

Reading Bodies and the Fairy Tale Gaze

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Declaration: I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

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Abstract

In this thesis, I will be asking the question: what does it mean to read? This is the question that underpins my thinking and my readings. I will begin by reading the implications of the relationship between the gaze and the body, as well as shifts in perspective and the lack which is implicated in this split.

I will be engaging with a range of fairy tales from both Hans Christian Anderson and Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, and I will be reading this split and deferral throughout my fairy tale analyses. I will also be engaging with texts that are not fairy tales, as these readings do not have to be limited by the bounds of one 'type' of text. I will be thinking about the problem of repetition as well as presence of absence, particularly in relation to disability theory discourse.

In the final section of this thesis, I will return to this notion of reading a body and what this means in problematising identity. I will be reading further sections of 'The Little Mermaid' and returning to Derrida in exploring ideas of denuding. I will be continuing to read division and deferral and returning to this notion of truth and revelation whilst asking 'what does it mean to read'? Finally, I will think about the consequences of my readings in this way. I want to end on a reading to show that this is not just about fairy tales or literature or disability: this is what people are thinking about and this is why this is important.

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.1 Introduction – The Gaze

In ‘The Return of Peter Pan’, Jacqueline Rose poses the question: ‘How do you read children’s bodies?’¹ In this being a ‘How do’, rather than a ‘can’, there is this notion of ‘children’s bodies’ being that which can be ‘read’, but there is an unknown in ‘How’. This reading is being generated by a ‘you’ in that it is the reading of ‘you’ which is subject to this questioning of ‘How do’. As this is a ‘How do you’, this is a questioning of the ‘you’ and the question is of this reading. In this, there is both a known and an unknown; in this perspective, there is an unknown in this being a question of ‘How do you read’, yet there is an implicit knowing in that the ‘you’ is that which should be asked this ‘How’. That which is subject to ‘How do you read’, are ‘children’s bodies’. In this perspective, ‘bodies’ are ‘children’s’, thus children are that which have ‘bodies’, so ‘bodies’ can be had, and these ‘children’s bodies’ have the potential to be ‘read’ by ‘you’. This ‘read’ in question is that of ‘bodies’ which are ‘children’s’. There is a claim to multiple in both ‘children’s’ and ‘bodies’, therefore this is not one body of one child; there are multiple ‘bodies’ of multiple children, yet this question of ‘How do you read’ constructs these ‘children’s bodies’ as collectively having a way to be ‘read’, as though there is a way to ‘read children’s bodies’, and this is what is being asked of the ‘you’. There is an implicit split in ‘children’s bodies’, as ‘children’s’ is not ‘bodies’ and, vice versa, ‘bodies’ are not ‘children’s’. Therefore, these ‘bodies’ are that which reside outside of this claim to ‘children’s’; there is an implicit lack in that ‘bodies’, according to this perspective, are other to the very ‘children’s’ that they are claimed to be through ‘s’. Children thus cannot contain these bodies as to claim what these ‘bodies’ are (children’s) is for them to be that which

¹ Jacqueline Rose, *The Case of Peter Pan or The Impossibility of Children’s Fiction* (London, Macmillan, 1984), p. xvi.

is other to themselves (bodies). This split is further constituted in that this is a 'How do you read' of the 'bodies'; this is not 'How do you read children', but a questioning of the reading of the 'bodies' which are those of 'children', according to 's'. A question I am thinking about is would there be a questioning of the reading of 'bodies', however, if they were not those of children? Is the question here of that which is constituted as being of a child or is it a question of the bodies 'themselves', with the children being that which is in excess? Therefore, if these 'children's bodies' are split in this way, a deferral of what these 'children's bodies' are, then the question of 'How do you read' them, cannot escape this deferral of meaning. These bodies are that which are in excess of these children, as they cannot be contained within this claim to 'children's'. Yet, if this is a 'How', then this is not necessarily a claim to a reading of 'children's bodies'; this is a questioning of 'How' the 'you' reads 'children's bodies'. Therefore, what the 'you' is, in this perspective, is that which is being asked, and that which has the potential to facilitate a reading.

This notion of 'How do you read' brings into question the very nature of reading and what reading is. In Sigmund Freud's essay 'Infantile Sexuality', it is claimed in a footnote that:

At the time it was impossible to make full use of direct observation on children [...] direct observation has fully confirmed the conclusions arrived at by psycho-analysis - which is incidentally good evidence of the trustworthiness of that method of research.²

² Sigmund Freud, 'Infantile Sexuality' in *Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality*, trans. James Strachey (Mansfield, Martino Fine Books, 2011), p .71.

In this perspective, 'children' are that which are subject to 'direct observation'. This 'direct observation' is 'on children', thus 'children' can be observed. In this notion of 'direct observation', there is a split, as 'direct' is other to the 'observation'; therefore, what this 'observation' is, is other to the very thing it is claimed to be. If the directness of the 'observation' is in excess to the 'observation', in that it is other to and cannot be contained by the 'observation', then there is a deferral of this 'direct'; this 'direct' is only 'direct' in that it is not 'observation' in its implicit otherness to the 'observation'. Therefore, that which is 'on children' is that which is lacking in terms of 'observation', implicitly, lacking this notion of 'direct'. If 'children' are that which are subject to this 'direct observation', then 'children' are that which have the potential to be directly observed; this 'direct observation' is 'on children', so 'children' have the capacity for this 'direct observation' to be 'on' from that which is other to themselves. However, it is that 'it was impossible to make full use of direct observation', therefore the 'direct observation on children', in this perspective, is that which is lacking in terms of 'full use'; in this 'full use' what is constituted is both a presence and an absence of 'use', as there is an absence of 'full use' in it being 'impossible to make', yet in this very absence there is a presence, for there is a claim to this 'full use' in its being constructed as that which 'was impossible to make'. This notion of that which 'was impossible' constitutes that which follows as that which is lacking; if 'to make full use of direct observation on children' is 'impossible', then what is lacking is this 'to make full use of direct observation on children'. However, as this impossibility is known as such, then this lack is not in excess to the 'impossible'; these claims are subject to 'At the time it was', therefore this 'impossible' is circumstantial and conditional upon the notion of 'time' and retrospection. Also, if this is what 'was impossible', then, implicitly, there exists the potential for that which was possible. If what 'was impossible' was 'to make full use of direct observation on children', then it was not 'direct observation on children' which was 'impossible'; what 'was impossible' was this notion of 'to

make full use of'. Therefore, this impossibility is constituting a 'use' which is 'full', thus there is possibility in a 'use' which is not 'full'. As this 'impossible' was 'At the time', this is not an indefinite impossibility; it is only 'At the time' that this 'fullness' 'was impossible'. Therefore, it is only in its potential to be 'full' that this 'direct observation' is lacking; if what is 'impossible' is 'to make full use of direct observation on children', then this is an impossibility within the 'impossible'. This very notion of 'impossible' is split, as what is 'impossible to make full use of' is the 'impossible'.

Another question that I am thinking about in this thesis is 'what is the relationship between the gaze and the body?': what does it mean to 'see' a body, 'look' at a body, 'gaze' at a body. In her text *Sexuality and the Field of Vision*, in a reading of Rankin's 'own body', Jacqueline Rose claims that 'the body is therefore inseparable from the gaze through which it is constituted'.³ What does it 'mean' to read or to 'see' an 'own body'?

In David Hillman and Carla Mazzio's edited text *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe*, it is claimed that 'Barrough notes the eye's inability to gaze upon itself'⁴. In this perspective, 'the eye' is that which has an 'inability to gaze upon itself'. If 'to gaze upon itself' is that which 'the eye' cannot do, then 'the eye' must have an 'itself' to not 'gaze upon'. There is a split constituted as the 'itself' which the eye cannot 'gaze upon' is other to this 'eye'. However, it is that 'Barrough notes the eye's inability to gaze', so what is made claim to is the noting and what is 'noted' is the 'inability' of the eye rather than the eye. So, does this mean that the 'eye' can never 'see' 'itself'?

Hillman continues: 'As the physical body is fragmented, so the body of understanding is held to be shaped and formed' (Hillman & Mazzio: p.200). In this perspective there are two claims to 'body': 'the physical body' and 'the body of understanding'. Although this is a

³ Jacqueline Rose, *Sexuality in the Field of Vision* (London: Verso, 2005), p.212.

⁴ David Hillman & Carla Mazzio, eds. *The Body in Parts: Fantasies of Corporeality in Early Modern Europe* (New York: Routledge, 1997), p.198. All further references will be given in parenthesis.

repetition of 'body', this is also not a repetition as one 'body' is constituted as 'the physical body', and the other is 'the body of understanding'. There is a further difference between these 'bodies', as one is 'fragmented', and the other is 'held to be shaped and formed'. So, there is the notion of a 'body' that is 'physical', and thus that which is not, and 'the physical body' is that which can be 'fragmented'. There is thus a split in this construction of 'body' as 'physical' is other to and cannot be contained within this claim to 'body'. This 'physical' is thus supplementary to this 'body' and meaning is deferred. This is so as not only is this 'body' other to this 'physical', but also other to 'fragmented', thus there is a further deferral of what this 'body' is.

what is created by this process of dissecting the body is not knowledge but a gaze that affirms the anatomist's subjectivity. Anatomy solicits the gaze, constitutes it as a form of language [...] It is the anatomist's gaze that mediates between the corpse and its reconstitution as language. (Hillman & Mazzio: p.200)

In this perspective, 'the body' is that which can be dissected 'in the process of dissecting the body'. This 'dissecting the body' is a 'process', so if it is 'the process of dissecting the body', then what we have in this perspective is not 'the body' but a 'process' to which 'the body' is supplementary. Through this 'process', something is 'created', and what is 'created' 'is not knowledge'. This 'is not knowledge but a gaze', and it is this 'a gaze that affirms the anatomist's subjectivity' which 'is created by this process of dissecting the body', so it is 'not knowledge but a gaze' that does this affirming. Therefore, this is about 'a gaze' as much as it is 'not about knowledge', so this is about a lack of 'knowledge' as it is 'not knowledge' that 'is created by this process of dissecting the body. Yet in this being 'not knowledge', there is a 'knowledge', as knowledge of this not knowledge is needed to know that this 'is not knowledge

but a gaze'. So, it is 'not knowledge but a gaze that affirms the anatomist's subject' and a 'gaze' can 'affirm' and 'a gaze' is this 'what' which is 'created by this process of dissecting the body'. Therefore, 'a gaze' is 'created' and this is so 'by this process'. In this perspective, there are multiple gazes as 'a gaze' is that which can 'affirm', but there is a shift as there is another claim to 'gaze' in 'Anatomy solicits the gaze'. Although this is a repetition of 'gaze', this is also not a repetition as this 'the gaze' is that which 'Anatomy solicits', whereas 'a gaze' is that which 'affirms'. Therefore, 'gaze' is that which can both 'affirm' and be 'solicited' in terms of anatomy. As well as soliciting 'the gaze', 'Anatomy' also 'constitutes it as a form of language', so 'the gaze', in this perspective, can be both solicited and constituted by 'Anatomy'. There is this notion of 'the gaze' being constituted as 'a form of language', so this is not 'language', but 'a form of it', but only insofar as 'Anatomy solicits' it.

Moreover, in thinking about 'language', 'language' has different 'form[s]' and this is about a constitution of it 'as a form'. However, there is another claim to 'language' as 'It is the anatomist's gaze that mediates between the corpse and its reconstitution as language'. In this perspective, 'the corpse' is that which is reconstituted 'as language'. So, this is that which is other to 'language', 'the corpse', 'and its reconstitution as' that which is other to 'the corpse', 'language'. Therefore, through 'its reconstitution' 'the corpse' can be 'as language'. There is thus a shift in this notion of 'language' in terms of constitution as there is 'constitutes it as a form of language' and 'its reconstitution as language'. In this perspective, there is 'the anatomist's gaze', so 'gaze' is that of 'the anatomist' through "s". However, 'gaze' is other to 'the anatomist's' and thus cannot be contained within this claim to 'anatomist'. There is thus a deferral of this 'gaze' as is it supplementary to the thing which it is of: the anatomist. It is this 'the anatomist's gaze' which 'mediates between the corpse and its reconstitution as language', so this 'gaze' can mediate 'between'. There is a separation of 'the corpse' and 'its reconstitution

as language' through this 'between', so although this is a 'reconstitution' of 'the corpse' 'as language', this is still 'the corpse' and 'language' and thus this inherent otherness.

So, what are the implications for disability studies of an approach to the gaze that resists focusing on establishing Lacanian understandings, and follows a detailed close reading in perspective? What are the implications for disability studies for a reading of the body that does not start and end with affect or new materialism, but, again, and following Jacqueline Rose, a close reading of textual constructions? How might reading in perspective disrupt also an understanding of meaning as spatial, as connected to materiality, even body? This thesis is going to be a work on the gaze which does not focus on Lacan. I want to, instead, think about what it would mean to read patiently and in perspective the construction of the gaze in, for example, fairy tales and their criticism.

This notion of 'the gaze' and 'knowledge' can be read in Jacques Derrida's *The Animal That Therefore I Am*:

[N]ever to my knowledge does Levinas evoke the gaze of the animal as the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face to which he has dedicated so many beautiful and gripping analyses.

The animal has no face, he does not have the naked face that looks at me to the extent of my forgetting the color of its eyes. [...]

There is, to my knowledge, no attention ever seriously given to the animal gaze, no more than to the difference among animals [...]⁵

⁵ Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. Marie-Luise Mallet (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008) p.107.

In this perspective, there is a construction of the 'gaze' in terms of 'the animal', and a constitution of 'the animal' in terms of this 'gaze'. There is a split in this 'the animal gaze', as that which is 'the animal' is other to this 'gaze', and this 'gaze' is other to this 'the animal'; this notion of 'gaze' is that which is not within this claim to 'the animal'. Therefore, within the bounds in which this 'gaze' is constituted, it resides as an other in relation to 'the animal'. Thus, in this perspective, what 'the animal' is lacking is 'gaze'; there is a lack of 'gaze' in what 'the animal' is. If this 'the animal gaze' is that which is lacking in its very being, and 'no attention [has] ever seriously [been] given to the animal gaze', then what is constituted is a lack within a lack. However, in this absence, there is, implicitly, a presence; there has to be something of this 'gaze' for it to be known to be the thing that is lacking, and there has to be the knowledge of an 'attention' for it to be known to be absent; the thing must be there and be known for it to be known to be lacking from there. Thus, there is a notion of 'attention' in this 'no attention'. If there has been 'no attention ever seriously given to the animal gaze', then this 'the animal gaze' is that which can have 'attention'. Although this is 'no attention', this lack of 'attention' is subject to 'to my knowledge', thus there is a limitation to this claim. It is thus only within the bounds of 'my knowledge' that there is this lack of 'attention'. However, this is 'no attention ever seriously given'. Therefore, through this 'seriously', there is the potential for there to have been 'attention' 'given', but, within the bounds of 'my knowledge', it is this 'seriously given' which is lacking in terms of the 'attention' 'to the animal gaze'.

So, what is 'the animal gaze' besides the thing that 'no attention [has] ever seriously [been] given to' within the bounds of 'my knowledge'? The 'gaze' of 'the animal' is other to 'the animal'; is *this* something which 'attention' has ever been 'seriously given' to?

