singular. As I have read, 'thought' here is the activity of thinking and what is to be limited is the expression of 'thoughts'. In the change from a limit to thought to a limit to the expression of thoughts the 'expression' is important. However, before moving on to 'expression' I will think about the difference between 'thought' and 'thoughts'.

If 'thought' is an activity then it might be argued that 'thoughts' are the product of that activity. Alternatively, the activity 'thought' might be a process of having 'thoughts'. Either way the change from limiting 'thought' to limiting the 'expression of thoughts' is not purely a change from a limit in thought to a limit in language, it is also a change from general 'thought' to specific 'thoughts', perhaps from the 'summed up' to the 'in detail'.

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[51] For a discussion of the Preface see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak's Translator's Preface to Jacques Derrrida's *Of Grammatology*. Here I am thinking particularly of Hegel's instruction to not 'take me seriously in the preface. The real philosophical work is what I have just written' in Derrida, Jacques, *Of Grammatology*, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) p.x

The 'expression of thoughts' is, in this narration, about 'what can be said and…said clearly'. Therefore, if 'thoughts' can be 'said clearly' they will fall within the limits the book aims to draw.

The narration goes on to explain that the problem with drawing a limit to 'thought' is that 'we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought)'. Since, as I read it in this narration, we are unable to 'think what cannot be thought' the boundary to what we can think is already set. There can be no thoughts that cannot be thought.

For this narration, it is not possible to set a limit to thought because we do not 'find both sides of the limit thinkable'. However, because we are not 'able to think what cannot be thought' I would argue that the limit of what is thinkable has been set by our inability to think beyond that existing limit. Thus, we do not have to 'find both sides of the limit thinkable' in order for that limit to be drawn.

We can, therefore, think up to the 'limit' of what is 'thinkable' on this side and no further. What the book aims to draw a limit to is the 'expression of thoughts'. Further, since we know that all thoughts are, by definition in this narration, thinkable, then it follows that in order to draw the limit to the 'expression of thoughts' there will be thoughts that cannot be expressed. Thoughts that can be expressed will be a subset of thoughts bounded by the limit drawn by this book. Beyond this limit lie thoughts that can be thought but not

expressed. With this claim in mind, I wonder if it is possible to think something that cannot be expressed.

The limit then is drawn between expressible and inexpressible thoughts and we must be able to 'find both sides of the limit thinkable'. I imagine 'we' must think a thought and then see whether it is expressible or not. One problem that I can envisage here is that, if the narration treats limits and thought and language in the same way, one could never 'express' where the limit is drawn because one would need to find both sides of the limit expressible to show both sides of the limit (i.e. we should have to find both sides of the limit expressible).

> It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense. (TLP, p.4)

As 'it will only be in language that the limit can be drawn' and the 'aim of the book is to draw [that] limit' I would argue that according to this narration this is a book concerned with language. The limit is drawn in language and has language on both sides. Within this limit is language that expresses thoughts and 'what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense', but, as I read it, that 'nonsense' will still be language.

From the perspective of the narration 'nonsense' is language that does not express thoughts. The narration therefore will decide what language is permissible and what is 'nonsense'. I am reminded here of a discussion, in a CIRCL MA(res) seminar, about Mr Toad and whether he could be a real toad and drive a car. The conclusion of the discussion was that he was a real toad and a driver in the narration of *The Wind in the Willows*. In the

narration of the preface to *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* thought is self-limiting and language requires a limit to be placed in it. In neither text, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* or *Wind in the Willows*[52]*,* is there any claim to general applicability beyond the text.

'Nonsense' in this narration is the expression of that which cannot be expressed, of what we 'cannot talk about'. Yet 'nonsense' is a word, a bit of language that this narration is using to express a thought. Perhaps then 'nonsense' is a word that exists within the 'limit' but is used here to express what is 'on the other side of the limit'. But if that is the case then either 'nonsense' is the expression of that which cannot be expressed and breaks down the limit, or the limit remains intact and 'nonsense' is a word that expresses nothing.

> I do not wish to judge how far my efforts coincide with those of other philosophers. Indeed, what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail, and the reason why I give no sources is that it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that I have had have been anticipated by someone else (TLP, p.4)

The 'I' here is a philosopher who makes no claim to 'novelty in detail' for this book. Indeed, any claim to originality would 'perhaps' prevent the book from being understood by 'someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it'. However, since the purpose of the book, as I read earlier, 'would be achieved if it gave pleasure to someone who read and understood it' and 'perhaps' that understanding could only come from someone who had anticipated the thoughts that the narration has expressed it seems somewhat contradictory that 'it is a matter of indifference to me whether the thoughts that

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[52] Grahame, K. The Wind in the Willows. (London: Methuen, 1908)

I have had have been anticipated by someone else'. As I read it the achievement of the purpose of the book is a matter of indifference to the narration of the book.

The narration continues that 'what I have written here makes no claim to novelty in detail' and again this is not a claim that the narration makes, it is what 'I have written' that 'makes no claim to novelty'. Here in the preface, 'what I have written' is in the past tense. This is also the first reference to 'written' language. Up until this point the 'I' has referred to language as 'what can be said', 'talk' and 'the expression of thoughts'. Here, as I read it, the 'I' asserts that the written is also language. Therefore, to have written is not to have passed over in silence.

What is 'novelty in detail'? Is the claim here that the 'summed up' 'sense of the book' is novel but the details from which this sum is made are not? As I read it, there is some claim to novelty, but not 'in detail'. Perhaps a more general novelty will become apparent as I read on.

Having 'give[n] no sources' the narration goes on to 'only mention that I am indebted to Frege's great works'. I wonder if this is a source and the 'only' refers to the limited number of sources or whether the 'only' is a reference to the limited level of indebtedness the narration acknowledges in only mentioning and not referencing as a source 'Frege's great works'. The 'I' is also 'indebted to…the writings of my friend Mr Bertrand Russell for much stimulation of my thoughts', from which I infer that language in the form of 'writings' can stimulate thoughts.

In the phrase 'If this work has any value' I can read work as either the activity of working on the 'problems of philosophy' or it might be the product of that work in the form of 'this book'.

The narration continues, 'if this work has any value it consists in two things'. The potential value of this work does not consist in the work itself. Rather the value consists in the fact that 'thoughts are expressed in it'. 'This work', therefore, is written language as the expression of thoughts, within the limits set, as defined by the narration in binary opposition to 'nonsense' which is language that 'lies on the other side of the limit'. If 'expression of thoughts' and 'nonsense' are binary as I have read, then when the narration goes on to say that 'on this score the better the thoughts are expressed – the more the nail has been hit on the head – the greater will be its value', 'this score' is a measure of how well 'thoughts are expressed'. It is not a measure of whether thoughts are expressed or not. So, within the limits of expression of thought where 'what can be said' is 'said clearly' there is a score of how much 'the nail has been hit on the head'. To 'hit the nail on the head' would be to express the thoughts as they are without the introduction of any deviation from the thought in the process of expression. There will be expressions of thoughts that do not express thoughts entirely as they are, where perhaps the 'nail has been hit on the head' but only partially, but these are still those thoughts being 'said clearly', otherwise they would be nonsense.

As I imagine it, there is the best expression of thoughts where the nail is hit squarely and centrally on the head. Then, as the expression moves further away from expressing the thought well it loses value but remains something 'said clearly'. In this narration as I

understand it, this expression will continue to be something said clearly, but will add diminishing value to the book, until it passes the limit into 'nonsense'.

The 'it' in the sentence 'the more the nail has been hit on the head – the greater will be its value' is 'the book'. Therefore, the better the thoughts are expressed in it the more valuable the book will be.

This reading alters the relationship between sense and nonsense. Rather than a binary opposition I read a more analogue sliding scale: between perfect sense and perfect nonsense there is a range of possible ratios of sense to nonsense. If, for example, the nail is hit half on the head then the corresponding language might be half sense and half nonsense. This reminds me of the conversation with students studying a module called 'What Kind of Text' in which we explored the differences between literary genres and found that the boundaries between fiction and non-fiction or poetry and prose can be quite problematic and porous.

In 'here I am conscious of having fallen a long way short of what is possible' the 'I' is conscious of what was possible in terms of hitting the nail on the head and how it has 'fallen a long way short of what is possible'.

The reason for this shortfall is that the 'I' has 'powers' that are 'too slight for the accomplishment of the task'. This then is an absence of sufficient 'powers' in the 'I' and not in the book. The narration continues, '- may others come and do better'. Here I read a desire on the part of the narration that the 'someone else' whose anticipation of 'the

thoughts that I have had' was 'a matter of indifference' to the narration will now take up the work and express the 'I''s thoughts better than 'I' could.

In 'on the other hand' I read that what follows is in opposition to the foregoing. Therefore, if what went before was a claim to have 'fallen a long way short of what is possible' because of the narration's 'too slight' 'powers' in the expression of thoughts which tended to devalue the book, then it follows that what is to come will serve to increase that value. 'The *truth*' here is not 'The truth'. In the preface '*truth'* is the only word that is in italics. Having previously said that the expression of thoughts has 'fallen a long way short of what is possible' the narration now claims that the '*truth* of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive'. While from the perspective of the narration the expression of the thoughts has 'fallen short', the thoughts themselves still have an 'unassailable and definitive' '*truth*'. Or rather, that '*truth*' 'seems to 'me' unassailable and definitive'. In 'seems to me' I read two perspectives: one in which the *truth* seems unassailable and definitive and another that is aware that this is a seeming and that what 'seems to me' might not be the case.

As I read it, the '*truth* of the thoughts' is independent of their expression.
In the final paragraph of the preface 'thoughts' are 'communicated' rather than 'expressed' as they have been before. Expression is, as I read it in this narration, giving thoughts form in language. A task that can be accomplished by the 'I' alone. 'Communication' is a making common and requires an other with whom the communication can occur. As I understand it, expression could fail to convey the thoughts expressed to an other and remain

expression. By contrast a 'communication' that does not allow the thought to be shared is not a communication since no common understanding is achieved.

However, the narration says that 'thoughts are here communicated' and therefore, within this narration, they are.

It is on the basis that the '*truth* of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive' that the narration believes 'myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems'. Indeed, what I can read of the 'truth' here is that it 'seems to' the 'me' of the narration to be 'unassailable and definitive' and it is on that basis that the narration 'therefore believe[s]' itself to 'have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems'. I read 'the problems' here to be 'the problems of philosophy'.

This 'solution of the problems' might be read as a general solution which is novel. Therefore, while nothing in the book is 'novel in detail' it may be novel in general.

Since all I can know of the '*truth'* is that it seems to the narration to be 'unassailable and definitive' it is not possible for me to argue otherwise. However, the claim to have found the 'final solution' rests upon how '*truth' '*seems' to the narration. The narration continues, 'If I am not mistaken in this belief' which, as I read it, is similar to the 'perhaps' with which the preface began in that it makes the claims of the narration conditional.

The first source of the value of 'the book' was that 'thoughts are expressed in it'. The second 'thing in which the value of this work consists' is not, as one might have assumed, that it solves philosophy, but is rather that 'it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved'.

When the narration remarks 'how little is achieved when these problems are solved' I have some ideas about what makes this achievement 'little'. The first is the possibility that thoughts expressed might only be understood by someone who has already had those thoughts. Therefore, nothing is communicated except that which is already known.
The second is the claim that the questions of philosophy can be solved by the narration's 'unassailable and definitive' *'truth'.* This is not a small claim but lacks any explanation of how this *'truth'* does the work.

The third and final possibility is that the narration is aware that having narrated a system where thought is self-limiting, language either expresses thought clearly or is nonsense, *'truth'* is, by definition, unassailable and knowledge is already known. All of these things are true within the narration.

There is around a third of a page of blank space above this first line of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, between the Preface and the text it prefaces.

In this preface I have read that the narration will draw a limit to what can be said and in doing so solve all of the problems of philosophy. The solution to these problems is, as I read

it, a general solution which is novel in its generality. Yet the narration also 'makes no claim to novelty in detail'.

In the opening chapter of this thesis I will read as the narration begins this task by defining the world within which this solution is possible. It is interesting to consider how this detail will achieve it's general aim. In the next chapter I will read Proposition 1 and the comments on it.

In this preface I have read that the narration will draw a limit to what can be said and in doing so solve all of the problems philosophy. The solution of these problems is, as I read it, a general solution which is novel in its generality. Yet the narration also 'makes no claim to novelty in detail'. In the opening chapter of this thesis I will read as the narration begins this task by defining the world within which this solution is possible. It is interesting to consider how this detail will achieve it's general aim. In the next chapter I will read Proposition 1 and the comments on it.

Chapter 2 – The world is all that is the case

The world is all that is the case. (1*)

As I read it, the 1 is, like the 1.1, 1.11, 1.12… beneath the 1*, refers to the line of text. The *

links with the slightly smaller * at the beginning of the footnote at the bottom of the page.

Although, I am not quite sure how I have made the link between the two *s.

The footnote begins:

The decimal numbers assigned to the individual propositions indicate the logical
importance of the propositions, the stress laid upon them in my exposition. (TLP, p.5)

'The decimal numbers' have been 'assigned to the 'individual propositions'. Thus the

'decimal numbers' are not part of the 'individual propositions' but have been 'assigned' to

them. As I read it the numbers and propositions existed independently prior to the

assignation.

The propositions are 'individual', which I understand to mean that they are separate from

each of the other propositions and also that each proposition is indivisible. However, the

idea of indivisibility is problematic. If 'The world is all that is the case' is an 'individual

proposition' with the number 1 'assigned' to it then, as I read it, that proposition can be

divided into words, letters, lines, dots or even smaller parts. Perhaps then, the 'proposition'

is 'individual' because it is not part of a larger group and stands alone. In this reading the

'proposition' would be complete as a 'proposition'.

With this in mind the 'decimal numbers assigned to the individual propositions' are not a part of the proposition. Neither are they required to complete the propositions, which were already complete before the numbers were assigned. The numbers then are a supplement to an already whole proposition.

In 'my exposition' something will be exposed. However, 'my exposition' is, as I read it, also a narration. The text is a narration made up of 'individual propositions'. Each proposition will be of more or less 'logical importance'. Here 'logical importance' is 'the stress laid on them in my exposition'. So, in this text 'logical importance' is derived from the narration's application of stress.

The footnote continues: 'the propositions n.1, n.2, n.3, etc. are comments on proposition no.n;'. I read 'n' here to stand in for any of the first numbers assigned to the propositions. 'n' therefore could be any of the numbers between 1 and 7, 7 being the highest decimal number assigned to any of the propositions.

Thus, propositions assigned with the numbers 1.1 and 1.2 are comments on the proposition assigned number 1. The 'individual proposition' 'The world is all that is the case' has the decimal number 1 assigned to it and has two comments 'on' it.

'The propositions n.m1, n.m2, etc are comments on propositions no. n.m; and so on.' In this final part of the footnote, 'n' stands for the first number which is followed by a point and then 'm' stands for the second number. So, n.m.1 might stand for 1.21. However, if this reading is correct then the proposition assigned the number 2.01 would, as I read it, be a

comment on the proposition assigned 2.0 and there is no 2.0 in my text. There are,
according to Jonathan Laventhol's hypertext of the Ogden bilingual edition of the *Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus,* fifteen of these 'phantom propositions'[53].

In the numbering system, 'the decimal number' 2.01 assigned to the proposition 'A state of
affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)' the '2' corresponds with the
letter 'n' in the footnote, which is followed by '.' In this number the letter 'm' would
correspond with 'm' and therefore 2.01 would be a comment on proposition 2.0, which is
not present. I have not been able to find any critical engagement with these 'phantom
propositions', perhaps there is little with which to engage. However, I also wonder if , like
the 'gaps' in the periodic table of elements, these 'missing' propositions are waiting to be
filled in.

Returning to the first proposition I read '[t]he world is all that is the case'. I read in 'the
world' and 'the case' that in this narration there is one 'world' and one 'case'. Also 'the
world is' and 'all…is the case', therefore in this first proposition which has the most 'logical
importance' the being of the 'world' and the 'case' is presupposed. As I understand this
proposition, 'all that is the case' is 'the world' and therefore there is nothing that is 'the
case' that is not 'the world'.

    The world is the totality of facts, not of things. (1.1)

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[53] Jonathan Laventhol, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, Hypertext of the Ogden Bilingual
Edition http://www.kfs.org/jonathan/witt/aabout.html accessed 8th June 2021. The
numbers assigned to the 'absent' propositions are 2.0, 2.020, 2.20, 3.00, 3.0, 3.20, 4.00, 5.0,
5.10, 5.50, 5.530, 6.00, 6.0 and 6.120.

The proposition assigned the number 1.1 is, as I have read, a comment on '[t]he world is all that is the case' and asserts that '[t]he world is the totality of facts, not of things'. Both propositions begin with '[t]he world is' and this seems to enable these transpositions:

The world is the world.
All that is the case is the totality of facts, not of things.

I have assumed that 'the world' in both propositions is the same. My first reading of these propositions is that 'the world' and therefore 'all that is the case' are made up of 'facts, not of things'. If 'all that is the case' is 'the totality of facts' I can read 'all that is' as meaning something very similar to 'the totality of'. As an example, 'all that is pencils in my drawer' could be replaced with 'the totality of pencils in my drawer' without significantly altering my reading of what is at stake. Thus, from 'all that is the case' is 'the totality of facts' I can read that 'what is the case' are 'facts'.

> The world is determined by the facts, and by their being *all* the facts.
> The next proposition, assigned the number 1.11, '[t]he world is determined by the facts, and by their being *all* of the facts', confirms my reading of propositions 1 and 1.1 in that the world is all of the facts and all of the facts are what 'is the case'. (1.11)

However, 'not of things' disrupts my reading. If '[t]he world is the totality of facts, not of things' then where do 'things' fit in? The world might be read as 'the totality of facts' and not 'the totality of things'. That is, the world is the totality of facts, but not the totality of things. So, there are some things in the world but not all of them. Alternatively, 'the world is

the totality of facts, and not of things' might be read as 'the world is the totality of facts' and contains no things.

What disrupts my reading is that there are 'things' in the narration. Therefore, there are 'things' and they are not 'the world' and not 'the case' which would in turn mean that 'the world' is less than the whole in that 'things' exist in the narration but outside 'the world' and 'things' are present but are not 'the case'. Another possible reading is that 'things' are part of the world but have no bearing on how the 'world is determined'. In this reading 'things' are incidental, they are there but they have no influence on the limits of what is 'the case'.

Having worked through the reading of where 'things' are situated in this narration I find myself back where I began. 'The world' of this narration is not my world. This might seem obvious, and the position from which I begin to read is that all of the information must be read from the text. Yet, in this reading I have been struggling against a desire to make 'the world' extra-textual and to assert some imagined 'real' in the text.

> For the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also whatever is not the case. (1.12)

Returning to the proposition assigned the number 1.12, I read '[f]or the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also what is not the case.' From this I infer that the 'facts' are prior to 'the world' and that 'determines' is, as I read it, an ongoing process of determining. Therefore 'facts' exist before the world in order to determine what 'is the

case' and, in turn, what the 'world is', but they must co-exist with the world because that process of determination continues.

What is 'the world' is 'determined' in part by 'the facts' being '*all* the facts'. As I read it, if 'the facts' are '*all* the facts' then 'the world' is unchangeable since it is already determined by being '*all* the facts' and therefore no more 'facts' can arrive or arise to alter what 'the world is determined' to be.

However, because this determining is always happening one might also read the proposition assigned 1.1 as 'the world is determined by the facts, and by their being *all* the facts' at the time it is determined. One might imagine a library that contains a copy of all of the books, provided that the library is updated whenever a new book is produced it would still contain all of the books even though what constitutes all of the books would have changed.

I also note that '*all*' here is in italics and is different from the 'all' in 'all that is the case'.

'Determined' might be read with reference to the preface as serving to 'draw a limit' to what is 'the case'. The 'facts' and their being '*all* the facts' therefore marks the terminus of the world.

The proposition assigned the number 1.12 begins with '[f]or' and is a comment on proposition 1.11. In the 'for' I read that the first proposition is derived from the latter. If I write the two propositions as a single sentence, 'The world is determined by the facts and by their being *all* the facts for the totality of facts determines what is the case, and also

whatever is not the case,' I read the 'for' as a claim that what is prior to the 'for' is true because of what comes after the 'for'.

Since it is possible for 'whatever' to be 'not the case' it follows that 'the world' is not universal. Both 'things' and 'whatever' can be 'not the case' and therefore not of 'the world' and still be.

> The facts in logical space are the world.
> Here again, 'logical space' is not 'the world'. 'Logical space' is outside of and different from 'the facts' which are 'in' it. Is this where 'things' and 'whatever' are too? (1.13)

Proposition 1.13 also adds a further definition of what the world is. Initially in '[t]he world is all that is the case' and 'the world is the totality of facts, not of things' there was no requirement for a 'logical space' in which they exist.

> The world divides into facts. (1.2)

The proposition assigned the number 1.2 asserts that '[t]he world divides into facts'. The first thing I notice here is that 'the world' is divisible. Also, that if one were to divide the world into its smallest constituent parts then one would end up with 'facts'. Therefore, when the narration said earlier that 'the world is the totality of facts, not of things', 'the world' is all of the 'facts' together rather than an abstracted 'totality'.

> Each item can be the case or not the case while every-thing else remains the same. (1.21)

In proposition 1.21, I read that 'each item' here is either 'the case' and therefore a 'fact', or it is not 'the case'. Thus an 'item' can exist and also not be part of the world. In my edition of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus,* 'every-thing' in this proposition has a hyphen. The hyphen for me highlights that what remains the same here is 'every-thing', which might be read as the totality of 'things'.

Since the 'world is the totality of facts, not of things' then 'things' exist outside the 'world'. So, an 'item' that is not 'the case' will not be a 'fact' and will therefore not be a part of the 'world'. Because 'every-thing else' 'remains the same' the 'item[s]' that are excluded from 'the world' cannot become a part of 'every-thing else' since to do so would change the constitution of 'every-thing else'. An 'item' that is 'not the case' is not part of the 'totality of facts' and neither can it be part of 'every-thing else'.

In this chapter I have read the narration define the 'world' as the totality of facts. However, beyond the limit drawn around the 'world' there are 'logical space' and 'things' which are not part of the 'world'. It is interesting, at least to me, that this first proposition can be read as the kind of 'world-building' that one might read in fiction. It is not a great leap to imagine Steerpike climbing among towers of 'facts' rather than among the stone towers of Gormenghast. Having read the narration to set out the 'world', its constituents and what is beyond the 'world' in broad strokes what follows is a more detailed examination of what constitutes the 'atoms' of this world: 'facts'.

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Chapter 3 – What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs

What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs. (2*)

I read this as a confirmation of my earlier reading that what is the case is a fact. It might then follow that a state of affairs is indivisible: 'the world divides into facts' and not into 'affairs'. I wonder then if 'facts' here are atomic, in the sense that they are the smallest possible division of 'the world'.

A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things). (2.01)

As I read it, the words in parentheses, '(a state of things)' and '(things)' are explanations of what preceded them. Continuing with this assumption, I find that 'affairs' and 'objects' here are both 'things' and, as 'the facts in logical space are the world', it follows that neither 'affairs' nor 'objects' are part of 'the world'.

Given that a 'fact' is, as defined here, the existence of a state of things and things are not part of the world then, as I read it, a fact cannot be a combination of things but is rather the existence of such states. However, that reading entirely contradicts proposition 2.01's claim that a 'state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)'.

It is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of affairs. (2.011)

If, as I have read, 'affairs' and 'things' are interchangeable then this proposition is tautological. One might rewrite it as: it is essential to things that they should be possible constituents of states of things.

> In logic nothing is accidental: If a thing can occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself. (2.012)

I read 'accidental' here as the opposite of 'essential'. Thus, the first part of the proposition might be read as either a claim that everything in logic is essential or possibly that in logic 'nothing' occurs, but it is not essential to logic. My reading of the latter part of the sentence leads me to believe that the claim is that everything is essential in logic. By which I mean that whether or not a thing can occur in a state of affairs and therefore be a fact and part of the world is essential to that thing. If a thing cannot exist as part of a 'state of affairs' then, by definition, it is not 'a thing'.

If 'the possibility of a state of affairs must be written into the thing itself' then who does the writing? Also, I wonder what comes first in this system of logic. I had thought that 'facts', as 'states of affairs' were derived from the things from which they are combined. However, if 'the possibility of a state of affairs must be written into the thing itself' in order for it to be a thing then the fact of the things must precede the things themselves.

> It would seem to be a sort of accident, if it turned out that a situation would fit a thing that could already exist entirely on its own.
> If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning.
> (Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts.)

Just as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is *no* object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others.

If I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the *possibility* of such combinations. (2.0121)

In 'it would seem to be' I read two perspectives on what might have 'turned out'. One perspective is aware that nothing in logic can be accidental and therefore what 'turned out' cannot be an accident. The other perspective sees how it might appear. In 'it would seem' the two perspectives are combined to say, it looks like an accident, but it is not one. In fact, the narration does not say that 'it would seem to be… [an] accident' but rather that 'it would seem to be a sort of accident'. One might read 'sort of accident' as an accident to some extent or, alternatively, as a category of accidents.

I infer from 'if it turned out' that there is a possibility of new information in this perspective. That something hidden from view will be 'turned out' and revealed. '[t]urned' is in the past tense and therefore this narration is a retrospection on something that has not yet happened. However, in my reading, there can be no revelation because everything that could have 'turned out' must already be 'written into the thing itself'. Thus, if a situation 'would fit a thing', that it would fit must already be written into the thing. Also, a 'thing' that could 'already exist entirely on its own' would not, as I read it, be a 'combination of objects' and therefore neither would it be a state of affairs, nor a fact nor part of the world.

The second sentence of the proposition assigned the number 2.0121 is, 'if things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning'. 'If' here, as I read it in relation to the possibility 'be[ing] in them', is not conditional. Proposition 2.012 states

that 'the possibility of states of affairs must be written into the thing itself' thus there is no possibility that these 'things can[not] occur in states of affairs'.

Most of this sentence in 2.0121 is a repetition of proposition 2.012. However, what differs is that in proposition 2.012 'the possibility…must be written into the thing itself', whereas in proposition 2.0121 'the possibility must be in them from the beginning'. What 'must be written' then has been written 'from the beginning'. The 'written' is already 'written' 'from the beginning' and therefore, as I read it, the writing must take place prior to the beginning. I wonder if 'the beginning' marks one of the 'limits' beyond which lies 'nonsense': writing that exists before it is written.

The third part of proposition 2.0121 is a parenthesis: '(Nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible. Logic deals with all possibilities and all possibilities are its facts)'. Here there is a 'province of logic'. I read this as the region over which logic has jurisdiction. In the narration this 'province' is 'the world'. However, as I read it, a 'province' is also a subdivision of a larger state. Thus, the world in this narration is not, and does not claim to be, universal.[54]

In my earlier reading I made the assumption that the parenthesis was an explanation, or perhaps a repetition, of what preceded it. Here I do not think that the same reading will work.

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[54] This reading is at odds with the claim that 'World: = "universe" in Max Black, *A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus,* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1964)

In 'nothing in the province of logic can be merely possible' to 'be… possible' is 'merely'. I read 'merely' as meaning only or perhaps purely. Thus, I read that for a 'thing' 'in the province of logic' being 'possible' is always alloyed with something more.

The proposition continues: '(…logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts). Thus, 'in the province of logic', if a 'thing' that is not 'nothing' exists, then its possible existence as part of a fact is essential to that thing. Therefore, tautologically to be a thing in this narration a thing must be what a thing is defined to be by this narration.

In the next sentence of proposition 2.0121 I read that: '[j]ust as we are quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space or temporal objects outside time, so too there is *no* object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others'.

The narration here is a 'we' and 'we' are 'quite unable to imagine spatial objects outside space'. One might argue that 'space' is 'written into' 'spatial objects' in that 'spatial' can be defined as relating to space so the link is 'written into' the language. Also, as I understand it, a spatial object would be defined by its occupying space. However, the narration's claim here is not that 'spatial objects outside space' would be illogical, but rather that 'we are quite unable to imagine' them there. However, I would argue that imagining is a type of thought and, in the preface, I read that, for this narration, language is 'the expression of thought'. Thus, if one can say or write 'spatial objects outside space' one must have had that thought in order to express it. Of course, to 'imagine' and to think are different, yet I would say that they are related and that imagination is a particular type of thinking.

Specifically, I would like to put forward that to 'imagine' is to think of something that is not present, to create a mental image. For example, I can think that my desk is in my office, but I have to imagine my desk on the moon. If I follow that reasoning then, because a spatial object cannot exist outside space it can only be imagined. In order to say that we are quite unable to imagine x one must have already imagined x.

Also, 'we are quite unable to imagine... temporal objects outside time'. However, not only has this thought been expressed in writing, it also, for me, raises a question about 'the beginning'. If the beginning is taken to be the beginning of time, which I think is a reasonable assumption in this reading given that before the beginning there can have been nothing written into things and by extension no world, and I have already read that the writing 'written into the thing itself' must happen before the beginning then 'we' have a writing that must be 'outside time' because in 'the world' it must always be already 'written'.

The narration continues: 'so too there is *no* object that we can imagine excluded from the possibility of combining with others'. I think that the arguments I have put forward in relation to temporal and spatial objects are equally valid here. I read this section as the third in a series of connected objects that 'we are quite unable to imagine':

> Spatial objects outside space
> Temporal objects outside time
> object[s]... excluded from possibility of combining with others (2.0121)

I have written the list in this way to show that the final set of objects do not have an adjective in place of 'spatial' and 'temporal'. I would suggest that these can be read as logical objects and since 'logic deals with every possibility and all possibilities are its facts' and that 'in logic…the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself' the claim might be restated as, we are quite unable to imagine logical objects outside logic.

The final part of proposition 2.0121 is '[i]f I can imagine objects combined in states of affairs, I cannot imagine them excluded from the *possibility* of such combinations.' The narration here is an 'I' rather than the 'we' I read earlier in the proposition. The proposition is about what 'I can' or 'cannot imagine'. So, If 'I' can imagine objects in combination, let's say a pencil in my hand, the claim is not that I cannot imagine the objects not in that combination, my hand without a pencil, but rather that I cannot imagine that 'such combinations' are not possible for these objects.

I wonder if this is a denial of the ability of the 'I' to un-imagine a state of affairs. If imagination is a kind of thought, then one might say that the claim here is that it is not possible to un-think a possibility.

> Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different rôles: by themselves and in propositions.) (2.0122)

As I have already read, 'the possibility of a state of affairs must be written into the thing itself'(2.012). The 'connexion' then between 'things' and 'states' of affairs is that the 'thing'

depends on having the 'possibility' of those 'states' in them from the beginning in order to be, or perhaps become, a thing. No possibility, no thing!

However, the claim here is that 'things' are also 'independent' of 'states of affairs'. This 'independence' is 'a form of dependence'. The claim that independence is a form of dependence is self-contradictory.

This 'independence' is the ability to 'occur in all *possible* states of affairs'. The 'states of affairs' that a 'thing' could 'occur in' are already written into that 'thing' 'from the beginning'. A 'thing', as I have read so far, can 'occur' in any of the states of affairs that are written into it, however, it cannot occur in a state of affairs that is not written into it. So, 'all *possible* states of affairs' here are not, as I read it, every state of affairs that could possibly occur, but rather every state of affairs in which it is possible for this 'thing' to occur.

If a 'thing' has written into it from the beginning that it can appear in two states of affairs then it is independent in the sense that it can appear in both of those states of affairs. It cannot occur in a third, unwritten, state of affairs because that would not be '*possible*'. However, having written that a thing cannot appear in a third state of affairs, according to my own argument, I have imagined that combination and made it possible.

I have written that a 'thing' could appear in both states of affairs. However, I wonder if the 'independence' here is that the thing can appear in either state of affairs rather than both. If I follow this reasoning then 'independence' here might be thought of as akin to choice. The

object can 'occur' in one state of affairs and is 'independent' in that which state of affairs it appears in is left undecided by what is 'written into' that thing.

The section of proposition 2.0122 in parentheses is, as I read it, making a similar point about words: (It is impossible for words to appear in two different rôles: by themselves and in propositions). The 'words' 'by themselves' here are not, as I read it, individual words without other words. These are 'words' without anything else present. So, 'words' here cannot appear with only other 'words' and also 'in propositions'. Thus, a proposition is not 'words…by themselves'.

Of course, it might be argued that my reading of 'by themselves' is incorrect and that 'by themselves' should be read as individual 'words' being alone and not in combination with other 'words'. However, each proposition is made up of individual 'words', so these words are, as I read it, both 'by themselves' and also 'in propositions'.

One way that this contradiction in both of my readings of the parentheses might be settled is to propose that 'It is impossible for words to appear in two different rôles [simultaneously]'. In this way the 'words' would be similar to what 'will be called the "duck rabbit"' in Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Psychology – A Fragment[55] in that it is possible, for me, to see either the duck or the rabbit but not both simultaneously.

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[55] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, revised fourth edition, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte, (Chichester: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2009) p.2

Proposition 2.0122 begins by proposing that 'things are independent'. Whereas the section

in parentheses proposes that '[i]t is impossible for words to appear in two different rôles'. I

have read parentheses in some of the earlier proposition to be explanation of what

precedes the parentheses. If I apply a similar reading to the proposition and its parentheses

then I infer that 'words' and 'things' here are in some way similar.

Following on from this reading 'things' and 'words' are both 'independent' and can

respectively 'occur' or 'appear' in 'all *possible* situations' but cannot do so in 'two different

rôles'. I would also speculate that 'words' might be 'things' in this narration.

This might be read to support the notion that language and 'things' in the 'real world' are

isomorphic in a way that is problematised in McManus[56]. I would also argue that 'things' in

this narration are narrated and are not part of some extra-textual 'real' to which the text

can be compared. I am reminded of the child in Jacqueline Rose's *The Case of Peter Pan*

when Rose writes that 'there is no child behind the category 'children's fiction', other than

the one which the category itself sets in place'[57]. Here, to paraphrase Rose, I read that there

is no 'thing' behind this narration's 'world' other than that which the narration sets in place.

Words 'appear in… rôles', from which I infer that 'words' are able to 'appear' to assume

different functions or play different parts in different situations. If this is the case for 'words'

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[56] For a fascinating exploration of this topic see the conclusion of *The Enchantment of Words*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2010) in particular page 216.
[57] Jacqueline Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,1993) p.10

in this proposition then it might also be inferred that this offers a way forward in my reading of 'independence' as 'dependence' of 'things' in this proposition. If I use the word 'set' as an example, 'set' in this example will be defined as the hardening of a jelly or the unfurling of a sail. Both of these definitions are, if I read 'set' as a 'word' as described in this narration, the 'rôles' in which 'set' 'appears'. So, if 'set' is describing the hardening of a jelly it cannot also appear in the 'rôle' of describing the unfurling of a sail.