Furthermore, in this perspective on 'my knowledge', this lack of 'attention' regarding 'the animal gaze' is 'no more than to the difference among animals'. In this perspective, there is a comparison between 'the animal gaze' and 'the difference among animals'; there are thus

two different claims to this notion of 'animal', one of which concerns 'gaze' and the other a multiplicity through 's'. Although this notion of 'animal' is repeated, this is about a difference rather than a sameness, as that which constitutes each claim to 'animal' is different. Thus, 'animal' has the potential to be about different things here. In this second claim to animal, it is 'the difference among animals', thus what is constituting 'animals' here is 'difference'. As well as 'animals' being multiple, 'animals' are that which 'difference' can be 'among', so 'animals' have an 'among' and 'difference' can be 'among'. Through 'no more than', there is a comparison between the lack of 'attention' which is 'given to the animal gaze' and the lack of 'attention' given to 'the difference among animals'. Thus, what 'animal' is constituted as being in both of these instances is that which 'no attention' has 'ever seriously [been] given to', even though one is 'the animal gaze' and the other is 'the difference among animals'. This 'difference', which is 'among animals', is other to these 'animals'; although there is a construction of the relational through this 'among', this 'difference' is still that which is exterior to these 'animals'. Therefore, this 'difference' which is 'among animals' is that which cannot be contained by these 'animals' and is thus an otherness.

This 'the animal gaze' is constituted as a repetition as there is a previous construction of 'the gaze of the animot'. Although there is a claim to this notion of 'gaze', this is a different 'gaze' as it is 'the gaze of' opposed to 'the animal gaze'. This 'the gaze of the animot' is also concerned with a 'knowledge' as it is 'never to my knowledge does Levinas evoke the gaze of the animot as the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face'. In this 'never to my knowledge', there is both an absence and a presence; there is an absence of 'knowledge' in this 'never to my knowledge', yet there is a presence of this 'knowledge' as it is known to be absent. This 'knowledge' is also 'my', therefore 'knowledge' is other to 'my', thus there is a split between the 'my' and that which is claimed to be that of the 'my'. This 'never to my knowledge' is

‘does Levinas evoke the gaze’, so this ‘evoke the gaze’ of ‘Levinas’ is that which the ‘my’ has ‘knowledge’ of, and what is known is that it is lacking. Thus, there is a lack of the ‘knowledge’ of ‘my’ when it comes to this ‘evoke the gaze’. In this construction of ‘the gaze’, ‘the gaze’ is that which can be evoked, but in this perspective, it is that ‘Levinas’ does not ‘evoke the gaze’, according to this perspective in the bounds of ‘my knowledge’. So, ‘the gaze of the animot’ can be evoked, but here it is not evoked, even though it has the potential to be so. However, this lack of ‘Levinas evok[ing] the gaze of the animot’ is ‘as the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face’. So, it is not that it is not evoked, but that it has not been evoked in this way e.g. ‘as the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face’. There is another ‘gaze’ in ‘the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face’, but this is not the same ‘gaze’ as before, ‘the gaze of the animot’, as this ‘gaze’ is ‘of that naked and vulnerable face’. However, both of these gazes are ‘of’, even if they are different ‘ofs’. Therefore, what a ‘gaze’ can be ‘of’ is both ‘the animot’ and ‘that naked and vulnerable face’. The difference is that, in terms of this ‘knowledge’ of the ‘my’ regarding ‘Levinas’, there is a lack in ‘evoke the gaze of the animot’ in that it is ‘never’, yet there is not a ‘lack’ in ‘Levinas[‘s]’ evoking of ‘the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face’. Although this is not lacking in terms of this ‘evoke’, there is still a lack in that there is an inherent split in this ‘gaze of that naked and vulnerable face’; ‘that naked and vulnerable face’ is other to ‘the gaze’. There is a further split in this constitution of ‘the gaze’, as not only is ‘the gaze’ split from ‘that naked and vulnerable face’, this ‘naked and vulnerable’ is split from the ‘face’ in that it is other; this otherness is implicit as ‘face’ cannot contain this notion of the ‘naked and vulnerable’; it is other to, thus this ‘naked and vulnerable’ is that which ‘face’ lacks as it is both in excess to the ‘face’. Therefore, in terms of ‘the gaze’, both ‘the animot’ and ‘that naked and vulnerable face’ are supplementary to ‘the gaze’; although in both instances there is ‘of’ (the gaze of), there is still this inherent split between ‘the gaze’ and that which it is ‘of’; this ‘of’ is part of this split as it is required in the constitution of ‘the gaze’.

So, there is 'the gaze of the animot' and there is 'the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face', and between these two claims are 'as'; it is that 'never to my knowledge does Levinas evoke the gaze of' one thing 'as' 'the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face'. He does not 'evoke the gaze' of one thing 'as' 'the gaze' of something other. So, not only are these two constructions of 'the gaze' separated in their difference to one another, they are also separated in that one is not evoked 'as' the other. In this 'the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face', 'that naked and vulnerable face' is that 'to which he has dedicated so many beautiful and gripping analyses'. This 'gaze' is 'of that' 'face' and that 'face' is 'naked and vulnerable'. There is this split within a split with 'the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face', but what this 'naked and vulnerable face' is also constituted by is this notion of 'that'; it is 'that naked and vulnerable face to which he has dedicated [...]'. Therefore, there is only one 'naked and vulnerable face'. Although there are multiple gazes in this perspective, there is only this one 'that naked and vulnerable face'. Yet, there are multiple 'analyses' as it is 'that' 'face' 'to which he has dedicated so many beautiful and gripping analyses'. So, according to this perspective, what 'face' is, is that which is 'naked and vulnerable', there is only this one notion of this face through 'that', and this 'face' is that which can have and has had 'beautiful and gripping analyses' dedicated by this 'he'. There is a shift in perspective with this 'he', as it was 'Levinas' who 'never' 'evoke[d] the gaze of the animot as the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face', yet it is 'he' who 'has dedicated so many beautiful and gripping analyses' 'to' 'that naked and vulnerable face'. Therefore, in these perspectives which are framed by this notion of 'my knowledge', there is 'the animal gaze', 'the gaze of the animot' and 'the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face', all of which are implicitly implicated by the notion of a lack. Thus, there is a deferral of the animal, and the animot, in the very gazes which are claimed to be that of these notions of 'the animal'.

There is a repetition of this notion of 'face', but this is a different 'face' as this is 'no face': 'the animal has no face'. If what 'the animal has' is 'no face', then what 'the animal has' is a lack; it 'has no face'. However, this lack in 'no' is other to the 'face' which is subject to this 'no', thus the 'face' is other to that which constitutes its lack. This 'the animal' is thus constituted in terms of a difference to the other 'the animal' and 'the animot' which are constituted through their being subject to 'gaze'. However, this 'the animal' is still implicit in its being split from that which is of it; this is 'the animal has no face'. There are two absences here; there is an absence in this being 'no face', and there is an absence in this 'no face' as that which is other to 'the animal'. This 'face' of 'the animal' is still in excess to 'the animal' even in it not being there as it has had to have been claimed to be not there. However, in this absence of 'face', there is a 'face' present, as this 'face' is known to not be had. Although it is so that 'the animal has no face', this is still what 'the animal has', therefore this is a having in a not having; what is had is this lack. As this is a 'has no face', then that which 'the animal has' is that which is not 'the animal'; in the otherness of this 'no face' to 'the animal', this 'no face' is in excess to 'the animal'. What 'the animal has', therefore, is a further lack; there is a lack within a lack as that which is constituting what 'the animal has' is the thing that is lacking: 'face'.

There is a shift from this 'the animal' who 'has no face' to a 'he' who 'does not have the naked face'. Although both instances are concerned with a not having and a 'face', this is a different not having as it is that of the 'he', rather than 'the animal', and it is a different 'face' as this 'face' is constituted by its nakedness. What is not had here is 'the naked face', so this 'face' is constituted in terms of both its nakedness and its lack through not being had. This 'face' is also further lacking because of this 'naked'; there is a lack of 'naked' in this 'face', and this is so through the split in the very construction of 'naked face'. Here, 'face' is that which cannot contain 'naked', even if the nakedness is that of the 'face'. This 'naked' is other

to this 'face', thus it is supplementary and in excess to this 'face'. This nakedness is therefore deferred, and a lack of nakedness is constituted in terms of the 'face' because it is supplementary. There is thus an absence in this nakedness as it is bound by its otherness to the 'face' in question. This nakedness is also other to the nakedness in 'the gaze of that naked and vulnerable face'. Although this is a repetition of a 'face' which is constituted as being 'naked', this 'naked face' is not 'that naked and vulnerable face'; this 'naked face' is preoccupied with the notion of looking, whereas the other 'naked and vulnerable face' was constituted as having 'the gaze'. In terms of this looking, there is a specificity in this being 'the naked face' and this is so through 'that looks at me', as this is not just any 'naked face', but 'the' one 'that looks at me'. Therefore, what the 'he does not have' is not simply 'the naked face', but the one 'that looks at me'. So, although there is a further not having in relation to 'face', ('the animal who has no face' and 'he does not have the naked face'), this second instance of not having has this further specificity in 'that looks at me', thus constituting another difference between the not having of these faces.

If this is 'the naked face that looks at me', then this 'naked face' can 'look' and can do so 'at me'. However, this is subject to 'he does not have', so the only 'naked face that looks at me', in this perspective, is the one that is not had; there is the potential for there to be a 'naked face that looks at me', but that 'naked face' is other to this 'naked face', therefore 'the naked face' in question is lacking as 'he does not have' it; this looking 'at me' is thus other to the 'he' who 'does not have the naked face'. There is also a limitation to this notion of a looking, as this 'looks at me' of 'the naked face' is 'to the extent of my forgetting the color of its eyes'. In this perspective, there is a 'forgetting', and this 'forgetting' is 'my', therefore this 'forgetting' is only so in the perspective on this 'my'. This is 'to the extent of my forgetting', so this is not just a 'forgetting' but 'the extent of' it. There are thus different extents of 'forgetting', and this 'looks at me' is limited by 'the extent' to which this 'my forgetting' is claimed. However, as

this is all retrospective, this is a retrospective ‘forgetting’, thus this is a remembered ‘forgetting’ and a presence is constituted in this absence. As well as this looking being bound by limitation, both in terms of this remembering and ‘extent’, there is also the notion of a split in this ‘the extent of my forgetting’. This ‘my forgetting’ is other to ‘the extent of’ it; ‘the extent of’ this ‘my forgetting’ is not contained within the ‘my forgetting’ itself but is so outside of it. Therefore, ‘the extent of’ this ‘my forgetting’ is deferred in that it is not the ‘my forgetting’ but that which is other to it. So, if this ‘looks at me’ of ‘the naked face’ is constituted through and through by lack and absence, and this ‘looks at me’ is ‘to the extent of my forgetting’, then there is a further lack still in that this is all limited by this ‘to the extent’.

This ‘to the extent of my forgetting’ is ‘the color of its eyes’. As this is ‘the color of its eyes’, this is a claim to ‘the color’, not to ‘its eyes’. This is therefore only a claim to ‘eyes’ insofar as ‘the color’; the ‘eyes’ are absent. However, there is a presence of these ‘eyes’ in their absence, as ‘the color’ is constituted. It is thus ‘the color of its eyes’ which are present in this perspective, with ‘its eyes’ being present through the presence of ‘the color’. However, in this ‘the color of its eyes’, there is an implicit split. In terms of ‘its eyes’, there is a split between ‘its’ and ‘eyes’, as these ‘eyes’ cannot be contained within ‘its’ and are therefore ‘other’ to ‘its’. There is then a further split in this constitution of ‘its eyes’ with ‘the color of’. Here, ‘the color’ of these ‘eyes’ are other to these ‘eyes’; ‘the color’ resides outside of the thing which it is of. This ‘color’ is therefore in excess to these ‘eyes’, and as it is only ‘the color’ and not the ‘eyes’ that are being made claim to, ‘the color’ is supplementary to that which is absent. There is thus a deferral of this ‘the color of its eyes’. There is a further absence concerning ‘the color of its eyes’ as this is ‘my forgetting of the color of its eyes’. If it is that ‘its eyes’ are absent in this notion of ‘color’ because of this deferral, but this ‘color’ is that which is forgotten, then there is an absence within an absence. This is ‘my forgetting of the color’, so this ‘color’ is constituted only insofar as ‘my forgetting’ of it, thus constructing ‘its eyes’ as being absent not

only through the constitution of ‘color’, but also because this ‘color’ is forgotten. However, it is ‘the color of its eyes’ which are subject to ‘my forgetting’, not ‘its eyes’. As there is a knowledge of ‘my forgetting the color of its eyes’, these ‘its eyes’ are a given; that which is subject to this ‘forgetting’ is ‘the color’ not ‘its eyes’. Thus, through the presence of this retrospective forgetting, there is a presence of ‘its eyes’ which has a stability regardless of this lack of knowing ‘the color’.

This notion of ‘eyes’ which are constituted as ‘its’ in relation to looking can be read in ‘the bird’ in Hans Christian Andersen’s ‘Thumbelina’: ‘[S]he crept down to the bird again. It was unmistakably alive, but so weak that it could barely open its eyes for a moment to look at Thumbelina’.⁶ In this perspective on the ‘It’ which is ‘the bird’, there is a construction of ‘eyes’. These ‘eyes’ are ‘its eyes’, therefore these ‘eyes’ are constituted as being that which is other to itself; they are ‘its’. There is a split in these ‘its eyes’, as ‘eyes’ are other to the ‘it’ which they are of, thus deferring these ‘eyes’ from the very ‘its’ which they are subject to. These ‘eyes’ are therefore in excess to the ‘its’, and this ‘its’ is constituted as being the thing which lacks ‘eyes’. If ‘eyes’ are lacking, then what is being claimed here is an absence of ‘eyes’ in accordance with this ‘it’. There is a shift in perspective with this ‘it’ which could ‘barely open its eyes’, and there is the ‘it’ which is subject to this deferral of ‘eyes’; although there is this ‘s’, there is still this separation. This is a further shift as there is also the ‘It’ which ‘was unmistakably alive’. If it is so that ‘it could barely open its eyes’, then these ‘eyes’ are constituted by more than one lack; there is the lack of ‘eyes’ in terms of ‘it’, and there is a lack in this ‘could barely open’. In this ‘barely open’, ‘eyes’ are that which can ‘open’; there is a limitation to this ‘open’ in which lack can be constituted, but this is still an ‘open’. There is a further limitation to this ‘open its eyes’ as it is ‘for a moment’, thus the opening of ‘its eyes’ is

⁶ Hans Christian Andersen ‘Thumbelina’, *Fairy Tales: A Selection*, trans. by L. W. Kingsland, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp. 30-45 (p. 38).

not only 'barely' but also 'for a moment'. This 'open its eyes' is 'to look', and this 'to look' is 'at Thumbelina', therefore this opening of 'its eyes' is 'to look at' something which is other to 'it': 'Thumbelina'. So, this is 'to look at' that which is other, but this is also from somewhere other as this is a perspective on the 'it' which 'could barely open its eyes for a moment to look'. This 'could barely open its eyes for a moment to look' is subject to this 'It' which 'was unmistakably alive, but so weak that it'; through 'that it', this 'could barely open its eyes' is constituted as being something of this 'so weak', and through 'but' this is an exception to this 'unmistakably alive'. Therefore, although 'It was unmistakably alive', there is this result of the 'could barely open its eyes' as through this 'so weak'. Furthermore, in this perspective on, 'Thumbelina' is that which the 'it' has the potential 'to look at', and this 'to look at' is facilitated through this 'open its eyes'. As this is 'for a moment to look at Thumbelina', this 'look' is that which requires the opening of 'its eyes' and this needs to be so 'for a moment', thus both this 'open' and 'a moment' are necessary, in this perspective, for this 'to look at Thumbelina'. This 'look at Thumbelina' is thus entirely other to this notion of 'Thumbelina'; this is a 'to look at' of the 'It' and this requires the opening of 'its eyes'.

But why Fairy Tales?

So, how do you read? How do you read a 'body', a 'gaze', a 'look', or an 'animal'? What do these things 'mean' and how can they be read? This is what I am thinking about, and I am going to do so by looking closely at a variety of fairy tales. But why fairy tales?