If I apply this reading to 'things' (I am here inventing a connection that I have not read in the text in order to think through the implications of my reading of this proposition, whilst also squeezing in some Poe) then a piece of paper might appear in the rôle of insignificant piece of scrap hanging on a nail or a letter that could bring down the monarchy. It is the same 'thing' but playing different rôles.

One difference between 'things' and 'words' in this proposition is that 'things' can 'occur' whereas words 'appear'. In order to appear 'words' must, as I read it, come into view and therefore appearance requires a perspective with a view to which things can appear. 'Occur' is derived from the Latin 'occurere' which is defined as to go to meet or present itself. So, while I still read a requirement for a perspective to which the 'thing' could present itself, that is to occur to, there is also a difference between making present and making visible.

> If I know an object I must also know all its occurrences in states of affairs.
> (Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.)
> A new possibility cannot be discovered later. (2.0123)

The narration of the proposition assigned the number 2.0123 is an 'I'. This 'I' can, possibly, 'know an object', although the 'if' makes the possibility of that knowing conditional. My initial reading was that here for the 'I' to 'know' an object is 'to know all of its possible occurrences in states of affairs'. However, the claim here in the narration is not that to know an object is to know all of its occurrences in states of affairs, it is rather that '[i]f I know an object' then 'I must also know…' and I think the 'also' here is important. If the 'I' knows an object then it 'also' has some other knowledge, 'all its occurrences in states of affairs' that is not part of what it is for 'I' to 'know an object'.

(Every one of these possibilities must be part of the nature of the object.) (2.0123)

As I have already read 'if a thing can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning'. Here then, what is 'written into the thing itself' 'from the beginning' is 'part of the nature of the object'.

A new possibility cannot be discovered later. (2.0123)

In 'discovered' again I read a perspective from which the 'possibility' would be covered and could be 'discovered'. In order to think this through further I will assume that the perspective from which a 'new possibility cannot be discovered later' is that of the 'I' in the narration of this proposition.

For this 'I' to 'know an object' also requires the 'I' to know every possible state of affairs in which it could ever occur. If this were a 'temporal object' the perspective of the 'I' would

necessarily be one that encompassed all of time in order to 'know' that no new possibilities could ever occur.

However, as I read it, this is a logical object. A logical object is defined by what is 'written into' it 'from the beginning'. Thus, I might restate the claim as: In 'the world' as defined by the 'I' of the narration, if the 'I' knows 'an object' it also 'knows all its possible occurrences in states of affairs' within this narration. If an object were to sprout a new possibility it would no longer be an 'object' in this narration.

> If I am to know an object, though I need not know its external properties, I must know all its internal properties. (2.01231)

'An Object' has 'internal properties' and 'external properties'. An object's 'external properties' are not 'its possible occurrences in states of affairs' nor are they 'the nature of the object' since 'I' must know these to 'know an object'. I would conjecture that what is 'written into the thing itself' might be its internal properties. However, my reading does not yet support this assertion.

> If all objects are given, then at the same time all *possible* states of affairs are also given. (2.0124)

Here '*possible'* is in italics, so not possible. As I have previously read, 'objects' are defined as having the possibility of all states of affairs in which that object can occur 'written into the thing itself' 'from the beginning'. If the 'I' 'knows an object' then it also knows 'all its possible occurrences in states of affairs'. In that sense this proposition is an extrapolation from previous propositions. However, here 'all objects are given' rather than known. I read

'given' here as similar to specified or accepted as correct. So, if all objects are 'given' and what is 'given' is derived from the 'states of affairs'[58] in which each object could possibly occur in, then all possible 'states of affairs' must also be specified.

> Each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs. This space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space. (2.013)

I read 'as it were' as a claim that 'each thing is…in' something similar to but not quite 'a space of possible states of affairs'. Much of my reading has led me to think that the propositions of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* are positive rather than descriptive, this stepping away from precision complicates that reading. If the narration is creating its own 'world' why would it not create that world definitely?

One might assert that the 'existence of states of affairs' are 'facts' and the 'facts in logical space are the world'. Also, a 'state of affairs' is a 'combination of objects (things)'. So, 'things' combined in 'states of affairs', which are 'facts', do, according to this narration, exist in a 'space' and that space is 'logical space'. However, because 'the world is the totality of facts, not of things', 'things' do not exist in logical space.

Thus, the 'as it were…space of possible states of affairs' is where '[e]ach thing is' and this 'space' cannot be part of 'the world'. The claim here, as I read it, is that the 'objects' 'as it were' exist in an 'as it were' 'space' where they wait to join with other 'objects' in order to

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[58] See my reading of 2.012 and 2.0121

form 'facts' and enter 'the world'. I wonder if this space might be read as akin to the realm of platonic ideal forms.

If, as I read in the preface, 'what can be said at all can be said clearly' then where does 'as it were' fit in? It might be a 'saying clearly' or a 'pass[ing] over in silence'.

The second sentence of the proposition assigned the number 2.013 is '[t]his space I can imagine empty, but I cannot imagine the thing without the space'. This is a 'space of possible states of affairs' and a 'fact – is the existence of states of affairs'. Therefore, as I read it 'a possible state of affairs' is one that could be a 'state of affairs' but is not one that has 'existence'. Although a 'possible state of affairs' might also describe a 'state of affairs' that does exist, in that to exist the 'state of affairs' must be possible.

If this is a 'space of possible states of affairs' that do not yet exist, then if this 'space' was empty it might mean that all 'possible states of affairs' have been realized in 'the world'. The narration continues 'but I cannot imagine the thing without the space'. The 'thing' here cannot be in 'the world' as 'things' but only as part of a 'fact' or 'state of affairs'. So, in order to imagine the 'thing' as a stand alone entity it must be imagined beyond the bounds of the world as defined by this narration. Therefore the 'I' cannot 'imagine' this 'thing' without imagining a space beyond 'the world' where the 'thing' can exist.

> A spatial object must be situated in infinite space. (A spatial point is an argument-place.)
> A speck in the visual field, though it need not be red, must have some colour: It is, so to speak, surrounded by colour-space. Notes must have *some* pitch, objects of the sense of touch *some* degree of hardness, and so on. (2.0131)

The claim here is, as I read it, that an 'object' that is defined as belonging in a specified 'field' or 'space' must have an attribute that allows it to occur in that field. So, 'a speck in the visual field' that is 'surrounded by colour-space' must have a colour.

'[C]olour' then is part of what must be 'written into' an 'object' or a 'speck' in order for it to occur in the 'visual field'. Essentially, an object that is defined as 'visual' must be visible and have a 'colour'.

'Notes' I read as musical notes and therefore defined as audible. So 'pitch' is a quality of sound and therefore an 'object' must have a 'pitch' in order to be audible and be a 'note'. Similarly, an object 'of the sense of touch' must have 'some degree of hardness' or it could not be touched or sensed.

Thus, if an object is to be described as visual, audible or tactile it must have properties that allow it to be perceived in that way. In this narration one could not smell blue or taste C#, which would deny the possibility of synesthesia in this 'world'.

Returning to the beginning of proposition 2.0131 I read that a 'spatial object must be situated in infinite space (a spatial point is an argument-place)'. That a 'spatial object' must exist in 'space' I have read in previous propositions. Here, however, the 'space' must be 'infinite'. Also, a 'spatial object' would be an 'object' not combined with other objects as a 'state of affairs' and therefore is not 'the world'. This might mean that 'infinite space' is outside 'the world' or alternatively that 'infinite space' is an 'object' and, therefore, that 'infinite space' is combined with this 'spatial object' to create a 'state of affairs' which would

then be 'in the world'. So, either there is 'infinite space' outside 'the world' or it is in 'the world' and the 'I' can know all of its 'possible occurrences in states of affairs'.

In my reading 'infinite space' must have a boundary between it and 'the world' which would make it both 'infinite' and finite, or it is in 'the world' as part of a 'fact' which contains within it an 'infinite space' which is again finite. All of which leads me to wonder what 'infinite space' might mean in this narration.

Objects contain the possibility of all situations. (2.014)

This proposition is almost a repetition of 2.0124 and draws upon 2.012 and 2.0121 in that 'if a thing *can* occur in a state of affairs the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself' and 'If things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning'. It follows then that all of the 'objects' together would have 'written into' them 'from the beginning' every possible 'state of affairs'.

The possibility of its occurring in a state of affairs is the form of an object. (2.0141)

The 'form of an object' here could be 'all its internal properties'(2.01231).

I extrapolate this from 'If I am to know an object... I must know all its internal properties' and 'If I know an object I also know all of its possible occurrences in states of affairs'(2.0123). However, I would also note that I am piling up names that I am assuming share the same meaning. If 'form' is 'internal properties' which is 'the possibility of occurring in states of affairs' then I read the narration to be building a self-referential system of meanings. I am linking various definitions which I have read from the text to connect those words and phrases together, as above. However, now that I have done that

work with these propositions I find that 'form' is 'internal properties' which is 'the possibility of occurring in states of affairs' and therefore the 'possibility of occurring in states of affairs' is 'form'.

Objects are simple. (2.02)

I think that it is clear from my reading that I am not finding 'objects' particularly 'simple' to understand! As I have read, 'objects' contain every possible 'fact' that could ever 'occur' in the 'world' whilst existing outside 'the world' in a space of potentiality. I assume, therefore, that 'simple' here is not a synonym for easy to understand.

Every statement about complexes can be resolved into a statement about their constituents and into the propositions that describe complexes completely. (2.0201)

This proposition would be a comment on 2.020 if the numbering system were being followed. However, as 2.020 is not present I will assume that it is a comment on the preceding proposition, 2.02.

It might be argued that 'complexes' are in contrast with the 'simple' 'objects' of proposition 2.02. If I continue with that reading then perhaps the 'constituents' of 'complexes' are 'simple' 'objects'. However, 2.0201 is a proposition that is primarily concerned with, as I read it, 'statements about' and 'propositions that describe' 'complexes' rather than complexes themselves.

My reading of 2.0201 is that 'every statement about complexes' can be 'resolved into' two separate expressions:

- A statement about their constituents.

- The propositions that describe the complexes completely.

The best analogy I can think of here is Ikea furniture. A *Billy* bookcase comes with a list of parts, which in this example is 'a statement about [its] constituents', and a set of assembly instruction which, when added to this 'statement about their constituents', corresponds with the 'propositions that describe the complex completely.

This analogy is, of course, 'as it were'. However, it has helped me to think through the proposition and to see that if 'propositions describe the complexes completely' then 'a statement about their constituents' is an unnecessary supplement. Perhaps, rather than reading this as a splitting of 'every statement about complexes' into two parts, I can read this proposition as a two-step process: First, 'every statement about complexes' can be 'resolved' into a 'statement about their constituents' and then that 'statement' can itself be 'resolved' into 'the propositions that describe complexes completely'.

> Objects make up the substance of the world. That is why they cannot be composite. (2.021)

I wonder whether 'objects…cannot be composite' is connected with the proposition that 'objects are simple'(2.02). If so, perhaps to be 'simple' here is to be not 'composite'. This supports my earlier reading of objects in this narration as atomic.

In 'objects make up the substance of the world' one might read that the world is made of objects. However, this would contradict proposition 1.1 that the 'world is the totality of facts, not of things'. Perhaps 'substance' is connected to 'form'. It is because they 'make up the substance of the world' that 'objects' cannot be 'composite'.

> If the world had no substance then whether a proposition had sense would depend on whether another proposition was true. (2.0211)

I will, for the moment, set aside what it would mean for a proposition to have 'sense' and to be 'true'. In proposition 1.21 the narration states that 'each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same'. If I accept that an 'item' and 'everything else' are propositions then it follows that whether a proposition 'is the case' or not does not alter any of the other propositions.

Proposition 2.0211 explains, to some extent, why 1.21 is the case. It is because 'the world' has 'substance' that 'each item can be the case or not the case while everything else remains the same'. However, if 1.21 has 'sense' because 2.0211 is 'true' then that would disprove 2.0211 because the 'sense' of 1.21 would rely on 2.0211 being 'true'.

> In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false). (2.0212)

The narration here is a 'we'. I read 'that case' to be a reference to the previous proposition. Therefore, 'that case' is a world without 'substance'. So, 'if the world had no substance' 'we could not sketch any picture of the world (true or false)'. This reading of the proposition

leads me to wonder what is it to sketch a picture of the world? And why are substances necessary to sketch a picture?

My answer to these questions is that a 'sketch' requires 'substance' which requires 'objects' which contain 'the possibility of states of affairs' which are the 'facts' that make up the 'world'. The issue I find with this long chain of necessities is that it boils down to 'we could not sketch any picture of the world' if the necessary condition for the existence of 'the world' were not met.

The parentheses here '(true or false)' I read to refer to the 'picture' 'we could not sketch'. Therefore a 'picture of the world' can be 'true or false'.

> It is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something – a form – in common with it. (2.022)

I infer from '[i]t is obvious' that this proposition should be easily understood. Given that I have no further information about either an 'imagined world' or a 'real one', the obviousness must be in the proposition itself. I read the 'real one' to be the 'real' 'world'. I would therefore argue that 'an imaginary world' and a 'real' 'world' share a 'world' 'in common'.

In this proposition the 'form' that the worlds share is being worlds, which is pretty obvious! If I return to proposition 2.0141 I read that the possibility of its occurring in states of affairs is the form of an object'. If the 'form of an object' has similar properties to the 'form' of 'real' and 'imaginary' worlds, then the *something* that 'real' and 'imagined worlds' have 'in common' is that they can both occur in the same 'states of affairs'

Objects are what constitute this unalterable form. (2.023)

This proposition follows on from the previous proposition in which 'real' and 'imagined world[s]' shared a 'form – in common'. As I have read that '[t]he world is the totality of facts, not of things'(1.01), I know that in this narration 'things' are not 'the world'. However, here it is 'objects' that 'constitute' the 'unalterable form' of the world'.

As I understand it the totality of 'objects' or 'things' contains every possible 'state of affairs' and, as will be remembered, a 'fact' is 'the existence of a state of affairs' and '[t]he world is determined by the facts'. I also know that each 'thing' is in a 'space of possible states of affairs'.

If I assume that 'a thing' 'in a space of possible states of affairs' is not yet combined into a 'state of affairs' then that 'state of affairs' would not be 'the case' or in 'the world'. The narration, therefore, has a perspective that encompasses 'the world' and the 'objects' outside 'the world' in 'a space of possible states of affairs'.
This means, as I read it, that 'all possible states of affairs' are 'written into' the 'things' that are outside 'the world' and it is how these things combine (dependently independent) that defines the 'states of affairs', 'facts', 'what is the case' and 'the world'.

If the 'I' knew all of the objects/things then it would know all of their possible occurrences in states of affairs and therefore would know all possible worlds. However 'the world' is only those things that have combined to become 'states of affairs' that are 'the case'.

In order to think this through more I will imagine a 'world' that has only one 'fact'. This world is surrounded by a 'space of possible states of affairs' in which there are three 'objects'. Each 'object' can occur in 'states of affairs' with any other.

To begin with there must be a 'state of affairs' in order for 'the world' to be 'the case'. So a fact made up of the combination of objects a and b, which I will call {ab} is already in my 'world'. The {} here represent that these two former objects have combined into a 'fact'. In the 'space of possible states of affairs' there are three objects: c, d, and e. These are the possible constituents of the next 'state of affairs'. Thus my 'world' could be completed by 'facts' {cd}, {ce} or {de}. There are then five possible final worlds with two facts: {ab}{cd}, {ab}{ce}, {ab}{de} and a world in which no further combinations occur and therefore it remains {ab} alone.

"The world' therefore is defined by how objects in a 'space of possible states of affairs' combine. However, 'the form' of 'the world' is constituted by its 'objects' and is 'unalterable'. So, as I read it, a new 'state of affairs' could not 'occur' in the world because that would alter its 'form'. In my example, 'world' {ab} could never contain any further 'states of affairs'.

> The substance of the world *can* only determine a form, and not any material properties. For it is only by means of propositions that material properties are represented – only by the configuration of objects that they are produced. (2.0231)

A 'form' is not 'any material properties'. I see two readings of 'they' in this proposition. The first is that 'they' are 'propositions' and the second is that 'they' are 'material properties'. If 'they' are read to be 'propositions' then it is by the 'configuration of objects' that [propositions] are produced'. I have been reading 'propositions' in this text and I can find a way to fit this reading with my reading of those 'propositions'. As an example, 'objects are simple' is, in this text, a 'proposition' assigned the number 2.02. As I read it there can be no 'configuration' of parts within a 'simple' 'object' and therefore 'configuration' must be read as the arrangement of 'objects' in relation to other 'objects'.

Since, as I read it, 'Objects are simple' is not about the relative 'configuration of objects' this 'proposition' is not 'produced by a configuration of objects'.

However, in my reading of proposition 2.0122 there is a possibility that 'words' are 'things' and I have read that 'things' and 'objects' are used interchangeably in this text. So, it is possible to read the claim here as: it is 'only by the configuration of [words] that [propositions] are produced'.

My second reading of 'they' is that 'they' are 'material properties'. In this 'proposition' the 'substance of the world *can* only determine form' and 'form' is not a 'material property'. In this reading it is 'only by the configuration of objects that [material properties] are produced'. The 'configuration of objects' is, as I read it, 'objects' in 'states of affairs' and these are 'the facts'. Thus 'material properties' are 'facts' and 'facts' are not 'things'.
As I understand it, in this proposition, assigned number 2.0231, 'form' is determined by 'things' which are the 'substance of the world'(2.021). These 'things' have every possible

fact 'written into' them, and, as I read in propositions 2.0122 and 2.021, it is how these 'objects' combine and pass from a 'space of possible states of affairs' into 'states of affairs' that determines 'the world'. But, according to proposition 2.0231 these 'things' 'can only determine a form and not any material properties'.

While 'the substance…determine[s]' and the 'configuration of objects…produce[s]', 'propositions' represent. Therefore, as I read it, 'propositions' re-present, 'material properties' In that sense 'propositions' are not 'material properties' but they present 'material properties' again. Hence 'material properties' are 'facts' and 'facts' can only be 'represented' 'by means of propositions'.

In a manner of speaking, objects are colourless. (2.0232)

'In a manner of speaking' can be read as a deviation from the narration's claim that I read in the preface that 'what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence'. 'In a manner of speaking' might also be read as a claim that 'objects are colourless' is not a 'proposition' in which 'a material property' is 'represented' correctly. There are, as I read it 'manner[s] of speaking' and in this 'manner of speaking' 'objects are colourless'. The implication of this reading is that 'facts' can be spoken in different 'manner[s]', which might indicate different perspectives. This 'manner of speaking' might be connected to 'expression' in the preface.

'[O]bjects are colourless' and yet 'a speck in the visual field…must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour space'(2.0131). The colour or lack thereof, of 'objects' or 'a

speck' are 'in a manner of speaking' and 'so to speak', I infer that, in some way I am yet to understand, the narration is unable to accurately 'represent' or 'speak' about the colour of these 'things'. The 'nail' cannot be 'hit on the head'.

If 'a speck' is 'an object', and in my reading of 2.0131 I have made that assumption, propositions 2.0232 and 2.0131 appear to contradict each other. An 'object' 'must have some colour' but is also 'colourless'. My solution to this contradiction is that whilst an 'object' is 'colourless', if it is an 'object' 'in the visual field' then it derives its 'colour' from the 'colour-space' by which it is surrounded.

> If two objects have the same logical form, the only distinction between them, apart from their external properties, is that they are different. (2.0233)

The narration has not, as yet, defined the 'logical form of an object'. However, proposition 2.012 states that 'in logic nothing is accidental: if a thing *can* occur in states of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself' and, therefore, I will assume for the time being that the 'logical form' of an 'object' is 'the possibility of its occurring in states of affairs'.

I have read that 'objects' occur in 'states of affairs' and that that occurrence would define their 'material properties'. I wonder if 'material properties' and 'external properties' are the same. If so, then proposition 2.0233 is a claim that, regardless of their 'combination' in 'states of affairs' (which would be their 'external' or 'material properties'), two objects can share a 'logical form'.

Since the narration has set aside 'external properties' what is left is two objects that share a 'logical form' but can be differentiated.

This proposition is, as I read it, tautological. There are 'two objects' and the narration can differentiate between the two and therefore they must be different. If the objects are different then there cannot be one object.

> Either a thing has properties that nothing else has, in which case we can immediately use a description to distinguish if from others and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several things that have the whole set of their properties in common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them.
> For if there is nothing to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since otherwise it would be distinguished after all. (2.02331)

As I read the first part of proposition 2.02331, it is not being the only 'thing' with these 'properties' that distinguishes one 'thing' from another. It is 'we' who 'use' 'a description' 'to distinguish it from others and refer to it'. Therefore it is in the perspective of the 'we' that 'things' are 'distinguish[ed]…from others'.

2.02331 continues, 'or, on the other hand, there are several things that have whole set of their properties in common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them'. As I read it 'several things that have whole set of their properties in common' could not be 'several things' because they would not be severable.

To work through my reading in more detail I will compare x and x. These two share many 'properties in common', however, I am able to differentiate between them because they

occupy different positions on this page. If there were no difference between them then there could not be more than one x.

However, the argument in proposition 2.02331 is, as I read it, slightly different. The claim is not that there would be only one 'thing' but that, while they would remain 'several things' 'it would be quite impossible to indicate one of them'. Thus this is a question of 'indicat[ion]' rather than one of existence.

The final sentence of the proposition assigned the number 2.02331 is '[f]or if there is nothing to distinguish a thing, I cannot distinguish it, since otherwise it would be distinguished after all.' I would argue that if 'I cannot distinguish' 'a thing' then, from the perspective of the 'I' there would be no 'thing'.

> Substance is what subsists independently of what is the case. (2.024)

As I have read 'what is the case' is 'the world'. Therefore 'substance' is what 'subsists' independently of 'the world'. I infer from these readings that '[s]ubstance' is not to do with 'facts' or 'states of affairs'. What I am left with then is that '[s]ubstance' might be 'things' or perhaps what is 'written into the thing itself'. I have read in proposition 2.013 that 'each thing is, as it were, in a space of possible states of affairs' and therefore, can 'subsist' outside occurrent 'states of affairs'. Thus 'things' can be 'what subsists independently of what is the case'.

> It is form and content. (2.025)

As I read 'it', 'it' here is 'substance'. Hence, the proposition could be rewritten as:

'[substance] is form and content'. The 'form of an object' is the 'possibility of its occurring in

states of affairs'(2.0141). The 'content' of an object might be what is in the object. In

objects, according to my reading of the earlier propositions, are what 'must be written into

the thing itself'(2.012) and 'what must be in them from the beginning'(2.0121). In both

cases, what is 'in' and 'written into' 'objects' are the possibilities of the objects occurring in

'states of affairs'.

Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects. (2.0251)

As I have read, the 'form' of an 'object' is 'the possibility of its occurring in states of affairs'.

Therefore one reading of this proposition is that 'Space, time, and colour' are possibilities of

objects occurring in states of affairs. In proposition 2.0131 I read that there are 'spatial

object[s]. With that in mind, I read '[s]pace' here as that which 'must be written into' an

'object' in order for it to be a 'spatial object'. A temporal 'object' would have 'time' in it

'from the beginning'. Finally an 'object' that can occur 'being coloured' would have the

possibility 'written into' that 'object'.

I have read in proposition 2.0131 that 'a speck in the visual field, though it need not be red,

must have some colour: it is, so to speak, surrounded by colour space', and in proposition

2.0232 that 'in a manner of speaking, objects are colourless'.

Setting aside for the moment that these propositions about colour are 'so to speak' and 'in a

manner of speaking', if, as I read earlier, a 'colourless' 'object' derives its colour from being

surrounded by 'colour-space' then that would not be the 'form' of the 'object'. However, it might be 'written in to the thing itself' that it can occur in a 'state of affairs' with 'colour-space'.

The 'state of affairs' that I will call object in colour-space would, as I have read it, be the combination of two objects: object and colour-space.

This suggests to me that I can read 'space' and 'time' in a similar way, as 'objects' with which other 'objects' could combine to form 'states of affairs'. A 'spatial object' and a 'temporal object' would have the 'possibility of occurring in states of affairs' with 'space' and 'time', respectively, written into the 'objects'.

How then am I to read proposition 2.0251? 'Space, time, and colour (being coloured) are forms of objects. Perhaps, here, 'forms of objects' can be read differently. If 'space' is a 'form of object', 'time' is a 'form of object' and 'colour (being coloured)' is a 'form of object' perhaps they are so in the same way that brie is a form of cheese. Thus I might read proposition 2.0251 as meaning there are multiple 'objects' and 'space, time, and colour (being coloured) are among them.

There must be objects, if the world is to have unalterable form. (2.026)

'[O]bjects' in this proposition are multiple, not a single 'object' but 'objects'. Thus, 'objects', as I read it, could be a set within which each individual 'object' can be differentiated but the set, 'objects' is 'one'.

In this narration, as I have read, '[e]ither a thing has properties that nothing else has, in which case we can immediately use a description to distinguish it from others and refer to it; or, on the other hand, there are several things that have the whole set of their properties in common, in which case it is quite impossible to indicate one of them'(2.02331). As I read it, '[o]bjects, the unalterable, and the subsistent'(2.027) have been distinguished from each other and, in this narration, therefore they cannot be 'one and the same'. Yet they are in this proposition! To move beyond this apparent contradiction I could read 'objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent' as a set.

This would solve the contradiction between my readings of propositions 2.02331 and 2.027. It also, as I read, highlights the importance of reading perspective in this narration. 'The world is the totality of facts, not of things' is a perspective in which 'things', the building blocks of 'facts' are excluded. One might, for example, describe a house as 10,000 bricks, mortar, timber, roof tiles and so on or just as a house without the constituents of the object, house, changing.

> Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable. (2.0271)

That 'objects are what is unalterable and subsistent' describes what 'objects are'. Therefore 'unalterable and subsistent' are qualities of 'objects'. Here then, 'objects, the unalterable and the subsistent'(2.027) can be 'distinguished' and are not 'one and the same' in this perspective.

I read 'their' here to refer to 'objects' and so I feel justified in re-writing the second part of this proposition as: it is the configuration of objects that is changing and unstable.

The 'configuration of objects' is 'states of affairs' which are 'facts' and, in proposition 2.023, I read that 'objects are just what constitute this unalterable form', that is the 'unalterable form' of 'the world'.

In my working through I suggested that perhaps 'objects' move from a 'space of possible states of affairs' into 'the world' when they combined with other 'objects' to form 'facts'. I also suggested that this movement could only happen once, since to add further 'objects' to 'the world' would alter its 'unalterable form'.

In proposition 2.0271, however, I read that 'the configuration' of 'objects' that is 'changing and unstable'. Since 'the world' has an 'unalterable form' which is derived from 'objects', all possible 'objects' must be in 'the world' to 'constitute' that 'form'.

However, if the 'configuration' of these 'objects' in 'facts' is 'changing and unstable', then an 'object' could be 'the world' as part of a 'fact' and then, when that 'fact' changed it would cease to be 'the world'. This would, as I read it, alter the unalterable again.

In order to think this through further I imagine a fact: a blue speck. This fact is a combination of the objects blue and speck. If this fact changes then I could be left with a colourless speck and a blue.

Since 'things' are not 'the world' these individual 'things' would, as I read it, be exiled to 'a space of possible states of affairs'. However, they cannot leave 'the world' without altering

its 'unalterable form'. So, 'a space of possible states of affairs' must be part of 'the world'.

Thus, in proposition 1.1, '[t]he world is the totality of facts, not of things', 'things' are not outside 'the world' even if they are not combined into 'facts'.

To return to my earlier exploratory example, I might say that a village is the totality of houses, not of bricks. The bricks, I would argue, are still in the village, I have simply chosen to define village as the totality of houses. So, from this perspective bricks do not count. In the narration of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* it now seems that 'the world is the totality of facts, not of things' does not mean that 'things' in 'a space of possible states of affairs' are excluded from the world. Rather that, from the perspective of this narration, 'things' do not 'determine' 'the world'.[59]

> The configuration of objects produces states of affairs. (2.0272)

This proposition confirms what I have read in relation to 'objects' and 'states of affairs'.

> In a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain. (2.03)

The world then is 'like' the totality of chains, not of links. As I understand it, a chain is a series of links which are connected to no more that two other links. If this is how 'objects' in 'states of affairs' are 'like the links of a chain' then, regardless of how many 'objects' make up a 'state of affairs', each 'object' would 'fit into' a maximum of two other 'objects'.

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[59] This reading seems to resolve the reading of proposition 1.1, but it leaves the possibility of a colourless speck and a 'blue' with nothing to colour. Also, this blue might be colourless!

Also, in a chain each link can 'fit into' its neighbouring links without changing the individual links. So, if this is also a way in which 'objects' in 'states of affairs' are 'like the links of a chain', when 'objects' 'fit into one another' the fitting does not change the individual objects.

In a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another. (2.031)

What is 'a determinate relation'? In 'relation' I read that the 'objects' are relative to one another in some way. 'Determinate' is defined[60] as having exact and discernible limits or form. Using this definition, I would argue that from the perspective of the narration it is possible to discern the 'relation' between 'objects' 'in a state of affairs'. In this reading, the 'state of affairs' and the 'objects' that constitute it are both discernible.

The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs. (2.032)

This proposition defines the 'structure of a state of affairs' as 'the determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs'. As I have read that '[i]n a state of affairs objects fit into one another like the links of a chain'(2.03), I infer that to be 'connected' here is to 'fit into one another' and that the 'structure' will in some way be 'like' a 'chain'.

Form is the possibility of structure. (2.033)

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[60] "Determinate, adj. and n." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2021. Web. 25 January 2022.

The 'possibility of structure' is, following on from proposition 2.032, 'the possibility of the structure' of 'the state of affairs'. Which is the possibility of objects combining in states of affairs. As I read in proposition 2.0121, 'if things can occur in states of affairs, this possibility must be in them from the beginning'. Also in proposition 2.012 I read that 'if a thing *can* occur in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself'. Therefore 'form' is the 'possibility' which is 'written into' objects.

As 'form is the possibility of structure' I might also read that 'structure' is the occurrence of possible 'form'. If object A has a form that would allow it to combine with object X then its possible structure in states of affairs might be written as AX. If state of affairs AX occurs then the possibility that was part of the form of A has become 'structure'.

The structure of a fact consists of the structures of states of affairs. (2.034)

Proposition 2 states that 'what is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs'. The 'existence of states of affairs' is, as I have read, the occurrence of possible 'form' and that occurrence is the structure of 'states of affairs'.

'The structure of a fact' is singular, whereas what it consists of, 'the structures of states of affairs' is plural. 'The structure of a fact' consists of the 'structures of' multiple 'states of affairs'.

The totality of existing states of affairs is the world. (2.04)

'All *possible* states of affairs' are 'given' if 'all objects are given', according to proposition 2.0124. Thus, the difference between 'all possible states of affairs' and 'the totality of existing states of affairs' would determine which 'states of affairs do not exist'. So, as I read it, the 'totality of existing states of affairs' 'determines' one boundary of the 'states of affairs' that 'do not exist'. The other boundary is determined by 'which states of affairs' could possibly exist, in that their possibility is 'written into' 'objects', but do not.

This reading assumes that the 'states of affairs' that 'do not exist' are possible 'states of affairs'. An alternative reading of this proposition extends what does not exist significantly. Rather than reading 'states of affairs' that 'do not exist' as 'possible' but not occurrent 'states of affairs', I could read them as any 'states of affairs', possible or impossible, that do not exist.

As I read in the preface, the 'aim of this book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather – not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts'(p.3). While I am unable to think of or express what an impossible 'state of affairs' might look like, according to my reading of this narration, there is, beyond what is expressible, a realm of nonsense. Perhaps then, 'the totality of existing states of affairs' might be imagined as being bounded by a circle. Outside the circle is another which contains the first circle and also all of the 'possible states of affairs' but not the 'existing' ones. Outside that circle is 'nonsense' which is an unbounded and inexpressible realm of impossible states of affairs.

> The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality. (We also call the existence of states of affairs a positive fact, and their non-existence a negative fact) (2.06)

Here, 'reality' is both the 'existence' and the 'non-existence' of 'states of affairs'. Depending on which reading of 'non-existence' I use, 'reality' could be all that exists and all that is possible but not existent, or alternatively, all that exists and all that is both possible and impossible. As I have read in previous propositions 'the existence of states of affairs' is 'a fact'(2). A 'positive fact' is also 'the existence of states of affairs', so 'a positive fact' has the same definition in this narration as a 'fact'.

A 'negative fact', by contrast, is the 'non-existence' of 'states of affairs'. Since I read in proposition 2 that 'what is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs' I had thought that the 'non-existence' of 'states of affairs' would not be a 'fact'. However, in proposition 2.06 I read that both the 'existence' and 'non-existence' of 'states of affairs' are 'facts'. Further, since '[t]he world is the totality of facts' it must contain all of the 'facts' both 'positive facts' and 'negative facts'. Which means, as I read it, that 'the world is' the totality of states of affairs that do and do not exist.

> States of affairs are independent of one another. (2.061)

In order to work through this proposition I will imagine objects a, b and c. These objects have 'written into' them the possibility of combining with each other. They could combine to form 'states of affairs' {ab}, {ac} or {bc} and also, because 'in states of affairs objects stand in determinate relations to one another' I should add {ba}, {ca} and {cb} as further possible 'states of affairs'. I had previously assumed that if 'state of affairs' {ab} had occurred then all of the other 'states of affairs' would be precluded. However, if '[s]tates of

affairs are independent of one another' then object a is not used up when it occurs in a 'state of affairs' and can also occur in other 'states of affairs'.

> From the existence or non-existence of one state of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence or non-existence of another. (2.062)

This proposition is, as I read it, similar to my own inferences drawn from my reading of the previous proposition. It appears to me, at this point in my reading of the narration, that even if I were to know every 'state of affairs', according to this proposition, I could not 'infer' that no further 'states of affairs' were in 'existence or non-existence'. If I were one 'state of affairs' away from knowing all of the existing 'states of affairs' then when I knew that final 'state of affairs' I would be able to infer that there were no further existing 'states of affairs'. However, this would be an inference about the existence of 'states of affairs' drawn from 'one state of affairs' and would, therefore, be impossible.

Thus, as I read it, because a 'fact – is the existence of states of affairs' I could not claim the there can be 'all the facts' without inferring from their 'totality' the non-existence of any further 'states of affairs'.

> The sum-total of reality is the world. (2.063)

I connect 'sum-total' with the 'positive' and 'negative facts' of proposition 2.06. Perhaps this 'sum' might be written: +facts + -facts = reality. In this sum I would subtract the 'negative facts' from the 'positive facts' and this would produce the 'sum-total', reality, which is 'the world'.

However, this reading would remove some 'states of affairs' from 'the world' which is 'the totality of facts'. Therefore, as I read it, the 'sum-total' must include all 'positive' and all 'negative' 'facts'.

In this chapter I have read that in logic everything is essential. This means that the possibility of states of affairs exists that possibility is written into the component parts of those states of affairs from the beginning. This raises the question: who does that writing? I suggest that one possible answer to that question is that because the fact written into its components the fact must exist prior to the beginning. If we take the tradition view then this would mean that facts exist before the beginning of an extra-textual universe. However, if this text is taken to be its own 'world' then 'the beginning' is simply the beginning of the text and it is the narration that writes the facts into the objects that constitute them.

The argument that there is truth in tautology also supports this reading in that 'objects' in this text must have the properties of 'objects' as defined in this text. However, this is not a reading of a universal truth of tautology. If, for example, I write that I can see a row of houses, a quantity surveyor may say that they see 10,000 bricks, 100 metres of timber, 10 tonnes of concrete etc, and a quantum physicist might 'see' 10^x sub-atomic particles. Here, the meaning of the sign 'row of houses' is one that is projected from the perspective. Thus, each perspective defines its own objects and what is written into them is an artefact of that projection. This reminds me of Donna Haraway's claim that '[r]ealism was a supreme achievement of the artifactual art of memory' [61] in that what is often understood as simply

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[61] Donna Haraway, *Primate Visions*, (New York: Routledge, 1989) p.41

'real' is, when read in this way, created by the perspective that asserts that reality, or as

Baudrillard writes 'it is the map that engenders the territory'.[62]

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[62] Jean Baudrillard, *Simulations*, translated by Paul Foss, Paul Patton and Philip Beitchman, (Los Angeles: Semiotext[e], 1983) p.2

Chapter 4 – We picture facts to ourselves

> We picture facts to ourselves. (2.1)

The narration here is a '[w]e' and in 'we picture' I read 'picture to be a verb, to 'picture' then is something that 'we' do. In this proposition 'facts' can be 'picture[d]' by the 'we', whereas in earlier propositions 'facts' have been what is, in this proposition 'we' do something to or with them. What 'we' do is to 'picture facts to ourselves' from which I infer that 'we' are multiple in that there is a 'we' who 'picture facts' and an 'ourselves' to whom 'facts' are 'picture[d]'. These 'selves' are 'ours'.

'We' here might be read as more than one person: my friend and I are we. If I 'picture a fact' to my friend are we picturing facts to ourselves? This seems unlikely. Therefore, I read 'we' to refer to people who are, from the perspective of the narration, in the same category as the 'I' of the narration in some way. Thus, I read 'we picture facts to ourselves' as a claim that a part of each 'I' that makes up the 'we' 'picture[s] facts' to another part of the same 'I', 'we' picture facts to be 'ourselves' is in this way the plural of 'I' picture facts to 'myself'.

> A picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence or non-existence of states of affairs. (2.11)

Here, a 'picture' is, as read it, a noun rather than a verb. In '[a] picture presents' I read either a making present or perhaps, in the sense of a presentation, a showing. In both cases in infer a perspective to which the 'situation in logical space' is 'present[ed]'.

The claim here is not that 'we' present in the way that 'we picture facts to ourselves'. Here, instead, it is the 'picture' that 'presents'. '[L]ogical space' is, in proposition 1.13, where 'the

facts' are. As I have read that '[t]he facts in logical space are the world' and that 'a fact – is the existence of states of affairs' I can extrapolate that a 'situation', which is the 'existence…of states of affairs' is a 'fact'. A 'situation' which is the 'non-existence of states of affairs' is not 'a fact' as defined in proposition 1.13. It is, however, a 'negative fact' as defined in proposition 2.06.

I can re-state proposition 2.11 as 'a picture presents' positive and negative facts. Although, I find it difficult to imagine how 'a picture presents' the 'non-existence of states of affairs', how could the non-existent be made present?

A picture is a model of reality. (2.12)

As I read in proposition 2.06, 'reality' is 'the existence and non-existence of states of affairs'. Therefore a 'picture is a model of' 'the existence and non-existence of states of affairs'. A 'model' might be defined as a replica, a prototype, an ideal, or a simplified description and all of these seem viable readings at this point in the text. However, as yet, I am unable to pin down my reading to a particular 'model'.

In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them. (2.13)

I read 'them' in this proposition to refer to 'objects'. If I read '[i]n a picture' to mean that everything in this proposition is '[i]n a picture' then both 'objects' and 'elements' would be '[i]n a picture'. I read in 'corresponding' that 'objects' and 'elements' are in some sense similar or analogous.

Since I have read that 'we picture facts to ourselves' and that 'facts' are derived from the relation of objects to one another, I read the claim in proposition 2.13 to be that '[i]n a picture' the 'fact' is 'picture[d]' because the 'objects' and 'elements of the picture' are 'corresponding'. If I read the 'objects' to be outside the 'picture' then the 'elements of the picture' would be 'corresponding to' 'objects' elsewhere.

> In a picture the elements of the picture are representatives of objects. (2.131)

In this and the previous proposition the 'elements of the picture' have been both 'corresponding to' and 'representatives of' 'objects'. I read that there is a difference in the relationship between 'objects' and 'elements' in these propositions. When they are 'corresponding' I imagine them to agree with one another in some way from a perspective. Whereas, when the 'elements' are 'representatives' of the 'objects' no comparison between 'objects' and 'elements' are made.

> What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way. (2.14)

A 'picture' here is not 'constitute[d]' by its 'elements'. 'What constitutes a picture' is the way in which 'its elements' are 'related to one another'. Thus, all of 'the elements' could be present, but if they are not 'related to one another in a determinate way' they could not be 'a picture'. I read in proposition 2.032 that the 'determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs'. A picture too has the requirement for its parts to be related to one another in a 'determinate way'. I wonder, therefore, if a picture might be similar in some way to the 'structure of [a] state of affairs'.

Having said that, 'a picture' here is not defined by its relation to objects[63], inside or outside the 'picture', but by the way 'elements' are 'related' to 'one another'.

> A picture is a fact. (2.141)

As I read in proposition 2, '[w]hat is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs'. Also, a state of affairs is defined as 'a combination of objects (things). Thus, I can extrapolate that 'a picture' is 'the existence of' a 'combination of objects'.

As I read it, the 'elements' of a 'picture' are differentiated from 'objects' and are 'representatives of objects'(2.131). So, despite a 'picture' not being 'objects' it contains their 'representatives' and is, 'according to proposition 2.141, 'a fact'. I infer that, in this narration, the 'existence of' the 'representatives of objects' is equivalent to the 'existence' of 'objects'.

> The fact that the elements of a picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in the same way.
> Let us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this structure the pictorial form of the picture. (2.15)

'The fact' here is 'that the elements of the picture are related to one another in a determinate way'. As I read it, this 'fact' is not a 'picture' nor is it a 'combination of objects'. It is a 'combination', if I read 'elements' being 'related to one another' as a 'combination', of 'elements' which are the 'representatives of objects'. It might be that these 'representatives

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[63] A picture will be defined later on, in 2.1513 onwards, as having to be related to 'reality'

of objects' also, in some way, confer 'existence' on the 'combination of objects' of which they are the 'representatives'. I suggest this because, in this narration, I read that in order to be represented the objects must first be present.

As I read in proposition 2.14, 'what constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way'. So, if the 'elements' were not 'related…in a determinate way' there would be no 'picture'. Here, it is not 'elements' that 'represent 'things' but rather the 'fact' of 'elements' being related that 'represents that objects are related in the same way'.

In '[l]et us call this connexion of its elements the structure of the picture' I read the narration to be an 'us'. From the perspective of the 'us' 'this connexion' is not 'the structure of the picture' but what this 'us' will 'call… the structure of the picture'. There is a similarity between 'the determinate way in which objects are combined in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs' in proposition 2.032 and the 'connexion of…elements' in this proposition. However, one of the differences is that while the way that objects are connected in proposition 2.032 'is the structure of states of affairs' [my underlining], in proposition 2.15 the 'connexion' is what the 'us' call 'the structure of the picture' rather than what it is.

I would speculate that, just as 'elements of the picture are the representatives of objects' and the relation of 'elements of a picture' represents 'that things are related to one another', this 'connexion' is represented by what the 'us' call it, 'the structure of the picture'.

The 'us' calls the 'possibility of this structure' the picture's 'pictorial form'. As I read in proposition 2.033, '[f]orm is the possibility of structure'. '[P]ictorial form' then, is the possibility of pictorial structure.

> Pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture. (2.151)

Here, 'pictorial form' is not what the 'us' will 'call the possibility of this structure'. 'Pictorial form' here 'is the possibility that things are related…'. What the 'us' will 'call' 'the structure of the picture' is the 'connexion' or relation of 'elements' to 'one another in a determinate way'.

Thus, as I read it, what the 'us' will 'call' 'pictorial form' in proposition 2.13 is not the same as what 'pictorial form' 'is' in proposition 2.151.

In proposition 2.151 'pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture'. In proposition 2.14 I read the '[w]hat constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way' and in proposition 2.031 that 'in a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another'. Since 'pictorial form' is the 'possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture', as I read it, both 'objects' and 'elements' are related in 'a determinate way' and therefore, the same way.

I have read in proposition 2.14 that having 'elements…related to one another in a determinate way' is what 'constitutes a picture'. If there is a 'picture' it must have 'elements…related…in a determinate way' otherwise it would not be 'constituted'. Therefore, if there is a 'picture', 'pictorial form' must exist. So, 'pictorial form' in a 'picture' is not a 'possibility' but a certainty.

> *That* is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it. (2.1511)

'[R]eality' has been defined, in proposition 2.06, as 'the existence or non-existence of states of affairs'. Therefore, 'a picture is attached' to 'the existence or non-existence of states of affairs'. I read '*that*' as a reference to the foregoing proposition. With that in mind, I read that 'how a picture is attached to reality' is related to the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of a picture. I am, as yet, unable to understand 'how a picture is attached to reality' based on the previous propositions.

In 'it reaches right out to it', 'it' appears twice. As I read it, the first 'it' is 'a picture' and the second 'it' is 'reality'. Thus, a picture reaches right out to reality. This 'reach[ing] out' seems to be constituted by the way that 'elements of a picture' are related to 'one another' in way that is similar to the way that 'things are related to one another'. That 'a picture is attached to reality' is not in question. It is the 'it', which I have read as the 'picture' that 'reaches'.

> It is laid against reality like a measure. (2.1512)

'It' here is, as I read it, a 'picture'. In this proposition it is not, as it was in the last proposition, the 'picture' that is actively 'reach[ing] right out'. Here 'it is laid against reality

like a measure'. What would it be to lay a 'picture' against 'the possibility of the existence or non-existence of states of affairs'?

I also read in this proposition that 'it', a 'picture', is not 'reality' and neither is it a 'measure', but it is 'laid…like a measure'. In this narration a 'picture' is 'attached to', 'laid against' and 'reaches right out to' 'reality'.

> Only the end points of the graduating lines actually *touch* the object that is to be measured. (2.15121)

Since neither 'a picture' or 'reality' has been defined as having 'graduating lines' I will assume for now that this proposition is describing 'a measure'. In particular, I read that the way that 'a picture' is 'laid against reality like a measure' is similar to this aspect of 'a measure'. This might mean that some unspecified part of a 'picture' corresponds with the 'end points of the graduating lines' of a 'measure' and that these pictorial end points '*touch* the object that is to be measured'. [64]

As I have read, 'a picture is a fact' and a 'fact' is 'the existence of states of affairs', therefore, a 'picture' is the existence of objects in relation to one another. Whereas, here, 'a picture' has physical attributes 'like a measure'.

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[64] To measure something is to compare it to a pre-determined scale, a measure. Here an object, I think in reality, is measured against a picture. This seems the opposite way to the way a picture is normally judged. If a picture represents reality, then how can it also be the measure of reality?

In this proposition *'touch'* is in italics. This might be read that *'touch'* is not a touch, in that a picture does not really touch 'the object to be measured'. Alternatively *'touch'* might be read as an emphasis so that *'touch'* is a more intimate kind of touch.

The 'graduating lines' are divisions on a 'measure' and have 'end points'.

I infer from 'the object to be measured' that a comparison is to be made between the 'measure', or perhaps the 'picture', and an 'object'. This comparison would require a perspective on the 'object' and what it is to be measured against.

> So a picture, conceived in this way, also includes the pictorial relationship, which makes it into a picture. (2.1513)

'[T]his way' is a 'way' of having 'conceived' a 'picture', from which I infer that there are other ways in which a 'picture' might be 'conceived'. I wonder if what is 'conceived' is the 'picture' having been 'laid against reality like a measure'(2.1512) and that 'only the end points of the graduating lines actually *touch* the object that is to be measured'(2.15121). Taking this as the 'way' a 'picture' has been 'conceived' for the moment, if a 'picture' is 'conceived in this way' then I read it to be imagined to be 'like a measure' and, therefore, to have 'conceived' is to have asserted a picture's similarity to 'a measure'.

However, regardless of how one reads 'this way', in this narration it is because 'a picture' is 'conceived in this way' that it 'also contains the pictorial relationship'. Hence it is the 'way' in which the 'picture' is 'conceived' that means it 'also includes the pictorial relationship'. Thus, as I read it, 'a picture' that is not 'conceived in this way' might not include 'the pictorial relationship'.

However, the proposition continues, 'which makes it into a picture'. So, as I read it, it is the 'way' that 'a picture' is 'conceived' that 'makes it into a picture'. 'A picture' here has something done to it, it is 'conceived in this way', and this is what 'makes it into a picture'. Yet it was 'a picture' prior to being made 'into a picture'. So, either being 'conceived in this way' does nothing, what was a picture is made into itself, or an unconceived ' picture' is not 'a picture'.

> The pictorial relationship consists of the correlation of the picture's elements with things. (2.1514)

In this proposition and in previous propositions 'a picture' is 'a picture' because it is related to 'reality' either by being 'laid against reality like a measure' or because 'things' and 'the elements of the picture' are 'related to one another in the same way'. In each case there is a perspective that can compare 'a picture' with 'reality' and know which is 'a picture' and which is 'reality'. A 'picture' can be 'attached to reality' and 'the elements of a picture are the representatives of objects', but they are not so similar as to be indistinguishable. A 'picture' as I read in proposition 2.1513 'also includes the pictorial relationship'. Thus the 'picture' 'includes' what 'consists of the correlations of the picture's elements with things'. In proposition 2.1511 I read that 'a picture' 'reaches right out to [reality]'. In this proposition, 2.1514, I read something of that 'reach[ing]'. Here, rather than there being a 'a picture', 'reality' and an third position from which the two can be compared, there are only two positions: 'reality' and 'a picture' which, when 'conceived in this way' 'includes' what 'consists of the correlations of the picture's elements with things'. Thus the perspective on both the 'picture's elements' and 'reality' is included within the 'picture'. If then a 'picture'

is 'conceived in this way' it automatically, in the sense that it acts by itself without an external correlating perspective, makes the 'correlation of the picture's elements with things'.

> These correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the picture's elements, with which the picture touches reality. (2.1515)

Here the 'picture touches reality' whereas in proposition 2.15121 'the graduating lines actually *touch* the object'. From the 'as it were' in this proposition I infer that '[t]hese correlations are [not] the feelers of the picture's elements, with which the picture touches reality'. As I wrote earlier, I read 'as it were' to be a claim that the statement describes a situation improperly, but not entirely so.

My argument here is not that I know that this proposition is incorrect, rather that, as I read it, the narration itself, in 'as it were' denies the accuracy of its own proposition.
In this proposition, which is, 'as it were' under erasure, the 'correlations of the picture's elements with things' are the 'feelers of the picture's elements'. Here the 'picture's elements' have 'feelers' with which, as I read it, the 'picture' actively seeks out 'reality', 'it reaches right out to it'. Thus, the claim is that a 'picture' 'touches reality' with 'the feelers of the picture's elements' without any external perspective. Although I read that the narration is itself a perspective on that 'touch'.

> If a fact is to be a picture, it must have something in common with what it depicts. (2.16)

According to proposition 2.141 '[a] picture is a fact'. However in this proposition whether a 'picture is a fact' relies on it fulfilling the condition that 'it must have something in common with what it depicts'.

As I have read in proposition 2.131, 'the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects'. If what a 'picture' 'depicts' is what its 'elements' represent then a 'picture' would 'depict' 'objects' in 'states of affairs' and 'objects' in 'existing states of affairs' are 'facts'. In this reading, 'if a fact is to be a picture' then its 'elements' must 'have something in common' with the 'objects' that are depicted.

Since I have read several times that it is the 'elements of the picture' that '[reach] right out ' and 'touch' 'reality' what a 'picture' has 'in common with what it depicts' is not a commonality that is viewed from outside the depicting. Rather the 'picture', if it has 'something in common with what it depicts', sends out 'the feelers of the pictures elements' and 'touches' the 'things' of 'reality'. I am unsure how this fits with the claim, in proposition 2.1 that '[w]e picture facts to ourselves', since in this later depiction 'we' do not picture or depict.

> There must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts, to enable the one to be a picture of the other at all. (2.161)

Whilst there 'must be something identical in a picture and what it depicts' if they were to 'have the whole set of their properties in common' it would 'quite impossible to indicate one of them'. For me, the questions here are what must be 'identical' 'to enable the one to

be a picture of the other'? And what must be non-identical in order that the 'picture' can be differentiated from 'what it depicts'?

I am unsure how to read 'at all' in this proposition. The claim seems to me to be complete without this supplemental 'at all'. Yet, of course, 'at all' is part of the proposition. In 'to enable' I read that both the 'picture' and 'what it depicts' are pre-existing and that it is the 'something identical' that they share that 'enable[s] the one to be a picture of the other'.

> What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it –
> correctly or incorrectly – in the way it does, is its pictorial form. (2.17)

I have read in proposition 2.151 that 'pictorial form is the possibility that things are related to one another in the same way as the elements of a picture'. Setting aside 'in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly' for the moment, I read that '[w]hat a picture must have in common with reality…is its pictorial form'. Thus, 'a picture' and 'reality' share a common 'form'.

In 'reality' 'form is the possibility of structure'(2.033) and the 'determinate way in which objects are connected in states of affairs is the structure of states of affairs'(2.0232). In 'a picture' 'form' is 'pictorial form' and 'the elements of a picture are the representatives of objects'(2.131). Thus, as I read it, it is the ability of elements of a picture to be related to one another in the same way as the objects of 'reality' are related to one another that makes 'a picture' 'able to depict' 'reality'.

This ability to 'depict' 'reality' relies upon there being 'correlations of the pictures elements with things' and a picture's 'pictorial form'. If I imagine two objects A and B, combined as a 'fact' AB, and make their relationship that A is to the left of B, then I can imagine pictorial elements A and B in the same relationship making the picture AB which represents the 'things' in 'reality'. My imagined picture AB is, as I read it, a correct depiction of AB because its 'elements' correlate and it shares the same 'form' with A being to the left of B. How could I 'depict it' incorrectly? If AB was depicted as CD then it would not contain 'the correlations of the picture's elements with things' (2.1514), but the relationship between the elements of the picture, C is to the left of D, is the same as the relationship between the 'things' A and B.

If instead I keep the pictorial elements AB but reverse them, BA, then the 'elements' are the same but the pictorial form has changed and is not 'able to depict' AB. In either case, when 'reality' is depicted 'incorrectly' the resultant picture is not, as I read it, 'a picture' as defined by this narration. It either lacks 'pictorial form'(2.1514) or 'the pictorial relationship'(2.1513) and, therefore lacks 'what makes it into a picture'(2.1513) or what makes it 'able to depict [reality]'(2.17).

> A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc. (2.171)

I wonder if my imagined picture AB might be described as a spatial picture because one element is to the left of the other, which I read as a spatial relationship. If this is so, then my reading of proposition 2.17 is perhaps too restrictive. Perhaps AB could be a depiction of any two 'objects' where one is to the left of the other. Thus a 'spatial picture' would only

'depict' the spatial relationship of the object to one another and not the 'objects'

themselves. So, any 'pictorial element' that was to the left of any other 'pictorial element'

would be read as a 'spatial picture' of AB.

A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it. (2.172)

To begin at the end of this proposition, I read 'it displays it' as '[a picture] displays [that

picture's] pictorial form. This reading shares something in common with my reading of 'a

spatial picture' in proposition 2.171 in that 'it' and 'it' depict 'a picture' and 'its pictorial

form'. The 'form' here is not 'pictorial form' because the relationship between 'it' and 'it' is

that the first 'it' 'displays' the second.

What is different between 'depict' and 'displays'? As I read it, to 'depict' in this narration is

what 'a picture' does to 'represent' the 'objects' of 'reality'. Thus, to 'depict' is to create a

depiction. To 'display' is to reveal something that already exists. A picture's 'pictorial form'

is not an 'object' from 'reality' that can be 'represent[ed]'. However, as I have read,

'pictorial form' does represent the way that 'objects stand in a determinate relation to one

another' in 'states of affairs'(2.031) so 'pictorial form' itself is a representation.

A picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its
representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or
incorrectly. (2.173)

It's those 'its' again! The 'its' here I read as the 'picture's'. So, '[a] picture represents [that

picture's] subject'. The 'it' might be read as '[a] picture' or 'its subject'. If a 'picture'

'represents its subject' from a point outside of 'its subject' then its 'representational form' is

what I read as the picture's perspective. If, for example, I take 'a picture represents' to be a 'picture' then its subject is 'a picture' and the narration is a perspective, or the 'representational form', on that subject which can be read from the text of the picture. If, alternatively, I read 'a picture represents [a picture's] subject from a point outside [that picture]' then what I have read as the picture's 'representational form' would not be available to be read from the picture. (Its standpoint is its representational form.) As I am able to read this 'representational form' I will assume that 'a picture represents its subject from a point outside [the subject]' but inside the picture.

This would mean that, although the 'picture' does not 'depict' its 'standpoint' the 'standpoint' can be read from the 'picture' because the 'picture' 'displays'(2.172) that 'standpoint'. This 'standpoint' is, according to this narration 'its representational form' and here I will assume that 'its' is the picture's, therefore, the picture's 'representational form'.

'That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly'. What here is 'that'? I am unable to read in '(its standpoint is its representational form)' a reason that 'a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly'. Therefore, as I read it, the reason 'a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly' must be that 'a picture represents its subject from a position outside it'. As I read it then, 'a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly' because it 'represents its subject from a position outside' the 'subject' but inside the 'picture'. However, I am not yet able to understand why this is the case. Perhaps the position of the 'I' in 'reality' must be the same as the 'standpoint' in the 'picture' in order for the picture to be a 'correct' 'representation'. If AB is represented from behind it might be

AB̄ . This would fulfil the criteria of having some elements in the same relationship,

therefore still be a picture of AB, but be 'incorrect' nonetheless.

A picture cannot, however, place itself outside its representational form. (2.174)

The 'representational form' of a 'picture' is 'its standpoint'. That is, the position in the

picture from which the picture's 'subject' is represented. Thus, as I read it, this

'representational form' is an essential part of the 'picture'. As I understand it,

'representational form' is the perspective on the 'subject'. Therefore, 'a picture' might

'depict' its 'subject' from any 'position' but it must always do so from some position. The

alternative would be 'a picture' without a position from which the 'picture' 'depicts' its

'subject' or a 'position' which is not part of the 'picture'. Perhaps it would be worthwhile to

imagine what 'a picture' would need to do in order to place itself beyond its

'representational form.'

A 'picture' 'displays' its 'pictorial form' in a way that allows me to read from the 'picture' the

'position' from which the 'subject' is depicted. Using my example of the 'object' AB I can

imagine a picture which represents this as AB. I will call the 'position' from which the AB is

depicted front. However, I can also imagine changing the 'position' that AB is depicted from

to one that I will call back looking like AB̄ . Would it then be possible to change the

'position' again so that the 'standpoint' itself could be 'depicted'?

The answer is no. I could move the 'standpoint' so that 'a picture' would include the

position's back and front, but these would then be part of the 'subject' of a new 'picture'.

Regardless of how many times I try to pull back the 'representational form' the 'picture' can never achieve a position beyond itself. It cannot have a perspective on itself or outside itself.

> What any picture, of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality. (2.18)

Reading this proposition alongside proposition 2.04, 'the totality of existing states of affairs is the world', and proposition 2.063, 'the sum total of reality is the world', I read that in this narration 'the world' is defined as 'the totality' of logical forms because a 'state of affairs' is 'a fact' and 'a fact' is what 'is the case' and the 'world is all that is the case'. Thus, in this narration, 'logical form' is what 'the world' is made of. It follows, as I read it, that any 'picture' that seeks to represent this 'world' would need a similar 'logical form'.

Also, because this narration is, as I read it, 'a picture' of this 'reality' it cannot 'place itself outside its representational form'. Therefore, 'reality' here is 'the world' that is 'all that is the case' in this text. If I were to create a world where everything is blue then a picture in and of that world would necessarily be blue too[65]. This would not mean that some other reality must be blue, it is a world unto itself, just as the logical world of the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* is a world within the text.

> A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture.
> As I have read in proposition 2.18 that 'a picture' must have 'logical form' 'in order to be able to depict [reality]' and that 'a picture is a fact', I would suggest that in order

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[65] Perhaps this 'shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved' (p.4).

to be 'a picture' in this narration 'a picture' must be 'a logical picture'. Otherwise, it would not be possible 'that things in reality are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture' and that possibility is 'pictorial form'. (2.181)

Every picture is *at the same time* a logical one. (On the other hand, not every picture is, for example, a spatial one) (2.182)

This proposition agrees with my reading of proposition 2.181 in that 'every picture is… a logical one'. It also adds that '*at the same time'* as being a 'logical' 'picture' 'every picture' is also a different kind of picture, 'for example, a spatial one'. As I read it, being 'a logical [picture]' is essential to what it is to be 'a picture' in this narration. Here it is also essential that a 'picture is *at the same time*' also some other kind of picture. Thus, a picture cannot be solely a 'logical one' but must also be, 'for example, a spatial one' simultaneously. This being two types of 'picture' '*at the same time'* is, as I read it, also essential to what 'a picture' is in this narration.

Logical pictures can depict the world. (2.19)

In this narration proposition 2.19 can be derived from the preceding propositions. In 2.182 I read that any picture is 'logical one' and, in proposition 2.1514, it is the 'correlations of the pictures elements with things' that 'makes it into a picture'.

In this chapter we 'we' and 'ourselves' are separate in that 'we' picture facts to 'ourselves'. What 'we' represent in this case is tautological in that an object is an object because that is what 'we' represent an object to be to ourselves.

In my reading what a picture is a similar claim arises: that a picture must be pictorial. A picture is also described as being like a measure of reality. However, because both picture and reality are aspects of this text both are defined within the *Tractatus*. The *Tractatus* itself then might be understood to be a picture of reality and as such cannot have a perspective on or beyond itself. The *Tractatus* then might be viewed as a world unto itself and the source of its own etymology.

Chapter 5 – A Picture has a logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts

> A picture has a logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts. (2.2)

As I have read, any 'picture' must have a logical form and 'pictorial form is the possibility that thing are related to one another in the same way as the elements of the picture' (2.151).

However, in 'logico-pictorial form' I can read that 'a picture' is logical and pictorial '*at the same time*' (2.182). Thus, 'pictorial form' and 'logical form' are separate forms. I have read 'what constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way' (2.14) as a claim that 'pictorial form' is the possibility of 'a structure' which is logical. This means that my reading of 'pictorial form' is derived from 'logical form' and, therefore, 'logico-pictorial form' is not two separate and independent forms but rather one hyphenated form with each side dependent upon the other.

> A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence or non-existence of states of affairs. (2.201)

Proposition 2.11 states that 'a picture presents a situation in logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs'. As I read it, much of what is written in proposition 2.201 is a repetition of this earlier proposition. However, 'a picture depicts reality by representing' is different to 'a picture presents a situation'. The 'situation' presented is, as I read it, a 'state of affairs'. I also read that to 'depict reality by representing' is to 'present'.

2.202   A picture represents a possible situation in logical space.

Again, this proposition is largely a repetition of what was written in proposition 2.11 if I read

the 'possible situation' to be 'the existence and non-existence of states of affairs'.

A picture contains the possibility of the situation it represents. (2.203)

As I read it, the claim here is not that the 'objects' that are represented are 'contain[ed]'

within the picture. Rather, that the 'elements' in the 'picture' that 'represent' those

'objects' in 'reality' are arranged in such a way that there are 'correlations of the picture's

elements with things' (2.1514).

A picture agrees with reality or it fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false.
(2.21)

In this proposition I read that if a 'picture' 'agrees with reality' the it is 'correct and 'true'

and if a 'picture' 'fails to agree' then it is 'incorrect' and 'false'. However, in

'representational form' I read that there is a 'standpoint' from which the 'subject is

represented'. Thus, I wonder whether 'a picture agrees with reality or fails to agree'

depends on perspective.

What a picture represents it represents independently of its truth or falsity, by
means of its pictorial form. (2.22)

As I have read, 'pictorial form' is 'the possibility' of a 'structure' in which 'the elements of a

picture are related to one another in a determinate way [that] represents that things are

related to one another in the same way.' Thus, in a 'correct' 'picture' 'elements' and 'things' are 'related to one another in the same way' (2.15). However, in a false 'picture' 'things' and 'elements' would not be 'related to one another in the same way' (2.151). A false 'picture' would not have 'correlations of the picture's objects with things' (2.151) and would, therefore, lack the 'pictorial relationship' 'which makes it into a picture' (2.1513). It might be argued that a false 'picture' of a situation could be a true 'picture' of a different situation, which would avoid the contradiction I read between this proposition and propositions 2.1513 and 2.1514. However, this would mean that no picture is ever false, it is just being 'laid against' the wrong 'reality' (2.1512). This reading suggests to me that the 'standpoint' which is the picture's 'representational form' would be important in deciding whether a 'picture' 'depicts' a certain 'state of affairs'.

What a picture represents is its sense. (2.221)

In proposition 2.202 'a picture represents a possible situation in logical space'; in proposition 2.173 'a picture represents its subject from a position outside it' and in proposition 2.131 'in a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects'. Thus I can read the 'sense' of a 'picture' to be 'objects' in 'a possible situation in logical space' depicted 'from a position outside' that situation.

The agreement or disagreement of the sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity. (2.222)

If I continue my reading of 'sense' from the previous proposition then the 'truth or falsity' of 'a picture' would be judged by whether the 'objects' in 'reality' are the same as the

'elements' in the 'picture', whether the 'situation' of the 'objects' in the 'picture' is the same as in 'reality' and whether the 'position outside' of the 'situation' is the same in the 'picture' as it is in 'reality'.

> In order to tell whether a picture is true of false we must compare it with reality. (2.223)

In this comparison 'we' would need to occupy the 'standpoint' in 'reality' that corresponds with the 'representational form' of the 'picture'.

> It is impossible to tell from a picture alone whether it is true or false. (2.224)

This is because 'In order to tell whether a picture is true of false we must compare it with reality' (2.223). However, as I have read, if a 'picture' has all of the attributes that it requires to be a 'picture' then it must be 'true' of some 'reality' otherwise it fails to be a picture.

> There are no pictures that are true a priori. (2.225)

Extending my reading of the previous propositions I would argue that, in this narration, all 'pictures' that are 'pictures' are true for some arrangement of objects in logical space from a certain position. However, in this proposition my reading is contradicted. Thus, even if I can read from the propositions that a picture must be true to be a picture, that cannot be known to be the case until the picture has been compared with its matching reality from the correct perspective.

In this chapter I have read that a picture has a combined logico-pictorial form. This reading suggests that there might be some overlap between a logical perspective and a pictorial perspective or that there is a third logico-pictorial perspective.

I also read that a picture can be true or false depending on how it agrees with reality. However, there are a possible three perspectives from which to compare a picture with and, therefore, what a picture presents will be compared with a different reality depending on the perspective of the comparison. If one occupies the same standpoint in relation to reality as that defined in the representational form of the picture then, according to the narration, one can compare that picture with reality. However, the picture itself is viewed from a perspective that is not entirely defined by its representational form. Here then whether a picture is true when compared to reality will be a function of a perspective on both.

Chapter 6 – A logical picture of facts is a thought

> A logical picture of facts is a thought. (3)

I read in the preface that 'the truth of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive' (TLP, p.4). If the 'thoughts that are here communicated' are 'logical picture[s] of facts' then their truth could not be 'a priori'. Therefore, the narration would have had to compare these 'thoughts' with 'reality' and found a match in order to make any claim about their 'truth'.

> 'A state of affairs is thinkable': what this means is that we can picture it to ourselves. (3.001)

I read 'it' here to be a 'state of affairs'. In this proposition "'a state of affairs is thinkable'" is a quotation. I read this as the narration's claim that these five words are in some way not part of this narration, but are rather from elsewhere. However, the proposition continues 'what this means is that we can picture facts to ourselves'. In order to read that "'a state of affairs is thinkable'" means 'that we can picture [that state of affairs] to ourselves', I read that it must be 'we' who are being quoted. If it were someone else quoted saying 'a state of affairs is thinkable' then it would be 'they' rather than 'we' who 'can picture it'. In this reading the 'we' is quoting itself and then explaining what 'we' mean when we say "'a state of affairs is thinkable'". Also, I read that 'we' are not 'ourselves'[66].

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[66] The narration has been 'I' and 'we' and 'ourselves' which I read as multiple perspectives. Given that, how does the 'standpoint' of 'representational form' move between them, or not? If a 'thought' is a 'picture' that contains within it its own 'standpoint' then these shifts in 'standpoint' seem essential to any understanding of the relation between 'thoughts' and 'things'.

If 'we can picture [a state of affairs] to ourselves' then it is 'thinkable' and, as I read in the preface, 'the aim of this book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather not to thought but to the expression of thoughts'(TLP, p.3) and later 'it will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense' (TLP, p.4). I would suggest that anything that is 'thinkable' is a 'thought' and some 'thoughts' are 'on the other side of the limit' of expressibility in language. I wonder if a 'logical picture of facts' which is 'a thought' can also be 'nonsense' or whether, if it is 'logical' it must fall within that limit.