Fairy tales, like myths, capitalize on the three concepts the Greeks captured in the term *kaleidoscope*: sparkling beauty, austere form, and visual power.⁷

In her introduction to *The Cambridge Companion to Fairytales*, Maria Tatar engages with the notion of the ‘visual’ in her thinking on fairy tales. This ‘visual’ is about ‘power’ so there is ‘power’ in ‘Fairy tales’ when reading these ideas of seeing, looking, and the gaze. Something I will be reading throughout this thesis is this notion of a look and a gaze which shifts, and asking the question: is there always this seeing or looking implicated in the ‘visual’ and what does this mean for our readings? Tatar continues:

There is magic in these tell tales, and the presence of enchantment is perhaps the defining feature of the genre [...] Again and again we witness transformations that break down the divide between life and death, nature and culture, animal and human, or beauty and monstrosity. (Tatar: p 4)

What I am doing is looking at these divides and where the boundaries of these ‘categories’ or ‘definitions’ lie, and what these boundaries mean for our readings of the fairy tale in relation to the body. These ‘transformations’ are claimed to ‘break down’ these ‘divides’, yet they are still these ‘divides’, even though there is this repetition (‘Again and again’) of a ‘we’ that

⁷ Maria Tatar, ‘Introduction’, *The Cambridge Companion to Fairytales*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) pp. 1-10 (p.1). All further references will be given in parenthesis.

witnesses these ‘transformations that break down’ these divides. In thinking about this notion of breaking down this divide between ‘animal and human’, I am looking at this in terms of reading ‘body’.

Occasionally our confidence about knowing a fairy tale gets in the way of interpretive work, just as our confidence about reading a fairy tale can obstruct our understanding of its deeper meaning. (Tatar: p.9)

In this perspective, there is a claim to ‘our confidence about knowing a fairy tale’ and ‘our confidence about reading a fairy tale’, and both of these ‘confidences’ can, ‘Occasionally’, result in an obstruction or get in the way. A ‘fairy tale’ is both that which we can have ‘confidence about knowing’ and ‘confidence about reading’ so there is this notion of ‘knowing’ what a ‘fairy tale’ is about and the assumptions that can come alongside that can get ‘in the way’ and ‘obstruct our understanding’. There is thus this knowledge and assumption in terms of the fairy tale as well as a difference between ‘knowing’ and ‘reading’ in terms of ‘confidence’ with regards to the fairy tale. This ‘understanding’ is ‘of its deeper meaning’, so according to this perspective, ‘deeper meaning’ is that which can be understood; I want to question this notion of ‘meaning’, though, and what it is to understand a ‘meaning’, and a ‘meaning’ which is ‘deeper’ than another ‘meaning’. With this in mind, I will now take into consideration several fairy tales, and think about readings of body, gaze, and our question of ‘what does it mean to read?’

.2 Fairy Tale Readings

In this section, I am going to think about what it means to read and this idea of a ‘body’ and a ‘gaze’. I am looking at this notion of ‘body’, which is implicitly lacking, and what this presence of absence does to our readings of fairy tales. I am also thinking about what these readings of bodies and the notion of ‘parts’ means for disability theory. In this next reading, I am going to think about hands and what it means to read a hand as being ‘absent’ or ‘missing’ and the implications of this in relation to disability discourse. I will be reading a passage from a fairy tale, a section of a poem and a reading of what it means for something to be one’s ‘own’. Hands, and a lack thereof, can be read in Margaret Hunt’s translation of The Brothers Grimm’s ‘The Girl Without Hands’:

The next morning, the devil came again, but she had wept on her hands, and they were quite clean. Again, he could not get near her, and furiously said to the miller, ‘Cut her hands off, or else I cannot get the better of her.’⁸

In this perspective, there is a construction of ‘hands’. These ‘hands’ are ‘her hands’ and it is ‘on her hands’ that ‘she had wept’. These ‘her hands’ therefore have an ‘on’ on which ‘she’ can weep. There is a split in these ‘her hands’, as the ‘hands’ are other to the ‘her’ which they are claimed to be; although these are ‘her hands’, these ‘hands’ cannot be contained within this ‘her’ and therefore reside outside of that which is ‘her’. There is thus a deferral of these ‘hands’,

⁸ Brothers Grimm “The Girl without Hands”, *Grimm’s Complete Fairy Tales*, trans. by Margaret Hunt (New York: Sterling Publishing Co, 2015) pp. 202-207 (pg. 203). All further references will be given in parenthesis.

and an implicit lack of 'hands' in 'her', as they are that which is in excess to 'her'. These 'her hands' 'had been wept on', and this 'wept on' is by 'she'; 'she' can therefore weep 'on her hands', and there is a difference between that which is 'she' and that which is 'her'; there is thus a shift in perspective for it is that which 'she had' and then 'her hands'. According to this perspective on 'her hands', there is another shift, for these 'her hands' are then the 'they' which 'were quite clean'. So, 'her hands' are that which can be 'clean', insofar as they are 'they', and there is a level as to how 'clean' 'her hands' can be, for here 'they were quite clean'. Therefore, through the 'but' of 'but she' and the 'and' of 'and they', in this 'she had wept on her hands' there is 'they were quite clean', thus in this 'wept' there is 'quite clean'. Therefore, what 'hands' are, according to this perspective, are those which are 'her', that which 'she had wept on' and those which 'were quite clean'. However, all of this which 'hands' are, are not within these 'hands' themselves; they are that which remain other and outside of these 'hands' and are thus supplementary to 'hands'.

Furthermore, there is a repetition of 'her hands' for there is then a claim to 'Cut her hands off'. Although what is constituted here are 'her hands', these are a different 'her hands'; there is a shift in what 'her hands' are, as there are the 'her hands' which 'she had wept on', and then the 'her hands' which 'he' 'furiously said to the miller, "Cut her hands off"'. This second construction of 'her hands' are so in the perspective on the perspective of the 'furiously said to the miller' of 'he', whereas the first 'her hands' were in the perspective on 'her hands'. Therefore, these 'hands' are other to the previous 'hands' as they are so within this claimed 'said'. In this perspective on the 'said' of 'he', 'her hands' are that which can be 'Cut' 'off'. However, this is within this 'said', therefore this is not a claim to 'her hands' being 'Cut' 'off', but a 'said to the miller'. Therefore, 'her hands' are that which can be 'Cut' 'off', so 'her hands' can be 'Cut', and this 'Cut' can be 'off'. Following this 'Cut her hands off', within this 'said', there is 'or else I cannot get the better of her'. So, through this 'or else', 'get the better of her'

is conditional upon this 'Cut her hands off', and thus this lack of 'hands'; therefore, to 'get the better of her', there needs to be this 'Cut her hands off'; 'her hands' being not 'Cut' 'off' is claimed as reason here for 'I cannot get the better of her'. There is another construction of 'her' in this 'I cannot get the better of her', but this is a different construction of 'her' to the 'her' in 'her hands'. The not being 'Cut' 'off' of 'her hands' is that which is constituting the lack of 'get the better of her', thus one 'her' is implicated in the 'her' which is other to this 'her'. So, if what is being 'said' here is 'Cut her hands off, or else I cannot get the better of her', that which would allow for the 'get the better of her' is a lack of 'her hands'. If what is required for this getting is a lack, then it is the having of these 'hands' which is disallowing for this 'get the better of her'.

The tale continues: 'The miller was shocked and answered, 'How could I cut off my own child's hands?'' (Hunt: p.203). In this perspective on the 'answered' of 'The miller', there is a claim to 'my own child's hands'. There is a difference between the 'hands' in the perspective on the 'said' of 'he' and the perspective on the 'answered' of 'The miller', as 'hands' were 'her', but now they are 'child's'. Therefore, what the 'hands' in question are, differ depending on the perspective. These 'hands', according to the perspective on the perspective of 'The miller', are 'my own child's hands'. These 'hands' are 'child's hands'; however, these 'hands' are that which are outside of and thus other to the 'child's' which they are claimed to be. There is thus an implicit split and a deferral of what these 'hands' are, as they cannot be contained within the claim to 'child's', implicating child as that which is lacking 'hands'. Unlike 'her hands', these are 'child's hands', thus through this 's' there is a claim to ownership; however, these 'hands' are still other to this 's', so these 'hands' are still in excess to this child. This child is 'my own', making these 'hands' 'my own child's hands'. This child is that which is constituted as 'my own', not the 'hands', as the 'hands' are separate to the child, thus it is the child who has the 'hands' which is subject to this 'my own'. However, there is a further

split in the constitution of this child in this 'my own'; there is a split within a split, as there is the split between 'child's' and 'hands', but there is also the split between 'my own' and 'child's'. Within this notion of ownership, there is a split and a deferral, as what is 'my' and what is 'own' is that which is other to each other, and in turn, is also other to the 'child's hands' which are in question. However, if this is 'my own child's hands', then there are these 'hands'; this is not a claim to a child but 'child's'. There is a claim to that which is the 'child's', 'hands', but this is not a claim to the child, just that which is of the child. If this is so, then regardless of the 's', 'hands' remain as that which are other; they are still deferred, they are in excess and they are other to that which is not this claim to 'hands'. Although there is a construction of 'my own child's hands', this is within the 'answered' of 'The miller'. Therefore, what this is, is an 'answered'; there is no child, there are no 'hands' and there are no 'my own child's hands'. Within the bounds of that which is claimed as being an 'answered', there are these 'my own child's hands', but this is only insofar as this is the 'answered' of 'The miller'. These 'my own child's hands' are also subject to a questioning as it is 'How could I cut off my own child's hands?'. This is a how could I cut off, so this is about a potential for lack through 'could', and a questioning of this potentiality. The 'hands' have not yet been 'cut off', but there is a presence of the potential for this to happen. There is thus a presence and an absence as there is the presence of the potential for this absence.

There is a shift in the claim to 'hands' as 'she laid down both her hands, and let them be cut off' (Hunt: p.204). In this perspective, the 'hands' are once again constituted as being hers, but this time it is from the narrative's perspective on 'her hands'. Nevertheless, there is still this split between 'her' and the 'hands' which are constituted as being hers. However, there is a further split as there is also the split between 'she' and 'her hands'. These 'her hands' are other to the 'she' who 'laid down both her hands', thus these 'hands' are not only in excess and thus supplementary to 'her' but also to the 'she'. In this split, the 'her' is implicated, thus 'she'

is also supplementary to the 'her'. Therefore, according to this perspective, the 'hands' and the 'herness' which constitute the hands are both deferred. As well as being constituted as 'her[s]', these 'hands' are also 'both': 'both her hands'. In this claim to 'both', we have two 'hands', yet more than one hand was already claimed as being of her through 's'. There is thus a further difference between the 'her hands' claimed in the narrative's perspective on the devil's saying to the miller and the 'both her hands' in this narrative perspective. There is a further repetition here as she 'let them be cut off', and this follows the miller's questioning of 'How could I cut off my own child's hands?'. Although these are both claims to 'cut off', they are different, as one is a questioning whereas the other is the 'letting' of this happen. Therefore, according to this perspective, 'hands' are that which can be 'laid down', as is done so by 'she', but they are also that which can be 'cut off' through this letting of 'them'. The implicit lack which comes from this cutting 'off' of the 'hands,' thus constitutes absence as that which has been 'let' or 'allowed' by the 'she'.

There is then a shift as that which constitutes 'hands' is 'silver': 'as she was so beautiful and good, he loved her with all his heart, had silver hands made for her, and took her to wife.' (Hunt: p.205). In this perspective, 'hands' are that which can be 'made'; this is something done by this 'he' 'for her'; he 'had silver hands made for her'. If these 'silver hands' are 'made for her' by 'he', then they are 'made for her' by an other; not only are these 'hands' made by that which is other to 'her', there 'hands' are also other to her. There 'silver hands' are simply that, 'silver hands', as they are not constituted as being hers, only 'for her'. Previously, there is a claim to 'she had wept so long and so much on the stumps' (Hunt: p.204). Just like these 'stumps' are 'the stumps' rather than hers, these 'silver hands' are also not hers. This lack of the claim to 'her' constitutes this being about lack in and of itself; like 'the stumps' these 'silver hands' are implicitly other to the 'her' to which they have been given. Furthermore, in this making of the 'silver hands', the notion of prosthetics is introduced, and this is done before he 'took her to

wife'. So, it is 'for her' that these 'silver hands' are 'made', and then he 'took her to wife'. In these 'silver hands' being prior to the shift of 'her' to 'wife', this lack of 'hands' is something to be 'resolved'. In her book, *Disability, Deformity, and Disease in the Grimms' Fairy Tales*, Ann Schmiesing states:

'No one, it seems, wants to depict the Maiden without Hands⁹ as a maiden without hands. And this appears to be true of the Grimms as well, since in KHM2 and subsequent editions the maiden is given silver prosthetic hands, whereas she had none in KHM1.'¹⁰

In this perspective, there is a presence of an absence through the lack of 'depict[ion]' of 'the Maiden without Hands as a maiden without hands'. In 'the maiden' being 'given silver prosthetic hands', the absence of 'hands' which are constituted as being 'her[s]' are replaced by these 'silver prosthetic hands'. However, there is a difference between 'her hands' and the 'given' 'hands' in them being 'silver prosthetic hands'. Although 'silver' and 'prosthetic' are what these 'hands' are, besides being other to 'her hands', there is a split and a further otherness as 'silver prosthetic' are other to the 'hands'. These 'hands' are thus deferred, as they are not 'hands' but this 'silver prosthetic' which has been 'given' to 'the maiden' by someone that is other. In this sense, there cannot be an absence of 'hands' as this 'maiden without hands' once again has 'hands', albeit other 'hands'. There appears to always be a need for a replacement as

⁹ I have chosen to use Hunt's translation in which this tale is entitled 'The Girl Without Hands', whereas in some other translations, the tale is called 'The Maiden Without Hands'. I am also looking at a 'version' of the tale which is referred to as 'KHM2' by Schmiesing. This is the version I am using for my readings in this thesis (See my readings on 'The Donkey' for more on the issue of translation).

¹⁰ Ann Schmiesing, *Disability, Deformity, and Disease in the Grimms' Fairy Tales* (Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 2014) p.85. All further references will be given in parenthesis.

such; there cannot simply be an absence. In thinking further about these 'silver hands' and Schmiesing makes claim to the notion of 'function':

[T]here is no mention in "The Maiden without Hands" of the degree to which the silver hands function as real hands. Perhaps because of the diminished agency of the maiden in KHM2 and subsequent editions, their functionality does not even matter.

(Schmiesing: p.91)

In this perspective, there is a comparison between 'the silver hands' and 'real hands'. There is something about 'hands' which is about 'functioning', and this 'function' is about a 'degree', so there are different 'degree[s]' of functioning for different 'hands'. In this perspective, there are 'hands' which are 'silver' and 'hands' which are 'real', but 'silver hands' are not 'real hands' as they can only 'function as' such. There is thus something in this 'silver' which does not constitute 'real'. This 'degree to which the silver hands function as real hands' is that to which 'there is no mention', so it is not that there is a lack of 'function[ing]' but that there is a lack of mentioning. Thus, this is something which is unknown, according to Schmiesing. There is also a repetition of this notion of 'function' in 'Perhaps [...] their functionality does not even matter'. So, 'functionality' is something which can 'matter', and whether this 'functionality' does or 'does not even matter' is being brought into question. Therefore, through this 'no mention' 'of the degree to which the silver hands function as real hands', there is the potential for this 'functionality' to not be something that 'matter[s]'. In the tale, it is so that 'she caused her maimed arms to be bound to her back' (Hunt: p.204). In this perspective, this is about 'arms' rather than 'hands', and these 'arms' are 'maimed' through this absence of 'hands'. Both 'arms'

and 'back' are that which are constituted as being that of 'her' and 'arms' are that which can 'be bound to her back'. There is a split in the construction of these 'arms' as they are 'her maimed arms'. Although these 'arms' are hers, there is a split as 'her' is other to these 'maimed arms'. There is thus an otherness in these 'maimed arms' to 'her', as the claim to 'her' cannot contain this notion of 'arms'. There is a split within a split here as not only are these 'arms' other to 'her', but they are also other to this 'maimed' which they are claimed to be. In thinking about this notion of 'bound to her back', Schmiesing continues: 'In terms of functionality, having her handless arms bound to her back basically makes her armless, too.' (Schmiesing: p.96). In this perspective, not only can one be 'handless' but they can also be 'armless'. If there are 'arms' which lack hands, then there is also a lack of 'arms' '[i]n terms of functionality', according to this perspective. However, this is 'basically makes her armless', so this is not a complete 'makes her armless'. So, according to this claim, 'arms' are not simply 'arms' in the absence of 'hands', but that which is lacking. These 'handless arms' are constituted as being that of 'her' and 'back' is also 'her back'. However, there is an otherness between these claims to 'her' and that which is hers: 'handless arms' and 'back'. It is this 'bound to her back' of the 'arms', rather than the 'handless' which 'basically makes her armless too', so this is about the 'arms' rather than lack of hands.

'[B]y God's grace, because of her piety, her hands which had been cut off, grew once more' Hunt: p.206). In this perspective, 'hands' have once again shifted to being 'her hands'. These 'her hands' are that 'which had been cut off', thus these are the 'hands' which have been lacking throughout as they are now being constituted as 'hers' (unlike 'stumps' and 'silver hands'). However, there is still this implicit split and deferral in that these 'hands' are in excess to 'her'. If these 'hands' are those 'which had been cut off', then these 'hands' are being constructed as those which were hers before. These 'her hands' are also constituted as those which 'grew once more', so this is about a repetition. If these 'hands' 'grew once more', is this

a claim to the same 'her hands'? In this perspective, 'hands' are that which can grow, and they can do so more than once. However, these cannot be the same 'her hands which had been cut off' as this is 'grew once more'. In this 'once more', this is a different growing to that which 'her hands' would have been subjected to before. This 'grew once more' is claimed to be 'by God's grace, because of her piety', so this is what is constituting this 'grew'. Therefore, this 'grew once more' is about that which is other to 'her'; although it is 'because of her piety', it is ultimately 'by God's grace' that this is happening.

the severed hands are discarded early in the tale, and later the silver prostheses are discarded too once natural hands grow back. No such discarding happens in KHM1, where the severed hands apparently grow back onto the stumps of the arms. Disability is erased at the end of both versions through the magical restoration of the hands (Schmiesing: p.97)

In this perspective, there is the claim that 'Disability is erased at the end of both versions through the magical restoration of the hands'. With this disability erasure there is a notion of the 'magical' in the 'restoration of the hands'. If this is the 'magical restoration of the hands', then there is a claim to sameness as these are 'the hands'. However, although 'the hands' are magically restored, they are 'the hands' which have been restored. Thus, there is a difference between these 'the hands' and 'the hands' prior to 'the magical restoration'. There are multiple claims to 'hands' as there are 'the severed hands' and 'natural hands'. Although there is a repetition of 'hands', there is a split in both constructions of 'hands' as there are those which are 'the severed hands' and 'natural hands'. There is a split as that which constitutes 'hands',

‘severed’ and ‘natural’ are other to the ‘hands’ which are subject to them. There is thus a deferral, as that which these ‘hands’ are, ‘severed’ and ‘natural’, cannot be contained within these ‘hands’. Therefore, that which ‘hands’ are shifts multiple times within this claim. As well as ‘severed hands’ and ‘natural hands’, there are also ‘the silver prostheses’. Both ‘the severed hands’ and ‘the silver prosthesis’ ‘are discarded’, and it is the ‘natural hands’ which ‘grow back’ following this ‘discarding’. So, ‘natural hands’ are that which can ‘grow back’, but in ‘KHM1’ it is also so that ‘the severed hands apparently grow back onto the stumps of the arms’. Through this ‘apparently’, there is a lack of certainty in terms of this ‘grow back’, unlike the ‘grow back’ of the ‘natural hands’ in the first instance, according to this perspective. There is a difference between this ‘grow back’ and the previous ‘grow back’, besides the ‘apparently’, as this second ‘grows back’ is ‘onto the stumps of the arms’. There is a layering here, as the ‘hands grow back onto the stumps’ and ‘the stumps’ are ‘of the arms’. If this ‘grow back’ is ‘onto the stumps’, then ‘the severed hands’ must have been on ‘the stumps of the arms’ for this to be ‘back onto’. If so, then these ‘stumps’ must have been there before with ‘the severed hands’. However, if the presence of these ‘the stumps of the arms’ is constituted through the absence of ‘hands’ in them being ‘severed’, there is not only the absence of the ‘hands’ in terms of the ‘arms’, but also the absence of ‘the stumps’ in this ‘grow back’. Thus, there would no longer be these ‘stumps’ through this ‘restoration of the hands’. In thinking about ‘both versions’ of this ‘restoration’, that which constitutes ‘the magical restoration’ differs as although they both have this ‘grow back’, that which constitutes this ‘grow back’ is different. There is thus a split in what ‘magical restoration’ is in terms of this difference and, in turn, the way in which ‘Disability is erased’ is inconsistent. This notion that ‘Disability is erased’ through the growing back of ‘hands’, whether it be the growing back of ‘natural hands’ or ‘severed hands’ ‘onto the stump’, is deferred through this very claim to ‘Disability is erased’.

For 'Disability' to be 'erased', there must be 'Disability' to be 'erased', and for it to be known as such, there has to be this presence of 'Disability' for it to be 'erased' or absent. Thus, there can be no absolute erasure of 'Disability' as there will always be an inherent presence in it's absence.

he saw her living hands, and said, "My wife had silver hands." She answered, "The good God has caused my natural hands to grow again;" and the angel went into the inner room, and brought the silver hands, and showed them to him.

Hereupon he knew for a certainty that it was his dear wife and his dear child (Hunt: p.207)

There is a shift in the claim to 'hands' as these are now 'her living hands'. There is a split within a split here, as these 'hands' are other to 'her' but are also other to 'living'. This notion of 'living' is thus that which 'hands' implicitly are not, as 'hands' cannot contain this notion of 'living'. There is thus a deferral of meaning, as this 'living' is in excess and supplementary to these 'hands', and a lack of 'living' is constituted in these 'hands'. These 'her living hands' are that which 'he saw', so 'her living hands' are that which can be seen by this 'he' – that which is other to 'her'. Therefore, the fact that these 'hands' are 'living' is known through this 'saw'. This 'saw' is then followed by a 'said': "My wife had silver hands". There is a distinction made here between 'her living hands' and the 'silver hands', as 'silver hands' were something which 'My wife had' rather than something which was hers. These 'silver hands' are that which constituted 'My wife', according to this perspective, rather than that which is claimed to be that of hers i.e. any other 'part' of 'her'. Thus, what 'My wife' is, according to this perspective,

is constituted through the thing that was ‘made for her’. This distinction between these different ‘kinds’ of ‘hands’, ‘living’, ‘natural’ and ‘silver’, constitutes the notion of prosthetic hands (‘silver’), as not being the ‘natural’ ones; it is ‘her living hands’ which are ‘my natural hands’. It is so that ‘natural hands’ are that which ‘grow’, whereas ‘the silver hands’ were ‘made’, and it is through this ‘made’ thing that this ‘knew for certainty’ comes. So, for this knowing to be certain, he had to be shown ‘the silver hands’. He does not know her for certain without ‘the silver hands’ - without her absence of ‘natural hands’. This knowing of ‘his dear wife and his dear child’ is dependent upon the showing of ‘the silver hands’ – the very thing which is other to that which he is looking for – his wife.

In the following poem written by Margaret Atwood, Atwood also thinks about this notion of absence in *Girl Without Hands*:

Only a girl like this can know what's
happened to you. If she were here she would
reach out her arms towards you now, and
touch you with her absent hands and you
would feel nothing, but you would be
touched all the same.¹¹

In this perspective, there is a claim to ‘Only a girl like this can know’. The notion of exclusivity can be read in this ‘Only’, and in this being ‘Only’ and ‘can know’, there is a limitation to this knowledge; this ‘know what’s happened to you’ can only be so according to the conditions set

¹¹ Margaret Atwood, *Girl Without Hands* < <https://endicottstudio.typepad.com/poetrylist/girl-without-hands-by-margaret-atwood.html> >

out in this claim. Thus, this knowing can only be so through this 'like[ness]'. As this is 'like', there is claim to a sameness, but only insofar as 'this'; this is not an absolute sameness because this 'girl' and 'this' are different; there is an otherness implicated in this likeness. As well as 'a girl like this' there is a 'you'. There is then a shift from 'a girl like this' to 'she' and it is so that 'If she were here she would'. As this is 'if she were here', it is so that she is not 'here', thus that which is subject to this 'If' is conditional; this is also so with this 'would'. Thus, this is all an absent and conditional happening.

Furthermore, that which 'she would' is 'reach out her arms towards you now'. In this perspective, 'she' is that which can 'reach out', but this is a conditional claim in it being subject to 'If' and 'she would'. There is a construction of 'arms' and these 'arms' are 'her arms', thus there is a claim to ownership. However, although there is this presence of 'arms' in terms of 'her', this 'her' is implicated as lacking 'arms'. This is so because this claim to 'arms' is supplementary to 'her'; this 'her' is other to the very thing which is hers: 'arms'. These 'arms' are therefore other to 'her[s]' and are thus in excess of 'her'. There is this presence of an absence in the constitution of 'her arms'; although 'arms' are not implicated in this 'her' and are separate and thus lacking, this is a known absence, which in turn constitutes a presence. These 'her arms' are also constituted in their ableness to 'reach out [...] towards you now'. So, 'arms' are that which can 'reach' and direction is constituted in both 'out' and 'towards'. There is also a notion of position here as this 'she' who 'would reach out her arms' does so 'out' and 'towards you', thus where this 'you' is positioned is outward from 'she'. However, this 'reach out [...] towards you' is subject to 'If she were here', so 'she' is required to be 'here' to be able to 'reach out [...] towards you'. Where the 'you' is therefore located is outward; even if this 'she were here', this 'out[wardness]' would still be necessary. Therefore, even in the conditionality of these claims, this you is always implicitly distanced from the 'she' and 'her arms'. There is a

presence in this reaching through 'now'. However, this is a conditional and retrospective 'now': it is conditional because of the 'were' and 'would', but it is also retrospective because this is a claimed presence from a past.

There is a repetition of 'you' as it is 'she would reach out her arms towards you now, and touch you with her absent hands'. There are two claims to 'you', according to this perspective, however this is not the same 'you' as they are two separate claims. There is the 'you' which 'she would reach out her arms towards' and then there is the 'you' who would be 'touch[ed]' 'with her absent hands'. Although 'you' is constituted in both instances, that which constitutes 'you' is different, thus there is a shift as one is about a 'reach' and the other a 'touch'. In this perspective, both 'arms' and 'absent hands' are constituted as being 'her[s]'.

There is thus a notion of ownership, even in this claim to absence. Although these 'hands' are 'absent', even in their absence they are still hers. However, as this is all conditional through 'if' and 'would', there is a further absence, as not only are these 'absent hands' absent, as are 'her arms', this 'reach' and this 'touch'. These 'hands' are thus 'absent' in their being claimed to be 'absent' but are also absent through this notion of the conditional.

If we now return to thinking about this notion of 'own child's hands', in Freud's essay 'Infantile Sexuality', it is claimed that 'They are clearly treated as a part of the infant's own body'.¹² This is 'treated as', so they are not 'a part of'. This is 'the infant's own body'. So 'the infant' is other to that which is its 'own body'. In this perspective, 'body' is 'own', yet there is an implicit split in this very construction of 'own body', as that which is 'body' is other to 'own', so what 'body' is, is not 'the infant's own', as it is other to this very thing which it is

¹² Freud, Sigmund, *Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality*, trans. James Strachey (London: Imago Publishing Company, 2011) p.64-65.

claimed to be. This 'the infant's own body' is not only split as 'the infant' is other to 'own body', and 'body' is other to 'own', but also in terms of this being 'a part of'. This 'a part of' constructs what is being claimed in this perspective as that which is incomplete; there is only a claim to 'the infant's own body' in that there is that which is 'of' it: 'a part'. However, there is not 'a part of the infant's own body' in this claim, as what is constructed is that which is 'treated as part of the infant's own body'. Therefore, there is no 'part of' this 'own body'; there is only that which is 'treated as such'. This 'treated as' is also 'clearly', so there are different levels of 'clearly', according to this perspective. That which is 'clearly treated as a part of the infant's own body' is that which is other to this 'a part of the infant's own body', not only through this 'treated as' but also in being the 'They' which is not this 'own body'. Therefore, that which a 'body' is, according to this perspective, is that which is both multiple and inherently different; it is other to 'itself'. 'body' is 'own', 'infants', has 'parts' and is that which 'they' can be 'treated as'.

At the start of 'Thumbelina' it is claimed that:

there was a woman who longed for a little child of her own, but she had no idea where she could get one from [...] 'I'd so much like to have a little child'¹³

In this perspective there is a repetition of 'a little child'. In the first instance, this is a longing 'for a little child of her own'. There is a split in the construction of this 'child' as it is 'little', yet this littleness cannot be contained within the claim to 'child'. There is a further split as this is 'a little child of her own. As well as being 'little', this 'child' is constituted as being that of an

¹³ Hans Christian Andersen 'Thumbelina' *Fairy Tales: A Selection*, trans. L. W. Kingsland, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp. 30-45 (p. 30). All further references will appear in parenthesis.

other: 'her'. However, this is 'a woman who longed for a little child of her own', therefore this 'little child' is not that of hers but that which 'a woman' 'longed for'. Therefore, this 'a little child of her own' is only present in this perspective through this longing; there is no 'little child of her own', but a longing for one. There is both a specificity and a lack of specificity to this 'a little child'. There is a specificity in that what this 'woman' 'longed for' is a child and that this child is to be constituted by littleness. There is also a specificity in the longing for ownership; this is about 'a little child of her own'. However, there is also a lack of specificity as this is 'a little child'.

There is a shift in perspective, as 'a woman' is then a 'she' who 'had no idea where she could get one from'. So, 'a little child of her own' is that which 'she could get' from somewhere other to where 'she' is, but 'she has no idea where' this is. Therefore, 'a little child of her own' is something which can come from somewhere other. There is a repetition of 'a little child' in 'I'd so much like to have a little child'. So, 'a little child' is something which can be had, but this is a different 'a little child' and this is not a repetition as this is 'a little child' whereas it was 'a little child of her own'. This is 'I'd so much like to have', so there is 'a little child of her own' which is 'longed for' and 'a little child' which the 'I' would 'so much like to have'. Therefore, in both instances, there is an absence of 'a little child'. Although there is a presence in the claim to 'a little child', there is no 'little child'; thus, there is this inherent presence of absence in that there needs to be this 'a little child' which is not there for there to be knowledge of this 'a little child' and its absence. However, that which comes from 'the flower' is 'a tiny little girl, delicate and lovely: she was not above an inch tall, and so she was called Thumbelina' (Kingsland: p.30). There is a shift as what she wants is 'a little child' and what she gets is 'a tiny little girl'. There is a repetition of 'little', so she wants that which is 'little' and gets that which is 'little'; however, that which constitutes this littleness is different in each instance. This cannot be a repetition as the littleness she would 'so much like to have' is 'a little child',

whereas what she gets is 'a tiny little girl'. There is a split in this construction of 'a tiny little girl' as 'tiny' and 'little' are other to 'girl'. This 'tiny' and 'little' therefore cannot be contained within this claim to 'girl' and are thus supplementary and in excess of this 'girl'. There is thus an implicit lack, as this 'girl' is only 'tiny' and 'little' insofar as is claimed in this perspective on this 'girl'. This 'a tiny little girl' is 'a tiny little girl, delicate and lovely', so this 'girl' is further constituted as that which is other to 'girl': 'delicate and lovely'.