The totality of true thoughts is a picture of the world. (3.01)

As I read it, if a 'true thought' is a true 'picture' which can only be confirmed by comparison with 'reality' this proposition is also true. However, to say that the totality of all representations of the world that have been proven to be correct by comparison with that world is 'a picture of the world' does little more than confirm the outcome of a reading of the foregoing propositions.

A thought contains the possibility of the situation of which it is a thought. (3.02)

As I have read, 'a thought' in this narration is 'a logical picture of facts' a 'fact' is 'the existence of states of affairs' and also 'a picture is a fact'. I can, using the definitions drawn from this narration, read proposition 3.02 as 'a [logical picture of the existence of states affairs] contains the possibility of the situation of which it is the [logical picture of the existence of states of affairs]'.

Using the definition of 'thought' that I have read in these propositions I would argue that

not only does a 'thought contain the possibility of the situation of which it is a thought' but,

because a 'thought' is 'a logical picture of the existence of states of affairs' any 'states of

affairs' that can be 'thought' must be in 'existence' and therefore be 'a fact'. Thus, in this

narration what is thinkable is.[67]

> Thought can never be of anything illogical, since, if it were, we should think illogically.
> (3.03)

Given that I have read 'thought' to be 'a logical picture of the existence of states of affairs' it

follows that 'thought' as defined in this narration must be 'logical'.

However, I would also note that 'thought' in the preface extends beyond what is expressible

in language. It might then be that when the limit is drawn in language it is drawn in such a

way that what is within the limit can be 'thought' as 'a logical picture of the existence of

states of affairs' whereas what is 'nonsense' cannot be 'thought' in this way. Is there,

perhaps, a different kind of thought that is not expressible?

> It used to be said that God could create anything except what would be contrary to
> the laws of logic. – The truth is that we could not *say* what an 'illogical' world would
> look like. (3.031)

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[67] This reminds me of Descartes' Cogito. I have often thought that in 'I think therefore I am'
the two 'I's cancel each other out rather like having the same figure on either side of an
equation. If I do that then I am left with 'think therefore am', or perhaps thought therefore
being, which seems very close to my reading of proposition 3.02 as thought therefore
existence.

It is no longer said that 'God could create anything except what would be contrary to the laws of logic', but it 'used to be'. This is 'what used to be said' rather than the current 'truth' of the narration. 'The truth is that we could not *say* what an "illogical" world would look like' is a retrospective narration of what 'we could not *say*'. I wonder if '*say*' in this proposition is in italics to emphasise that this is a matter of the limits of language, it is not possible for us to '*say*' what is '"illogical"'. '"illogical"' is marked out from the rest of the proposition. However, if 'we' cannot say what is illogical, why would a limit in language be necessary?

> It is as impossible to represent in language anything that 'contradicts logic' as it is in geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space, or to give the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist. (3.032)

As I read it, this proposition contradicts itself. If it is 'impossible to represent in logic anything that "'contradicts logic"' then the phrase "'contradicts logic"' would be 'impossible' in that it 'represent[s]' in language, which in this narration is logical, that which "'contradicts logic"'. I infer from the fact that "'contradicts logic"' is in quotation marks that "'contradicts logic"' is in some way not part of the narration from the perspective of the narration. However, even if I accept that "'contradicts logic"' is an import from another narration or is a phrase from which this narration seeks to distance itself, it is still, in my reading, part of this narration.

I have assumed that 'to represent in language anything that "contradicts logic"' is impossible. However, it is 'as impossible' 'as it is in geometry to represent by its co-ordinates a figure that contradicts the laws of space or to give the co-ordinates of a point

that does not exist'. Since I do not know how 'impossible' these things are in this narration, other than they share their level of impossibility with 'represent[ing] in language anything that "contradicts logic"', then my assumption could be incorrect. As an example it might be said that 'in geometry' no point exists until the 'co-ordinates' of that point are given in which case 'to give the co-ordinates of a point that does not exist' would be an everyday occurrence 'in geometry'.

> Though a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics can be represented by us spatially, on that would contravene the laws of geometry cannot. (3.0321)

As I read it, 'a state of affairs that would contravene the laws of physics' would not 'contravene the laws of geometry' and could, therefore, 'be represented by us spatially'. A 'spatial' representation is bound by 'the laws of geometry' but not by 'the laws of physics'. The claim here is that the 'us' must follow 'the laws of geometry' when representing 'states of affairs' 'spatially' because 'the laws of geometry' govern spatial representations.

> If a thought were correct a priori, it would be a thought whose possibility ensured its truth. (3.04)

In proposition 2.225 I read that 'there are no pictures that are true a priori' and in proposition 3 that 'a logical picture of facts is a thought'. From my reading of these propositions I would assert that there are no 'pictures' and, therefore, no 'thoughts' that are 'correct a priori'. I would also suggest that in this narration in order to be 'correct' a 'thought' must be 'true'.

Proposition 3.04 contradicts my earlier readings in that here it is possible that a 'thought' might be 'correct' before 'we…compare it with reality'(2.223) even though 'it is impossible to tell from the picture alone whether it is true or false'(2.225). However, perhaps in proposition 3.04 the claim is that a 'thought' cannot be 'correct a priori' because in order to be so in that 'it would be a thought whose possibility ensures its truth'.

> A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible only if its truth was recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to compare it with). (3.05)

'A priori knowledge that a thought was true' would negate the necessity to 'compare it with reality'. Therefore a 'thought' that was 'true' 'a priori' would be a thought whose truth or falsity would require no external validation. It occurs to me that, perhaps, only a tautology would require no comparison in this way.

In this short chapter I have read that, from the perspective of this narration, what is thinkable must exist. I have also read that the laws of geometry, logic and physics are limited in that they apply only their own realm. The laws of geometry etc are not generally applicable. This, in my reading, undermines the notion that the laws 'in logic' of the *Tractatus* should be or can be applied to something beyond the text.

Chapter 7 – In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses

> In a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses. (3.1)

Proposition 3.1 is a proposition that describes 'a proposition'. 'In a proposition a thought finds an expression' is not a claim that the narration finds a way of expressing a thought in a way that 'can be perceived by the senses', here it is 'a thought' that 'finds an expression'.

The 'expression' that 'a thought finds' 'in a proposition' 'can be perceived by the senses'. If proposition 3.1 is a proposition then it too can be perceived by the senses. It might be tempting here to say that I am able to see proposition 3.1 in my book and can therefore confirm that it can be 'perceived' by my 'senses'. However, that would require me to assume that my ideas of perception, expression and proposition are the same as those in the text.

The claim that 'a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses' is 'in a proposition' and is, therefore, in the text. Thus proposition 3.1 is true in this text. However, as yet I do not know what 'senses' are in this text except that they are what the expression of a 'thought' 'can be perceived by' 'in a proposition'.

> We us the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc) as a projection of a possible situation.
> The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition. (3.11)

Here it is not that 'a thought finds an expression' but rather it is 'we' who 'use the perceptible sign of a proposition...as a projection'. As I read it, there is 'a thought' that is 'thinkable' because the 'situation' is 'possible' (or perhaps the 'situation' is 'possible' because it is 'thinkable') (3.02). This 'thought' 'finds an expression' that can be 'perceived by the senses' 'in a proposition' (3.1). However, it is not the 'proposition' that 'can be perceived by the senses' but the 'perceptible sign of the proposition' which is 'a projection of a possible situation'.

Since it is 'we' that 'use the perceptible sign of a proposition...as a projection' I read that it is also 'we' who employ the 'method of projection'. Thus when 'we' 'think of the sense of the proposition' that is 'a projection of a possible situation'.

If the 'sense of a proposition' is similar to the 'sense of a picture' then I know from my reading of proposition 2.221 that 'what a picture represents is its sense' and from proposition 2.22 that 'the agreement or disagreement of its [a picture's] sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity'. One difference between 'a picture' and 'a proposition' is that 'a picture' 'represents...its sense' whereas 'the perceptible sign of a proposition' is 'a projection of its 'sense' rather than a 'representation'.

> I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign. – And a
> proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world. (3.12)

Here the narration is an 'I' and 'the sign with which we express a thought' is not 'a propositional sign' but is rather what 'I call' 'a propositional sign'. In the last proposition,

proposition 3.11, I read that 'the perceptible sign of a proposition' is '(spoken or written etc)'. Thus, what 'I call the sign' can be read as the '(spoken or written etc)' 'perceptible sign' 'with which we express a thought'. If I take proposition 1 as an example, I can read '[t]he world is all that is the case' to be a proposition, as defined in this text, 'and a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world'. Thus '[t]he world is all that is the case' is 'the sign with which we express a thought' and 'we' are the narration of this text.

However, 'a proposition is a propositional sign' only in a certain circumstance, it is 'a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world'. Here I can only ask, what is it to 'express a thought'? And what is a proposition's 'projective relation to the world'?

> A proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected. (3.13)

I will assume, for now, that 'a proposition' here is similar to the 'individual propositions' described in the footnote to proposition 1. Based on that assumption I can further assume that what I have been reading in this text is the 'perceptible' 'written' 'sign of a proposition'. So, I have not been reading 'individual propositions' but rather their 'written' 'sign'.
If this is the case then this text might be read as 'the propositional sign' 'with which we express a thought', but only if my reading creates the necessary 'projective relation to the world'.

If a 'proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected' then what is it that 'the projection includes'? I have read that 'we use the perceptible sign of a

proposition...as a projection of a possible situation' (3.11), and that the narration calls 'the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign...in its projective relation to the world' (3.12) and that 'the method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition' (3.11). From this I would suggest that a 'projection includes' 'a possible situation' or perhaps the 'thought' of 'a possible situation' since 'the method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition'. Therefore, 'a proposition' would also include 'a possible situation' or the 'thought' of that situation. However, a 'proposition includes all that the projection includes, but not what is projected'.

Proposition 3.13 continues '[t]herefore, though what is projected is not itself included, its possibility is'. As I have read it, either 'a situation' or the 'thought' of that 'situation is 'projected', therefore, a 'proposition' would contain either the 'possibility' of the 'thought' of a 'situation' or the 'possibility' of the 'situation', but not the 'thought' or the 'situation'.

The narration continues, '[a] proposition, therefore, does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it.' Here, 'actually' stands out in my reading as a supplement, what difference does it make to the text? '[a] proposition, therefore, does not[...] contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it' seems to me complete. I wonder if 'actually' is a claim to 'reality' rather than 'possibility'. I have read in proposition 2.022 that there can be a 'real-world' and in proposition 2.06 that the 'existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality'. I have also read in proposition 2.221 that 'what a picture represents is its sense', in proposition 2.222 that '[t]he agreement or disagreement of its [a picture's] sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity', in

proposition 3 that '[a] logical picture of facts is a thought' and, in proposition 3.1, that '[i]n a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses'.

With all of that in mind I can read that a proposition here is where a 'thought' which is a 'logical' 'picture' of a 'state of affairs' 'finds expression'. If I assume for the moment that I can read a 'proposition' and its 'sense' is 'expressed' in a way that I can understand I cannot have 'actually' encountered 'its sense' because the 'proposition' does not 'actually contain its sense'.

Thus, 'the possibility of expressing [its sense]' is not the possibility of reading the proposition's 'sense', which is not 'actually contain[ed]' in the 'proposition'. Perhaps 'expressing it' is a further movement from 'picture' to 'thought' to 'proposition' to 'an expression that can be perceived by the senses'. As I read it, the 'expression that can be perceived by the senses' does not guarantee 'expression' but only 'the possibility of expressing'.

'The perceptible sign of a proposition' is, in this narration, where 'a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses' (3.11). However, in proposition 3.13 a 'proposition...does contain the possibility of expressing [its sense]'. I wonder then what it is that makes a proposition into a propositional sign. Perhaps in the 'projective relation to the world' there is something that completes the projection.

Proposition 3.13 continues, "('the content of a proposition' means the content of a proposition that has sense')". In these parentheses, which I read to differentiate this

definition from the rest of the proposition, "'the content of a proposition'" is a quotation.

Further, "'the content of a proposition'" does not mean the content of a proposition, rather it 'means the content of a proposition that has sense'. I find this definition confusing. First, if it means 'the content of a proposition that has sense' why not simply call it 'the content of a proposition that has sense'? Secondly, does 'the content of a proposition that has sense' mean all of the content of a proposition if that proposition has sense? Or, alternatively, does it mean that a proposition could have a quarter of its content that 'has sense' and the other three quarters would not have sense and therefore not be "'the content of a proposition'"?

The narration goes on, '[a] proposition contains the form, but not the content, of its sense.' In proposition 2.022 I read that 'an imagined world' and a 'real one must have *something* – a form – in common' and in proposition 2.023 that 'objects are just what constitute this unalterable form'. As I read it, there is, in 'form' something that is passed from 'object' to 'picture' to 'thought' to 'proposition' to 'propositional sign' and that makes 'expression' possible.[68]

> What constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand in a
> determinate relation to one another. (3.14)

This proposition is similar to proposition 2.14, 'what constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way', and also proposition 2.031, 'in a state of affairs objects stand in a determinate relation to one another'. I read that a 'state of

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[68] For a further examination of 'form' see my reading of propositions 4.014 and 4.0141.

affairs', 'a picture' and 'a propositional sign' all share the property of being made up of parts, whether 'objects', 'elements' or 'words' that 'stand in a determinate relation to one another'. In proposition 3.14 the 'elements' of a 'propositional sign' are, as I read it, '(the words)'. Here I read the parentheses are marking 'the words' as an explanation of what 'its elements' are.

Proposition 3.14 continues, 'a propositional sign is a fact', which is similar to proposition 2.14, 'a picture is a fact' and also proposition 2 'what is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs'. However, propositions 2 and 2.14 are here quoted in full so that the claim that they are facts is the complete proposition. Whereas 'a propositional sign is a fact' is the final sentence of a larger proposition in 3.14.

> A proposition is not a blend of words. – (Just as a theme in music is not a blend of notes.)
> A proposition is articulate. (3.141)

As I read it here, to be 'articulate' is to be 'not a blend'. Thus, because 'a proposition is not a blend of words' it is 'articulate'. The 'words' are still part of the proposition, they are, as I read in proposition 3.14 the 'elements' of 'a propositional sign'. 'Just as a theme in music is' made up of notes but is 'not a blend of notes'. In both cases, propositions and musical themes, to be 'articulate' is, as I read it, to be made up of 'elements', respectively 'words' and 'notes', that are both parts of a greater whole but also remain individually distinguishable.

> Only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot. (3.142)

As I have read, 'facts' are 'a propositional sign'(3.14), 'a picture'(2.141), and 'the existence of states of affairs'. Thus, each of these 'can express a sense'. I have also read that each of these 'facts' contain 'elements' that 'are related to one another in a determinate way'. Perhaps then, it is the 'relation' between these elements that 'can express a sense'.

If I imagine a proposition, the cat sat on the mat, then the relation between the cat and the mat is that the cat was seated on the mat in the past. If I were to write just 'the set of names' of the elements, cat, mat, and sat then the 'sense' is missing. I wonder if it is the 'standpoint' or 'representational form' of 'facts' that enables them to 'express a sense'.

> Although a propositional sign is a fact, this is obscured by the usual form of expression in writing or print.
> For in a printed proposition, for example, no essential difference is apparent between a propositional sign and a word.
> (This is what made it possible for Frege to call a proposition a composite name.) (3.143)

The narration here has a perspective where 'a propositional sign is a fact' and this is not 'obscured' and also a perspective where 'this is obscured by the usual form of expression in writing and print'.

Since the 'usual form of expression in writing and print' 'obscure[s]' that 'a propositional sign is a fact' I wonder whether the narration is, from its own perspective, not 'the usual form of expression'.

'For in a printed proposition, for example, no essential difference is apparent between a propositional sign and a word.' From my reading I know that in this narration 'a word' is an 'element' of a 'propositional sign' which is 'a fact'. However, from the perspective of the narration it appears that 'in a printed proposition' it would not be possible to differentiate between 'a propositional sign and a word' because 'no essential difference is apparent'. This differentiation is possible for the narration, which is able to differentiate despite the lack of any 'apparent' 'essential differences'.

What makes it 'possible for Frege to call a proposition a composite name' is that 'Frege[s]' perspective is one from which 'no essential difference is apparent between a propositional sign and a word'.

> The essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs and books) instead of written signs.
> Then the spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition. (3.1431)

In this proposition 'tables chairs and books' are imagined 'spatial objects'. Yet, just like my own imagined cat and mat, they are, as I read them, 'written signs'. However, this proposition does support my reading that it is the relations between 'elements' or, in this proposition 'the spatial arrangement of these things' that 'express the sense of the proposition'.

Also, as I read it, any 'spatial arrangement' is defined by the position from which it is observed. As an example, the chair is to the left of the table from one position, but if the

'representational form' (2.173) changes then the chair is to the right of the table with no alteration to the 'spatial arrangement' of the chair and the table in relation to one another.

> Instead of 'the complex sign "*aRb*" says that *a* stands to *b* in the relation *R*', we ought to put, '*That "a" stands to "b" in a certain relationship says that aRb.'* (3.1432)

In this proposition only '[i]nstead of' and 'we ought to put' are not quotations. The first quotation, 'the complex sign "*aRb*" says that *a* stands to *b* in the relation *R*', 'ought to' be replaced. I wonder whether this first quotation is what 'we' would currently 'put' in the obscuring 'usual form of expression in writing or print' (3.143).

If the single quotation marks are read as a quotation made by the narration of what 'we…put' then the double quotation marks might be read as a quotation within that already quoted narration.

There is, as I read it, the narration of '"*aRb*"', the narration that cites this first narration in its claim that 'the complex "*aRb*" says that *a* stands to *b* in the relation *R*' and finally the narration that cites this to say that 'instead of'…'we ought to put'. However, I would also argue that all of the quotations are part of the third narration, just as all of my quotations form a large part of my own narration here.

In the first quotation '"*aRb*"' is 'a complex sign' that 'says that *a* stands to *b* in the relation *R*'. If I re-use one of the tables and chairs from the previous proposition I might read that in the quoted narration, 'the complex sign "*aRb*" says that [the chair] *a* stands to [the table] *b* in the relation [to the left of] *R*', or the chair stands to the left of the table. However, this is

not what 'we ought to put'. What 'we ought to put' is '*That "a" stands to "b"* in a certain

relationship says *that aRb.'*

As I read it, the narration attempts to reverse the relation between the 'complex sign' and

the objects it represents. So, the fact that in this narration 'object' '"*a*"' stands to the

'object' '"*b*"' in a certain relation 'says' that '<u>*aRb*</u>'. As I read it, it is the 'objects' '*a*' and '*b*'

that, in this narration give the 'complex sign' '*aRb*' meaning. One problem with this reading

is that I am bringing in a real, extra-textual 'object' to give the text a meaning that I have

already read from the text.

> Situations can be described but not *given names*.
> (Names are like points; propositions are like arrows– they have sense.) (3.144)

A 'situation' is described in proposition 2.11 as 'the existence and non-existence of states of

affairs'. Whereas in proposition 2.0121 I read that a 'situation' is 'a state of affairs'.

In either reading, whether a 'situation' is a 'state of affairs' or the 'existence and non-

existence' of one, the claim here is that 'situations can be described but not *given names*'.

I read the parentheses that make up the latter part of this proposition, '(names are like

points; propositions like arrows– they have sense), as an explanation of why 'situations

can…not [be] given names'. The difference between 'points' and 'arrows' here is that

'arrows…have sense'.

In this chapter I have read that a proposition is not a propositional sign. This in turn leads

me to wonder what the direction of signification is in this narration. There might be a chain

of signification that begins with an object which stands as guarantor to the picture which

stands behind the thought which stands behind the propositional sign which stands behind the proposition. However, one might also begin with the proposition and understand the chain of signifiers to work in the opposite direction.

This also raises the question of what is it that passes from signifier to signified in this concatenation. I would suggest that the change from signifier to signified that occurs when, for example a picture represents an object but is also what is represented by a thought, is a clue to answering this question. It might be that, as I have read in previous chapters, what links these elements is the perspective from which each item is seen. Thus, again somewhat tautologically, it is the narration that defines how each elements stands in relation to its fellows and what links them is the narrative perspective.

Chapter 8 – In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought

> In a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond to the objects of the thought. (3.2)

This proposition is about what happens '[i]n a proposition'. As I read in proposition 3.1, '[i]n a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses' and the 'propositional sign' is what the 'I' of the narration in proposition 3.12 'call[s] the sign with which we express a thought'. The 'propositional sign' here is made up of 'elements' that, 'if the thought is 'expressed in such a way' 'correspond to the objects of the thought'. In proposition 2.01 I read that '[a] state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things).

'Objects' as I read earlier are of the 'world'. So I wonder whether 'the objects of the thought' are in 'thought', that is they are thoughts themselves, or whether 'the objects of the thought' are 'objects' in 'the world' to which the 'thought' corresponds. Either way, there is a chain of signifiers that leads back to 'the world is all that is the case' (1) which constructs the 'world' and its 'objects' as the proof that 'the world is all that is the case'.

> I call such elements 'simple signs' and such a proposition 'completely analysed'. (3.201)

These 'elements' are not "simple signs" but are what the 'I' calls "simple signs". In proposition 3.12 I read 'I call the sign with which we express a thought a propositional sign'. I note that while a propositional sign is what 'I call', something is not in quotation marks

whereas what 'I call such elements', "simple signs" is, as I read it, a quotation, as is "completely analysed".

One difference between 'propositional sign' and 'simple signs' is that 'propositional sign' is part of the narration of proposition 3.12 whereas in proposition 3.201 "simple signs" are a quotation from a different narration. However, "simple signs" is what 'I call such elements', so the 'I' is quoting its own calling.

As I read it, "simple signs" is what 'I call' 'elements of the propositional sign' that 'correspond to the objects of the thought'(3.2). In proposition 3.14 I read that the 'elements' of a 'propositional sign' are '(the words)'. Thus, "simple signs" are 'the words' that 'correspond to the objects of a thought'. What the 'I call[s]' a "completely analysed" 'proposition' would contain only 'elements' that correspond to 'objects'.

In proposition 3.1432 I read the 'complex sign' 'aRb'. As I read it here 'a' and 'b' would be 'simple signs' as described in proposition 3.201. 'R' on the other hand is 'the relation' in which 'a' stands to 'b'. 'R' then, is not a "simple sign" since it is not an 'object' but a 'relation'. I have read that a proposition is where a 'thought finds expression'(3.1), and a 'thought' is a 'logical picture of facts'(3) and '[w]hat constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way' (2.14). As I read it the 'determinate way' in which 'a' and 'b' are related is 'R'.

Is '*R*' then a "simple sign"? It does not 'correspond to the objects of the thought' (3.2). But a proposition requires 'that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way' (2.14). So, a proposition as I read it could never be 'completely analysed'.[69]

> The simple signs employed in propositions are called names. (3.202)

These 'simple signs' are not 'names', they 'are called names'. Here it is not the 'I' or the 'we' by whom 'simple signs employed in propositions are called names'.

Also, in order that they can be 'employed in propositions' "simple signs" that 'are called names' must pre-exist the 'propositions' in which they are 'employed'. I have read that 'names' are what "simple signs" are 'called' and that 'simple signs' are what 'I call' (3.201) 'elements of the propositional sign' and that these 'elements' are '(the words)' (3.14). Thus, following this chain of callings I read 'names' to be what 'words' are called.

I read in proposition 2.0122 that '[i]t is impossible for words to appear in two different rôles: by themselves and in propositions'. However, these 'words' that are called 'names' appear to exist both before and in propositions. I wonder if this might support a reading of proposition 2.0122 in which '[i]t is impossible for words to appear in two different rôles' simultaneously.

> A name means an object. The object is its meaning. ('A' is the same sign as 'A'.) (3.203)

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[69] If '*R*' is read as an object, then it could 'correspond' with the 'elements of a propositional sign' but that would, I read, contradict proposition 2.0271.

Beginning with the parentheses, as I read it, 'A' is not the same as 'A' because I can differentiate between the first 'A' and the second 'A' in the proposition. Perhaps though it is a property of being a 'sign' that elides that difference. If 'A' and 'A' are a 'sign' in that they mean the same 'object'. Here I am reading a 'sign' to be, like "simple signs" in proposition 3.202, called a 'name'.

If '[t]he object is [a name's] meaning' and '[a] name means an object' then, as I read it, the 'name' itself does not contain 'meaning', it derives its meaning from 'an object' and thus any 'name' or 'sign' 'A' is given 'meaning' by the 'object' that 'is its meaning'. In this reading 'A' and 'A' can be 'the same sign' because they both 'mean' object A.

> The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign. (3.21)

Here the 'determinate relation' of the 'words', described in proposition 3.14, 'corresponds to 'the configuration of objects in a situation'. This proposition is similar to my reading of proposition 3.202. As I read it, 'objects' are part of the text. In which case a 'name' is the representative of an 'object' and the 'object' is the meaning of the 'name'. While this reading holds meaning within the text it is also, as I read it, tautological, in that 'A' represents object A which means 'A'.

> Objects can only be *named*. Signs are their representatives. I can only speak *about* them: I cannot *put them into words*. Propositions can only say *how* things are not *what* they are. (3.221)

The names of objects are not essential to them, they 'can…be named' but do not have a name prior to being 'named'. As I read it, 'objects' can not 'be named' they 'can only be *named*'. Thus, for this narration, 'objects' are not 'named' but 'can only be *named*'.

In proposition 2.0123 the narration begins 'if I know an object'. In proposition 3.221 I read that an object cannot be known, it 'can only be named'. Also, in proposition 2.02 I read that 'objects are simple' yet here I read that 'objects can only be named'. Thus, when an 'object' is in the perspective of the narration it 'can only be named' and so can only exist as part of an object/name pairing.[70]

However, the proposition continues 'signs are their representatives', which I read as a claim that 'objects' are represented by 'signs'. In this reading the 'I' of the narration would not 'know an object'(2.0123), but would 'know' its 'representative' 'sign'. If the 'I can only speak *about* them: I cannot *put them into words*' then 'objects' are not 'signs' or names or words but, as I read it, the narration has access to the 'objects' as well as the 'signs' that are the representatives of the 'objects'. In the perspective of this narration then 'objects' present themselves and are also represented (re-presented) by 'signs'.

'*named*', '*about*', '*put them into words*', '*how*' and '*what*' are all in italics. These 'objects' can only be '*named*', not 'named'. As I read it, each of these words separates 'objects' from language. To be '*named'* can not convey '*what*' 'objects' 'are' only '*how* things are'.[71] 'I

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[70] DW Winnicott makes a similar observation about the baby/mother being indivisible in D.W. Winnicott, *The Maturational Processes and the Facilitating Environment,* (London: Karnac,2007)
[71] In proposition 2.01 I have read 'objects (things)' as synonymous.

cannot *put them into words*’ because ‘*words*’ are not made from ‘objects’, which I read to

contradict part of my reading of proposition 2.027, ‘objects, the unalterable and the

subsistent are one and the same’. In proposition 3.221 ‘objects’ cannot be ‘*put…into words’*

and therefore in ‘*words*’ ‘objects’ are not ‘subsistent’. Thus, as I read it here, ‘words’ are

made of different stuff than ‘the world’.[72]

> The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement that sense be
> determinate. (3.23)

This proposition reminds me that this text is not descriptive! It is not a description of a

‘world’ but rather a prescription for a ‘logical’ ‘world’ and such a ‘world’ is required to have

‘simple signs’ and ‘determinate’ ‘sense’.[73]

> A proposition about a complex stands in an internal relation to a proposition about a
> constituent of the complex.
> A complex can be given only by its description, which will be right or wrong. A
> proposition that mentions a complex will not be nonsensical, if the complex does not
> exist, but simply false.
> When a propositional element signifies a complex, this can be seen from an
> indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs. In such cases we *know* that
> the proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation for generality
> *contains* a prototype.)
> The contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simple symbol can be expressed in
> a definition. (3.24)

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[72] This has implications for any reading of Wittgenstein’s ‘linguistic turn’ and for the reading
of ‘the world’ as the universe which contains everything because ‘words’ are not of ‘the
world’.
[73] In much the same way that Rousseau’s *Emile* is an imaginary child constructed for the
purpose of delineating a particular type of education, this is an imaginary world. Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, (London: J.M. Dent & Sons, 1974)

As I read it, 'a complex' here is a 'complex' of 'objects' rather than a 'complex sign'(3.1432). 'A proposition about a complex' then is 'the words'(3.14) that 'say *how* things are'(3.221) in that 'complex'.

However, in this 'complex' there is a 'proposition about a constituent of the complex' to which the first 'complex' 'stands in an internal relation'.

Thus, the 'complex' which I initially read as a 'complex' of 'objects' is made up of at least one 'proposition about a constituent of the complex', therefore it is not simply a 'complex' of 'objects' but a 'complex' of 'objects' and 'complex signs'. Further, since a proposition is made up of 'its elements'(3.14), which I have read to be 'words' then 'a complex' here is 'words' 'about' 'words' about 'objects'.

'A complex can be *given* only by its description…'. As I have read in this proposition a 'complex' can be made up of 'objects', 'words' or a combination of the two. Therefore a 'complex' about 'words' 'can only be *given* by its description'. If I take proposition 1 as an example, '[t]he world is all that is the case', the 'world' can be read as a complex of all of the complexes except itself. However, 'world' is a 'word' that is one of the 'elements' of a 'propositional sign'(3.14) which is the 'representative' of the complexes rather than a 'complex' itself.

Thus, a possible 'description' of the 'world' is that it is the representative of the complex that contains all of the other complexes or perhaps it is the representative of the complex that contains all of the representatives of all of the other complexes.

As I read it a 'description' is a portrayal in words. This reading is close to the OED's definition and it also fits well with my reading of a 'proposition' as where a 'thought', which is a 'logical picture of facts'(3), 'finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses'(3). With this in mind, I read that 'world' is the 'word' that can be described as all of the other words. There are also 'objects' in the 'world' but it is 'in a proposition [that] a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses'. So, I can read the 'world' as all of the 'words' that express 'in a proposition'' the 'thoughts' that 'picture' the arrangement of 'objects' that 'can only be *named*'(3.221). Thus, the 'world' is 'the words' that describe the 'world'.

'A complex can be given only by its description, which will be right or wrong.' As I read it, the "complex sign '"aRb"'" is how the complex of objects 'aRb' is described. If the complex of objects does not exist then the complex sign would be, from the perspective of the narration, 'wrong'. A 'right' 'description' is one in which the elements of the 'description' are 'related to one another in the same way'(2.15) as the 'objects' or complexes or names in the 'complex' it describes.

'A proposition that mentions a complex will not be nonsensical, if the complex does not exist, but simply false.' This part of proposition 3.24 is, as I read it, dealing with a similar question to the following part of the preface: 'It will only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense' (TLP, p.4).
In proposition 3.24 I read that if a 'proposition' 'mentions a complex' then the 'complex' cannot be 'nonsensical'. Anything that can be mentioned in a proposition has sense because of that mentioning. If this is the case then 'words' subsist as well as 'objects'.

Thus, if something 'finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses' (3.1) then it is sensible and something that is sensible is not 'nonsense' (TLP, p.4). As I read it here, it is not the existence of a complex that makes a proposition about that complex sensible. Rather it is the presence of the proposition that makes it 'not be nonsensical'.

When a propositional element signifies a complex, this can be seen from an indeterminateness in the propositions in which it occurs. In such cases we *know* that the proposition leaves something undetermined. (In fact the notation for generality contains a prototype).

If I take 'aRb' to be a complex then I could signify that complex with 'a propositional element', a 'word' as I read in proposition 3.14. However, this would be to name a 'situation' and in proposition 3.144 I read that 'situations can be described but not given names' and in proposition 3.24 'a complex can be given only by its description'. As I read it then a 'complex' can by 'signified' by a 'word', which might be read as being 'named', but the 'complex' is not 'given' in that signification.

If I use c as the 'propositional element' that 'signifies' the complex 'aRb' then if the 'we' of the narration here were to read c the 'we *know*[s] that the proposition leaves something undetermined'.

Given that 'we *know*' that 'a proposition leaves something undetermined' '[w]hen a propositional element signifies a complex' there must be something in c that allows the 'we'

to 'know' that a proposition containing c is 'not fully determined'. As I have read it here 'a' and 'b' are 'fully determined' but c is not. I wonder what it is in 'a' and 'b' that marks them out as fully determined when c is not.

The narration goes on: '(In fact the notation for generality *contains* a prototype.)' The claim made in this parenthesis is 'in fact' rather than, for example, 'in logic' (2.012). Also, it is the 'notation for generality' rather than 'generality' itself that '*contains* a prototype'.

What is a prototype here? The OED defines 'prototype' as 'the first or primary type of a person or thing; an original on which something is modelled or from which it is derived; an exemplar, an archetype'.[74] If the 'notation for generality *contains* a prototype' and a 'prototype' in this text is as defined by the OED then the 'notation for generality *contains*' 'an original on which something is modelled or from which it is derived'. Here I read that the 'notation for generality' precedes the 'generality' it notates. Furthermore, if I read 'the notation for generality' as one of the 'elements' of 'a propositional sign' then it would follow that these 'words' are the 'prototype' of 'objects'.

As I read it '[t]he contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simple symbol' is what I did when I used c to represent 'aRb'. If this 'contraction' 'can be expressed by a definition' then c might be defined as 'aRb'. In this reading c does not 'express' 'aRb'.

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[74] "Prototype, n. and adj." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2021. Web. 26 January 2022.

A proposition has one and only one complete analysis. (3.25)

Since I have demonstrated repeatedly that there are multiple possible readings of each of the propositions in this text I must assume that a 'complete analysis' is not a reading or not what I consider to be a reading. As I read it, 'one and only one' is not a claim that there are two 'complete analys[e]s' in that there are 'one' plus 'only one'. My reading is that there can be 'only one' 'complete analysis' of a 'proposition'. However, at this point in my reading I am unable to ascertain what a 'complete analysis' might be.

What a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly: a proposition is articulate. (3.251)

This proposition reminds me of the claim in the preface that 'what can be said at all can be said clearly, and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence'(TLP, p.3).

As proposition 3.251 is a proposition I will assume that 'what it expresses it expresses in a determinate manner'. However, if I look for a definition of the first word of 'set out clearly', 'set', in the OED then I find fifty possible meanings. As I read in proposition 3.25 that 'a proposition has one and only one complete analysis' I wonder if forty-nine of these possible definitions of 'set' are excluded from any 'complete analysis' and, if so, how do I ascertain which is the correct reading?