In Stephen Thomson's 'The Adjective, My Daughter: Staging T. S. Eliot's "Marina"', it is claimed that:

The child here is something I can hold and call my own. The 'supreme created being' is not just *'the child'*, but *'one's child'*, *'my daughter'*. But whose exactly? Anyone's child is *'my child'*. The very form of the possessive that declares property is also what allows absolute expropriation. *'My child'* is anyone's child.¹⁴

In this perspective, 'The child here is something I can hold and call my own'. There is a specificity in that this is 'The child here', and this is about what the 'I can' do: 'hold and call my own'. So, this is about what 'The child' is, according to this perspective on the perspective of 'I'. There is a shift in perspective as this is 'I' but then 'my own', so 'The child here' can be held by 'I' but 'my own' is what it is called by the 'I'. This 'The child here is something', so 'The child is' that which is other to 'The child'; it 'is something'. There is a repetition of 'child'

¹⁴ Stephen Thomson, 'The Adjective, My Daughter: Staging T. S. Eliot's "Marina"', *The Yearbook of English Studies*, vol.32, Children in Literature (2002) pp.110-126 (p.116).

as ‘The ‘supreme created being’ is not just ‘*the* child’, but ‘*one’s* child’’, so there are multiple claims to ‘child’. However, this is not a repetition as these claims to ‘child’ are each constituted differently. Through this shift of ‘The’ to ‘*the*’ to ‘*one’s*’ to ‘*my*’, there is this shift to ‘the possessive’, but, as Thomson argues, ‘The very form of the possessive that declares property is also what allows absolute expropriation’. This about a sameness which is different; there is a sameness in ‘Anyone’s child is ‘my child’ and ‘My child’ is anyone’s child’, but there is also a difference as this is not the same claim. In both instances ‘my child’ is in quotation marks, but ‘anyone’s child’ is not, so there is a further difference besides it being ‘my’ and ‘anyone’s’. In this very notion of a ‘child’ which is ‘my child’, there is an implicit lack; as Thomson questions ‘But whose exactly?’, there is a lack of knowledge as these claims are perspective dependent, thus, in turn, the answer to this question will always implicitly be the same but different. In ‘The Ugly Duckling’ there is also a claim to an ‘own child’:

‘Well, that’s no turkey!’ she said. ‘Look how beautifully he uses his legs and how straight he holds himself! He’s my own child and no mistake! He’s really quite handsome if you look at him properly!’¹⁵

In this perspective, ‘child’ is that which is constituted as being ‘my own’. This ‘child’ is also ‘He[‘s]’. However, with ‘‘s’, this ‘He’ is that which is other to ‘He’: ‘my own child’. There is a split in this construction of ‘He’s my own child’, as there is a shift from ‘He’ to that which is ‘my’: ‘own child’. So, ‘my own child’ is that which ‘He’ is, despite this otherness. With this

¹⁵ Hans Christian Andersen ‘The Ugly Duckling’, *Fairy Tales: A Selection*, trans. L. W. Kingsland, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp.214-227 (p. 216).

claim to 'He's my own child', the way in which 'He' is constituted in terms of the 'my' is different to the way 'own child' is. There is a shift from this 'He' to being 'my own child, but as this is 'He's my own child', 'He' is 'my own child', yet this 'He' is separate from this 'my own child' and is therefore other. There is thus a split, as 'my own child' is supplementary to this 'He's' and constitutes this excess. Therefore, there is a deferral of meaning in this 'He's my own child'.

Furthermore, in the perspective on the perspective on 'she', the mother, 'he' who is previously constituted as the 'ugly grey one' is 'said' to be using 'his legs' 'beautifully'. In this perspective, 'legs' are that which are 'his', and it is 'he' who 'uses his legs'. There is a split within a split in the notion of these 'legs' being used, as there are 'his legs' and 'he uses'. In 'his legs', although the 'legs' are constituted as being 'his', 'legs' are other to this 'his'. As these 'legs' cannot be contained within this claim to 'his', they are that which is not the 'his'. There is thus a split and a deferral in these 'his legs' as the 'legs' are that which are supplementary and thus in excess to this 'his'. There is a further split as it is 'he' who 'uses his legs'. In this being 'he' and 'his', there is a difference between that which is doing the using and that which is used; it is 'he' who can use, yet it is that which is 'his' which can, and is, being used. There is a specificity in this being 'his legs' which 'he uses'; although these 'legs' are other and thus split in terms of the 'his', this is still what the 'legs' are being constituted as in this perspective. Furthermore, there is a specificity to the 'uses of his legs' as it is 'how beautifully he uses his legs'. 'legs' can therefore be used in different ways; here, it is that they are used 'beautifully' and this is the 'how' of the using of 'his legs'. This 'how beautifully he uses his legs' is that which can be looked at as it is 'Look how beautifully'. It is so that 'legs' can be looked at, but also that 'how' 'he uses' them is also that which can be looked at. However, this is a 'Look how beautifully he uses his legs', so although this is something which

can be looked at, it does not necessarily mean that it is something which can be seen; it is just that it is subject to a 'Look' in this perspective on the 'said' of 'she'.

As well as 'how beautifully he uses his legs', 'how straight he holds himself' is also constituted through this 'Look'; the 'how' of this 'beautifully' and 'straight' is constructed as being known through this looking. As with 'he' and 'his legs', there is a shift in this 'he' with 'he holds himself'. Although this is another claim to 'he', it is not a repetition, as what constitutes each 'he' in each instance is different: the first 'he' is the 'he' who 'uses his legs', whereas the second 'he' is the 'he' who 'holds himself'. 'he' is therefore constituted as being able to do these different things which each constitute this 'he' differently. So, in this perspective, 'he' is that which 'holds' and 'himself' is that which can be held by 'he'. There is a split and thus a deferral of identity through these notions of 'he' and 'himself' as each is constituted as other to the other. There is a further split with this 'himself' as 'him' is other to 'self', thus there is a split within in a split in the constructions of 'he' and 'himself'. There is a shift in perspective from this 'he' and 'himself' to 'He['s]' and then 'him'; this 'him' is that which 'you' can 'look at' and this is known from a perspective other to 'him', but it is 'He['s]' which is 'really quite handsome'. There is a split in the notion of 'handsome' in it being 'really quite handsome', as this 'really quite' is other to 'handsome'. With this otherness, the 'really quite' of this 'handsome' cannot be contained within the claim to 'handsome', so is thus supplementary. This 'handsome' which is he is claimed to be through this conditional looking is therefore unstable and meaning is deferred as there cannot be a definitive claim to 'handsome' as it is so that he is 'really quite handsome'.

That which implicates this 'He's really quite handsome' is 'if you look'. In this perspective, there is a repetition of 'look' in 'if you look at him properly'. There is a shift in this notion of 'look', as although both claims to 'look' are within the ' of 'she said', that which

constitutes these look[s] are different. In this second instance, there is a 'look' which is subject to this notion of 'properly'. There is to 'look' and to 'look' 'properly'; there is a looking of 'how', and a looking 'at', and it is this 'look at him' which is constructed as being 'properly'. However, this is a conditional looking 'properly', for it is 'if you look at him properly'. Therefore, 'He's really quite handsome' is dependent on the conditional notion of 'if', for, in this perspective, the 'really quite handsome' of he, is conditional upon 'if you look at him properly'. There is thus a lack implicated in this construction of looking, as unlike the previous claim to 'Look', this 'look' is a 'look' which has not happened. That being said, as this is a perspective on the perspective of this saying of 'if you look', this is a retrospective conditional 'look'. In this absence of a 'look', there is also a presence, as this 'look' needs to be known to be absent which in turn requires the presence of this 'look'.

Another text which also engages with this notion of a type of looking is *The Water Babies* by Charles Kingsley, which has been coined as a 'modern-day fairy tale':

Under the snow-white coverlet, upon the show-white pillow, lay the most beautiful little girl that Tom had ever seen. Her cheeks were almost as white as the pillow, and her hair was like threads of gold spread all about over the bed. She might have been as old as Tom, or maybe a year or two older; but Tom did not think of that. He thought only of her delicate skin and golden hair, and wondered whether she were a real live person, or one of the wax dolls he had seen in the shops. But when he saw her breathe, he made up his mind that she was alive, and stood staring at her, as if she had been an angel out of heaven.¹⁶

¹⁶ Charles Kingsley, *The Water Babies*, ed. Brian Alderson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014) p.17.

In this perspective, this 'lay' is both 'under' and 'upon'; what it is 'under' and 'upon' is that which is constituted as being 'snow-white'. There is a repetition of 'the snow-white' in the construction of 'the snow-white coverlet' and 'the snow-white pillow'. However, although there are two claims to 'the snow-white', that which is subject to each 'the snow-white' is different; thus, what these claims to 'the snow-white' are that which is other to one another, both in terms of what is subject to these claims as well as there being two claims to 'the snow-white'. That which is 'the snow-white' are the 'coverlet' and the 'pillow', therefore both 'coverlet' and 'pillow' are that which can be constituted as being 'the snow-white'. However, there is an implicit split in both 'the snow-white coverlet' and 'the snow-white pillow', as 'the snow-white' is other to 'coverlet' and 'pillow'. In being other to that which is claimed to be 'the snow-white', 'coverlet' and 'pillow', there is a separation and thus a deferral, as what the 'coverlet' and 'pillow' are, 'the snow-white', cannot be contained within 'coverlet' or 'pillow'; this 'the snow-white' is supplementary in both of these instances. Through this deferral, there is thus an excess, as 'the snow-white' is in excess to 'coverlet' and 'pillow'. Therefore, both the 'coverlet' and the 'pillow' are lacking, in this perspective, as that which they are, 'the snow-white', remains as that which is other and is thus not the 'coverlet' nor the 'pillow'. Although this split can be read as being between 'the snow-white coverlet' and 'the snow-white pillow', there is also a further split within this split with the very claim to 'the snow-white'. In this constitution of 'the snow-white', 'snow' and 'white' are that which is other to the other; 'snow' is other to 'white' and vice versa. However, this split is implicated by the '-'. Although a 'togetherness' could be constituted through this '-', there is still this split, as 'snow' and 'white'

are other to one another regardless of this ‘-‘ and this ‘-‘ is also other to both ‘snow’ and ‘white’; thus, in turn, this ‘-‘ constitutes this ‘snow’ and ‘white’ as being further separated.

It is ‘Under’ this ‘the snow-white coverlet’ that this ‘lay’ is, so what ‘the snow-white coverlet’ is, according to this perspective, is that which has an ‘Under’ and this ‘Under’ is where this ‘lay’ can be. In terms of ‘the snow-white pillow’, it is ‘upon’ this ‘the snow-white pillow’ that this same ‘lay’ is. As there is only this one claim to ‘lay’, through the ‘,’ it is that this ‘lay’ which is ‘Under the snow-white coverlet’ is simultaneous to that which is ‘upon the snow-white pillow’, that is that this ‘Under’ and ‘upon’ are subject to this ‘lay’. Therefore, ‘the snow-white coverlet’ and ‘the snow-white pillow’ are constructed in relation to one another; ‘lay’ can be ‘Under’ one and ‘upon’ the other in the same instance. However, if this is that ‘the snow-white coverlet’ has an ‘Under’ and that ‘the snow-white pillow’ has an ‘upon’, then this ‘Under’ and ‘upon’ are other to ‘the snow-white coverlet’ and ‘the snow-white pillow’. If this is so, then the ‘Under’ of ‘the snow-white coverlet’ is that which has to potential to exist as that which is not ‘the snow-white coverlet’; it is other to and thus separate to the ‘coverlet’. This ‘Under’ of the ‘coverlet’ is therefore deferred and is in excess and supplementary to ‘the snow-white coverlet’ as it is that which is ‘other’ and cannot be contained. This is also so with ‘upon the snow-white pillow’; as with the ‘coverlet’, the ‘upon’ of ‘the snow-white pillow’ is other to ‘the snow-white pillow’ and, in turn, this ‘upon’ is that which cannot be contained within the claim to ‘the snow-white pillow’ in its being constituted as that which is not ‘the snow-white pillow’.

Moreover, that which is subject to this ‘lay’ is ‘the most beautiful little girl that Tom had ever seen’. What ‘girl’ is, in this perspective, is that which is ‘the most beautiful’ and ‘little’. As this is ‘the most’, this ‘beautiful little girl’ is that which is in relation to other ‘beautiful little girls’; there cannot be ‘the most’ without something else, something other, which is not ‘the most’. However, what this ‘the most’ is constituting is ‘beautiful little girl’,

therefore, in terms of an otherness, this 'the most' is outside of this notion of 'beautiful little girl'; this 'most' is deferred in its being in excess to that which it is constituting: 'beautiful little girl'. There is also a deferral in the split of 'beautiful little girl'; there is a split within a split and then a further split, as this 'most' is other to 'beautiful little girl', but the beautifulness and the littleness of this 'girl' is also that which is other to each other and, in turn, to 'girl'. Thus, what we have is a notion of 'girl' which is separate to, which is other to, the very thing that this 'girl' is claimed to be: 'the most beautiful little'. What is also here is that in terms of 'girl', 'beautiful' and 'little' have varying, say degrees, of 'beautiful' and 'little'; this goes back to that comparison to the other through this notion of 'the most'. Furthermore, what this 'the most' is constructed as being, is 'that Tom had ever seen', therefore this 'the most' is in terms of 'Tom'; this is a perspective on the 'had ever seen' on 'Tom', and, in this perspective, this is what this 'the most' is about; it is the seeing of Tom. So, if this is 'the most beautiful little girl that Tom had ever seen', then, in a sense, there is a limit on these claims through this seeing of 'Tom'. What can be read here, then, is that this 'girl' can be 'seen', and so can other little girls, for this is the 'most beautiful little' one that has been seen within this realm of Tom's seeing. In this being so, Tom must have therefore seen other girls, and this seeing of other girls must implicitly be before this seeing of the girl who is constructed in this perspective.

Here, there is a perspective on that which is 'Her'; what is constituted as 'her' are 'cheeks' and 'hair'. Although there is a repetition of 'her', these are different hers, as one is that which is about 'cheeks' and the other is that which is about 'hair'. There is thus a split between the construction of 'her' and that which is constructed as being hers, or of 'her'. This is so as 'her' is other to 'cheeks' and 'her' is other to 'hair', therefore 'cheeks' and 'hair' are that which is other to their respective 'her'; if 'cheeks' and 'hair' are that which are separate to 'her', then they cannot be contained within the construction of 'her'; this very notion of that which is hers is problematised by claiming that it is hers. In this 'her cheeks' it is that they

'were almost as white as the pillow', therefore 'her cheeks' were 'white'. However, as this is 'almost as white as', we are back to this notion of comparison; 'Her cheeks' cannot be 'almost as white as' something without that other something; in this case it is 'the pillow'. There is a shift in this construction of 'pillow', as there was 'the snow-white pillow' and then there this 'almost as white as the pillow'; although 'pillow' is constituted in terms of its whiteness in both instances, this is a different perspective on 'pillow' as this is in terms of 'Her cheeks', whereas the other was in terms of the positioning.

In this perspective, there is a construction of that which is hers. This idea of what is hers and what is not is apparent with 'Her cheeks' and 'her hair'. In this perspective both 'cheeks' and 'hair' are constituted as being hers; however, there is a split, as there is 'Her' and there are 'cheeks' and 'hair'. Therefore, 'cheeks' and 'hair' are not 'Her' as they are constructed as that which are hers, but not 'Her'; they are 'cheeks' and 'hair'. These 'cheeks' and 'hair' are constructed in what they are 'as' and 'like', and it is this 'as' and 'like' which are constituted; 'Her cheeks' are defined through their 'whiteness', and 'her hair' is defined through its 'goldness'. Although 'cheeks' and 'hair' are hers before they are 'as' and 'like', this is still supplementary to their being hers. There is also a layering in this perspective; 'Her cheeks' are that which 'were almost as white' and this 'almost as white' is 'as the pillow'. Therefore, it is not 'Her cheeks' which are 'as the pillow', but the 'whiteness' of them. Therefore this 'asness', and this 'likeness', constitute the 'cheeks' and hair' as being 'as' and 'like' that which is other, or what it is not. This is not that which the 'cheeks' and 'hair' are themselves, but that which they are 'as' and 'like, thus, through this 'as' and 'like', a lack is constituted; this is a division through that which is other.