This reading does not contradict the claim that a 'proposition' 'expresses in a determinate way' because there are a 'determinate' number of definitions. However, this number would be calculated by multiplying the number of definitions for each word by the number of

definitions for each of the other words. As an example, the OED gives about fifty definitions for 'set', a similar number for 'out' and ten definitions for 'clearly'. So, the phrase 'set out clearly' has around twenty-five thousand possible definitions.

As I read it, the 'one complete analysis' of a proposition might be all of the possible permutations of meanings or, alternatively, there may be 'only one' meaning that 'expresses' the 'sense'(2.221) of the proposition.

In proposition 3.251 I read that 'a proposition is articulate', coming as it does after the colon, is an explanation of why 'what a proposition expresses it expresses in a determinate manner, which can be set out clearly'.

> A name cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition: it is a primitive sign. (3.26)

A 'primitive sign' here is one that 'cannot be dissected any further by means of a definition'. I read that 'a name' that is a 'primitive sign' has been somewhat 'dissected' but 'cannot be dissected any further'. In proposition 3.24 I read that a 'propositional sign' can signify 'a complex'. A 'complex' can be 'dissected' into simple 'objects'. With this in mind, I wonder how 'a name' for a 'complex' can be 'expressed in a definition' (3.24) that is not a 'further dissection' of that 'name'.

Also, how is it possible that '[i]n a proposition a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign correspond with the objects of the thought' 3.2 when the

'complex' is divisible, can be 'dissected' into objects, but its 'name' which is a primitive sign'

and a 'propositional sign' can not?

> Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve to define it; and the
> definitions point the way. Two signs cannot signify in the same manner if one is a
> primitive sign and the other is defined by primitive signs. Names cannot be
> anatomized by means of definitions'.
> (Nor can any sign that has meaning independently and on its own.) (3.261)

In 'Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve to define it' I read 'sign'

to be 'the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc)' (3.11). Thus, I might

read 'world' as a 'written' 'sign' in the proposition assigned the number 1. I also read that

'world' represents a 'complex'. If 'world' is read as a 'simple symbol' then, as I read in

proposition 3.24, 'the contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simply symbol can be

expressed in a definition'. As I read it 'world' is the 'simple symbol' for a 'complex' and

therefore 'can be expressed in a definition' (3.24).

Because, as I read in proposition 3.203, a 'name means an object', 'world' in proposition 1

cannot be a 'name' since 'world' is a 'propositional element [that] signifies a complex'(3.24).

Therefore, a sign that has a definition cannot be the sign for an object.

A 'sign that has a definition' is the sign for a 'complex'. Such a sign 'signifies *via* the signs

that serve to define it'. If I return to my 'sign' c which I made the 'sign' for the complex

'aRb', then c 'signifies *via* the signs that serve to define it'. So c does not 'signify' 'aRb' rather

c 'signifies *via*' 'aRb'. In '*via*' I read that 'every sign that has a definition signifies' through or

'by means of' 'the signs that serve to define it' where it is the 'sign that has a definition'. Here then, such a sign 'signifies' indirectly, '*via*' the other 'signs that serve to define it'. Using c as an example I read that c 'signifies' '*via*' 'aRb' in my example. Thus, c cannot signify on its own. The narration continues '; and the definitions point the way'. Which 'way' do these definitions 'point'? As I read it the 'sign that has a definition signifies', through 'the signs that serve to define it', to somewhere that is neither the 'sign' nor the 'signs that define it' but, perhaps, elsewhere.

So, 'the way' that the signification takes in this reading is from c through 'aRb' to elsewhere. If the 'definitions point the way' and that 'way' is the direction of signification they point the way to some, as yet undefined, elsewhere.

The 'definitions point the way' and the 'definitions' are made up of 'the signs that serve to define it'. These signs do not simply 'define', they 'serve to define'. Thus, as I read it, the 'signs' that 'serve' are being put to work, performing a service, but perhaps one for which they are not perfectly suited.

The narration of proposition 3.261 continues '[t]wo signs cannot signify in the same manner if one is primitive and the other is defined by primitive signs'. There are here two different 'manner[s]' in which 'signs' 'signify'. '[P]rimitive signs' signify directly, whereas a 'sign' that is 'defined by primitive signs' 'signif[ies]' '*via*' those 'primitive signs'. Using c again I read that the 'sign' c is defined by the primitive signs 'aRb'. So 'aRb' is where I read what c is and c 'signifies *via*' 'aRb'.

The narration continues '[n]ames *cannot* be anatomized by means of definitions'. This is because, as I read in proposition 3.203, a 'name means an object'. Therefore, the definition of a 'name' would be the 'object' that it 'means'. It cannot be 'anatomized' because an 'object' is simple and so indivisible.

The parenthesis, '([n]or can any sign that has a meaning independently and on its own)', undermines my reading that a primitive sign in this text is defined by the 'object' that it 'means'. If a 'sign' can have 'meaning independently and on its own' then it would not be defined by an 'object'. It also introduces a third 'type' of 'sign' that is neither defined by primitive signs nor by being the primitive sign that 'means an object' (3.203).

> What signs fail to express, their application show. What signs slur over, their application says clearly. (3.262)

In proposition 3.1 I read that '[i]n a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses'. These 'perceptible signs' are the 'signs' 'with which we express a thought' and are what the narration calls 'propositional signs'. However, in this proposition I read that these 'signs' can 'fail to express' and 'slur over'. I wonder if there is a connection between my reading of 'signs that serve to define' and the claim in this proposition that signs 'fail to express' or 'slur over'. A further question is what is 'application' here? If the 'application' of a 'sign' is that it is the 'name' that 'means an object' then I could read that it is the 'application' of the 'sign' to that 'object' that 'shows' what the sign 'fails to express'. The same might be said of a 'sign that has a definition', if it is applied to that 'definition' the 'application' is what allows the 'sign' to 'say clearly' *via* the signs that define it' (3.261).

However, this reading of 'application' does not work with a 'sign that has meaning independently and on its own' (3.261).

> The meanings of primitive signs can be explained by means of elucidations. Elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive signs. So they can only be understood if the meanings of those signs are already known. (3.263)

One possible reading of this proposition is that the 'meanings of primitive signs can be explained…if the meanings of these signs are already known'. Which raises the question, if they are 'already known' why would they need to be 'explained'?

I would also argue, based on my reading of this text, that all propositions 'contain…primitive signs'. Either directly, as in 'aRb' or indirectly because c 'signifies *via*' 'aRb'. In this reading then, all 'propositions' are also 'elucidations'.

A different reading begins with the 'they' in 'elucidations are propositions that contain the primitive sign. So they can only be understood if the meanings of the signs are already understood'. The 'they' can be read as the 'primitive signs' as I read earlier. However, 'they' can also be read as the 'elucidations'. The claim of the proposition is then that the 'elucidations' by 'means of' which 'the meanings of primitive signs can be explained' 'can only be understood if the meanings of these signs', which the 'elucidations' are supposed to explain, are 'already understood'.

In this chapter I put forward the idea of a circular chain of signifiers in which each item is both signifier and signified. Following this reasoning I wonder whether my understanding

that A≠A based on my reading of two distinct A's might be expanded upon. If I take 'A' to be a signifier for an object A that stand behind the signifier then 'A' can be equal to 'A' in the sense that the both share the same signified object A.

This chapter also brings my reading into line with the verificationist interpretations put forward by Russell, A.J. Ayer and P.M.S. Hacker[75]. In short, these scholars theorise that 'nonsense' can be defined in the *Tractatus* by testing a statement against an extra-textual real. Sense is that which is either empirically verifiable or is a tautology in logic. However, this reading is at odds with my other reading where the direction of signification is reversible. By contrast, I would also suggest that, as I have read that a sign can, in the *Tractatus*, have meaning on its own no further verification is necessary.

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[75] Refs to Hacker, Ayer and Russell

Chapter 9 – Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have any meaning

> Only propositions have sense; only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have any meaning. (3.3)

This proposition, as I read it, contradicts proposition 2.221, 'a picture represents its sense'.

Also, in proposition 3.13 there is the claim that a 'proposition…does not actually contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it'. In proposition 3.142, 'only facts can express a sense'.

A 'proposition' has a 'nexus' or perhaps is a 'nexus', and it is 'only in' this 'nexus' that a 'name' has 'any meaning'. So, in proposition 3.203 '[a] name means an object' this 'mean[ing]' can only happen in the 'nexus of a proposition' and not, for example in, 'the world'.

> I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (or a symbol).
> (A proposition is itself an expression.)
> Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common with one another is an expression.
> An expression is the mark of a form and a content. (3.31)

To begin with, 'any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense' is not 'an expression' in this narration'. '[A]n expression' is what 'I call' these 'part[s]'. The 'I' calls these 'part[s] of a proposition' 'an expression (or a symbol)', are 'an expression' and 'a symbol' interchangeable? As I read it, the 'part[s]' can be called 'an expression' 'or' 'a symbol', so the 'I' does not 'call' the 'part[s]' 'an expression' and 'a symbol' simultaneously.

In proposition 3.24 I read that the 'contraction of a symbol for a complex into a simple symbol can be expressed in a definition'. Both the 'symbol for a complex' and 'a simple symbol' are, as I read it in proposition 3.31, a 'part of a proposition that characterizes its sense'.

If ([a] proposition is itself an expression' and 'a symbol' 'or' an 'expression' are also what 'I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense'. Then from the perspective of this narration a 'proposition' could be 'part of a proposition'. Because 'any part of a proposition that expresses its sense' is 'an expression' and 'a proposition itself is an expression'.

If this claim is reversible: 'a proposition itself is an expression' and therefore 'an expression' 'itself' is 'a proposition' then it would follow that 'any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense' is 'a proposition'.

However, a 'proposition is itself an expression' the 'expression' is, as I read it, 'an expression' whereas 'any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense' is what 'I call…an expression (or a symbol). So, 'an expression' and 'what I call…an expression (or a symbol) are not necessarily the same thing. This, perhaps, troubles the claim that '("A" is the same sign as "A")' (3.203) in that 'expression' may not be 'the same sign as' 'expression'.

The narration continues, 'everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common with one another is an expression'. An 'expression' here is 'an expression' and not, as I read it, what 'I call…an expression'. However, if this part of the proposition is narrated by the 'I' then this 'expression' could also be the 'I' calling.

If 'everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common with one another is an expression' and 'a proposition' is not entirely 'an expression (or a symbol)' then, as I read it, there is, or could be, parts of a 'proposition' that are not 'essential to their sense'. There may also be things that are for some 'propositions' 'essential to their sense' that other 'propositions' 'can [not] have in common'.

Alternatively, if 'a proposition' is 'an expression' and what 'I call…an expression' is also 'an expression' then all of a 'proposition' is 'an expression'. Therefore 'Everything essential to their sense that propositions can have in common with one another is [a proposition]'. This would mean that 'proposition[s]' have 'everything essential to their sense' 'in common with one another'.

'An expression is the mark of a form and a content' and not the mark of form and content. Thus an 'expression' is not the 'mark' of a general form and content but rather of 'a' specific 'form' and 'a' specific 'content'. If, as I have read, propositions share 'everything essential to their sense…in common with one another' then 'an expression' might be read to be the 'mark of a form and a content'. But, if all propositions share 'everything essential to their sense in common' then 'a form' is all 'form' and 'a content' is all 'content'.

> An expression presupposes the forms of all the propositions in which it can occur. It is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions. (3.311)

'An expression' here 'presupposes'. It might be argued that any 'expression' in language 'presupposes' that the 'expression' will be understood. However, that presupposition would be made by the user of the 'expression'. Here it is the 'expression' itself that 'presupposes'.

Leaving aside this sentient 'expression', I read this part of the proposition to be similar to proposition 2.0124, 'in logic nothing is accidental: if a thing *can* occur in a state of affairs the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself'. Here it is 'an expression' rather than 'a thing' that 'presupposes' 'the forms of all the propositions in which it can occur'.

In '[i]t is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions' I find it difficult to determine what '[i]t' is. 'It' might be read as the presupposing of 'the forms' or the 'expression' or the set of all 'the propositions in which [a specific proposition?] can occur'. Whatever, '[i]t' is, I read that 'it is the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions'. Thus, '[i]t' is not itself the 'common characteristic' but is the 'common characteristic mark'. In the foregoing proposition I read that '[a]n expression is the mark of a form and a content'. So, perhaps, it is the 'expression' in both cases that is 'the mark' of something else.

If I use 'aRb' as a possible proposition and assume that 'R' is the expression of a relationship the 'R' could be 'the common characteristic mark of a class of propositions'. I might then call this 'class of propositions' relational propositions because they describe relationship 'R'. However, what this 'presupposes' is that 'R' will be contained by propositions in 'a class of propositions' that all contain 'R', which is, as I read it, tautological.

> It is therefore presented by means of the general form of the propositions that it characterizes. (3.312)

In this proposition 'It' and 'it' are not defined. If I assume that 'It' and 'it' are both 'an expression' then '[an expression] is therefore presented by means of the general form of the propositions '[an expression] characterizes'.

In proposition 3.2 I read that in a 'proposition a thought can be expressed'. If, for the moment, I accept that 'it' is 'an expression' and that 'an expression' is, as described in proposition 3.2, the 'expression of a thought' then here, in proposition 3.312, the 'expression of a thought' is 'presented by means of the general form of the propositions that it characterizes'.

Proposition 3.312 continues, '[i]n fact in this form the expression will be *constant* and everything else *variable*'. This part of this proposition '[i]n fact' and not, for example, 'in logic'. Also, 'the expression' here is 'in this form' and, as I read it, could be in a different 'form'. Here it is the 'expression [that] will be *constant* and everything else *variable*'. While '*constant*' and '*variable*' are not constant and variable I still read this proposition to contradict proposition 2.027 in which 'objects are what is unalterable and subsistent'. Here, as I read it, 'objects' are not 'the expression' and are part of 'everything else' and therefore they are '*variable*' and not 'unalterable'.

> Thus an expression is presented by means of a variable whose values are the propositions that contain the expression.
> (In the limiting case the variable becomes constant, the expression becomes a proposition.)
> I call such a variable a propositional variable. (3.313)

In '[t]hus' I read that the claim in this proposition is based on the foregoing propositions. This reliance on prior propositions is described in the footnote to proposition 1: 'the propositions $n.1$, $n.2$, $n.3$, etc. are comments on propositions no. n; the propositions $n.m$ 1 , $n.m$ 2 , etc. are comments on propositions no. $n.m$; and so on.' However, most of the propositions do not begin with '[t]hus', which I read as a particular emphasis on the reliance of this proposition on what went before.

In proposition 3.312 'it', which I read as an 'expression', is 'presented by means of the general form of the propositions that it characterizes'. I read here that the 'propositions' are 'characterized' by an 'expression'.

In both propositions, 3.312 and 3.313, 'an expression is presented by means of' something other than the 'expression' itself. I wonder if 'the general form of the propositions that it characterizes' and 'a variable whose values are the propositions that contain the expression' mean something similar to one another.

If so, then 'general form' might be read as the 'form' of all of the 'propositions that contain the expression'. Using 'R' as my example I might say that all of the propositions that contain 'R' are in the 'form' 'aRb'. Continuing this reading, 'R' 'is presented' 'by means of all of the propositions that contain' 'R'.

I read in this claim a similarity to a dictionary definition based upon usage. If 'R' appears in 'propositions' in the form 'aRb' then that is how the 'expression is presented'. However, if a proposition in the form 'RR' exists then the 'expression' is 'presented' differently.

'(In the limiting case the variable becomes a constant, the expression becomes a proposition.)' As I read it, 'the limiting case' in this proposition might be similar to the claim in proposition 2.012 that 'if anything can occur in a state of affairs the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself'. Following this reading the 'limiting case' might be seen as the 'case' where every 'proposition' in which an 'expression' can occur is known.

In this 'case' the 'variable' is no longer variable because no further 'propositions' than contain the 'expression' can be added. Thus, 'the variable becomes a constant'. When this 'limiting case' is achieved and the 'variable becomes a constant', because there are no more propositions then the 'expression becomes a proposition'.

If this emergent 'proposition' contains the 'expression' then 'the limiting case' is no longer 'the limiting case' because there is now one more 'proposition' and so the 'variable' that was 'a constant' is not constant. Also, if the 'expression becomes a proposition' then what is 'presented by means of a variable whose values are the propositions that contain' and what is it that these 'propositions' contain if they have no 'expression'?

> I call such a variable a "propositional variable". (3.313)

As I read it, what the 'I call[s]' a "'propositional variable"' is a 'variable' that is also a 'constant' and whose values vanish because the 'expression' that defines its 'values' ceases to be an 'expression' when it is fully explained.

An expression has meaning only in a proposition. All variables can be construed as propositional variables.
(Even variable names.) (3.314)

I read the first sentence of this proposition in two ways. The first is that it is 'only' in 'propositions' that an 'expression' 'has meaning'. The second is that 'an expression' is the only meaningful part of a 'proposition'.

All variables can be construed as propositional variables. (3.314)

In proposition 3.313 I read that there was a 'variable whose values are the propositions…' In 'whose' I read that 'values' belong to or are of the 'variable'. Thus, a 'variable' is that to which 'values' belong. Also, I would argue that if 'all variables can be construed as propositional variables' then they also 'can' also be 'construed' differently.

In the final parentheses, '(Even variable names)', I again see two possible readings. In the first, 'variable names' are the 'names' of 'variable[s]'. In my alternate reading 'names' are the 'values' of the 'variable'. Regardless of which reading of 'variable names' I choose, I read in '[e]ven' that 'variable names' are in some way unlikely to be 'construed as propositional variables' in this narration.

If we turn a constituent part of a proposition into a variable, there is a class of propositions all of which are values of the resulting variable proposition.
In general, this class too will be dependent on the meaning that our arbitrary conventions have given to parts of the original proposition. But if all the signs in it that have arbitrarily determined meanings are turned into variables, we shall still get a class of this kind. This one, however, is not dependent on any convention, but

solely on the nature of the proposition. It corresponds to a logical form – a logical prototype. (3.315)

As I read it, 'If we turn a constituent part of a proposition', and here I will assume that 'world' is a 'constituent part' of proposition 1, 'into a variable, there is a class of propositions all of which are values of the resulting variable proposition'. So, if I assume the 'we' have 'turn[ed]' 'world' into a 'variable' every proposition that contains 'world' will become a 'value' in the 'resulting variable proposition'. This 'class of propositions' are all the propositions that 'contain' 'world'.

I read 'in general' as a claim to an incomplete generality, a claim that what follows may be very likely to be the case, but other possibilities exist. As I read it, the second part of the sentence troubles much of what I have read as the transmission of 'meaning' where 'objects' are the 'subsistent' and thus the foundational source of 'meaning'. I wonder, therefore, whether 'in general' here might be better read as something akin to 'in our everyday lives'. Perhaps, 'in general' as opposed to 'in logic'.

As I read it, 'our arbitrary conventions' might then be similar to 'the usual form of expression in writing or print' (3.143).

It is not the narration that has 'given' 'meaning' to parts of the original proposition but rather it is 'our arbitrary conventions' that 'have given' 'the meaning'. 'But if all the signs in it that have arbitrarily determined meanings are turned into variables, we shall still get a class of this kind. This one, however, is not dependent on any convention, but solely on the nature of the proposition. It corresponds to a logical form – a logical prototype.' If I take 'world' as a 'sign' that has an 'arbitrarily defined meaning' and turn it into a 'variable' what I

think that I have done is to make 'world' the term for a set of 'values' 3.313. So, in this text

the propositions that contain the 'sign' 'world' are listed in the index on page 106. These

propositions make up the 'class' 'world'.

However, each of these 'propositions' contain other 'signs', which I have read as other

'words'. For example, in proposition 1, '[t]he world is all that is the case', taking each 'word'

as a 'sign' I would have seven new 'variables': the set of all propositions that contain 'The',

the set of all propositions that contain 'is', and so on.

If I continue to do this for the whole text then each 'variable' will be fully defined by the

propositions in which it occurs. Thus, every 'word' is defined by its usage in this text. This

'class' is, according the narration, 'not dependent on any convention, but solely on the

nature of the proposition. It corresponds to a logical form – a logical prototype'. This is, as I

read it, very similar to using a dictionary to define the meanings of words. If one could

record every use of a word then one would have a full definition of that word.

This system of definitions is also a repeated deferral. If I want to know what 'world' means I

look at how it is defined. I could then look up each of the words that define 'world', 'is' and

'the' and 'case' for example, and eventually one of their definitions might contain the word

'world'.

Thus, all of the definitions are themselves based on definitions which, when followed for long enough, lead back to the starting 'word'. This recursive definition is what I read to be the basis for 'a logical prototype'.[76]

> What values a propositional variable may take is something to be stipulated. The stipulation of values is the variable. (3.316)

'What values a propositional variable may take' has not yet been 'stipulated' and is therefore something 'to be stipulated', As I read it, to have 'stipulated' here is to have specified what 'values' the 'variable may take'. So, in my 'world' example, I 'stipulated' that the 'propositional variable' that I called 'world' was to 'take' every proposition containing the word 'world'. This gives me a set of 'values' that then define what the 'variable' 'world' is. Thus it is the 'stipulation of values' that 'is the variable' in the sense that it is the 'stipulation of values' that defines the 'propositional variable' by deciding what it 'may take'.

> To stipulate values for a propositional variable is *to give the propositions* whose common characteristic the variable is.
> The stipulation is a description of those propositions.
> The stipulation will therefore be concerned only with symbols, not their meaning.
> And the *only* thing essential to the stipulation is *that it is merely a description of symbols and states nothing about what is signified*. (3.317)

As I read it, the first sentence of this proposition supports my reading of proposition 3.316. If, as I have read, 'symbols' can be 'words' then it would follow that my 'propositional

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[76] For a further discussion of deferral of meaning, see '…That Dangerous Supplement…' in Derrida,1997

variable', 'world', is 'concerned only with [these] symbols', and not with what 'world' might mean.

In the final sentence of this proposition in the section in italics the claim is that when I have read every proposition that contains the word 'world' in this text I will have read '*merely a description of symbols*' in this case the 'symbol' 'world'. I will not have read anything that tells me about any 'world' beyond the text.

Returning to the first part of this sentence, '[a]nd the *only* thing essential to the stipulation', I read that a perspective from with to 'stipulate' is not 'essential to the stipulation'. I would argue that, while this is consistent with a certain reading of the claim that ('A' is the same as 'A')(3.203), my own reading is that 'A' and 'A' cannot be the same 'sign' because I am able to differentiate between the two 'signs'. Thus, as I read it, a perspective is required to 'stipulate' that 'world' is the same sign as 'world'.

However, the final sentence of proposition 3.317, '[h]ow the description of the propositions is produced is not essential', contradict my reading. In proposition 2.173 I read that 'a picture represents its subject from a position outside it. (Its standpoint is its representational form.)'. Also, in proposition 2, '[a] logical picture of facts is a thought' and in proposition 3.1, '[i]n a proposition a thought finds expression that can be perceived by the senses'.

Therefore, a proposition in this text is built upon a 'representational form' and this is 'how the description of the propositions is produced' because the meaning of the 'sign' is derived

from the propositions in which it appears from the 'representational form' of the proposition. As I read it then, 'representational form' is 'essential' to a 'proposition' and 'propositions' are 'essential' to 'propositional variables'.

> Like Frege and Russell I construe a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it. (3.318)

In this text, 'Frege and Russell' 'construe a proposition as a function of the expressions contained in it' in what the 'I' of the narration here claims is the same way that it 'construe[s] a proposition'.

> A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol. (3.32)

'A sign' here is 'of a symbol' and is that part 'of a symbol' that 'can be perceived'. As I read it what remains 'of a symbol' that is not a 'sign' can not be 'perceived'. How then is the narration able to claim that there is an imperceptible part of a 'symbol'? How can the narration 'perceive' what cannot be 'perceived'?

> So one and the same sign (written or spoken, etc) can be common to two different symbols – in which case they will signify in different ways. (3.321)

If I return to my reading of the word 'world' as a 'sign' to work through this proposition then it would follow that 'world' is 'what is perceived' of the 'symbol' of which 'world' is the 'sign'. This 'sign' is not 'of' an 'object' but rather it is the 'sign' of a 'symbol'.

If I chose a 'written' 'sign' with two distinct meaning, say 'bark', then I might say that 'bark' is the 'sign' of a 'symbol' of the outer layer of a tree or that 'bark' is the 'sign' of a 'symbol'

for the sound made by a dog. In my everyday language 'bark' is 'the same sign' for both things. In this narration they could be differentiated because 'the two signs will signify in different ways'.

As I read in this proposition, the 'sign' is still the 'same sign' even when it 'will signify in different ways'. Therefore, a 'sign' in this narration is not differentiated by the way it 'signifies' but by what it 'signifies'.

> Our use of the same sign to signify two different objects can never indicate a common characteristic of the two. If we use it with two different *modes of signification*. For the sign, of course, is arbitrary. So we could choose two different signs instead, and then what would be left in common on the signifying side. (3.322)

In this proposition the 'sign' signifies an 'object' and not, as I read in proposition 3.321, a 'symbol'. Also, it is '[o]ur use of the same sign to signify two different objects' that is being described rather than the way that the 'sign' signifies. This 'use' 'can never indicate a common characteristic of the two' and, since the 'sign' is the 'same sign' it must be the 'objects' that are not 'indicate[d]' to share a 'common characteristic'. As I read it the 'common characteristic' of these 'two different objects' is that they share the same 'sign'. However, this is the case 'if we use it with two different *modes of signification'.* This means that 'if we use it', and here I read 'it' as the 'sign', 'with two different modes of signification' then 'it' remains the same 'sign' and it is the 'modes of signification' that enables 'it' to 'signify two different objects'.

The 'sign' is 'of course' 'arbitrary'[77] but what prevents 'the same sign' which signifies 'two different objects' from indicating 'a common characteristic of the two' is that 'we use [the sign] with two different *modes of signification*'. So while 'the sign' is 'arbitrary' the '*modes of signification*' may not be.

If 'we…choose two different signs' then these two 'signs' would have been chosen because they have been defined as 'different signs' by the 'we' who 'choose' and therefore would, by choice, have less in common than the 'same sign' 'used' 'with two different '*modes of signification*'. However, even these 'two different signs' share their sign-ness.

> In everyday language it very frequently happens that the same word has different modes of signification – and so belongs to different symbols – or that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way.
> Thus the word 'is' figures as the copula, as a sign for identity, and as an expression for existence; 'exist' figures as an intransitive verb like 'go', and 'identical' as an adjective; we speak of *something* but also of *something's* happening.
> (In the proposition 'Green is green' – where the first word is the proper name of a person and the last an adjective – these words do not merely have different meanings: they are *different symbols'*.) (3.323)

In the first sentence of this proposition 'modes of signification' is not '*modes of signification*' (3.322). These are different 'words' and perhaps different 'symbols'. However, I also read that they are 'used' here to 'indicate a common characteristic' (3.22).

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[77] W. Kohler, *Gestalt psychology, an introduction to new concepts in modern psychology*, (New York: Liveright,1929) and Ramachandran, V. S., & Hubbard, E. M.,'Synaesthesia--a window into perception, thought and language' in *Journal of Consciousness Studies, 8*(12), pp.3–34. (Exeter: Imprint Academic, 2001) argue against entirely arbitrary language.

This proposition does not deal with things 'in logic' but rather in 'everyday language' and in 'everyday language' the 'same word' can have 'different modes of signification'.

As I read it, these 'different modes of signification' are explained in the second sentence of the proposition. The 'word "is" figures as the copula, as a sign for identity and as an expression for existence'. Thus, as I read it, 'the word "is"', if its 'mode of signification' is to be 'the copula' links together the 'Green' and the 'green' in the proposition 'Green is green'. In a different 'mode of signification' 'is' is 'an expression for existence', thus 'Green is' signifies that 'Green' exists.

In this proposition 'the word "is" figures as' each of these modes of signification.
In this reading 'is' can be read as both 'the copula' and 'as an expression for existence'. I would argue that the difference is not a property of the text but rather a result of my reading. Perhaps the 'modes of signification' are not to be read as differences in the text but instead as differences in the reading of the text.

It also 'frequently happens' in 'everyday language' 'that two words that have different modes of signification are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way'. I wonder whether this reading might be applied to 'Green is green'. These are two different words, easily differentiated by the upper case 'G' in 'Green' and the lower case 'g' in 'green'. 'Green' is 'the proper name of a person' and 'green' is 'an adjective' and thus 'these words do not merely have different meanings: they are different symbols'. In this narration 'Green' and 'green' have 'different modes of signification', are 'different symbols' and are, as I read them, different 'words'. However, the narration does not state that they are different words

and therefore I wonder whether, from the perspective of the narration, they are 'employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way'?

In order to answer this question I would have to be able to pin down what 'superficially' means in this narration. As I read in proposition 3.203 "'A' is the same sign as 'A'" for this narration. Yet, as I read it, the first "A" is separated from the second "A" by the words 'is the same sign as'. So, as I read it, the claim to sameness here rests upon what might be termed a 'superficial' reading. However, this may not be 'superficial' from the perspective of the narration. It could be that, in the proposition 'Green is green', 'Green' and 'green' are 'two words that have different modes of signification [and] are employed in [this proposition] in what is superficially the same way' from the perspective of this narration.

> In this way the most fundamental confusions are easily produced (the whole of philosophy is full of them). (3.324)

I read '[i]n this way' as a reference to the foregoing proposition and therefore that 'the most fundamental confusions are easily produced' when different 'words…are employed in…superficially the same way' or 'the same word has different modes of signification'. As I read it, some of these 'fundamental confusions' might be overcome by not reading 'superficially'.

In the parentheses, '(the whole of philosophy is full of them)', I read that, for this narration, everything that is 'philosophy' is 'full of' 'fundamental confusions'. Thus, 'philosophy' in this text is entirely made up of 'fundamental confusions' brought about by the way that 'words' can 'signify' multiple 'symbols', that 'symbols' can be 'signified' by different 'words' and that

'modes of signification' can be employed in 'superficially the same way'. This proposition

echoes what I read in the introduction to this text: that this 'book deals with the problems

of philosophy, and shows, I believe, that the reason why these problems are posed is that

the logic of our language is misunderstood' (TLP, p.3).

As I read it, if words had only one meaning and superficial differences were recognized as

differences then 'the whole of philosophy' would cease to be 'full of' these 'fundamental

confusions' and would be empty.

> In order to avoid such errors we must make use of a sign language that excludes
> them by not using the same sign for different symbols and by not using in a
> superficially similar way signs that have different modes of signification: this is to say,
> a sign language that is governed by *logical* grammar – by logical syntax.
> (The conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language, though, it is true, it
> fails to exclude all mistakes.) (3.325)

The beginning of this proposition agrees with much of my reading of the foregoing

propositions in that it seeks to eradicate the sources of 'fundamental confusions' (3.324)

that arise, in this narration, from our use of signs in 'everyday language' (3.323).

While in 'our' 'everyday language' 'we' 'use' 'signs', this is not made explicit in this narration

in what 'we' call 'our' 'everyday language'. By contrast, what 'we must make use of' to

'avoid such errors' is 'a sign-language', I infer form this that there is more 'sign' in this 'sign-

language' than there is in 'our' 'everyday language'.

This 'sign-language' is 'governed by *logical* grammar – by logical syntax'. Given that in this proposition the narration is setting out a 'sign-language' that would tend to avoid 'confusions' how should I read this excerpt?

Are '*logical*' and 'logical' two different 'words', the same word with different 'modes of signification', do they signify the same or different 'symbols'?

Further, how should I read the – in 'by *logical* grammar – by logical syntax'? I could read that it marks a similarity between 'by *logical* grammar' and 'by logical syntax'. Alternatively, that 'by logical syntax' is a supplement to 'by *logical* grammar' or that the – marks a correction and that 'by logical syntax' is intended to replace 'by *logical* grammar' as the means of avoiding 'fundamental confusions'.

In the parentheses, ([t]he conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language, though, it is true, it fails to exclude all mistakes), the narration begins by claiming that the 'conceptual notation of Frege and Russell is such a language' and I read 'such a language' to be a 'sign-language' that meets the criteria set out earlier in this proposition and that is 'governed by *logical* grammar – by logical syntax' (I assume that, despite my own difficulties in pinning down the meaning of these phrases, the narration has connected 'such a language' with its own description of 'a sign-language'). However, having set out a 'sign-language' that will 'avoid such errors' and described the 'conceptual notation' as 'such a language' the narration continues 'though, it is true, it fails to exclude all errors'. This could be because the 'sign-language' cannot 'avoid such errors' or because the 'conceptual

notation of Frege and Russell' is not 'such a language'. Either way, as I read it, there is a contradiction in this proposition.

> In order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense. (3.326)

I read in proposition 3.32 that a 'sign is what can be perceived of a symbol' and therefore 'we' can only 'perceive' the 'sign'. If 'we' wish to 'recognize [an imperceptible] symbol by its [perceptible] sign' then 'we must observe how it' and here I read 'it' as the 'sign', 'is used with sense'.

I read in proposition 2.221 that the 'what a picture represents is its sense' and in proposition 2.222 that the 'agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity'. As I read it then, when a 'sign' is 'used with a sense' that 'sense' is something that can be 'compared with reality'. Or, if I extrapolate from proposition 2.202, 'a picture represents a possible situation in logical space', I read 'a sense' to be 'a possible situation in logical space'.

Thus, 'in order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used' with a view to representing 'a possible situation in logical space'. In proposition 3.31 I read that 'I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (or a symbol). For this narration 'any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense' is called 'a symbol'.
Here 'we' would need to know what the 'sense' was and therefore what the 'symbol' was in order to 'recognize a symbol by its sign'. Which leads me to wonder what 'we' 'recognize' if 'we' already have to know the 'symbol' before 'we' 'recognize' it.

> A sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its logico-syntactical employment. (3.327)

A different way to write this proposition is that a 'sign does…determine a logical form [when] it is taken together with its logico-syntactical employment'. As I read in proposition 2.18, 'what any picture…must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it…is logical form, i.e. the form of reality'.

Thus a 'sign' alone 'does not determine' a form comparable with 'the form of reality'. For example 'Green' alone cannot 'determine a logical form', whereas 'Green is green', in which 'Green' is 'taken together with its logico-syntactical employment' can 'determine a logical form'.

> If a sign is *useless*, it is meaningless. That is the point of Occam's maxim.
> (If everything behaves as if a sign had meaning, then it does have meaning.) (3.328)

My first thought when reading this proposition is, what does '*useless*' mean? Since, in this narration 'the sign is, of course, arbitrary' then, as I read it, the 'sign' could not be a 'sign' if it cannot be used. Therefore, a '*useless*' 'sign' would be a sign that is not used.

I will, in order to explain further, assume that U is an 'object' that I wish to represent by means of a 'sign'. Because signs are arbitrary in this narration it is not possible to rule out the use of any 'sign' to represent U, therefore no 'sign' can be '*useless*' in the sense that it cannot be used.

So, a '*useless*' 'sign' is one that is not used to signify. Unfortunately, there is no way to give

an example of a '*useless*' 'sign' because were I to write it the 'sign' would signify and then

no longer be '*useless*'. I also wonder whether a 'sign' that does not signify because it is

never used is actually a 'sign' at all. As I read it, to assert that a 'sign' that is '*useless*' 'is

meaningless' is to assert that the absence of a 'sign', because as I have read a '*useless*' 'sign'

cannot be used, 'is meaningless'.

In the parentheses, '([i]f everything behaves as if a sign had meaning then it does have

meaning)' there is, as I read it, a similar contradiction. This is because if 'it does have

meaning' it would not be possible for 'everything [to] behave as if a sign had meaning'. To

behave 'as if' something is the case requires that it is not the case. As an example, I might

behave 'as if' I am a squirrel, but a squirrel cannot behave 'as if' it was a squirrel because it

is a squirrel.

> In logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a rôle. It must be possible to
> establish logical syntax without mentioning the *meaning* of a sign: *only* the
> description of expressions may be presupposed. (3.33)

The narration here is concerned with what 'should' happen in 'logical syntax' rather than in

'everyday language'. I wonder whether 'should' in this first sentence might be read as a

claim that, as yet, no 'logical syntax' is in existence and this narration is engaged in the

development of this 'logical syntax' and what 'should' or 'should never play a rôle'.

Alternatively, I can read 'should' as an admission of where 'such a language…fails to exclude

all mistakes' (3.325).

I can paraphrase my second reading then as '[i]n logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a rôle [but sometimes it does]'.

In the sentence '[i]n logical syntax the meaning of a sign should never play a rôle', a 'sign' has a 'meaning' and this 'meaning' can have a 'rôle' to 'play' but 'should never play [that] rôle' in 'logical syntax'.

The narration continues '[i]t must be possible to establish logical syntax without mentioning the meaning of a sign: only the description of expressions may be presupposed.' As I read it, not 'mentioning the meaning of a sign' has the same effect as not allowing 'the meaning of a sign to play a rôle' in 'logical syntax'.

In 'it must be possible to establish logical syntax' I read that 'logical syntax' has yet to be 'establish[ed]'. Also, in 'only the description of expressions may be presupposed' the 'description of expressions' does not 'mention the meaning of a sign' and is a 'presuppos[ition]' which must come before something in order to be 'pre'.

In proposition 3.31 I read that 'I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (or a symbol)' and that a 'proposition itself is an expression'. Thus, by a process of substitution, I can read that 'only the description of [propositions] may be presupposed'. I wonder then how I might describe a proposition without 'mentioning the *meaning* of a sign' when 'propositions', as I read them, are made up of signs. I might describe the proposition 'Green is green', for example, by writing that the 'proper name of a person' precedes 'the copula' which precedes an 'adjective'. However, as I read it, the 'meaning' of 'Green' is 'the

proper name of a person' and therefore my description 'mentions' at least part of the

'*meaning* of a sign'. The same issue arises with my description of 'is' and 'green'.

So, If I cannot categorize signs by their type, 'proper name', 'adjective', 'copula' and so

forth, how might I render a 'description of expressions'? As I read it 'Green is green' fulfils

the criteria that it 'establish[es] logical syntax without mentioning the *meaning* of a sign',

but I am unsure whether I have 'presupposed' the 'description of expressions'.

> From this observation we turn to Russell's 'theory of types'. It can be seen that
> Russell must be *wrong*, because he had to mention the meaning of signs when
> establishing the rules for them. (3.331)

Here, 'Russell's "theory of types"' 'must be wrong' not because it has been compared with

'reality' and found to be 'false' in the way that a 'picture' is in proposition 2.24. In this case

the 'theory of types' is '*wrong*' because it does not 'establish a logical syntax without

mentioning the *meaning* of a sign'.

The narration 'turns' in this proposition from 'this observation'. As I read it the 'observation'

is the assertion in proposition 3.33 that 'the meaning of a sign should never play a rôle' in

'logical syntax'. I would argue that, in order to be an 'observation' 'logical syntax' would

have to be observed and, as I read earlier, 'logical syntax' does not yet exist in this narration

to be observed.

> No proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign
> cannot be contained in itself (that is the whole theory of types). (3.332)

Since, from the perspective of the narration, 'it can be seen that Russell', and as I read it 'Russell's "theory of types"', 'must be wrong'. The part of the proposition that is not enclosed in brackets is, as I read it, 'the whole of the "theory of types"' it follows that the claim that '[n]o proposition can make a statement about itself, because a propositional sign cannot be contained in itself' is 'wrong'.

One might also question whether, in setting out the nature of what a 'proposition' can or cannot do, proposition 3.332 is making a 'statement about itself' as a 'proposition'. I also wonder where, if a 'propositional sign cannot be contained within itself', the uncontained residue of a 'propositional sign' resides.

> The reason why a function cannot be its own argument is that the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument, and it cannot contain itself.
> For let us suppose that the function $F(fx)$ could be its own argument: in that case there would be a proposition '$F(F(fx))$', in which the outer function F and the inner function F must have different meanings, since the inner one has the form $\varphi(fx)$ and the outer one has the form $\psi(\varphi(fx))$. Only the letter 'F' is common to the two functions, but the letter by itself signifies nothing.
>
> This immediately becomes clear if instead of '$F(Fu)$' we write '$(\exists\varphi) : F(\varphi u) . \varphi u = Fu$'
> That disposes of Russell's paradox. (3.333)

In the first sentence of this proposition I read that 'a function cannot be its own argument' because 'the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument'. Therefore, it is the 'sign for a function' that determines what a 'function' can be.

If, as I read in proposition 3.322, 'the sign is, of course, arbitrary', then any 'sign' can be replaced with any other 'sign' without altering the 'symbol' that the 'sign' signifies.

However, in this proposition it is 'the sign for a function' and the fact that it 'already contains the prototype of its argument' that defines what a 'function' can be. If the sign is arbitrary then any 'sign' already contains 'the prototype of [any function's] argument'. In 'the sign for a function already contains the prototype of its argument' is the 'it' to which 'the prototype of its argument' belongs 'the sign for a function' or the 'function'? In this proposition there is the supposition of 'the sign for a function' that 'already contains the prototype of its argument' and this supposition will show why 'the sign for a function' or 'a function' 'cannot contain itself'. The 'us' will 'suppose that the function F(fx) could be its own argument'. Here, as I read it, 'F(fx)' is 'the function' rather than 'the sign for a function'. When the 'us' of the narration 'suppose that the function *F(fx)* could be its own argument' it follows that 'in that case there would be a proposition *F(F(fx))* in which the outer function *F* and the inner function *F* must have different meanings'. At this point I am not able to explain why the supposition 'that the function *F(fx)* could be its own argument' means that there would necessarily 'be a proposition *F(F(fx))*'.

Also, here '*F*' is the outer function and '*F*' is the 'inner function'. As I read earlier that the 'us' supposed a 'function *F(fx)*' 'could be its own argument' I wonder what '*fx*' is if '*F*' alone is the 'function'. Is 'fx' the 'sign for a function [that] already contains the prototype of its argument'?

In the 'proposition *F(F(fx))*' 'the outer function *F*' and the 'inner function *F*' 'must have different meanings'. This, as I read it, follows proposition 3.327 where a 'sign does not determine a logical form unless it is taken together with its logico-syntactical employment'.

In the reading of '*F(F(fx))*' the 'logico-syntactical employment' of the 'inner function *F*' and the 'outer function *F*' are different and therefore they 'must have different meanings'.

However, this reading raises some issues for me. The first is that proposition 3.327 refers to 'sign[s]' whereas '*F*' here is a 'function', so I am unsure whether the same rules apply in this text. The second is that in this proposition the claim, as I read it, is that if I assume that the same rules apply to 'sign' and '*F*' then 'a function cannot be its own argument' because it would not be compatible with the text's 'logical grammar' (3.325). The implication of my reading is that the fact that the 'outer function *F*' and the 'inner function *F*' 'must have different meanings' does not disagree with the 'logical grammar' that I read in the text.

If I read the 'inner one' in the 'proposition *F(F(fx))*' to be the bracketed '*F(fx)*' which was the 'function that it was 'suppose[d]…could be its own argument' then, according to this narration, it has the 'form' 'φ(fx)'. As I read it '*F(fx)*' and '*φ(fx)*' are different and the difference is that 'φ(fx)' is a 'form' while '*F(fx)*' is the 'inner one' or 'inner function *F*'. Since both the 'function' and the 'form' contain '*(fx)*' I read the difference to be that 'function' contains '*F*' and 'form' contains 'φ'.

If I now read the 'outer function *F*', according to the narration, 'the outer one has the form 'ψ(φ(fx))'. In this case the '*F*' outside the brackets holds the same position as 'ψ' in the 'form'. The narration continues, 'only the letter 'F' is common to the two functions, but the letter itself signifies nothing'. Here the 'letter "F"' is more upright than 'the outer function *F*', 'the inner function *F*', '*F(fx)*' and the 'proposition *F(F(fx))*'.

As I read it, from the perspective of this narration the italic '*F*' and '*F*' in '*F(F(fx))*' are two different signs, otherwise it would not be possible to read that there were 'inner' and 'outer' 'function[s]'.

However, according to the narration, 'only the letter "F"' is common to the two functions'. This is, as I read it, the first time that the letter 'F' has appeared in this proposition. Not only is the letter 'F' not 'common to the two functions', it does not appear in either.

In order to make this make sense I would have to assume that from the perspective of this narration '*F('* '*(F*' and 'F' are all the same sign, despite having different shapes, different 'logico-syntactical employment[s]' and different positions in the 'proposition'. However, having made that assumption it would follow that if 'the letter "F"…by itself signifies nothing' that the 'inner function *F*' and the 'outer function *F*' also 'signif[y] nothing'. When the 'form' of the 'outer' and 'inner' 'function[s]' are narrated the signs 'ψ' and 'φ' are introduced. As I read it, these are lower-case Greek letters. If these are the new 'sign-language' it is interesting to note that they can be read as very old signs.

The argument of this proposition, as I read it, is that because the proposition '*F(F(fx))*' should have the 'form' 'ψ(φ(fx))' and 'ψ' 'φ' are different signs, '*F*' and '*F*' cannot be the same sign. And, while I read 'F', '*F*' and '*F*' as different signs that can have 'different meanings' the narration conflates them all into a single sign. The whole argument, as I read it, is based upon a reading of different signs as sharing the same 'meanings' and then an assertion that they must have 'different meanings'.

The narration goes on '[t]his immediately becomes clear if instead of "*F(Fu)*" we write "(∃φ) : F(φu) . φu = Fu". That disposes of Russell's paradox'. Unfortunately, this is not a text that 'immediately becomes clear' to me! In the absence of immediate clarity I will again try to read out the narration. As I read it, '*F(Fu)*' from the perspective of the narration is incorrect because the 'function *F*', which I read as a 'function' rather than a 'letter' because of its angle, is on both sides of the brackets and because '*F*' cannot contain itself or be its own argument this contradicts the rules of a 'logical grammar' (3.325).

'[I]f instead of "*F(Fu)*" we write "(∃φ) : F(φu) . φu = Fu"' then according to this narration 'we' will have written something that 'disposes of Russell's paradox'. As I understand it, Russell's paradox can be understood as the paradox that arises when one considers a set of all sets that do not contain themselves and ask whether the set of all things that do not contain themselves 'contains itself'. If it does not contain itself then it is a set that does not contain itself and should contain itself but if it contains itself then it is no longer a set that does not contain itself.

So, returning to '(∃φ) : *F*(φu) . φu = *F*u'. I read '∃' as 'the existential quantifier' and from this I read that the first set of brackets here contain a claim that I would translate as there exists at least one thing which is 'φ'[78]. As I read earlier in the proposition, 'φ' is part of the 'form' of a proposition rather than a 'function'. I can read 'φ' as a placeholder for the 'inner function *F*'. So, I might render '(∃φ)' as 'there is an 'inner function *F*' or perhaps within this 'form' there is a place where an 'inner function *F*' can exist.

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[78] R.L. Simpson, *Essentials of Symbolic Logic,* Third Edition, (Plymouth: Broadview Press, 2008) p.166

These brackets are followed by ': $F(\varphi u)$' and here the 'inner function F' that I read in '$F(Fu)$'

has been replaced by 'φ'. There is then a '.' Followed by '$\varphi u = Fu$'. Here I read that the form

'φu' is equal to 'Fu'.[79] However, as I read it, neither 'φu' nor 'Fu' are in the position of the

'inner function F' here.

> The rules of logical syntax must go without saying, once we know how each
> individual sign signifies. (3.334)

I read in the preface to this *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* that 'the whole sense of the book

might be summed up in the following words: 'what can be said at all can be said clearly'. In

proposition 3.1432 'we ought to put that "a" stands to "b" in a certain relation says that

aRb' is, as I read it, a description of a 'saying' in this text. Further, much of what is written

before proposition 3.334 is an explication which could be read as a 'saying', from the

perspective of the narration, of the 'rules of logical syntax'.

If this text is read as a 'saying' of 'the rules of logical syntax' that 'must go without saying'

then this leads to a paradox. Because the 'rules of logical syntax must go without saying' it

must follow that if 'the rules of logical syntax' have been 'said' in this text then they cannot

be 'the rules of logical syntax'. Which would mean that what the text is 'saying' are not the

'rules of logical syntax'.

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[79] I do not yet know how this 'disposes of Russell's Paradox'. However, In Urmas Sutrop's article on this proposition they write that 'this solution is disregarded by the Russellians and most Wittgensteinians'. Urmas Sutrop, "Wittgenstein's Tractatus 3.333 and Russell's paradox." *Trames*, vol. 13, no. 2, June 2009, pp. 179+. (Talinn: Estonian Academy Publishers, 2009) link.gale.com/apps/doc/A202074289/AONE?u=anon~d0930e57&sid=googleScholar&xid=f2db4bee. Accessed 28 Jan. 2022.

This paradox is, perhaps, disposed of in the second part of the proposition: 'once we know how each individual sign signifies'. If 'we know how each individual sign signifies' then the 'rules of logical syntax must go without saying'. As I read it, when 'we know each individual sign signifies' we must also know 'the rules of logical syntax'. So, as I read it, what 'must go without saying' is what 'we' already know.

> A proposition possesses essential and accidental features. Accidental features are those that result from the particular way in which the propositional sign is produced. Essential features are those without which the proposition could not express itself. (3.34)

Here a 'proposition' has 'features'. Since this is the first mention of 'features' I will also read proposition 4.1221 '[a]n internal property of a fact can also be called a feature of that fact (in the sense that we speak of facial features, for example'.

I might, therefore, read 'a feature' that a 'proposition possesses' as an 'internal property' of that 'proposition' and while all 'features' are 'internal properties' they can be 'essential' or 'accidental'.

'Accidental features' whilst they are 'internal properties' are those that result from 'the particular way in which the propositional sign is produced'. Which raises for me the question of how a 'propositional sign' is 'produced'. Are 'propositional signs' the 'written or spoken etc.' 'sign' described in proposition 3.321? If so, then, as I read it, writing or speaking would be 'way[s]' in which the 'propositional sign is produced'.

In this text as I have read it then signs are 'written' and therefore the 'accidental features' of a 'proposition' in this text would arise from that 'particular way' of production. It would follow that 'essential features' are 'internal properties' of the 'proposition' that do not result from the 'particular way in which the propositional sign is produced'. As I read it these 'essential features' would remain the same whether the 'propositional sign' was 'written' or 'spoken' or 'produced' in one of the other way that I read in the 'etc.' in proposition 3.321. In proposition 3.32 I read that a 'sign is what can be perceived of a symbol'. So, the narration here is claiming, as I read it, that whether a 'propositional sign' is 'written' or 'spoken' or produced in some other way, its 'essential features' remain the same.

If I take proposition 1 as my example, I understand the claim is that some of '[t]he world is all that is the case' is 'essential' and some is 'accidental'.

Proposition 1 is, as I read it, the sign or signs that are 'what can be perceived'(3.32) of the symbol or symbols that are represented. Since the 'sign' is all that 'can be perceived' in this text I am not able to discern which parts of '[t]he world is all that is the case' are 'accidental' and which 'essential'.

In order to be able to know which 'features' enable the proposition to 'express its sense' I would need to be able to compare the perceptible 'sign' with the imperceptible 'symbol' from which the proposition's 'sense' is derived. This is not, as I read it, a failure in my reading, but rather a property of the system set up in this text.

> So what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that can express the same sense have in common.
> And similarly, in general, what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols that can serve the same purpose have in common. (3.341)

In '[s]o' I read that the relevance of the foregoing proposition is re-iterated. Here 'what is essential in a proposition' is not a 'feature' but is 'what all propositions that can express the same sense have in common'. In proposition 3.326 I read that 'in order to recognize a symbol by its sign we must observe how it is used with a sense'. As I read it, a proposition is a 'sign' or a collection of signs and therefore if the last 'it' in proposition 3.326 is read as 'its sign' then it is by observing how 'a proposition' is used 'with a sense' that would make it possible to 'recognize a symbol by its sign'.

A sign is 'used with a sense' and therefore 'a sense' is not, as I read it, part of the 'sign' but rather something that a 'sign' is 'used with'. From this I infer that it is not in the words that make up the proposition that I can read the 'proposition express its sense' but rather it is the 'sense' that the 'propositional sign' is 'used with' that enables one to 'recognize a symbol by its sign'. However, 'what is essential in a proposition is what all propositions that can express the same sense have in common'. Therefore, there must be something in the 'proposition' that allows it to 'express' the 'sense' that it is 'used with'. Thus there are 'propositions' that can 'express' the 'same sense' and have a 'sense' 'in common', but that expression is not, as I read it, in the words that make up the proposition.

The narration continues '[a]nd similarly, in general, what is essential in a symbol is what all symbols that can serve the same purpose have in common'. The most obvious reading of this proposition for me is that what 'all symbols that can serve the same purpose have in

common' is that they 'can serve the same purpose' and therefore what is 'essential' to those symbols is their ability to 'serve the same purpose'.

This claim is 'in general' rather than 'in logic', although I can also read 'in general' to introduce a conditionality about the claim in that what follows is the case 'in general' but not necessarily in all circumstances.

'[S]ymbols' here 'can serve the same purpose' as one another. In proposition 3.31 I read that the 'I' of the narration 'call[s] any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (or a symbol)' and that '(a proposition itself is a symbol)'. Since 'a proposition itself is a symbol' this second part of the proposition, which describes the similarity between propositions and symbols is, as I read it, redundant.

> So one could say that the real name of an object was what all symbols that signified it had in common. Thus, one by one, all kinds of composition would prove to be unessential to a name. (3.3411)

In reading the last proposition I referred to proposition 3.31 where '[a] proposition is itself an expression'. Therefore, as I read it, 'a proposition' and 'an expression' share something 'in common'. If there is an 'object' that is signified by 'a proposition' and 'an expression' then the 'real name of [that] object' is something that 'a proposition' and 'an expression' have 'in common'.

If 'all kinds of composition...prove to be unessential to a name' then these 'compositions' are 'accidental'. The claim here, as I read it, is that as 'one' finds the 'real name of an object'

the 'kinds of composition', which I read as the 'particular way that the propositional sign is produced', that gives rise to 'accidental features' will prove to be 'unessential'. Thus, what would be left is the 'real name' of the 'object' that is common to 'all symbols that signified it'.

As, 'one by one' 'all kinds of compositions' 'prove to be unessential to a name' 'written or spoken etc' 'compositions' will be set aside as 'accidental features' and, as I read it, what will remain will be the 'real name of an object'. However, to arrive at this 'real name' is, as I read it, a matter of arriving at the 'sense' behind the 'production' or 'composition' of what 'can be perceived' (3.32).

> Although there is something arbitrary in our notations, *this* much is not arbitrary - that *when* we have determined one thing arbitrarily something else is necessarily the case.
> (This derives from the essence of notation.) (3.342)

Here 'our notations' have 'something arbitrary in' them. Thus, 'our notations' are not themselves 'arbitrary' but there is 'something' that is not 'our notations' but is 'in' them that is 'arbitrary'. However, '*this* much is not arbitrary – that *when* we have determined one thing arbitrarily, something else is necessarily the case'. The 'not arbitrary' '*this* much' is a quantity that occurs 'when we have determined one thing arbitrarily'. Here I wonder whether this 'one thing' is the 'something arbitrary in our notations'.

The 'one thing' will be 'determined' at a particular time and '*when* we have determined [that] one thing arbitrarily, something else is necessarily the case'. As I read it, '*when* we have determined one thing arbitrarily', for example that 'R' is a sign that signifies a

relationship, then it follows that within the 'sign-language governed by a logical grammar' 'R' is not a sign that signifies an 'object' or anything other than what 'we have determined' 'R' to 'signify'.

In '(This derives from the *essence* of notation)' I read that there is an '*essence* of notation' which is part of 'our notations'. If the '*essence* of notation' is similar to the 'essence of a propositional sign' as described in proposition 3.1431, then in order that it be 'very clearly seen' 'we' might 'imagine one composed of spatial objects'.

So, if I imagine a notation where the sign 'pencil' represents the 'spatial object' that I have in my hand and nothing else, I will, perhaps, have 'seen very clearly' the '*essence* of notation'. However, if I have 'seen' this '*essence*' I find that in my writing here 'spatial object' and 'pencil' are, as I read it, 'notation'. So, whilst I can imagine the '*essence* of notation' to contain 'spatial object[s]' that 'notation', which is not a 'spatial object', 'represents', what I read is a 'notation' that represents 'notation'.

This reading is based on a reading of a similarity between the '*essence* of notation' and the 'essence of a propositional sign) (3.1431). Another possible reading is that what is 'derive[d] for the *essence* of notation' is that '*when* we have determined one thing arbitrarily something else is necessarily the case'. As I read in proposition 2.0122 '(It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles: by themselves and in propositions)'. So, if 'we have determined...arbitrarily' that the 'words' 'the world' will 'appear' in 'propositions' then the

'something else [that] is necessarily the case is that the 'words' 'the world' cannot 'appear' 'by themselves'[80].

> A particular mode of signifying may be unimportant but it is always important that it is a *possible* mode of signifying. And that is generally so in philosophy: again and again the individual case turns out to be unimportant, but the possibility of each individual case discloses something about the essence of the world. (3.3421)

I can read a 'written' 'sign' is capable of 'signifying' in a 'particular mode' that is peculiar to writing. However, as I read in proposition 3.321 'one and the same sign (written or spoken, etc.) can be common to two different symbols – in which case they will signify in different ways'. So, as I read it here, a 'particular mode of signifying' is not defined by whether it is 'written' or 'spoken' or 'etc.'. Thus, 'the world' might 'signify in different ways' when it signifies 'two different symbols' without any alteration to the sign or signs 'the world'.

This 'mode of signifying may be unimportant' and therefore may also be important. However, what is 'always important' is that it is a 'possible mode of signifying'. In my reading then 'a particular mode of signifying' may or may not be 'unimportant' but that this 'particular mode of signifying' is a 'possible mode of signifying' is 'always important'. Given that being 'possible' is 'always important' and this possibility is a property of 'the particular mode of signifying' the 'particular mode' is also 'always important'.

The proposition continues, '[a]nd that is generally so in philosophy'. I read 'that' here as the claim that while the 'particular…may be unimportant' that it is 'possible' is 'always

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[80] This is the 'form of independence' that is a 'form of dependence' in proposition 2.0122.

important'[81]. There is, in 'again and again', a repetition that is a repetition of what has always already been repeated. In 'again and again' what 'turns out' is already something that has 'turn[ed] out' before because this 'turn[ing] out' is something that is happening 'again'.

The 'individual case' is, as I read it, unique and therefore cannot 'turn out' 'again and again'. Thus, this perspective on the 'individual case' is one in which the 'individual' 'turns out' 'again and again' because its individuality is 'unimportant' in the perspective.

What is 'important' is that the 'possibility of each individual case discloses something about the essence of the world'. The 'individual case' is not, or may not be, 'important' per se, but is important in that it 'discloses' that which is enclosed or perhaps hidden. What is 'disclose[d]' is not 'the essence of the world' but rather 'something about the essence of the world'. I read 'something about' as a further deferral. In this proposition the 'particular mode of signifying' and the 'individual case' may not be 'important' in their own right, but are 'always important' because they 'disclose…something about the essence of the world'. However, this 'something about' itself is, as I read it, only important because it is 'about the essence of the world'.

> Definitions are rules for translating from one language into another. Any correct sign-language must be translatable into any other in accordance with such rules: it is this that they have in common. (3.343)

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[81] There is, as I read it, a deferral of importance away from the 'particular' and towards the general. In much the same way as I read in the criticism of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* the particular words are read as less important than the meaning behind the words.

Taking the second sentence of this proposition first, I read that '[a]ny correct sign-language must be translatable into any other in accordance with such rules', the 'rules' being 'definitions' as I will read in the first sentence of the proposition, and that it is 'this that they have in common'. I read 'they' here to be 'any correct sign-language' and what 'they have in common' as 'be[ing] translatable into any other in accordance with such rules'.

As I read it, the narration here defines what '[a]ny correct sign-language must be' and then asserts that the defining feature of these 'correct sign-language[s]' is what 'they have in common'. I read this as tautological in that the narration defines what belongs to the set of 'any correct sign-language' and then asserts that what these 'correct sign-language[s]' have in common is the definition put in place by the narration. It is akin to the statement 'all bald men are bald' in that it is correct but doesn't communicate any new information.

I also note that the narration here is concerned with 'any correct sign-language' from which I infer that there can be, in this narration, a 'sign-language' that can be incorrect but still be a 'sign-language'.

In the first sentence of the proposition the narration states that '[d]efinitions are rules for translating from one language into another'. As I read in proposition 3.261, '[e]very sign that has a definition signifies *via* the signs that serve to define it; and the definitions point the way'. And 'names *cannot* be anatomized by means of definitions. (Nor can any sign that has a meaning independently and on its own.)'

In this proposition neither 'names' nor 'any sign that has a meaning independently or on its own' can be 'anatomized by means of definitions'. Thus, as I read it, 'all correct sign-language[s]' are, if I follow their definitions to their sources, defined by signs that cannot be 'anatomized'. Thus 'names' and 'any sign that has a meaning independently and on its own' are the atomic facts[82] of 'any correct sign-language.

This strikes me as analogous to computer programming languages. Each language is, as I understand it, based on binary machine code. If I follow this analogy further, then any 'correct sign-language' is akin to a higher-level programming language in that each can be translated back into their binary root. Thus, one might translate language A into binary and then that binary back into language B in the same way that any 'correct sign-language' can be translated into its atomic signs. However, as I read it, one would need some kind of language to understand what this atomic language meant. If I take 'R' to be a 'sign that means independently and on its own' or a 'name' then in order for 'R' to 'express a sense' (3.142) it must be in 'a fact' because 'only facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot'. So, in this example, 'R', when taken as a sign that cannot be 'anatomized by means of definitions' and that has 'meaning independently and on its own', 'cannot express a sense'. Furthermore, given that 'any correct sign-language' must be built upon this foundation of 'signs' that cannot be 'anatomized', I wonder why more than one 'correct sign-language' would exist. If everything can be 'expressed' using these atomic signs that make up 'definitions' then any further 'sign-language' is an unnecessary multiplication which is at odds with my reading of 'Occam's maxim' in proposition 3.328.

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[82] Atomic is a word that I used to describe the smallest possible part of the 'world'. Here I am reading a sign that cannot be 'anatomized' as atomic in the sense that is indivisible.

What signifies in a symbol is what is common to all the symbols that the rules of logical syntax allow us to substitute for it. (3.344)

In this proposition I can read '[w]hat signifies in a symbol' as the 'it' 'that the rules of logical syntax allow us to substitute for'. If 'it' is 'what signifies in a symbol' one might rewrite this proposition '[w]hat signifies in a symbol is what is common to all symbols that the rules of logical syntax allow us to substitute [what signifies in a symbol] for'. As I read it, 'the rules of logical syntax allow us to substitute' 'what signifies in a symbol' for 'what signifies in a symbol'.

If I take the claim that 'A is the same sign as A' in proposition 3.203, at face value then the substitution in this proposition is the substitution of one sign or set of signs for the same sign or set of signs. I would therefore question whether any substitution has taken place. If a substitution requires the replacement of one thing with a different thing then my reading needs to be re-worked in order to make sense of this proposition.

'What signifies in a symbol' is 'common to all symbols' that we can 'substitute for it'. If 'it' is read as 'a symbol' then the proposition might be rewritten: what signifies in a symbol is what is common to all symbols that the rules of logical syntax allow us to substitute for [that symbol]. In this reading 'it' is 'a symbol' which can be substituted for a different 'symbol' from those symbols that are among 'all symbols that the rules of logical syntax allow to substitute for [that] symbol'. There is, in this reading, a substitution of one symbol for another that shares what 'signifies in a symbol' in common. Thus, multiple 'symbols' share a

common signifier, ('[w]hat signifies'), which is in them. It is this common signifier as defined

by 'the rules of logical syntax' that 'allow[s] us' to substitute one 'symbol' for another.

> For instance, we can express what is common to all notations for truth functions in
> the following way: they have in common that, for example, the notation that uses
> '~*p*' ('not *p*') and '*p* v *q*' ('*p* or *q*') *can be substituted* for any of them.
> (This serves to characterize the way in which some-thing general can be disclosed by
> the possibility of specific notation. (3.3441)

I read in '[f]or instance' that what follows is an 'instance' that will serve as an example of 'an

individual case' (3.3421) as described in the foregoing proposition. In this 'instance' the 'we'

'can express…in the following way…for example…the notation that uses '~*p*'. Thus, 'the

notation that uses '~*p*' is an 'example' of a 'way' of an 'expression' of an 'instance'.

The 'example' that is narrated here is 'the notation that uses '~*p*' ('not *p*') and '*p* v *q*' ('*p* or

q') can be substituted for any of them.' I can read the 'them' here to be 'all notations for

truth-functions'. I also read that "'~*p*' ('not *p*')" and "'*p* v *q*' ('*p* or *q*')" are not 'the notation'

but are what that 'notation…uses'.

Thus, the 'example' is the claim that a specified 'notation' '*can be substituted* for any'

'notations for truth-functions'. As I read it this is not an 'example' of a substitution of one

notation for another but rather a restatement of the claim that such a substitution is

possible.

However, perhaps I can read the brackets surrounding 'not *p*' to exclude 'not *p*' from the

'narration that uses '~*p*'. In which case '*p* or *q*' might also be read as being used by a

different 'notation'. If I continue this reading then '~' and 'v' can be substituted for 'not' and 'or' respectively.

This reading is supported by my reading in *Essentials of Symbolic Logic* of 'a very crude account of the way that symbols are used', which includes:

1. '~A' is the rough equivalent of 'it is false that A'.

    The '~' is the **tilde**.

3. '(A v B)' is the rough equivalent of 'A or B'.

    The 'v' is the **vel** sometimes called the 'wedge'.[83]

While this is 'a very crude account' and the '~' and 'v' are different in the two texts, as I read it, there are sufficient similarities to make this reading worth pursuing.

If I assume that '~*p*' and '*p* v *q*' are what one 'notation' 'uses' and 'not *p*' and '*p* or *q*' are what a different 'notation' 'uses' then the proposition can be read as an 'example' that shows that what one 'notation' 'uses' *can be substituted* for what a different 'notation' 'uses'. However, if to *'substitute'* is to replace one thing with another then there has been no substitution in this proposition. Here '~*p*', 'not *p*', '*p* v *q*' and '*p* or *q*' are all present. This is an 'example' of supplementation. In this 'instance', 'not *p*' is the supplement that informs my reading of '~*p*'. I wonder if *'can be substituted'* is in italics because *'can be substituted'* is not can be substituted but rather can be supplemented.

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[83] R.L. Simpson, *Essentials of Symbolic Logic*, 3rd Edition, (Plymouth : Broadview Press, 2008)

The proposition continues '(This serves to characterize the way in which something general can be disclosed by the possibility of a specific notation.)' If 'something general can be disclosed by the possibility of a specific notation' then my two readings suggest two possibilities for the 'something general' that 'can be disclosed' in this proposition. The first is that in in this text an 'example' is a restatement of an assertion. The implication being that the foregoing proposition was not complete and requires this supplement. The second is that 'substituted' in this text can be read as meaning something akin to supplemented. In both readings the 'something general' that I read to be 'disclosed' by the 'possibility of [these] specific notation[s]' is the requirement for a supplement in each case.

> Nor does analysis resolve the sign for a complex in an arbitrary way, so that it would have a different resolution every time that it was incorporated in a different proposition. (3.3442)

'Nor' here I read as a continuation of the foregoing propositions' description of 'logical syntax'. In this proposition 'analysis' does not 'resolve the sign for a complex in an arbitrary way'. However, 'analysis' does 'resolve the sign for a complex' in some 'way'. As I read it, in this proposition to 'resolve the sign for a complex in an arbitrary way' would lead to 'a different resolution every time that it was incorporated in a different proposition', where 'it' is 'the sign for a complex'.

The '[n]or' at the beginning of the proposition also negates what follows. Thus, the rest of this proposition is a description of how 'analysis' does not 'resolve the sign'. As I read it, a positive claim that might be read from this proposition is that when 'analysis resolves the

sign for a complex' it would have the same 'resolution every time that it was incorporated in a different proposition'.

However, this positive claim goes further than my reading of the text. If 'the sign for a complex' is resolved in an 'arbitrary way' 'it would have a different resolution every time it was incorporated in a different proposition'. This does not, as I read it, mean that if the 'sign for a complex' is resolved in a non-arbitrary way that it 'would have [the same] resolution every time it was incorporated in a different proposition'. My reading of this proposition is that 'analysis' does not 'resolve the sign for a complex in an arbitrary way', but if it did this 'arbitrary' 'resolution' would 'have a different resolution every time'. All that I can read of a non-arbitrary 'resolution' is that it might not 'have a different resolution every time that it was incorporated in a different proposition'.