There is a shift in perspective as there is a perspective on 'She' who 'might have been as old Tom, or maybe a year or two older'. There is a notion of uncertainty, as it is that 'She might have been' and also 'maybe', so there is a lack of knowing about this 'She'. However, it

is then claimed '; but Tom did not think of that'. This is a perspective on 'Tom', so this not thinking of 'Tom' is coming from a perspective that is other to 'Tom'; this is something which is known about 'Tom' from a different perspective than that of 'Tom'. Through this ';', this 'that' which 'Tom did not think of' is that 'She might have been as old as Tom, or maybe a year or two older'. Therefore, this thinking of 'She might' is not that of Tom but is precisely what 'Tom did not think of'. If this is so, then this is a perspective other to 'Tom' which knows the 'not think[ing]' of 'Tom' and knows the 'might' and 'maybe' which this 'She' is subject to. However, there is a lack of knowledge on the part of this perspective on 'She' as there is still a lack of knowing as to whether 'She might have been as old as Tom, or maybe a year or two older'.

There is a shift in this notion of thinking as it is that 'He thought only of her delicate skin and golden hair'. Whereas before it was a perspective on 'Tom' in relation to thinking, and that which 'Tom did not think of', here it is the 'thought' of 'He', as claimed from a perspective which is other to Tom. There is a notion of singularity in this 'He thought only of' but this is of 'her delicate skin and golden hair', so these are things can be 'thought of' by that which is other to 'her', as this is a perspective on the 'thought' of 'He'. That which is 'her[s]' is 'delicate skin and golden hair', and this 'skin' and 'hair' are known to be this way. However, there is an implicit split in the construction of this 'hair' and 'skin' because they are that which is other to themselves: 'delicate' and 'golden'. This 'delicate' and 'golden' are supplementary and thus in excess of this 'skin' and 'hair'. There is a further split as this 'delicate skin and golden hair' are also other to 'her'.

There is a shift from 'He thought' to 'wondered' and what is 'wondered' is 'whether she were a real live person, or one of those wax dolls he had seen in the shops'. A difference is constructed between 'person' and 'dolls', yet there is the potential in this 'wondered' for 'she' to be either 'a real live person, or one of the wax dolls'. There is the of that which is 'real' and that which is not for the options are that 'she' were that which was 'real' or that which is other to this

'real'. There is a further shift in that which is 'seen', as there was 'the most beautiful girl that Tom had ever seen' and then 'one of the wax dolls he had seen'. Therefore, both 'girl' and 'dolls' can be 'seen' and have been 'seen' in the past by 'Tom'/'He'. However, as this is a retrospective claim from a perspective which is other to both of these 'seen[s]', these 'seen[s]' are past 'seen[s]' from a retrospective perspective. There is a further seeing of 'he' in 'But when he saw her breathe', but this is a 'saw', and what 'he saw' was 'her breathe'. So, 'her breathe' is something which can be seen and something which can be done by 'her'. It is 'when he saw her breathe' that 'he made up his mind that she was alive', so 'his mind' is that which can be 'made up' by that which is other to 'his' - 'he' - and can be 'made up' about something other to 'he' - that 'she was alive'. Thus, 'she' being 'alive' is conditional upon this 'made up his mind', according to this perspective. Furthermore, according to this claim, 'he' is other to 'his' mind; there is a split and then a further split as 'mind' is other to 'his' which is other to the 'he' that 'saw'. So, 'mind' is that which has the potential to be that which need not be contained, and it is so in this otherness to both the 'he' and the 'his', even in this notion of 'his mind'. However, a lack is constituted through this separation between 'his' and 'mind' as the 'mind' is supplementary and in excess of 'his'; there is thus a presence of an absence as 'mind' is that of 'his' which need to be claimed as other and, in turn, meaning is deferred.

There is further notion of 'seeing' as following this 'when he saw her breathe' it is so that 'he made up his mind that she was alive, and stood staring at her'. So, there is the 'her' who can 'breathe' and this is what 'he saw' and there is the 'her' who is subject to this 'stood staring at'. Therefore, according to this perspective, that which is other to 'he' knows what 'her saw' and knows that this 'staring' is 'at her'. It is also that this 'staring at her' is 'as if she had been an angel out of heaven'. However, this 'she' is not 'an angel out of heaven' as this is 'as if', so this is constituting the 'staring' rather than what this 'she' is. There is a shift in perspective, as it is

'her' who this 'staring' is 'at', but it is 'she' who is subject to this 'as if she had been an angel out of heaven'. There is thus a split in this construction that which is 'her' and 'she'.

Human and Animal

But what *is* a human? Is a human an animal? And what is an animal anyway?¹⁷

In this section I am going to compare different translations of 'the same' tale, and I will be thinking about the implications of this claim to 'sameness' when it comes to oral tales. I will also be thinking about the differences between these two translations and the implications of these differences for the readings and how this changes the way in which child, body, human, and animal are read.

when the child came into the world, it did not look like a human child, but was a little donkey. When the mother saw that, her lamentations and outcries began in real earnest; she said she would far rather have had no child at all than have a donkey [...] The donkey, therefore, was brought up and grew bigger, and his ears grew up beautifully high and straight.¹⁸

¹⁷ Sunaura Taylor, *Beasts of Burden: animal and disability liberation* (New York: New Press, 2017) p.84.

¹⁸ Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm 'The Donkey', *Grimm's Complete Fairy Tales*, trans. by Margaret Hunt (New York: Sterling Publishing Co, 2015) pp. 526-528 (p.526) All further references will be given in parenthesis.

In this passage from Margaret Hunt's translation of 'The Donkey', there is a perspective on 'the child' which is other to 'the child'; this 'the child' can only be read from elsewhere. This 'the child came into the world', so 'the child' must have been somewhere other to 'the world' in order to have 'came into' it. It is so that it is 'the child' who 'came into the world' but 'did not look like a human child', so there is a lack in this 'look'. This notion of the 'child' is retained, as it is 'when the child', so that which is lacking in this 'look' is 'human'. There is a split in this construction of 'a human child' as 'child' is other to that which it is constituted as being: 'human'. If 'human' is that which is in excess of 'child' and that which is supplementary to it, then there is an implicit lack of 'human' in this claim to 'child'. There is thus a deferral of meaning, as 'child' is that which cannot contain this notion of 'human' in this instance. There is also a presence of absence as in this claim to 'human child', there is a lack of 'human' in this 'child' but also a presence as it is 'a human child' which is made claim to. So, the 'child' which 'did not look like a human child', so this notion of a 'child' is still retained. This was a 'did not look like a human child' 'but was a little donkey', so 'a little donkey' is what it 'was' rather than a 'look'. In this thinking about 'a human child' and 'a little donkey', this must be a perspective which knows that 'it did not look like a human child' and that it 'was a little donkey', so there is a knowledge of what these things - human child and donkey - 'look like'. Also, in this 'but was a little donkey', it is so that this 'a little donkey' 'did not look like a human child'.

Furthermore, it is claimed that 'she said she would far rather have had no child at all', so a lack of a 'child' is that which 'she would far rather' than 'a donkey'. So, according to this perspective on what 'she said', if it is that 'she would far rather have had no child at all' and that 'the child came into the world' 'but was a little donkey', then 'donkey' is also 'child'. This is about a having so 'no child' and 'a donkey' are that which can be had by another who is other

to 'child' and 'donkey'. In this claim to having 'no child', although this is about having a 'child', this is about a lack of having a 'child'. There is thus a presence of 'child' in this claim, but also an absence as it is 'no'. This is therefore a presence of an absence, as for this wanting of a lack of 'child' to be known, there must be this knowing of the 'no child'. There are multiple shifts in the claim to 'child' as it is 'when the child came', 'a human child' and 'no child'. Therefore, although this is a repetition in that the claim to 'child' is retained, this cannot be a repetition as that which constitutes 'child' is different: 'the', 'a human' and 'no'. In thinking about the construction of 'a little donkey', there is also a split as 'little' is other to 'donkey'. Therefore, 'donkey' cannot contain this notion of littleness, thus 'little' is supplementary and in excess of this 'donkey'. This 'a little donkey' and 'a human child' is also that which can be seen. In this perspective there is a claim to a seeing in 'When the mother saw that'. This is a past seeing in 'saw', but as this is from a retrospective perspective, this is a retrospective past seeing. This is also a claim to a 'saw' from a perspective other to that who 'saw' this is not the perspective of 'the mother' but a perspective on 'the mother'. So, this is a claimed knowledge to a seeing from somewhere that is other to the 'seer'. It is through this 'saw' that 'her lamentations and outcries began in real earnest', so it is after this seeing that this happens. This 'it did not look like a human child, but was a little donkey' is that which 'the mother saw', so this difference between 'a human child' and 'a little donkey' is therefore that which can be seen by 'the mother', according to this perspective.

However, in thinking about the 'same' passage from Jack Zipes' translation of 'The Little Donkey', there are undeniable differences:

when the baby was born, it didn't look like a human child but like a young little donkey.

When the mother saw it, she really began to lament and screamed that she would rather

have had no child at all than to have had a donkey [...] As he got bigger, his ears also grew quite high and straight.¹⁹

To begin, the very title 'The Little Donkey' is different to the title in Hunt's translation: 'The Donkey'. In this claim to 'The Little Donkey', this notion of 'littleness' comes through whereas it does not in 'The Donkey'. In this perspective there is a claim to 'when the baby was born', whereas in the other translation it was 'when the child came into the world'. This is thus a perspective on 'the baby' who 'was born', rather than 'the child'. However, both this 'the child' and 'the baby' do not 'look like a human child', thus this lack of 'human' is retained across the two perspectives. There is a shift in perspective as it was 'the baby' who 'was born' that 'didn't look like a human child', so this is no longer about 'the baby' but about the lack of something 'child'. What this 'look' is 'like' is 'a young little donkey', so there is a construction of a 'little donkey', but there is a difference in that this is a looking 'like a young little donkey' rather than being 'a little donkey' through the claim to 'was'. There are implications for this reading in there being this difference of 'was a little donkey' and looking 'like a young little donkey'. In Hunt's passage, it is that it 'was a little donkey'. However, in Zipes' passage whereby it was 'like a young little donkey', this is only 'a young little donkey' in this 'look'; it is so that 'it didn't look like a human child but like a young little donkey', so this 'baby' is neither 'a human child' nor 'a young little donkey', according to this perspective as it is 'the baby' which looked 'like' a 'donkey'. There is a presence of an absence of both 'human child' and 'young little donkey' as both of these claims are subject to 'look like' in this perspective; in there being a lack of 'child' and 'donkey', there is thus a presence of a lack, and this is facilitated through this 'look'. As well

¹⁹ Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, 'The Little Donkey', *The Original Folk and Fairy Tales of the Brothers Grimm: The Complete First Edition*, trans. Jack Zipes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) pp. 456-461 (p.457).

as a 'look' there is also a 'saw': 'When the mother saw it, she really began to lament and screamed'. There is a difference here, as in the other passage, that which 'the mother saw' was 'that' whereas in this translation was 'the mother saw' is 'it'. Through this difference, there are implications for this reading. In the first passage, with what 'the mother saw' being 'that', this 'that' can be read as being the lack of looking 'like a human child'. However, in the second passage, with what 'the mother saw' being 'it', this can be read as being 'the baby' with looked 'like a young little donkey'. Therefore, that which is seen is different in the different translations which, in turn, constitutes the lack of 'sameness' between the 'same' tale.

The final lines of these passages which I am thinking about read as such: 'The donkey, therefore, was brought up and grew bigger, and his ears grew up beautifully high and straight' (Hunt) and 'As he got bigger, his ears also grew quite high and straight' (Zipes). In this perspective there is a construction of 'his ears'. There is a split in these 'his ears', as 'ears' are that which cannot be contained within this claim to 'his'. These 'ears' are therefore in excess of and supplementary to 'his'. In the first instance, it is that 'The donkey' 'grew bigger, and his ears grew up beautifully high and straight'. So, both 'The donkey' and 'his ears' are that which 'grew', but 'The donkey' 'grew bigger' whilst 'his ears grew up', so there is a difference between how each grew'. There is a consistency in that the growing of 'his ears' are 'and' in relation to the 'grew bigger' of 'The donkey', so there are these two notions of growing. However, in the second instance, it is that 'As he got bigger, his ears also grew quite high and straight'. In this perspective, rather than an 'and' there is an 'As' and an 'also'. Although there is a 'sameness' in that there is an increase in size of 'he' in 'got bigger' and an increase in 'his ears' with 'grew quite high', this is different to the first claim. In this being 'As he got bigger, his ears also grew', it is so that this 'he got bigger' is necessary for the growth of 'his ears'. There is thus a different relationship in terms of how growth is constructed in each translation, as although there is growth, this growth is constituted in different ways.

Once he was convinced that they were completely alone, he threw off the donkey skin, and all at once he stood there as a handsome young prince. [...]

When morning came, he jumped up, put on his donkey skin again, and nobody would have guessed what lay beneath it. (Zipes: p.460)

In this perspective, that of 'the donkey' is 'the donkey skin' and this is what 'he threw off'. There is a separation between the 'he' who 'was convinced', the 'he' who 'threw off the donkey skin' and the 'he' who 'stood there as a handsome young prince'. In this being 'he stood there as a handsome young prince', it is not that 'he' is 'a handsome young prince', but that 'he stood there as' one. Thus, through this 'asness', what 'he' is claimed to be is not 'a handsome prince'; it is only through this 'stood there' that he is 'as a handsome young prince'. This is therefore about the 'stood there' rather than the 'he' himself. Furthermore, in this perspective on the 'said' of 'he', a seeing is constituted: 'Now you see who I am'. This 'see' is that of 'you' and this 'see' is 'Now'. However, as this is a retrospective perspective, this 'Now' is a past 'Now'. Thus, this 'see' of 'you' is a past seeing, regardless of this 'Now'. This 'see' is also a seeing of 'who I am', so the 'who' of this 'I' is that which can be seen by the 'you' who is other to the 'I'. In this sense, if the 'I' is other to the 'who' which the 'I' is in this claim to 'who I am', the 'I' is always separate. There is a further seeing in 'and you also see that I'm worthy of you'. There is a shift in the claim to 'you' as there is the 'you' that 'see[s]', the 'you' that 'also see[s]', and the 'you' that 'I'm worthy of'.

There is a repetition of 'donkey skin' as 'When morning came, he jumped up' and 'put on his donkey skin again'. There is a shift in perspective as this is 'his donkey skin' which is

being 'put on', whereas it was 'the donkey skin' that 'he threw off'. Therefore, this is not a repetition as this 'donkey skin' is different to the previous 'donkey skin'. So, in the 'threw off' of 'the donkey skin', there is a lack of 'his', but in the 'put on' of this 'donkey skin' it is 'his'. There is a split in the construction of 'donkey skin', as 'skin' is other to that which is claimed to be: 'donkey'. There is an implicit otherness as this 'skin' cannot be contained within this claim to 'donkey', so it is supplementary and in excess of 'donkey'. There is a split within a split in 'his donkey skin', as 'donkey skin' is other to 'his', thus constituting a further otherness in this construction of 'his donkey skin'.

When they were both within, the bridegroom bolted the door, looked around, and as he believed that they were quite alone, he suddenly threw off his ass's skin, and stood there in the form of a handsome royal youth. [...]

When morning came, he jumped up, put his animal's skin on again, and no one could have guessed what kind of a form was hidden beneath it. (Hunt: p.528)

In the 'same' passage in Hunt's passage, there is also this notion of 'skin', however, in this perspective, it is that 'he suddenly threw off his ass's skin'. Here, this 'skin' is that which 'he' 'threw off', but this 'skin' is constituted as being an 'ass's'. There is a separation and an otherness between this 'skin' and 'ass's' as well as 'he', thus there is a split within a split. However, whereas in Zipes' translation 'he threw off the donkey skin' and 'put on his donkey skin again', in Hunt's translation it is that 'he suddenly threw off his ass's skin' and 'put his animal's skin on again'. There is a split in the ownership of the 'skin' through the 's' in 'ass's' and 'animal's', whereas there was not with 'donkey skin'. Furthermore, in this perspective, 'the ass's skin' which 'he

suddenly threw off' is constituted as being 'his'. Whereas, in Zipes' translation, it is that 'he threw off the donkey skin'. Through this 'the', there is a separation between the 'he' and 'the donkey skin' in comparison to the 'he' who 'suddenly threw off his ass's skin'. This 'skin' is 'animal's', yet it is also 'his animal's', thus there is a split between that which is 'his', 'animal's' and the 'skin'. Therefore, this 'skin' is in excess to both 'his' and the 'animal's' which it is claimed to be.

In this perspective, there is also a difference in that which constitutes the notion of 'alone'. In Hunt's translation, it is so that 'the bridegroom bolted the door, looked around, and as he believed they were quite alone, he suddenly threw off his ass's skin', whereas, in Zipes' translation, it is that 'Once he was convinced that they were alone, he threw off the donkey skin'. There is construction of a look in 'looked around'. This 'looked around' is then followed by 'and as he believed that they were quite alone', so there is something in this 'looked around' which constitutes this 'he believed'. However, with Zipes' translation, it is that 'Once he was convinced that they were completely alone', so this is about a 'convinced' rather than a 'believed' and there is no claim to a 'looked' in this 'convinced'.

if you were to take his skin away and throw it in the fire, he would be forced to show himself in his true shape [...] he saw by the light of the moon a noble-looking youth lying there, and the skin lay stretched on the ground' 'So he took it away, and had a great fire lighted outside, and threw the skin onto it'²⁰ (Hunt: p.528)

²⁰ I have chosen to continue my readings using a single translation. This is not a claim to one being 'better' or more 'accurate' than the other, it is simply the one which I am using to continue my analysis within the word count of this thesis.

With this notion of the removal of the donkey/animal skin, I will now think about Derrida's reading of Levinas' response: 'The human face is completely different and only afterwards do we discover the face of an animal'.²¹ In this perspective, the notion of 'face' is constructed in terms of 'human' and 'animal'. There are multiple claims to 'face' as there is 'The human face' and 'the face of an animal'; there is a repetition of 'face' but there is also not a repetition, as that which constitutes these claims to 'face' are different: 'human' and 'animal'. There is thus a shift in this notion of 'face'. As this 'human face' is 'The', there is only this 'The human face'; according to this perspective, 'The human face' is not subject to difference because it is 'The'. However, this notion of 'face' is split in its being 'The human face', for 'face' is other to the very 'human' which it is claimed to be. This 'face' is therefore deferred in its separation to 'human', as 'human' cannot contain 'face', in this instance, as it is that which resides outside of 'human'. In terms of 'animal', what is constructed here is 'the face of an animal'. With 'The human face', there is only this 'The human face', whereas with 'the face of an animal', there is the potential for 'animal' which is other to this 'an animal'. Although this is 'the face of an animal', there is an implicit split; with 'The human face', there was an otherness between 'human' and 'face'. With 'the face of an animal', although this is 'the face of', this 'face' is still other to this 'an animal'; with 'The human', there was a specificity with 'The', but with 'an animal', there is the potential for difference and thus an excess within this 'an animal'. Therefore, there is a split within a split; there is the split between 'the face of' and 'an animal', but there is also a split within 'an animal'.

This potential for difference within 'an animal' constitutes a further difference between 'face' in terms of 'human' and 'face' in terms of 'animal'; although both 'The' and 'an' are singular,

²¹ Jacques Derrida, *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, ed. Marie-Luise Mallet (New York: Fordham University Press, 2008) p.108.

there is no other within 'The human', unlike with 'an animal' whereby there are animals other to this 'animal' in the 'an'. As this is 'the face of an animal', there is a sameness constituted in 'face' which is not there with 'animal'; if this is 'the face', then there is this one 'the face' to this 'an animal'. So, 'an animal' has 'the face', 'face' is 'face', this is 'the face', but it is 'an animal'; there is a specificity in 'the face' which is not so with 'an animal'; there is a potential for difference, but not so with 'the face'. There is thus a shift in both claims to 'face', yet both faces are deferred as neither can be contained within the claim to either 'human' or 'animal'. However, there is this fundamental difference in construction between 'The human face' and 'the face of an animal'; if this is 'human face' and 'face of an animal', then in terms of 'animal', there is a further separation between 'the face' and 'animal' which is not so with 'The human face'. This being so, neither can escape this implicit deferral and excess.

Moreover, 'the face of the animal' is that which 'we discover', but it is 'only afterwards do we discover the face of the animal'. In this that 'of the animal' is that which is 'afterwards' to that which is constituted as 'human'. In terms of what 'The human face is', what it is claimed to be 'is completely different'. So, although 'The human face' is 'The human face' what this 'is' is constituted as, in this perspective 'is completely different'. There is a completeness in this difference and that which 'is completely different' is 'The human face', therefore, although this is a 'face' and 'the face', these faces are constructed through difference. In this construction it is known that 'The human face is completely different'. Yet this 'different' is only so far as its completeness. Therefore, there is a difference within a difference; there is the difference between 'The human face' and 'the face of an animal' which is so through the 'discover of the face of an animal' being that which is 'only afterwards' this 'The human face' which 'is completely different' in its being constructed as such, yet there is also the difference between 'human' and 'face'; there is yet a further difference in 'the face of an animal'.

Furthermore, this 'discover the face of an animal' is 'only afterwards' to 'The human face is completely different', so the 'discover' is conditional upon the 'completely different' of 'The human face'. That of the 'animal' is therefore after that of the 'human', according to this perspective. So, is the 'human face' needed to recognise the animal face? If this is a complete difference, then why is the 'human' needed to recognise 'animal' as this difference? There is a shift in the claim to face, yet both faces are deferred as neither can be contained within the claim to either 'human' or 'animal'. However, in the case of 'The Donkey', it is the 'animal' which is discovered first, and it is only after this 'animal' that something other to this 'animal' is then known. It is the 'animal' or the 'donkey' that is being seen.

In her book *Beasts of Burden*, Sunaura Taylor claims the following in thinking about this notion of 'human' and 'animal':

We humans are the species with language, with rationality, with complex emotions, with two legs and opposable thumbs. Animals lack these traits and abilities and therefore exist outside of our moral responsibility, which means we can dominate and use them. But isn't it ableist to devalue animals because of what abilities they do or do not have?²²

In this perspective, there is a construction of 'humans' and a construction of 'Animals', thus there is a notion of difference between 'We humans' and 'Animals'. What 'We humans are' 'are the species with language'; 'We humans' are therefore constituted as 'the species', so there is a

²² Sunaura Taylor, *Beasts of Burden: animal and disability liberation* (New York: New Press, 2017) p.58. All further references will be given in parenthesis.

split between 'humans' and 'the species' which they are claimed to be. There is also a specificity to 'the species' which 'We humans are' as it is 'the species with language'. If 'humans are the species with language', is this to say that 'the species' which are other to 'We humans' are that which are without 'language' and in turn that which lack 'language'? In this perspective, 'language' is that which is 'with', as in that which is other to 'language', in this case 'the species', is 'with language', thus 'language' is that which is supplementary to the thing which is claimed to be 'with' it. '[L]anguage' is thus that which is other to 'the species' which is other to 'humans', thus there is an otherness within an otherness, or a split within a split. Although 'humans' are 'the species with language', this 'the species with language' remains as that which is other to or in excess of 'We humans' as it cannot be contained within this notion of 'human'. Furthermore, there is another split here, as 'We' and 'humans' are in otherness to each other, yet there is also a notion of collectiveness and identification through 'We'. There is a repetition of what 'We humans are the species' are 'with': 'with language, with rationality, with complex emotions, with two legs and opposable thumbs'. In this perspective, there is 'with language' and this 'with' is then repeated 3 times (the first 'with' is not a repetition as there has to be the thing to be repeated in the first instance). However, this is not a repetition as the 'withs' which are consecutive to the first 'with' are not the first 'with'; these other 'withs' are exactly that: they are other to the first 'with'. The notion of repetition is also problematic here as each 'with' is different to the previous 'with' as that which constitutes each 'with' is different e.g. 'rationality', 'complex emotions', 'two legs and opposable thumbs'. Thus, although there is a sameness in 'with', this sameness is constituted by a difference. As this is 'We humans are the species with', it is 'the species' which are 'with' this 'language', 'rationality', 'complex emotions' and 'two legs and opposable thumbs', rather than these 'We humans' themselves; this thus constitutes a further difference between that which is 'We humans' and that which is 'the species'. There is a claim to 'complex emotions', so there is something other to these 'emotions' which is constituting

them: 'complex'. As this 'complex' is other to these 'emotions', what these 'emotions' are is that which is split; these 'emotions' cannot contain the 'complex' which they are claimed to be. In this sense, this 'complex' is supplementary to the 'emotions' and is therefore in excess of the 'emotions'. This 'complex' of these 'emotions' is thus deferred through this split, constituting these 'emotions' as that which lack this 'complex' as it needs to be claimed separately to the 'emotions'. This notion of a split and otherness can also be read in 'two legs and opposable thumbs'. In this perspective, there is a multiple constituted in both 'two' and 'legs'. What 'legs' are, according to this perspective, is that which is multiple in 's' but also in 'two'. However, part of this multiplicity is split, as 'two' is other to 'legs'; although 'legs' are not split in and of themselves with 's', they are with this outside notion of 'two'. This 'two' can also be read as a specificity, as 'legs' could constitute any number of 'legs' over one leg, therefore this specificity of this 'two' of the 'legs' is that which 'We humans are the species with': 'two legs'. If these 'two legs' are that which 'We humans are the species with', then there must be 'species' which are other to 'We humans' who do not have these 'two legs'. Therefore, although there is this split and implicit lack through the 'twoness' of these 'legs', this 'two' is necessary in what constitutes 'We humans'. This is also the case with 'opposable thumbs'. It is so that 'We humans are the species with' 'two legs and opposable thumbs', so it is the 'two' of the 'legs' and the 'opposable' of the 'thumbs' which constitute the 'humanness' of 'the species' in question. If this is the case, then, as 'legs' in and of themselves do not constitute 'twoness', then 'thumbs' must not constitute this 'opposability'; this 'opposable' of the 'thumbs' is something other to the 'thumbs' which is necessary in the specificity of what these 'thumbs' are in terms of 'humans' in this perspective.

There is a shift in perspective, as it was a perspective on 'We humans' but is then a perspective on 'Animals'. Through this shift, it is so that the perspective which is other to 'We humans' and 'Animals' is that which can know both 'We humans' and 'Animals'. However, as it is 'We humans' and 'Animals', it could be that this perspective identifies as part of 'humans'

because of this claim to 'We humans' and the subsequent lack of 'We' when it comes to 'Animals'. As with 'humans', there is a multiplicity in 'Animals' through 's', so this is not only one, but how many is unspecified, thus constituting a generalisation or a notion of 'category'. In this perspective, it is that 'Animals lack these traits and abilities', thus constituting 'Animals' as that which is lacking. This notion of lack in terms of 'Animals' is so in comparison to 'We humans', as it is that of 'We humans' which are these 'traits and abilities' that 'Animals lack' and this is known to be so: 'language', 'rationality', 'complex emotions', 'two legs and opposable thumbs'. Therefore, this 'list', so to speak, is what is constituted as 'traits and abilities'. Before, this was 'We humans are the species with', but in the perspective on 'Animals', it is 'traits and abilities' which 'Animals lack'. Through the claim to 'therefore', there is a notion of reason as it is that 'Animals lack these traits and abilities and therefore exist outside of our moral responsibility'; it is so that because of this 'lack' they 'therefore exist outside of our moral responsibility'. So, 'Animals' are that which 'exist' and they do so 'outside of our moral responsibility', and they are known to do so by this perspective on and other to them. This 'lack' therefore results in this 'outsideness', and 'moral responsibility' has an 'outside' in which these 'Animals' reside. There is a further claim to collectiveness through 'our moral responsibility', as there was with 'We', whereby the perspective situates itself with that which is other to 'Animals', and in turn that which is not claimed to 'lack these traits and abilities'. However, there is a split within a split in this 'our moral responsibility' as 'our' is other to 'moral responsibility' and 'responsibility' is other to the 'moral' which it is, according to this perspective. There is thus a deferral of meaning here, as 'moral responsibility' is not 'part' of this 'our' because it cannot be contained by 'our'; it is in excess of and supplementary to this 'our', thus implicating 'our' as implicitly lacking this notion of 'moral responsibility' which is other to 'our'. Furthermore, 'meaning' is constituted to this 'Animals lack' through 'which means we can dominate and use them'. In this perspective, 'Animals' are that which 'can' be

'dominate[d]' and 'use[d]' by that which is other to them: 'we'. There is a repetition of 'we', but it is not a repetition, as 'We' was 'We humans', but here it is the 'we' which 'can dominate and use them'. Through this 'can', it is that there is the potential to 'dominate and use them', therefore this is something which 'can' happen, and it is known to be such by the 'we' which is other to 'Animals'. Through 'which means', this 'we can dominate and use them' comes from the fact that 'Animals lack these traits and abilities and therefore exist outside of our moral responsibility'; it is because of this 'lack' and this 'outsideness' that this meaning is possible. Meaning is thus resultant of 'lack' in terms of 'Animals', according to this perspective.

Taylor continues: 'Their lack of various capabilities is often cited as proof of our superiority as human beings and as justification for our continued use of them for our own benefit' (Taylor: p.58). In this perspective, there is a repetition of 'lack' in terms of 'Animals'. Here, this is 'their lack', thus 'lack' is constituted as being that which is theirs; there is a notion of ownership of this 'lack'. This 'lack', as well as being 'Their[s]', is 'of various capabilities', so it is these 'various capabilities' which the 'Their' which are the 'Animals' is lacking. There is a lack of specificity in these 'various capabilities', as although it is the 'capabilities' which are lacking, we do not know which ones, only that they are 'various'. Before it was that 'Animals lack these traits', so not only is there a lack of 'traits', but also 'capabilities' when in comparison to 'humans'. It is that this 'lack' is 'often cited as proof of our superiority as human beings', so this 'lack' is 'proof' of 'superiority' of something which is other to these 'Animals': 'human beings'. There is another notion of collectiveness in relation to 'human', as this is 'our superiority'; once again, the perspective is identifying as part of this 'superiority as human beings'. However, there is a split in this construction of 'human' as it is 'human beings'. It was that 'We human beings are the species with language', but here it is 'our superiority as human beings'. What 'human' is therefore constituted as is that which is other to 'beings'; this notion of 'being[s]' is not within this claim to 'human' and is thus in excess to 'human'. If this is that there

is 'superiority as human beings', but this 'being' is supplementary to this 'human', then that which is superior in this perspective is that which is implicitly lacking; the 'human' lacks 'being', and in 'being' there is a lack of 'human'. This notion of 'superiority' is also other to these 'human beings' as it is 'our superiority as'. However, this 'superiority' is not a given in this perspective as it is 'often cited as proof of our superiority'. There is thus no 'superiority' in this claim; there is only the potential for 'proof of' it which is 'often cited', but this is just an acknowledgment of this 'proof', not the 'proof' itself. If it is so that 'Their lack' is that which 'is often cited as proof', then there is a presence of this 'lack'; if 'lack' is about that which is absent, then there is an implicit presence of this absence through it being known.