My readings of the propositions in the foregoing chapter seem to further problematise any overall argument for what the *Tractatus* means. The chapter begins with the claim that 'only in the nexus of a proposition does a name have meaning' and that propositions share 'everything essential to their sense in common'. Thus, a 'name' must derive its meaning from the context of the proposition in which it appears. This seems to be simple enough to understand. If I put forward two propositions: 'a dog can bark' and 'a tree has bark' then it seems obvious why I read the word 'bark' in different ways.

However, the narration goes on to say that there is an imperceptible part of a symbol that is not a sign. So, while I can perceive a dog barking to prove that my reading of 'a dog can bark' is correct this can only be a reading of the perceptible signs. The 'name' bark can then

be read as referring to different types of barks only if the imperceptible part of the symbol in some way links bark to dog or bark to tree, but it is imperceptible so how could I tell? That 'bark' receives a different meaning when in a different nexus also undermines the claim that A=A, since, in this reading, bark ≠ bark.

I also read that in general it is arbitrary conventions that give meaning to parts of a proposition. If I read the parts of a proposition to be the words of which it is made up then it would follow that, in this text, those conventions are what make up the narration of the proposition. This, as I read it, gives further credence to the notion that the text can be considered to be a world unto itself.

With this in mind I can connect the idea that a name is defined by its nexus with the arbitrariness of the sign with another claim that I read in this chapter: that there is an imperceptible part of a symbol as well as the perceptible sign that is also a part of the symbol. The symbol then can be read as the rest of the text in that it is only within the boundary drawn around any particular text that a word or a name's meaning can be known.

I also read the narration to question whether Frege and Russell's sign-languages are sign-languages at all since they fail to fulfil the criteria laid out by the narration for such a language. Indeed, as I read it, even the sign-language put forward by the narration of the Tractatus is incomplete and in the process of being constructed. Part of this construction process is show in the discussion of signs including '~P' which I read to mean 'not P'. While the narration argues that this is a substitution of '~P' for 'not P', my own reading is that

addition of the former to the latter is a supplementation of ordinary language with a sign-

language.

Chapter 10 – A proposition determines a place in logical space

> A proposition determines a place in logical space. The existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents—by the existence of the proposition with a sense. (3.4)

Here I read 'determines' as a claim that a proposition sets the boundaries of 'a place in logical space'. Although this is not the 'space' where 'spatial objects' such as 'tables, chairs, and books' (3.1431) exist it is a 'space' where 'a place' can exist. I read 'a place' as a position in 'logical space'. Thus, I imagine that a 'proposition' is similar to a set of co-ordinates that would 'determine a place' in non-logical space.

The proposition goes on 'the existence of this logical place is guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents—by the existence of the proposition with a sense'. As I read it, the existence of the determinant of a 'place in logical space' is what 'guarantee[s]' the 'existence of this logical place'. The claim here is that in 'determin[ing] a place in logical space' a 'proposition' 'guarantee[s]' the 'existence' of that 'place'. If I compare this to my imagined set of co-ordinates in non-logical space I might say that the existence of a place in my imagined space is guaranteed by the 'mere existence' of the co-ordinates by which the place was determined.

This is akin to saying that the existence of Toad Hall is guaranteed by 'the mere existence of the constituents' of Toad Hall. Just as Toad Hall exists in *The wind in the willows* because its constituents are in the text, a 'place in logical space' is 'guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents'.

What is required to 'guarantee' the 'existence' of 'this logical place' is the 'mere existence of the constituents'. As I read it, the 'constituents' are the parts that constitute a 'proposition'. If the 'place in logical space' is 'guaranteed by the mere existence of the constituents' and in the 'proposition' 'Green is green' 'green' 'Green' and 'is' are the 'constituents' then the 'mere existence' of 'green' 'Green' and 'is' is enough to guarantee that 'logical place'. It is not, for example, necessary that these 'constituents' be in a particular order or even brought together in a proposition, their 'mere existence' is that by which 'the existence of the logical place is guaranteed'.

The final part of the proposition is '– by the existence of the proposition with a sense'. I read this as an explanation of what 'the mere existence of the constituents is. This contradicts my reading of 'the constituents' as the words that constitute the proposition. In this reading it is the 'existence of the proposition with a sense' that 'guarantee[s] the existence of this logical space'. In this latter part of the proposition a 'proposition' alone does not 'determine a place in logical space', but 'the existence of a proposition with a sense' does. I wonder then if the 'constituents' are not the words of the proposition but the 'proposition with a sense'.

I read in proposition 2.21 that '[w]hat a picture represents is its sense', in proposition 3 that '[a] logical picture of facts is a thought' and in proposition 3.1 that '[i]n a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses'. If I work through these propositions then a 'proposition' is where a 'thought finds expression' and this 'thought' is a 'picture' which 'represents its…sense' and 'can be perceived by the senses'. This 'sense' is the expressed thought of a representation and is therefore not part of the proposition. Also, if there can be a 'proposition with a sense' I would argue that there can be a 'proposition

with[out] a sense'. This agrees with my reading in proposition 3.13 that a 'proposition

therefore does not actually contain its sense, but it does contain the possibility of

expressing it' and that 'a proposition contains the form, but not the content of its sense'.

The 'sense' here is something that is both 'represented' by a picture but also a possibility of

expression in a proposition and these two 'sense[s]' are themselves in some sense

'perceived by the senses'.

The propositional sign with logical co-ordinates – that is the logical place. (3.41)

The 'propositional sign' is described in proposition 3.12 as 'the sign with which we express a

thought'. In the same proposition 'a proposition is a propositional sign in its projective

relation to the world'. In proposition 3.14 ''[w]hat constitutes a propositional sign is that in

it its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another'. In proposition

3.1431 'the essence of a propositional sign is very clearly seen if we imagine one composed

of spatial objects (such as tables, chairs, and books) instead of written signs. Then the

spatial arrangement of these things will express the sense of the proposition'.

As I read it, the 'propositional sign' in proposition 3.41 is 'the proposition with a sense' (3.4).

If this 'propositional sign' is 'with logical co-ordinates' then '– that is the logical place'. In the

previous proposition a 'proposition determines a place in logical space'(3.4), whereas here

'the propositional sign with logical co-ordinates' 'is the logical place'.

In geometry and logic alike a place is a possibility: something can exist in it. (3.411)

In this proposition 'a place' is a 'possibility' in 'geometry and logic alike'. As I read it, the

'possibility' is not that the 'place' exists. The existence of the 'logical place is guaranteed by

the mere existence of its constituents'. With this 'guarantee' the 'place' is a certainty, not a 'possibility'.

Thus, the 'possibility' is that 'something can exist in it', where 'it' is the 'place', and implicit in the 'possibility' is that 'something can [not] exist in it'.

> A proposition can determine only one place in logical space: nevertheless the whole of logical space must be given by it.
> Otherwise negation, logical sum, logical product etc.; would introduce more and more new elements – in co-ordination.
> (The logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space. The force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space.) (3.42)

To begin to understand the first sentence here I will assume that 'in geometry and logic alike' (3.411) 'co-ordinates' are 'alike' in that they determine a 'place'. With this in mind, I imagine a two-dimensional space with x and y axes and I create a place with the co-ordinates (0,0) then I have determined 'only one place'. However, according to my reading of this proposition, 'the whole of [this imagined geometrical space] must be given by it'. Here I am assuming that 'it' is the co-ordinates (0,0) which is a proposition in this 'space'. If (0,0) gives the 'whole of' this space then to have 'given' in this proposition is not the same as being 'determined'. If I replace (0,0) with (1,1) I would have 'determined' another 'place'. If I imagine that this two dimensional space extends infinitely then any pair of numbers in the form (x,y) 'determines' a 'place' in this 'space'. Perhaps, then, a 'proposition' that 'can determine only one place in logical space' has a form by which 'the whole of logical space must be given'.

I will now try to apply this reading to the 'individual propositions' with the highest 'logical importance' that I have read so far in this text:

1. The world is all that is the case.

2. What is the case – a fact – is the existence of states of affairs.

3. A logical picture of facts is a thought.

I read that in each of these three propositions there is a claim that something <u>is</u> another thing. Taking proposition 1 as my example I read that 'the world' is both '[t]he world' and also 'is all that is the case'. Thus, in this 'logical space' a 'place' is 'given' by determining that one thing, '[t]he world', is '[t]he world' and is also another thing, 'all that is the case'. If this is read as the form of the proposition then what can be determined by a proposition is determined by this form. In this reading '[t]he world' alone cannot be a proposition because it does not fit the form x is y. Whereas, '[t]he world is all that is the case' does.

The narration continues, '[o]therwise negation, logical sum, logical product, etc.; would introduce more and more new elements – in co-ordination.)' Thus, because 'logical space must already be given by' 'a proposition' 'negation…etc.' would not 'introduce more and more new elements – in co-ordination'.

The symbol for 'negation' as I read in proposition 3.3441 and in the excerpt I read from *Fundamentals of Symbolic Logic* is the tilde: '~'. If I apply this 'negation' to proposition 1,

then I would produce '~The world is all that is the case' which is the 'rough equivalent of'[84]

it is false that the world is all that is the case.

As I read it, in '[t]he world is all that is the case' there 'must already' be 'given' the elements

that can 'determine' it is false that the world is all that is the case. If I re-write this 'negation'

I might write '[t]he world is [not] all that is the case'. In this reading then, 'is not' must be

'given' by 'is'. That is, in a proposition the possibility of the negation of any claim 'must be

given by' the claim itself.

An example of the 'logical sum' is 'p v q' and 'is the rough equivalent' of 'p or q'. An example

of 'logical product' is 'p^q' which is 'the rough equivalent' of 'p and q'. If the 'whole of

logical space' was not 'already given' then each 'logical' 'negation', 'sum' and 'product'

would 'introduce more and more new elements'.

I am reminded of a passage from 'A study in Scarlet' in which Holmes writes 'from a drop of

water…a logician could infer the possibility of an Atlantic or a Niagara without having seen

or heard of one or the other. So all life is a grand chain, the nature of which is known

whenever we are shown a single link of it.[85]

In this proposition it is '[a] proposition' by which 'the whole of logical space must be given'.

However, in proposition 2.012 I read that '[i]n logic nothing is accidental: if a thing *can* occur

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[84] *Essentials of Symbolic Logic* p.11
[85] Arthur Conan-Doyle, *A Study in Scarlet and The Sign of Four*, (London: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 2004) p.14

in a state of affairs, the possibility of the state of affairs must be written into the thing itself'. In proposition 2.014 '[o]bjects contain the possibility of all situations'. Thus the 'guarantee' of 'the existence of this logical space' in proposition 3.4 might be derived from the 'objects' or 'things' that are the 'constituents' of the 'state of affairs' of which the 'proposition is a description' (4.023).

If the 'whole of logical space' was not 'already given' then 'negation, logical sum, logical product, etc.; would introduce more and more new elements – in co-ordination.' In proposition 3.14 I read that '[w]hat constitutes a propositional sign is that in it its elements (the words) stand in a determinate relation to one another'. I read that 'elements' are '(the words)'. If I take 'elements' in proposition 3.42 as '(the words)' then, if 'the whole of logical space' was not 'already given' then 'negation, logical sum, logical product, etc.;' would 'introduce more and more new' 'words'. However, this is not the case because 'logical space must already be given. Therefore, as I read it, all of the 'elements', all of '(the words)', must also 'already be given'.

The final part of this sentence is '– in co-ordination'. As I read it, what is 'in co-ordination' is either 'negation, logical sum, logical product, etc.' or the 'more and more new elements'. If 'negation, logical sum, logical product, etc.' were 'in co-ordination' then the 'more and more elements' would be 'introduced' by that 'co-ordination'. The alternative is that 'negation…etc.' would introduce 'more and more new elements' and these 'elements' would be 'in co-ordination'.

The proposition continues, '([t]he logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space. The force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space)'. Earlier in this proposition I read that 'the whole of logical space must be given by it' and that 'it' here is a 'proposition'. I also read in proposition 4.01 that a 'proposition is a picture of reality'. Thus, I can assume that 'a picture' here can also be read as 'proposition' and from there that 'the whole of logical space must be given by' 'a picture'.

If 'logical space' is 'given by' 'a picture' then where does the 'logical scaffolding' come from? The 'logical scaffolding…determines logical space'. To 'determine' is, as I read it, to 'set bounds to'[86]. So, a 'proposition determines a place in logical space' and 'the logical scaffolding' 'determines logical space'. The logical scaffolding is 'surrounding a picture' which, as I read it, places the 'logical scaffolding' outside the 'picture'. The 'logical scaffolding' also sets the bounds of 'logical space'. Perhaps then this 'logical scaffolding' is outside 'logical space' too. The OED defines 'scaffolding' as a 'supporting framework'[87] and 'to put scaffolding up (to a building'. If I read 'scaffolding' as a 'supporting framework' then perhaps this 'logical scaffolding' is a 'framework' that supports as well as 'determines' 'logical space'. If, alternatively, I read 'scaffolding' as to 'put scaffolding up' then this supporting structure would always be being built 'around a picture'.

A third definition of scaffolding is the one with which I am familiar: 'the temporary framework of platforms and poles constructed to provide accommodation for workmen and

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[86] "Determine, v." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2021. Web. 27 January 2022.

[87] "Scaffolding, n." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2021. Web. 27 January 2022.

their materials during the erection, repairing, or decoration of a building'. In proposition 4.023 a 'proposition constructs a world with the help of a logical scaffolding'. I wonder then if this 'logical scaffolding' is a 'temporary framework' on which the 'force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space'.

In this reading, given that the 'whole of logical space must already be given by' 'a proposition' the 'reach[ing] through the whole of logical space' must have 'already' occurred. Perhaps then a 'temporary framework' is no longer needed, having always 'already' been used.

If '[t]he force of proposition reaches through the whole of logical space' then, as I read it, 'logical space' must have already been determined, otherwise how could it be possible to make any claim about 'the whole of logical space'. Thus, the 'logical scaffolding' must have 'determine[d] logical space' before the 'force of a proposition reaches through the whole of logical space'. However, if 'the whole of logical space must be given by' a 'proposition' then 'logical space' cannot be 'given' until there is a 'proposition', but, as I read in proposition 3.4, 'a proposition determines a place in logical space'.

In this chapter I have compared logical space to what I have called narrative space. Narrative space as I conceive it here is the place where the rules of any particular narration hold. So, in logical space the rules of logic hold and the space is defined by those rules. The same applies to colour space or geometric space in my reading of the *Tractatus*. My suggestion here is that each of these spaces are defined by the set of rules that govern what can occur within them. So, Hamlet can converse with the ghost of his father, travel with 'no

less celerity than that of thought' is possible in Henry V and Mr Toad can drive a car in their respective narrations. Thus, the narrative space of each of these fictional texts is defined by their narrations.

I also connect my reading of narrative space with the narration's claim that a logical scaffolding surrounding a picture determines logical space. If this scaffolding is taken to be a temporary structure that is removed when the construction of a picture is complete then it might be that the confusion in everyday language that Wittgenstein, Frege and Russell are attempting to overcome with their sign-languages comes about because the scaffolding is only present in the early stages of language construction. To give a concrete example of this we might look at the speculation around the method of construction of the pyramids of Egypt. At the time of construction it seems reasonable to assume that anyone could ascertain how the blocks of stone were being set in place. Now, however, when the scaffolding, and here I am referring to any temporary structures that were used in constructing the pyramids, has been gone for several thousand years, no-one can say definitely how the construction was completed. In the absence of this scaffolding it is possible for anyone to put forward a construction method, from aliens to the power of prayer to complex rock flotation systems and canals, based upon their own perspective.

A further analogy that supplements this reading is connected with my interpretation of Samuel Beckett's notebooks. In these notebooks I read that part of Beckett's writing process was to remove detail. This lack of detail opens up a space for speculation about what the text in question is about. In much the same way, because Wittgenstein refused to explain

what he meant by a logical object is, except to repeat that it is a logical object, each reader

is free to speculate about the meaning of the text.

Chapter 11 – A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought

A propositional sign, applied and thought out, is a thought. (3.5)

Here a 'propositional sign…is a thought', but only when it has been 'applied and thought out. I wonder what a 'propositional sign' must be 'applied' to in order for it to be a 'thought'. Also, when a 'propositional sign' is being 'thought out' it cannot be 'a thought' because, as I read it, it is not yet 'thought out'.

This chapter is deliberately short in order to maintain a coherent chapter structure. My reading of this proposition allows me to consider what happens between the propositional sign and the thought. There is a gap where application and thinking happen in this text. Again, I read this application and thinking to be part of the narration.

Chapter 12 – A thought is a proposition with a sense

A thought is a proposition with a sense. (4)

I have two initial thoughts about how to read this proposition. The first is that 'a proposition with a sense' is a thought'. The second is that a 'thought…with a sense' is 'a proposition'. These readings place 'a sense' 'with' either '[a] thought' or 'a proposition'. This again raises for me the question of what 'a sense' is in this narration.

In proposition 2.0211 I read that 'sense' depends on the 'substance' of the 'world'; in proposition 2.221, 'a picture represents its sense'; in proposition 2.222, ' the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity'. So, a sense is that which can be compared with 'reality' in a 'picture'.

In proposition 3.11, '[w]e use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation. The method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition.' Here, 'sense' is 'of the proposition' and, therefore, if I read proposition 4 in the same way then 'a proposition with a sense' is a 'thought'.
In proposition 3.13 'a proposition…does not contain its sense, but does contain the possibility of expressing it.' Thus, if '[a] thought is a proposition with a sense' I read that the 'possibility' of 'expressing' that 'sense' has been realised and that the 'sense' has been expressed in such a way that 'a proposition with a sense' can be, for this narration, 'a thought'.

The totality of propositions is language. (4.001)

Following on from the previous proposition, I notice that 'language' is not 'the totality of propositions' 'with sense' (4). This 'language' is made up of propositions 'with sense' that are 'thoughts' and, based on my reading of the preface, 'propositions' that lack 'a sense' and are, therefore, not 'thoughts'.

I read in the preface:

> Thus the aim of the book is to draw a limit to thought, or rather – not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to draw a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought).

> It will therefore only be in language that the limit can be drawn, and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (TLP, p.3-4).

As I read it, 'language' is made up of 'propositions' that are 'with sense' that are 'thoughts' and 'propositions' without 'sense' that lie 'on the other side of the limit' are 'simply…nonsense'.

In proposition 4.003 the narration describes the 'nonsensical' 'propositions' of 'philosophers' as belonging to: 'the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful'. So, taking this as a proposition without 'sense' I read that in this narration this 'proposition' cannot be 'thought' because it is beyond the 'limit' of what is 'thinkable' and it cannot be 'a thought' because it is a proposition that lacks 'sense'.

> Man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is – just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced.
> Everyday language is a part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it.
> It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is.
> Language disguises thought. So much so, that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.
> The tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated. (4.002)

As I read it, the narration here has an 'idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is'. Thus the narration here is not part of the 'man' that 'possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing any sense, without having any idea how each word has meaning'.

The 'ability to construct language' is, in this narration, something that 'man possesses'. However, as I read in the last proposition and the preface, what can be 'thought' is a subset of language because some language is 'on the other side of the limit' of what is 'thinkable'. So, not only does 'man' possess the 'the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense', 'man' also 'possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing 'nonsense'.

As I read in the preface, 'in order to be able to draw a limit to thought we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable (i.e. we should have to be able to think what cannot be

thought)' (p.3). 'We' cannot 'think what cannot be thought' but 'we' can 'construct languages capable of expressing' 'what cannot be thought' if 'we' are 'man'. It is a strange 'possession' that is an ability to express what cannot be thought.

There are, however, some questions that trouble my reading here. In the preface it is 'we' who 'should be able to think what cannot be thought' (TLP, p.3). This 'we' is the narration. One way to understand this 'we' is that it is the 'I' of the narration and the 'one person who read and understood' 'this book'. If it is this 'we' who 'draw a limit' then this 'we' is not part of 'man' because 'we' have some 'idea how each word has meaning'. It would follow that no 'man' could have 'any idea how each word has meaning' and remain a 'man'.

Furthermore, because 'man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense' the 'we' who, in this narration, cannot be 'man' cannot possess the 'ability'. Thus the ability to construct languages excludes the possibility of understanding those languages. One can either construct or understand language, never both.

The second thing that troubles my reading is the claim that '[m]an possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense'. In my reading earlier the claims in the preface took precedence and they contradict my reading of proposition 4.002. If I read this proposition without giving the preface precedence, then 'languages' are 'capable of expressing every sense'. In proposition 4 I read that '[a] thought is a proposition with a sense'. If 'languages' are 'capable of expressing every sense' and '[t]he totality of propositions is language' then, as I read it, every 'proposition' is a 'thought' and thought and language are coterminous. This would lead me to conclude that 'the question whether the

good is more or less identical that the beautiful' 4.003 is a 'thought' and therefore 'a proposition with a sense', but is also described in proposition 4.003 as 'nonsensical'.

The narration continues, 'without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is – just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced'. So, while 'man possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense', 'man' has no 'idea how each word has meaning'. The 'ability to construct languages' does not, therefore, require 'any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is'.

There are, as I read it, two claims here. The first is that 'man possesses the ability to construct languages...without having any idea how each word has meaning'. The claim is not that 'man' does not fully understand this 'how each word has meaning'. Rather that in order to be 'man' in this narration 'man' must not have 'any idea how each word has meaning'. So, for example, if someone imagines that 'each word has meaning' because '[t]he world is all that is the case' that would be an 'idea' of how 'each word has meaning'. (Here I am making the assumption that there is some similarity between an idea and a thought and that because proposition 1 has 'a sense' it is 'a thought'.) This would mean that this someone has 'an idea how each word has meaning' and cannot then be 'man'. '[L]anguages' for 'man' must be 'without any idea how each word has meaning'.

The second claim is that 'man possesses the ability to construct languages...without having any idea...what its meaning is'. Here I read 'its meaning' as the meaning of 'each word'. Again 'man' does not have 'any idea' what the 'meaning' of 'each word' is.

All of this is described as being 'just as people speak without knowing how the individual sounds are produced'. I read 'just as' to be a claim to similarity. The similarity is that 'man' and 'people' are 'without' knowledge. When 'people' 'speak' and when 'man' 'possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense' they do so 'without knowing'. Since, as I read it, the possession of 'the ability to construct language' and 'speaking' are very different, I assume that it is the 'without knowing' and 'without having any idea' that makes the two 'just as' one another.

What is it that is not known by 'people' when they 'speak'? If these 'people' can 'speak' then it would follow that they know how to 'produce' the 'individual sounds'. As I type this it occurs to me that I don't know how each letter appears on the screen as I type. I wonder then if, from the perspective of this narration, I write 'without knowing how the individual [letters] are produced'. If so, then the knowledge that enables 'people' to 'speak' is not knowledge.

The narration continues: '[e]veryday language is part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it'. I would contrast 'everyday language' with 'a sign-language that is governed by logical grammar – by logical syntax' (3.325). The OED defines 'organism' as an 'individual animal, plant or single celled life form. Also: the material structure of such an individual; an instance of this.'[88] If, for the moment, I read 'organism' in this way then 'everyday language' is a part of the 'material structure' of an 'individual' 'human'. However,

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[88] "Organism, n." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2021. Web. 27 January 2022.

the OED also offers 'a whole with independent parts, compared to a living thing, an organic system' which is a definition that I find fits my reading. In this reading the 'human organism' might be understood to be 'Man' as a whole. In this 'organic system' 'everyday language' is one of the 'independent parts' that make up the 'whole'. I am reminded here of Winnicott's observation that 'there is no such thing as a baby'[89] which I understand to mean that the 'nursing couple' is an 'organism' in that neither can exist independently. Perhaps then 'man' cannot exist without '[e]veryday language'.

The second part of this sentence is a claim that '[e]veryday language' is 'no less complicated' than 'the human organism' of which 'it' is a 'part'. If this is so then all that is 'complicated' must be 'everyday language' since the whole 'human organism' can be no more 'complicated' than '[e]veryday language'. So, whatever the 'human organism' might contain, apart from '[e]veryday language' cannot add any complexity to the 'organism'. Because the part is 'no less complicated' than the whole. This reading, of course, relies on a reading of the final 'it' in this sentence as 'the human organism', but I can find no other reading that makes sense to me.

In '[i]t is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is' I read 'humanly possible' as 'possible' for the humans that make up the 'human organism' in this proposition. These humans 'cannot gather immediately from it', I read it here as 'everyday language', 'what the logic of language is'. While they may not be able to 'gather immediately' this sentence does not preclude a less immediate 'gather[ing]' of 'what the

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[89] DW Winnicott, *Maturational processes and the facilitating environment*. P.39 footnote.

logic of language is'. In order to 'gather what the logic of language is' from 'everyday language' that 'logic' would have to be 'gather[ed]' from the part of 'language' that is 'everyday'.

Also, if I read 'man' and 'people' and 'human' as members of the same 'human organism' then none of them can have 'any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is'. Therefore, any understanding of the 'logic of language' would be inhuman. The alternative to this reading that conflates 'man', 'people' and 'human' is that each part of this proposition is concerned with a different group: '[m]an' lacks 'any idea', the 'human organism' contains 'language' and 'people speak'.

The narration continues, '[l]anguage disguises thought. So much so that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.' Here '[l]anguage disguises thought' but from the perspective of the narration 'thought' is still 'thought' despite its 'disguise'. So, if 'disguises' is read to be a concealment of 'thought' behind 'language' then it fails to do so in this narration. In '[s]o much so' I read that there are degrees of 'disguise' and that what follows is because of the level to which '[l]anguage disguises thought'. I would argue that, regardless of the level to which '[l]anguage disguises thought', because this is known to be a 'disguise' it reveals that which it 'disguises'.

Here I read that 'language' is the 'outward form of the clothing' that 'disguises thought' to the extent that it is 'it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath'. While the

'form of the thought' is 'impossible to infer' from the 'outward form of the clothing' it is possible to 'infer' that what is 'beneath' is a 'thought'. It is also possible to differentiate the 'outward form of the clothing' from the 'thought beneath it' even when the 'form of the thought' is 'impossible to infer'.

This is 'because the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes'. As I have read, 'language' is the 'clothing' that 'disguises thought' whilst also revealing 'thought' to the perspective in this narration. In order to read the text in this way I have had to make the assumptions that 'the outward form of the clothing' is 'language' and 'the form of the body' is 'the form of thought beneath it', where it is the 'language'/ 'clothing'. This reading supports the notion that 'language disguises', in that 'thought' and 'language' are 'disguised' as 'body' and 'clothing'. However, as I read it, it would be more accurate to write that 'language disguises' 'language' in this instance.

Continuing with this reading I read that the 'form of the clothing' which is 'language' is 'not designed to reveal the form of the body', which is 'thought'. Setting aside, for now, my reading that the disguise must always reveal what it disguises in order to be a disguise, I would like to consider the claim that 'clothing' as 'language' is 'not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes'. While it is not 'designed to reveal', it is, as I read it, 'designed'. Since I read earlier in this proposition that '[m]an possesses the ability to construct languages capable of expressing every sense', I will assume for now that it is 'man' who has 'designed' this 'clothing' that I am reading as 'language'. However, I

would argue that the most basic requirement of 'design' for 'language' would be an 'idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is' and 'man' possesses neither. Even if 'language' is 'designed…for entirely different purposes', an understanding of how 'language' 'means' would be a prerequisite for such a 'design'. 'Everyday language' is also 'part of the human organism' and I wonder if it is possible to have 'designed' part of the 'organism' to which one belongs and also I wonder how a 'human' might 'design' a 'language' that is 'no less complicated' than the 'human organism' to which that 'human' belongs.[90]

The final sentence in this proposition is, '[t]he tacit conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated.'

The 'conventions' here are 'tacit' which I read as being implied but not openly expressed. The narration here claims that the 'conventions on which understanding of everyday language depends are enormously complicated'. In a similar way to the 'disguised' 'language' I read earlier in this proposition what is 'tacit' is also known to be 'enormously complicated'. Thus, despite having to infer the 'conventions on which the understanding of everyday language depends' from a 'language' that 'disguises thought' these 'conventions' can be known to be 'enormously complicated'.

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[90] It strikes me that the 'disguise' is all that is there. If I look at a drawing of a man in clothes, I imagine that there is a body beneath the clothes, but the picture doesn't present that, I put it into the picture. In proposition 3.11 'the method of projection is to think of the sense of the proposition', but who does the projecting?

The 'conventions' are for 'understanding' not for making or disguising language'. I wonder then if I am reading the text with the right 'conventions'. This, in turn, leads me to question where the meaning in this text lies: Is it in the 'language' which disguises thought; in the thought that is represented but not present; or is it in the conventions of interpretation?

> Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.
> (They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful.)
> And it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact *not* problems at all.
> (4.003)

The claim in the first sentence of this proposition applies to 'most' but not all 'of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works'. The narration here is, as I read it, concerned with 'everyday language' as delineated in the foregoing proposition rather than the 'sign-language' 'governed by a logical *grammar* – a logical syntax' in proposition 3.325.

Since, in the 'everyday language'[91] of 'philosophical works' 'man' has no 'idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is' and this language 'disguises thought' it might be that in order for these 'propositions and questions to be found' the narration must first

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[91] In the introduction to Mary Godolphin's *Robinson Crusoe in Words of One Syllable*, (London: George Routledge & Sons, 1912) there is the argument that the text must be adapted from 'everyday language' so that children can read the adaptation before moving on to the quotidian original. Is the narration here the bridge between those who know and those who don't in the way that children's authors are described as retaining their childness while also being knowing adults?

have some 'idea of how language works' and to penetrate the 'disguise[d] thought' in the 'philosophical works'. However, in my own reading I am forced to rely on the 'everyday language' and my 'idea of how language works' rather than having access to the 'propositions and questions' that are 'beneath' (4.002) that language.

The 'propositions and questions' 'are not false but nonsensical'. As I read in the preface to this book, the 'limit' that 'can be drawn' between sense and what 'will simply be nonsense' (TLP, p.4) is one that will only be drawn 'in language' because to draw such a limit in 'thought' 'we should have to be able to think what cannot be thought' (TLP, p.3). Thus these 'propositions and questions' are those that can be 'expressed' but not 'thought'. According to the narration 'we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical'. Here it is 'questions of this kind' that 'we cannot give any answer to'. 'Propositions' are excluded from this claim, perhaps because 'propositions' do not require that 'we give… [an] answer'.

Whatever the reason for the differentiation between 'propositions and questions' here, the 'we' in this proposition can differentiate between a 'nonsensical' 'question' and a 'nonsensical' 'proposition'. I infer from this that there is something that can be read, even if only an expression of their form as 'question' or 'proposition' in the 'nonsensical' in which I read that 'what lies on the other side of the limit will [not] simply be nonsense'. The simplicity of this 'nonsense' is contaminated by its also being 'propositions and questions'.

These 'questions' 'are not false'. In propositions 2.221 and 2.222 I read that '[w]hat a picture represents is its sense' and that '[t]he agreement or disagreement of its sense with

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reality constitutes its truth or falsity'. If I transfer these properties of 'truth or falsity' to the 'propositions and questions found in philosophical works' then, as I read it, they are neither 'true' nor 'false' but are, from the perspective of the narration, 'nonsensical' because they cannot be compared with 'reality' and found to be in 'agreement or disagreement' with that 'reality'[92]. 'Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only point out that they are nonsensical' I read that to 'point out that they are nonsensical' is not an 'answer'. Also, there can be 'questions of this kind' and therefore nonsense can be categorised.

When 'we can only point out that they [t]he 'questions to be found in philosophical works'] are nonsensical' I wonder why this the 'only' thing that 'we' can do. As I read it, the narration of much of this book is an attempt to explain why 'questions of this kind' are 'nonsensical' and to construct a 'sign-language' that will avoid such nonsense, which contradicts the claim that 'we can only point out that they are nonsensical'.

The narration continues, '[m]ost of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language'. Here the narration is concerned with 'propositions and questions' again and it is '<u>our</u> failure to understand the logic of <u>our</u> language' [my underlining] that gives rise to 'most of the[se] propositions and questions'. Since 'we' 'can only point out that they are nonsensical' I read that the 'we' in the foregoing sentence must, to some extent, 'understand the logic of our language' in order to be able to

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[92] 'Reality' is always already known and fixed in this reading. Not constructed or from a certain perspective. This seems important in that it is the basis for a science that already knows what it is investigating and a learning that already knows what there is to be learned.

differentiate between 'questions of this kind', 'nonsensical' 'propositions' and 'questions' of a different kind. Thus, the 'we' who 'cannot give any answer' is not the same 'we' to whom 'our failure' and 'our language' belong.

In the parentheses that follow, '(They belong to the same class as the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful), the 'questions and propositions to be found in philosophical works', as I read it, 'belong to the same class' as this 'question'. It would follow that this question is not one of those 'to be found in philosophical works' because '[t]hey belong to the same class' as this 'question' but this 'question' is not part of the 'they' from the perspective of the narration.

As I read it, 'whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful' is not a question. However, in this narration it is 'the question'. So, if I read 'the question' as '[is] the good…more or less identical than the beautiful [?]' then 'the question' asks about a 'complex sign' similar to 'aRb' where 'a' stands in relationship 'R' to 'b'. Here I can read 'a' to stand in for 'the good', 'b' for 'the beautiful' and 'R' as the relationship 'more of less identical'. It is not then the structure of the question that makes it 'nonsensical'. The terms of 'the question' are not defined and therefore I do not know what 'the good' or 'the beautiful' are. However, for now I will assume that 'the good' are things that belong to the 'same class', 'the beautiful' belong to a different 'class' and to be 'identical' is to stand in a relationship similar to that described in '("A" is the same sign as "A")' (3.203). If I then define 'the good' as all the iterations of 'g' and 'the beautiful' as all of the iterations of 'b' and 'e' then, because there is some difference between the constituents of 'the beautiful'

and fewer in the constituents of 'the good' I can justifiably claim that 'the good is more…identical that the beautiful'.

So, as I have read it here, 'the question whether the good is more or less identical than the beautiful' is similar to the 'complex sign' 'aRb' and is therefore 'logical' and can, with the definitions I inserted, be answered. Thus 'our' inability to answer a 'question' of this 'class' arises not 'from our failure to understand the logic of our language' but from a failure to define the words in the question, or, as in proposition 4.002, 'without having any idea…what [each word's] meaning is' 'the question' cannot be answered.

It might be argued that 'the good' and 'the beautiful' have no 'object' in 'reality' with which they can be compared to ascertain their truth or falsity. However, neither do 'logic' or 'language' or 'nonsensical'. Why then are 'the good' and 'the beautiful' markers of a 'nonsensical' 'class' of 'question' when similarly difficult to define terms are not?

In the final sentence of this proposition, '[a]nd it is not surprising that the deepest problems are in fact *not* problems at all' the narration appears to contradict itself in claiming that 'problems are in fact *not* problems'. However, I would argue that 'the deepest problems' are 'in philosophical works' and not 'in fact'. The contradiction is removed if I rewrite the sentence '[a]nd it is not surprising that the deepest problems [in philosophical works] are not [from a perspective where 'fact' is always already known] problems at all'. The 'questions and propositions to be found in philosophical works' in this text have been defined as those which cannot be compared with a 'reality' in order to judge their 'truth or falsity' and if 'reality' is where 'truth' is derived then 'it is not surprising at all' that non-

factual problems do not find their solutions 'in fact'. As I read it the 'questions to be found in philosophical works' are not universally unanswerable questions but are not questions to which 'logic', as defined in this narration, can provide an answer that is satisfactory from the perspective of that narration.[93]

> All philosophy is a 'critique of language' (though not in Mauthner's sense). It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one. (4.0031)

In the front matter of my copy of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* the Library of Congress in Publication Data gives the subjects of the book as '1. Logic, Symbolic and mathematical. 2. Language and languages–Philosophy'. This book then is, from this perspective, one of the 'philosophical works' discussed in the previous proposition and is part of the '[a]ll philosophy' that is a "critique of language". Having made the claim that '[a]ll philosophy is a "critique of language"' the narration in the parentheses questions this claim to homogeneity with 'though not in Mauthner's sense'.) It has been argued that Mauthner's 'critique of language' is more pessimistic than the one put forward in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and asserts that 'the time has come to learn to be silent once again' because language has become 'a useless device for knowledge'[94]. However, the claim in this proposition is not that 'All philosophy is a critique of language'. The quotation marks surrounding "'critique of language'" need to be read.

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[93] For an exploration of different kinds of 'truth' see B.K. Ridley, *On Science*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2001)

[94] Elena Najera, 'Wittgenstein Vs Mauthner two critiques of language, two mysteries', (Bergen: The Wittgenstein Archives at the University of Bergen, 2013) Accessed 27th January 2022
http://wab.uib.no/agora/tools/alws/collection-7-issue-1-article-29.annotate

As I read it, '"critique of language"' is a quotation and therefore for this narration all philosophy is not a critique of language, but is a '"critique of language"' from a perspective other than that of the narration. Neither is this '"critique of language"' a '"critique of language"' 'in mauthner's sense' according to the narration in parentheses. Thus, there is a 'critique of language' from an unknown perspective that from the perspective of the narration is what 'all philosophy is'. Also, from the perspective of the narration this is not a '"critique of language"' in the 'sense' that is 'Mauthner's'.

The second sentence in this proposition is '[i]t was Russell who performed the service of showing that the apparent logical form of a proposition need not be its real one'. Bertrand Russell wrote in 1924 that 'language misleads us both by its vocabulary and by its syntax. We must be on our guard in both respects if our logic is not to lead to a false metaphysic'[95]. This leads me to question whether my reading of the first part of this proposition is an example of the way that 'language misleads us'? Certainly, many scholars read this proposition in a very different way, although I cannot say which of us is misled.

> A proposition is a picture of reality.
> A proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it. (4.01)

As I read it here a 'proposition' in being a 'picture of reality' is not itself 'reality'. This reading is supported by my reading, in proposition 2.173, that 'a picture represents its subject from a position outside it' where 'it' is taken to be the 'subject' in 'reality'. In propositions 2.221

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and 2.222 respectively I read that '[w]hat a picture represents is its sense' and that the 'agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality constitutes its truth or falsity'. If I attempt to combine these claims as I read them then a 'proposition is a picture' that 'represents [its] sense' of 'reality'. That this 'sense' can be in 'agreement or disagreement with reality' while the 'proposition' is still 'a picture of reality' raises, for me, a question about how to read the 'of' in this sentence'.

One might imagine that 'a picture of reality' can be known to be a 'picture of reality' because its 'elements' are in 'agreement with reality' from a certain perspective. I read in proposition 2.173 that '(its [a picture's] standpoint is its representational form.) That is why a picture represents its subject correctly or incorrectly'. If, as in proposition 4.01, 'a proposition is a picture of reality' then it is always 'of reality' even when it does not agree with 'reality'. I wonder then how 'a proposition' can be recognised to be 'of reality' unless it 'represents its subject correctly'. If a 'proposition' can 'represent' 'reality' 'incorrectly' and still be a 'proposition' then it is a representation 'of reality' that is incorrect from every 'standpoint'. How can such a proposition be said to be 'of reality'?

The second part of this proposition is '[a] proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it'. The 'it' here might be read as 'a model' or 'reality' or 'a proposition'. Also, 'as we imagine' might be read as at the same time that 'we imagine' or might be read as in the way that 'we imagine'. The reading that makes most sense to me is that '[a] proposition is a model of reality [in the way that] we imagine [that reality]. I am struck that my reading, despite all of

the possible permutations I have considered, is a reading of the proposition in the way that I 'imagine it' to make the most sense.[96]

One of the definitions of 'imagine' in the OED contains 'to form a mental image of, picture to oneself…'[97] If I rework this proposition to include this definition of 'imagine' and the equivalences among 'picture', 'proposition' and 'model' then: a picture is a picture of reality as we picture reality to ourselves. This reworking is, as I read it, solipsistic and later in the text, in proposition 5.62, the narration claims that 'what the solipsist *means* is quite correct; only it cannot be *said*, but makes itself manifest'. Perhaps I have read such a manifestation here.

> At first sight a proposition–one set out on the printed page, for example – does not seem to be a picture of the reality with which it is concerned. But neither do written notes seem at first sight to be a picture of a piece of music, nor our phonetic notation (the alphabet) to be a picture of our speech.
> And yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the ordinary sense, of what they represent. (4.011)

The claim I read here is that 'a proposition' is 'a picture of the reality with which it is concerned' but that it 'does not seem to be' 'at first sight'. Thus, there is a difference between what is seen 'at first sight' and what is seen at a subsequent 'sight'. There are three perspectives in this sentence. The first is the 'first sight' which would, as I read it, simply see that 'a proposition' is not 'a picture of the reality with which it is concerned'. At

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[96] This is an example of my inability to move beyond the language in which I, and the narration, are entangled.

[97] "Imagine, v." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2021. Web. 16 January 2022.

some subsequent 'sight' a perspective that sees that 'a proposition is a picture of reality'

occurs. This subsequent 'sight' corrects what was seen at the 'first sight' which is

retrospectively known to have been a 'seem[ing]' and not a correct 'sight' from a third

perspective that encompasses both the first and subsequent 'sight[s]'.

The narration continues, '[b]ut neither do written notes seem at first to be a picture of a

piece of music'. As I read in proposition 3.322 'the sign, of course, is arbitrary' and therefore

there is, as I read it, nothing in 'the sign' or the 'written notes' that could be read as 'a piece

of music' 'at first sight'. The same claim is made for our 'phonetic notation (the alphabet)

which does not 'seem at first sight' 'to be a picture of our speech'[98]. I wonder if the failure

of these notations to be understood as 'picture[s]' 'at first sight' might be because the

'proposition…set out on the printed page, for example' would be 'set out' in 'everyday

language', 'the understanding' of which 'depends on' 'enormously complicated' 'tacit

conventions' (4.002).

The proposition continues, '[a]nd yet these sign-languages prove to be pictures, even in the

ordinary sense, of what they represent'. As I read it 'these sign-languages prove to be

pictures' because, from the perspective of this narration a 'proposition is a picture of

reality'. The narration puts in place the 'conventions' by which a 'proposition' is a 'picture'

and then this is what they 'prove to be'.

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[98] The idea that speech precedes writing is one that is troubled in Derrida's reading of
Rousseau in "… That Dangerous Supplement…" in Jacques Derrida, *of Grammatology*
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) pp.141-164

It is obvious that a proposition of the form 'aRb' strikes us as a picture. In this case the sign is obviously the likeness of what is signified. (4.012)

I read in proposition 3.1432 that 'instead of "the complex sign 'aRb' say that a stands to b in the relation R" we ought to put "that 'a' stands to 'b' in a certain relation says that aRb"'. In proposition 4.012 'aRb' is not a 'complex sign' but is a 'proposition of the form "aRb"'. Thus 'aRb' is the 'form' of the 'proposition' but, as I read it, the proposition would still be a 'proposition' if it were 'of' a different 'form'. Here I have read 'a proposition of the form "aRb"' as a description of the 'form' of the 'proposition'.

However, I read in proposition 4.01 that a 'proposition is a picture of reality'. A 'picture of reality' then means that the 'picture' represents a 'reality' of which that 'picture' is not a part. If I read the 'of' in 'a proposition of the form "aRb"' in a similar way, then the 'proposition' is a 'picture' of something that exists in reality: the 'form "aRb"'. Notwithstanding the multiple readings I have put forward, from the perspective of the narration, '[i]t is obvious that a proposition of the form "aRb" strikes us as a picture'. I have been arguing 'a proposition of the form "aRb"' is not from my perspective 'obvious[ly]' a 'picture'. However, another reading of this sentence is that what is 'obvious' is that 'it strikes us as a picture'. Presumably, because the narration is part of the 'us', or is the 'us', how something 'strikes us' is 'obvious' from that perspective. That 'a proposition of the form "aRb" strikes us as a picture' is perhaps 'obvious' because the claim in proposition 4.01 that 'proposition is a picture of reality' is one made from the perspective the narration.

However, this reading is troubled, for me, by the claim that 'a proposition…strikes us as a picture'. I read the 'strike' of 'strikes us' as 'to come into the mind of, occur to'[99]. In this case what 'strikes us' is that 'a proposition' is 'a picture', which is not something that has just 'come into the mind of' the 'us' but is the narration's own definition of 'a proposition'. The proposition continues '[i]n this case the sign is obviously a likeness of what is signified'. In the first proposition in this text I read that '[t]he world is all that is the case'. Thus, because what is described in this part of proposition 4.012 is 'in this case' I can read that 'the sign [that] is obviously a likeness of what is signified' is of 'the world'. However, 'this case' may not be 'the case' and therefore 'this case' may not be 'the world'. In proposition 2.022 I read that '[i]t is obvious that an imagined world, however different it may be from the real one, must have something – a form – in common with it'. As I read it then, 'this case' even if it is not part of 'the world' must share 'a form' with the 'real one' from the perspective of this narration.

Whatever 'this case' may be, 'the sign is obviously a likeness of what is signified'. The 'sign' here is, as I read it, 'a proposition of the form "aRb"' and 'aRb' is described in proposition 3.1432 as a 'complex sign'. In my reading of this proposition earlier I suggest that 'the form "aRb"' might be something in 'reality' that is represented by the 'proposition' in proposition 4.012. If I follow that reading then a 'proposition' or 'complex sign' which is 'a picture' (4.01) and is 'a [picture] of the form "aRb"' is 'a likeness of what is signified' because that is how the 'sign-language' put in place by this narration works. The sky is blue today as I look out of my window. According to my reading of this narration, 'the sky is blue' is 'a likeness of what

[99] "Strike, v." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2021. Web. 16 January 2022.

is represented'. However, I would argue that the connection between 'the sky is blue' and what I see is a learned one and is 'obvious' to me only because I have learned to make those connections. It is 'obvious' because it is tautological.

> And if we penetrate to the essence of this pictorial character we see that it is *not* impaired by *apparent irregularities* (such as the use of ♯ and ♭ in musical notation).
>
> For even these irregularities depict what they are intended to express; only they do it in a different way. (4.013)

I read in the 'And' at the beginning here that this proposition is an addition to the foregoing proposition. The 'if' introduces contingency for it is only 'if we penetrate to the essence of this pictorial character' that 'we see that it is *not* impaired by *apparent irregularities*…' Thus, as I read it, 'we' might not 'penetrate to the essence of this pictorial character'. If 'we' must 'penetrate' to this 'essence' then it is neither easily accessible nor 'obvious'. In proposition 4.002 I read that '[l]anguage disguises thought' to the extent 'that from the outward form of the clothing it is impossible to infer the form of the thought beneath it'. There is a similarity between the 'disguise[d] thought' and the 'essence of this pictorial character' that must be 'penetrate[d] to' in order for 'us' to 'see' its attributes. If 'we' can 'penetrate to the essence' then there must be something to be 'penetrate[d]' and since '[l]anguage disguises thought' it is perhaps the 'languages' (4.002) 'set out on the printed page for example' 4.011 that 'we' must 'penetrate'. Perhaps it is the need for this 'penetration' that prevents this 'language' proving to be 'pictures…of what they represent at first sight'.

However, in the last proposition I read that it 'is obvious that a proposition of the form "aRb" strikes us as a picture'. While this is only one 'proposition' and my reading of

proposition 4.012 problematises the claim to obviousness, I read that from the perspective of the narration the 'pictorial character' of a proposition can be read as being 'obvious' to the 'we' of the narration.

Perhaps then, it is the 'pictorial character' itself that 'we' must 'penetrate' in order to reach the 'essence of the pictorial character'. Since what is disguised by 'language' is 'thought' I wonder whether the 'essence of the pictorial character' is also 'thought'. I read the 'pictorial' in 'pictorial character' as that which makes 'a proposition…a picture' (4.01). However, the 'pictorial character' might be read as a letter or symbol that marks the proposition as 'pictorial', or the 'aggregate of the distinctive features'[100] of the 'proposition' or a role taken on by the 'proposition'. In each of these readings there is, as I read it, something beyond what is presented. The symbol, the features and the role all have something to which they refer, each is a simulacrum that defers meaning back to an 'essence'.

If, as I have suggested, the 'essence of this pictorial character' is 'thought' then, as I read it, the claim here is that if 'we penetrate to the essence' of what is presented then 'we' understand the meaning behind the proposition. If this 'penetrat[ion]' has been achieved 'we see that it is *not impaired* by *apparent irregularities* (such as the use of ♯ and ♭ in musical notation). For even these irregularities depict what they are intended to express; only they do it in a different way'. As I read it, 'it' must be either the 'essence of the pictorial character' or the 'pictorial character' itself that is 'not impaired'. I read that 'we see' the

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[100] "Character, n." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2021. Web. 16 January 2022.

'pictorial character' when 'a proposition…strikes us as a picture' and therefore 'it' in this case is 'the essence of the pictorial character'. So, 'if we penetrate to the essence of this pictorial character' then 'we see that [the essence of this pictorial character] is '*not impaired by apparent irregularities*'.

That the 'essence' is '*not impaired by apparent irregularities*' raises for me the question of how the 'essence of this pictorial character' might be lessened, weakened or worsened[101] by '*apparent irregularities*' in the 'written notes' through which the 'essence' is represented. An example of these '*apparent irregularities*' is given in parentheses: (such as the use of ♯ and ♭ in musical notation). As I understand it, '♯' is the musical notation for sharp, which means 'the note is one half step higher than the natural note' and '♭' is the musical notation for flat which means 'the note that is one half step lower than the natural note'[102]. Since both of these 'signs' rely for their meaning on a 'natural note' from which they are different, perhaps '♭' and '♯' are 'irregularities' from the regular 'natural'. As the proposition does not refer to a 'natural note', I wonder if, form the perspective of the narration, there is a regular way in which 'a proposition' can be 'set out on the printed page', regular 'written [musical] notes' and regular 'phonetic notation'. In this proposition there are 'irregularities' or '*apparent irregularities*' and, as I read it, there must be, from the perspective of the narration, a 'regular' from which they differ.

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[101] "Impair, v." *OED Online*. Oxford University Press, December 2021. Web. 16 January 2022.

[102] 'Sharp, Flat, and Natural Notes', accessed on 14th January 2022 at https://ou.instructure.com/courses/1819836/pages/sharp-flat-and-natural-notes-lecture-and-notes

In the final sentence of the proposition the 'irregularities' are not *irregularities* and are not *apparent*. Although, as I read it, the 'irregularities' here are still apparent in that they appear to the narration. However, they are not only 'apparent', they are, from the narration's perspective, real 'irregularities'. These 'irregularities' 'depict what they are intended to express; only they do it in a different way'. The 'irregularities' are then 'sign[s]' that are not 'obviously a likeness of what is signified' (4.012) from the perspective of the narration. What makes them capable of being read to 'depict what they are intended to express' is, as I read it, that 'we' have been able to 'penetrate to the essence of this pictorial form'. My reading of this proposition is that there is something that the proposition is 'intended to express' which is that proposition's 'picture of reality' (4.01). The proposition has a perspective, its 'standpoint' (2.173), from which that 'picture of reality' is represented and an intention to 'express' that 'picture'. This 'picture' is, as I read it, 'the essence of this pictorial character' and is where '[i]n a proposition a thought finds an expression that can be perceived by the senses' (3.1). So, if 'we' are able to 'penetrate to [this] essence' then 'we' know what the proposition is 'intended to express'. If we already know what the proposition is 'intended to express' then no amount of 'irregularities' will 'impair' that 'express[ion]'. However, if 'we' already know what the proposition was 'intended to express' then, as I read it, nothing is communicated.[103]

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[103] This is the recurrent problem of having to know what is communicated before it has been communicated in order to understand the communication!

A gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound waves, all stand to one another in the same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world.
They are all constructed according to a common logical pattern.
(Like the two youths in the fairy tale, their two horses, and their lilies. They are all in a certain sense one.) (4.014)

The 'internal relation' here cannot be 'internal to' the 'gramophone record', or the 'musical idea', the 'written notes' or 'the sound waves' because they 'all stand to one another in the same internal relation'. As I read it, in order to 'stand to one another' the 'relation' between each must be external to the 'record', 'idea', 'notes' and 'waves'. Which, for me, raises the question: to what is this 'relation' 'internal'?

The 'relation' is the 'same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world'. As I read it, each of the items listed: 'gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound waves' can be read to 'depict' 'one another'. As an example, I might play the 'gramophone record', hear the 'sound waves' produced by that playing, have my own 'musical idea' and then write the 'written notes'. Alternatively, I might begin with the 'musical idea' write some 'notes', make the 'sound waves' and record them onto a 'gramophone record'. There is no starting point, no origin. Each item in the list can be read as 'depicting' the others.

Thus, what they are inside, in order to be 'internal relations' is the perspective from which they are read to be 'depicting' 'one another'. This is, according to this narration, 'the same internal relation that holds between language and the world'. This means, as I read it, that while 'language' is 'depicting' 'the world', 'the world' is also 'depicting' 'language'.

Furthermore, in order for 'language' and 'the world' to be known to be 'in the same internal relation of depicting' the perspective that they are 'internal' to must extend beyond and outside of 'language' and 'the world'. Therefore, being outside 'the world', this perspective is also not 'the case' (1)

I read that 'all' in '[t]hey are all constructed according to a common logical pattern' to refer to the 'gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the sound waves' and also to 'language and the world'. Each of these are 'constructed according to a common logical pattern'. As I read it the 'common logical pattern' can be read as prior to the 'construction' in that if I am to construct something 'according to a…pattern' I must have that 'pattern' before I can begin to construct 'according to' it. However, in a later proposition, 6.341, the narration claims that 'Newtonian mechanics, for example, imposes a uniform form on the description of the world'. Here I read that from the perspective of the narration on the perspective of 'Newtonian Mechanics' the world can be described and understood in a certain way. Thus, in this reading, it is the perspective itself that constructs what it sees 'according to' its 'logical pattern' of reading the items listed. This reading is similar to Jacqueline Rose's claim that '[t]here is no child behind the category 'children's fiction', other than the one which the category itself sets in place, the one which it needs to believe is there for its own purposes'[104]. It also brings to my mind Thomas Kuhn's claim that 'what a man sees depends both upon what he looks at and also what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him to see'[105].

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[104] Jacqueline Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children's Fiction*, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1993) p.10
[105] Thomas Kuhn, *The structure of Scientific Revolutions*, Fourth Edition, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2012) p.113

I read '(Like the two youths in the fairy-tale, their two horses, and their lilies. They are all in a certain sense one)' as a reference to the Grimm's 'fairy-tale 'The Gold Children'[106]. In that 'fairy-tale' a magical 'Gold Fish', having been caught several times by a poor fisherman, instructs the fisherman to '[t]ake me home and cut me into six pieces, give your wife two of them to eat, two to your horse, and bury two of them in the ground'. Having followed these instructions '[i]t came to pass that from the two pieces that were buried in the ground, two golden lilies sprang up; that the horse had two golden foals; and the fisherman's wife bore two children who were made entirely of gold'. In the 'fairy-tale' and in this proposition there are then 'two youths', 'two horses' and two 'lilies'. This is, as I read it, six things. Yet, according to this narration '[t]hey are all in a certain sense one.)' 'In the fairy tale' the children are 'solid gold' and the horses and lilies are 'golden', so perhaps they are 'one' in their colour or material. Or, perhaps because their source, the magical 'Gold Fish', is 'one' fish 'in a certain sense' they are, however differentiated, still 'one'. The problem with all of my speculation about their oneness is that there are, as I read it, six.

> There is a general rule by which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and, using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records. (4.0141)

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[106] Jacob C.L. Grimm and Wilhelm C. Grimm, 'The Golden Children' in *Grimm's Tales for Young and Old*, translated by Ralph Manheim, (London: Victor Gollancz Ltd, 1978) pp.293-296

I read in '[t]here is a general rule by which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record' that there is a 'general rule' that 'makes it possible to derive' the 'symphony from the score' and 'the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record'. However, the proposition then continues 'and, using the first rule, to derive the score again'. 'There is', in this proposition then, 'a general rule' and a 'first rule' which may be the same rule. But, as I read it, a 'first rule' is only necessary if there are more than one 'rule'. This 'rule' that is not the 'first rule' is, as I read it, that 'which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the gramophone record'. This reading is based on what I understand to be a return to the 'first rule' in order to 'derive the score again'. If, as I have read, there are more than one rule then there is not a 'general rule' in the sense that it is always applicable. Indeed, it is not even 'general' when applied to this proposition. So this 'general rule' is 'general' in that it is always this 'rule' 'by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score'.

The meaning of the first sentence in this proposition is, as I read it, undecidable. There is both one 'general rule' which allows 'the musician to obtain the symphony from the score' and 'to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record' and, because one of these is 'the first rule' there are two different rules. Perhaps, from the perspective of the narration here this 'general rule' can be 'one' '[l]ike the two youths in the fairytale' (4.014). However, as I read it, these things are multiple in every 'sense' that makes sense to me.

In '[t]hat is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways' I read that '[t]hat' is the possibility of applying the 'general rule' to the 'symphony', 'the score' or the 'gramophone record' to 'derive' them from one another. 'The inner similarity between these things' then is that 'by means of' 'a general rule' each can be derived from the others. As I read it, this 'inner similarity' is based upon what can be 'obtained' or 'derived' by the application of the 'general rule'. This 'inner similarity' is the case despite these being 'things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways'. In this seeming there is, as I have discussed earlier, a perspective from which these 'things' are 'constructed in quite different ways'. This is my own understanding: that a musical 'score' and the 'groove on a gramophone record' are indeed 'constructed in such entirely different ways'. However, from the perspective of the narration, as I read it, they only 'seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways' and are in fact 'constructed' in similar ways. This reading brings me back to my reading of 'construction' as a projection of 'inner similarity' into the 'gramophone record' the 'score' and 'the symphony'.

The narration continues, '[a]nd that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation.' I read 'that rule' as 'the general rule' which is, in my reading of the narration, also 'the law of projection'. The 'general rule' then is not only the 'general rule' and the 'first rule' but is also the 'law of projection'. These rules and law 'seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways' that it is difficult for me to read 'the general rule' and 'the law of projection' as 'one'. However, it is this 'rule' that is 'the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation'. This, as I read it, somewhat undermines my reading that the 'inner similarity' was projected

into 'things' by the perspective of the narration. Here it is 'the law of projection that projects'. As yet, I cannot locate where the 'law of projection' 'projects' from. This 'law' 'projects the symphony into the language of musical notation'. The 'law' then is not in 'the symphony' or 'the language of musical notation'. It might be described as an external force that 'projects' 'the symphony into the language of musical notation'.

It is the 'rule' that is also the 'law' that 'projects the symphony into the language of musical notes', not 'into…musical notation'[107]. So, as I read it, 'the written notes' (4.014) do not have the 'symphony' projected into them, but the 'language of musical notes' does. I wonder if the 'language of musical notes' might be read as music[108]. 'It is the rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records'. Again, what 'this language', which I read here to be the 'language of musical notes', is 'translat[ed]' into is not 'the groove on the record' but the 'language of gramophone records'. These projections or translations are not then from 'symphony' to 'musical notation' to 'gramophone record' but from the 'language' of one into the 'language' of the other. This 'language' is not defined. However, as I read it, in this 'language', from the perspective of the narration, these 'things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways' 'are all in a certain sense one' (4.014).

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[107] This law/rule, as I read it, both justifies the claim that it can project/translate between 'things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways' and is derived from that claim. The 'law' is constituted by the application of the 'law' to the subject. This is, as I read it, an interpretation that is explored in more detail in Derrrida's reading of Kafka's *Before the Law* in Jacques Derrida, *Acts of Literature*, Edited by Derek Attridge (London: Routledge, 1992) pp.181-221

[108] The connections and disjunctures between written and audible 'language' are explored in "… That Dangerous Supplement …" in Jacques Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) pp.141-164

The possibility of all imagery, of all our pictorial modes of expression, is contained in the logic of depiction. (4.015)

I read in the claim that the 'logic of depiction' contains 'the possibility of all imagery' that 'all imagery', from the perspective of this narration, is 'depiction'. It would follow that 'all our pictorial modes of expression' are also depictions and, therefore, also that their 'possibility' is 'contained in the logic of depiction'. In 'the possibility of all imagery, of all our pictorial modes of expression' I read that 'all our pictorial modes of expression' is an expansion upon, an explanation of 'all imagery'. Thus, again I read that 'images' here are 'pictorial modes of expression'. That, from the perspective of this narration, 'the possibility of' 'all our pictorial modes of expression' are 'contained in the logic of depiction' is, as I read it, if not tautological, at least obvious. 'Our' 'pictorial mode of expression' is a 'mode of expression' that belongs to the '[o]ur' of the narration and, in order to express in a 'pictorial mode' a 'depiction' is necessary.

My reading of this chapter began with an exploration of verificationism. A theory in which truth can be determined either by empirical observation or by logical tautology. I went on to question the validity of a verificationist interpretation of the *Tractatus* in the light of my own reading that language can express nonsense because thought, as described in the Tractatus, goes beyond the boundary of sense and yet, again according to the *Tractatus*, a thought is a proposition with sense. This leads me to the self-contradictory reading that any thought, even those without sense, has sense.

The narration goes on to claim that man can have no idea how a word has meaning or what any word means. In which case, what is the perspective of the narration? If we take the I of the narration to be a man, the historical Ludwig Wittgenstein, then he can have no idea what or how his words mean. I would argue that the I of the narration is a production of my reading of this text.

I also read in this chapter that language is all of man's complexity and that language can evade verification. Here I am reminded of Derrida's assertion that 'there is no outside text*; il n'y a pas de hors texte*' in that, from the perspective of the narration of the *Tractatus* the complexity of man is the complexity of language and, as such, everything must be read. I mean by this that whether I am looking at a word or an object it will be a word or an object because I read it to be such. This reading fits well with my earlier claim that whether something is the signifier or the signified depends upon perspective.

I also read that language disguises thought and that in order to be known to be a disguise a disguise must reveal that which it disguises. This reminds me of Freud's Screen Memories in that that which is supposed screened is present in the screen memory itself.

Conclusion

The initial impetus for writing this thesis was my reading of an article in the journal *Science* that claimed to have shown that reading literary fiction improves theory of mind. Having read this article carefully I was curious about what assumptions form the basis for scientific investigations. Having discussed this question with my supervisor and read some of the literature on the philosophy of science it became clear that Wittgentstein's *Tractatus* is seen by many as one of the foundational texts of current scientific thought. As I wrote in my introduction, I read Stephen Hawking's announcement of the death of philosophy as being descended from a certain understanding of the statement in the *Tractatus* that the 'correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy…' (6.53)

From this starting point I set out to understand how the *Tractatus* is read to lead to the death of philosophy and whether this was the only possible reading of the text. In order achieve this aim I have employed a close textual analysis of the preface to the *Tractatus* and proposition 1 to 4.0141. The thesis ends at proposition 4.0141 not because my reading is complete (I do not believe that a complete reading of the text is possible), but rather because the thesis has a maximum length and, unlike many of the Wittgenstein scholars I have read, I cannot say which parts of the *Tractatus* are important and which should be passed over in silence. If I were to analyse all of the propositions in the *Tractatus* I would estimate that this thesis would be between four and five times longer than the current work.

This analysis is informed by my readings of Freud, Derrida, Rose, Barthes and Haraway and more so by my work with Professor Lesnik-Oberstein, Doctors Cocks and Walsh at the University of Reading.

The outcome of this approach has been a reading that in many ways brings the assumptions underpinning the existing Wittgenstein scholarship into question. The first of these assumptions is that the 'I' in the *Tractatus* is the historical, extra-textual Ludwig Wittgenstein. This presupposition is contradicted throughout my reading of the *Tractatus.* One example of this contradiction is the claim in proposition 4.002 that man constructs language 'without having any idea how each word has meaning or what its meaning is'. I argue that this places the 'I' of the *Tractatus* beyond the text's own definition of 'man'.

A second outcome of this reading has been the notion that words are given meaning by an extra-textual world that stands behind words as an ultimate transcendental signified. Throughout this thesis I have read that signification is reversible and that often, rather than language being defined by the thoughts or world that are taken to be anterior to that language, it is thought and the world that are defined by language.

In reading other Wittgenstein scholars I have found that all begin with these two basic assumptions in place and therefore, while the *Tractatus* is often cited as one of the most analysed philosophical texts of the past century none of the criticism questions these two basic assumptions.

In the preparation of this thesis I have come to to understand the *Tractatus* not as a text that derives its meaning from an extra-textual world or an extra-textual author but rather *as* its own world which is defined by my reading of the narration. I have been pleased that, using this method of reading, I have been able to pull out a great many contradictions and to gain a deeper understanding of the logic put forward in the *Tractatus.* However, I have been struck by the number of times my reading appears to be tautological in a similar way to that I have seen in other scholarship.

I have noted how I read that scholars who base their understanding of the *Tractatus* on Wittgenstein as the author or an author function and a language built on a transcendental foundation often appear to 'discover' these assumptions to be borne out in their reading of the *Tractatus.* What I have also noted in the preparation of this thesis is how often my own reading does something very similar. Perhaps it is inevitable that any reading of the *Tractatus* will be determined by the reader's initial unexamined assumptions. If this is the case then it might be that my own contribution is to recognise that fact.

Throughout this thesis I have chosen to use the term 'narration' when referring to the 'I' or the 'we' in the text, and also as a catch-all term to describe the imagined speaker within the text. As I mentioned briefly in my introduction, when I was asked by Professor Buse about this decision I was unable to provide a satisfactory answer. Thus, part of my work here is to examine the assumptions I made in making this choice and to try explain why I read these propositions to be a narration. Whilst I have tried to justify this in the foregoing chapters in relation to my reading, here I will engage with a specific definition of what narration is and how I read the text of the *Tractatus* to fit within that definition.

The OED defines narration as a 'thing narrated or recounted; a story, an account;

= **narrative**' which is not entirely helpful. However, it does point to narrative, which is given

as 'an account of a series of events, facts, etc., given in order and with the establishing of

connections between them; a narration, a story, an account'.[109] So, while the *Tractatus* has

no events in my reading, it does give an account of facts according to its own definition. In

the *Tractatus* 'a picture is a fact' (2.141) and 'a proposition is a picture of reality' (4.01).

Thus, by a process of substitution, we come to the conclusion that a proposition is a fact.

There are, as I have read, many other parts of the text where this conclusion is supported.

Having shown that the propositions of the *Tractatus* are facts, what remains is to show

whether these facts are given in order and whether connections are established between

them. The numbering system described in the footnote to proposition one shows that the

propositions are given in order. In the same footnote it is explained that each of the top

level propositions, 1-7, are connected to those that follow them because the lower level

propositions are comments upon those of a higher level. As I read it, in this account of the

Tractatus, it can be seen that the text is a narrative and that the term 'narration' is thereby

justified.

Here, at the end, I would like to offer some hope to philosophy from an unlikely source. In a

recent interview, Dr Stephen Wolfram, the physicist and computer scientist was discussing

his work in the field of artificial intelligence. Wolfram, although he refers only briefly to

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[109] "narration, n., sense 1.a". *Oxford English Dictionary*, Oxford University Press, September 2023, https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/3951541652
"narrative, n., sense 2.a". Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, September 2023, <https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/1161337353>

Wittgenstein in his writing[110], is, in my opinion, working in a way that is very much in line with Wittgenstein's prescription to 'say nothing except…the propositions of natural science. Wolfram has developed a computer language and has tested theories only when they are capable of being expressed in computer code. When asked about the progress and dangers in artificial intelligence he said that he was 'more concerned about the lack of kind of depth of understanding on the philosophical side than on the technical side'[111]. This brings me to my own final analysis of why the propositions of the *Tractatus* are eventually seen as 'nonsense' and why, in the preface, 'the second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when these problems are solved' (TLP, p.4) The propositions I have read are 'nonsense' because they are not 'propositions of natural science'. In a sense, I am asserting that the verificationists were right and that the *Tractatus* is an instruction manual for a system of language that only deals with 'real-world' objects and logical tautologies. However, this position is, as I read it, one that is transitional. It is the top of the ladder.

Having reached a position from which to 'see the world aright' (6.54) what I see is that the in placing a limit around that which can be said clearly and then solving all of the problems of philosophy that exist within that bounded area 'little is achieved'. I make no claim to being the 'someone who has himself already had the thoughts expressed in' the *Tractatus*' or to having produced any final or definitive reading. However, I would argue that the *Tractatus* is, as I read it, a book within which an imaginary world is built, where the protagonists are facts, the villain is a certain kind of philosophy and the twist in the tale is

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[110] Stephen Wolfram, *A New Kind of Science*, (Champaign: Wolfram Media, 2002) p.1181
[111] Machine learning street talk, *Mystery of Entropy FINALLY Solved After 50 Years? (STEPHEN WOLFRAM)* <https://youtu.be/dkpDjd2nHgo?si=INw32F2TRDHBuL_o> Accessed 26th September 2023

that the whole story turns out to be nonsense. Seen in this light, the question of how or

whether the propositions of the *Tractatus* fit with the 'real world' is itself nonsensical.

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