As well as 'proof of our superiority', this 'Their lack of various capabilities is often cited' 'as justification for our continued use of them for our own benefit'. In this perspective, 'Animals' are the 'Their' which are lacking, but also the 'them' in 'our continued use of them'. So, 'Animals' are that which are subject to this 'continued use' and this 'continued use of them' is 'for our own benefit'. So, if we are thinking about this difference in terms of lack between animals and 'human beings', there is this separation between them. I will now return to this notion that 'humans are the species with language' and 'animals' are constituted by 'lack': if language is seen to be something crucial which separates human and animal, then does this mean that animals don't have language? Or is it that there is a difference in terms of how this language is defined? And what about humans who lack language? As Taylor states: 'Not all animals have language for instance, but not all humans do either' (Taylor: p.68).

In thinking about this notion of 'human' and 'animal', I will now read some passages from Hans Christian Anderson's 'Thumbelina':

In the middle of the floor lay a dead swallow with its beautiful wings pressed close against its sides and its legs and head tucked in under its feathers: the poor bird had obviously died of cold. Thumbelina was so sorry for it: she loved all the little birds that had sung and twittered so beautifully for her the whole summer through.²³

In this perspective, there is a construction of ‘a dead swallow’. There is a ‘swallow’ which is ‘dead’ and ‘a’, so there are dead swallows other to this ‘a dead swallow’, but only one, ‘a’, here. This ‘a dead swallow’ ‘lay’, so ‘lay’ is what ‘a dead swallow’ can do, and this ‘lay’ is ‘In the middle of the floor’. There is a construction of location, ‘the floor’, and this ‘floor’ has a ‘middle’. This ‘middle’ is ‘the middle’ so ‘the floor’ only has one ‘middle’, and this ‘the middle’ is where this ‘dead swallow’ is laying. This ‘lay’ of this ‘dead swallow’ is ‘with its beautiful wings pressed close against its sides,’ so this is how the ‘dead swallow’ is laying, thus there is a construction of position. This position is that of this ‘a dead swallow’. This ‘a dead swallow’ has ‘wings’, and these ‘wings’ are ‘beautiful’. There is an implicit otherness in these ‘its beautiful wings’; these ‘beautiful wings’ are split, as the beautifulness of these ‘wings’ are other to the ‘wings’. There is thus a deferral in these ‘wings’ as they are unable to contain this ‘beautiful’, according to the perspective. These ‘beautiful wings’ are ‘its’; as this is ‘a dead swallow with its beautiful wings’, these ‘beautiful wings’ are the ‘its’ of ‘a dead swallow’, and this is so through this ‘with’. There is another split, and thus an otherness, as ‘its’ is other to these ‘beautiful wings’. There is an implicit lack here, as the ‘its’ cannot contain these ‘beautiful wings’, just as the ‘wings’ cannot contain the ‘beautiful’. Therefore, the ‘wings’ are also lacking alongside the ‘its’. These ‘its beautiful wings’ are ‘pressed close against its sides’, so there is a repetition of ‘its’. However, this is a different ‘its’ as this is ‘sides’ rather than ‘beautiful wings’.

²³ Hans Christian Andersen, ‘Thumbelina’, *Fairy Tales: A Selection*, trans. by L. W. Kingsland, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) pp. 30-45, (p. 38). All further references will be given in parenthesis.

Therefore, 'wings' and 'sides' are that which 'a dead swallow' has, but they are not 'a dead swallow' as they are 'its beautiful wings' and 'its sides', therefore, as well as being other to one another, these 'wings' and 'sides' are also other to the 'a dead swallow'. There is a construction of the positioning of these 'wings' and 'sides' in relation to one another, as it is that 'its beautiful wings pressed close against its sides'. In this perspective, 'beautiful wings' can be 'pressed close' and as this is 'against its sides', 'its sides' have an 'against' for the 'beautiful wings' to be 'pressed close' to.

As well as 'beautiful wings' and 'sides' what is also constituted as 'its' are 'its legs'; however, there is a shift as this 'its' is these 'legs' and is thus other to that of the 'wings' and 'sides'. There is a split in this construction of 'its legs', as with 'its beautiful wings' and 'its sides', as 'its' is other to 'legs' and, in turn, these 'legs' are other to this very 'its' which it is claimed to be. These 'its legs' are 'and its legs and head tucked under its feathers', so this is 'and' to 'its beautiful wings pressed close against its sides'. Therefore, through this 'and', the 'wings' and 'legs and head' are constituted in the 'lay' of 'a dead swallow'. This 'its legs' are 'its legs and head', and 'its legs and head' are that which are 'tucked in under its feathers', so 'its legs and head' can be 'tucked in', and this is so 'under its feathers'. So, 'its feathers' have an 'under' in which 'its legs and head' can be 'tucked', and they also have an 'in' as this 'tucked' is 'in'. These 'feathers' are 'its', but 'head' is not; although it is 'its legs and head', 'legs', 'wings', 'sides', and 'feathers' are all constituted as being 'its', whereas 'head' is 'and' to the 'its legs'. As with 'its legs', each claim to 'its' remains other to these 'wings', 'sides', 'legs', and 'feathers', but 'head' is also other in that it is 'and' to the 'legs'. In this perspective, 'head' is also singular, whereas 'wings', 'sides', 'legs', and 'feathers' are all constructed as being multiple, and it is this multiple which is 'its', according to these claims. These constructions of 'wings', 'sides', 'legs', 'head', and 'feathers' are all subject to 'In the middle of the floor lay a

dead swallow with', so these are that which 'a dead swallow' 'lay' 'with', thus constituting them as being the 'with' of 'a dead swallow'. If these are the 'its' of 'a dead swallow', then these are those of this 'a dead swallow' and are thus specific to this 'a dead swallow' which 'lay' 'In the middle of the floor'. However, if this is 'lay a dead swallow with', then each of these claims which are subject to the 'with' are supplementary and in excess of 'a dead swallow'. As each of these constructions cannot be contained by the 'its', they cannot be so with 'a dead swallow' either, just as the 'its' is other to 'a dead swallow'. Therefore, although this is 'a dead swallow with its', that which is constructed is not 'a dead swallow', besides this very claim to 'a dead swallow'; what is constructed are 'wings', 'sides', 'legs', 'head', and 'feathers', all of which are other to 'a dead swallow'.

This perspective on 'a dead swallow' then shifts, as there is a perspective on 'the poor bird'. This 'poor bird' is 'the', whereas 'dead swallow' was 'a', so there is a specificity in their being 'the poor bird'. This 'the poor bird' is constituted as being 'poor', yet this 'poor' is other to this 'bird', as it is not contained within 'bird', and 'had obviously died of cold'. If 'the poor bird had obviously died of cold', then this 'the poor bird' is dead, yet it is constructed as being 'the poor bird' which 'had obviously died of cold'. As this is a 'died' opposed to a 'dead', then this is not a dead bird, but one which has 'died'. Thus, this is about the 'died of' the 'bird', rather than its being dead. What this 'bird' 'died of' is 'cold', so 'cold' is that which can be 'died of', and this 'died of cold' is 'obviously', thus this way of dying is obvious, according to this perspective. This 'the poor bird had obviously died with cold' is subject to ':', thus there is a relationship between that which comes before the ':' and that which comes after the ':'. Therefore, the construction of 'a dead swallow' is ':' to this 'the poor bird' which 'had obviously died of cold'.

There is another shift, as there is then a perspective on 'Thumbelina'. In this perspective, 'Thumbelina was so sorry for it', so this is what 'Thumbelina was'. This 'was' is

‘so sorry for it’, therefore this is about a level of ‘sorry’ in ‘so’, and this is ‘for it’. This ‘Thumbelina was so sorry for it’ is to do with ‘she loved all the little birds that had sung and twittered’, and this is so through ‘:’. So, this ‘so sorry for it’ is that which follows ‘the poor bird had obviously died of cold’ and there is then the ‘she’ who ‘loved all the little birds’, thus there is a shift in the construction of ‘bird’. There is ‘the poor bird’, and then ‘all the little birds’, thus what a ‘bird’ can be is ‘poor’ and ‘little’. However, these are different constructions of ‘birds’, for ‘the poor bird’ is one, whereas there is a multiplicity in ‘all the little birds’ in both ‘all’ and ‘birds’. These ‘all the little birds’ are those which ‘she loved’, thus this is a perspective on a ‘she’ who ‘loved’, so ‘she’ can love, and ‘all the little birds’ can be ‘loved’. There is a split and thus a separation in the construction of ‘all the little birds’, as these ‘birds’ are other to the ‘little’ and are therefore different to the ‘little’ which they are constructed as being. This is also so with ‘all’, as ‘the little birds’ are not this ‘all’, as it is ‘all’ and ‘the little birds’. There is thus a split within a split here, as there is a deferral in both the ‘all’ and the ‘little’ of the ‘birds’ which are other to this which they are constituted as. These ‘all the little birds’ are those ‘that had sung and twittered so beautifully for her the whole summer through’, so there is a ‘her’ in this perspective, and it is ‘for her’ which ‘all the little birds’ ‘had sung and twittered so beautifully’. Therefore, there is a ‘she’ who ‘loved’ and a ‘her’ which the ‘sung and twittered’ are ‘for’. There is a further construction of these ‘all the little birds’ as they are those which ‘had sung and twittered so beautifully’. However, as with the ‘birds’, there is an implicit split and deferral with this ‘sung and twittered’ and ‘so beautifully’ as this ‘so beautifully’ is outside of the very ‘sung and twittered’ which is ‘so beautifully’ and is thus in excess. There is also a difference in this ‘sung and twittered’; they are other to each other, this is so as they are ‘sung and twittered’, but there is also this ‘and’ which separates the two. This ‘sung and twittered so beautifully’ is ‘for her’, thus there is a notion of intention in this ‘sung and twittered so beautifully’ as it is ‘for’. This ‘sung and twittered so beautifully for her’ is ‘the

whole summer through', thus there is a construction of a when of this 'sung and twittered'; this is a 'loved' of 'all the little birds' who are other to 'the poor bird' who are in their 'sung and twittered' which was 'the whole summer through'.

Thumbelina said nothing, but when the others had turned their backs upon the bird, she bent down, gently moved aside the feathers that lay over its head, and kissed its closed eyes (Kingsland: p.38)

In this perspective, there is a construction of a saying in 'said'. There is a 'said', and it is a 'said nothing'. Although what is 'said' is 'nothing', there is still the presence of a 'said' in this claim to the absence of a 'said', thus this is a saying in its saying of 'nothing. This is 'Thumbelina said', so this is a perspective on the 'said nothing' of 'Thumbelina'. There is a shift in perspective, as there is a perspective on 'Thumbelina', but there is then a perspective on 'the others' in 'but when the others had turned their backs ', therefore there are 'the others' to 'Thumbelina', who is not included in 'the others' for there is 'Thumbelina' and there are 'the others', according to this perspective. This 'but' is an exception to the 'said nothing', and this 'but' is 'when the others had turned their backs', and this is 'when'. These 'backs' are 'their', and it is 'the others' who 'had turned', so 'backs' can turn, and this is the 'had' of 'the others', even though 'backs' are 'their'. Although these 'backs' are 'their', there is a split, as these 'backs' are other to 'their', and 'their backs' are other to 'the others' who 'had turned their backs'. This 'turned their backs' is 'upon the bird', so 'backs' can be 'turned' 'upon', and this is 'upon the bird'. There is a notion of direction and location here, for this is 'turned' and 'upon the bird', thus there is also movement in this turning. Here, 'the bird' has an 'upon'; so, that

which 'the bird' is, according to this perspective, is that which has an 'upon' that 'the others had their backs upon'.

There is another construction of direction in the construction of 'she' in 'she bent down', and this is subject to the 'but when', so this is an exception to the 'said nothing'. This 'she' 'bent down', so 'she' can bend, and there is direction in this 'down', so 'she' can be 'down' when 'bent'. There is a notion of order in this perspective through ',', for 'she bent then,' then 'gently moved aside the feathers that lay over its head,' and then 'kissed its closed eyes', thus there is a 'bend', a 'moved', and a 'kissed', all of which are subject to not only 'she', but also 'but when the others had turned their backs upon the bird'. This 'moved' is constituted as 'gently' and is 'aside', and this is of 'the feathers that lay over its head'. So, 'feathers' can be 'gently moved aside', but there is a specificity in that these are 'the feathers that lay over its head', therefore, according to this perspective, it is these particular 'feathers' which are 'gently moved aside'. These 'feathers' are constructed as 'the', and they 'lay over its head', so 'lay over its head' is something which these 'feathers' can do. '[T]he feathers' are that which 'lay over its head', so 'its head' has an 'over' for these 'feathers' to 'lay'. If these 'feathers' are 'over its head', then there is a notion of layering, and, implicitly, 'its head' must therefore be under 'the feathers'.

There is a notion of ownership in 'its head' as it is 'its'; however, there is a split, and thus a deferral, as 'head' is other to this 'its'. In this construction, 'feathers', unlike 'head', are not 'its' as they are 'the', so these 'feathers' are other, not only in a split, but also in their being 'the'. There is a repetition of 'its' in 'its closed eyes'. However, this is a different 'its' as this is 'its closed eyes', whereas it was 'its head', and thus is a claim to difference, rather than a sameness. Here, there is a construction of 'eyes' in 'and kissed its closed eyes'. In this perspective, 'eyes' are constructed as 'closed', and thus have the potential to be not 'closed', and it is these 'closed eyes' which are 'kissed' by the 'she'. However, these 'closed eyes' are

split, as 'closed' cannot be contained by the 'eyes' and is thus in excess to the 'eyes'. These 'eyes' are therefore other to this very 'closed' which they are constituted as being. As with 'its head', this is 'its closed eyes', so there is another split in the 'closed eyes' being other to the 'its'. In this construction of 'closed eyes', there is a lack of openness; in the constitution of 'eyes' as 'closed', there is a lack in the 'eyes', according to this perspective on the 'she' who 'kissed its closed eyes'.

Thumbelina had had such a fright that she was actually trembling, for she was only an inch tall and compared with her the bird was a great big creature.

But she plucked up her courage, tucked the cotton-wool more closely round the poor swallow, and fetched a mint-leaf which she herself used as a bedspread and laid it over the bird's head. (Kingsland: p.39)

In this perspective, there is a perspective on 'Thumbelina' and 'the bird', whereby 'the bird' is 'compared with her'. This comparison is one of size, 'for she was only an inch tall and compared with her the bird was a great big creature'. In this comparison of 'her' and 'the bird', this is what 'the bird was' when 'compared with her', thus 'the bird' only retains its being 'a great big creature' when it is being 'compared' to Thumbelina, according to this perspective on 'the bird'. There is an otherness in this construction of 'the bird', for if 'the bird was a great big creature', then what 'was a great big creature' is not 'the bird', as it is 'a great big creature' and 'the bird' is not 'a great big creature' as it is 'the bird', therefore there is a split in what 'the bird was', according to this perspective on it. Thus, although 'the bird was a great big creature' only when being 'compared with her', in this comparison 'the bird' loses the very thing that it is: 'the bird'. Therefore, what 'the bird' is is not stable; there is the potential for

‘the bird’ to no longer be ‘the bird’ when ‘compared with her’. In this perspective, it is ‘her’ with whom ‘the bird’ is ‘compared’, yet it is ‘she’ who ‘was actually trembling’ and ‘she’ who ‘was only an inch tall’. Therefore, this is a perspective on ‘Thumbelina’, then the ‘she’ who trembled, the ‘she’ who ‘was only an inch tall’, and then the ‘her’ with whom ‘the bird’ is ‘compared’. Thus, through this shift, there is a split in identity between ‘Thumbelina’, ‘she’, and ‘her’. Furthermore, in ‘for she was only an inch tall’, this claim to ‘only’ constitutes a lack in that the tallness of ‘she’ is ‘only an inch’. Although this is ‘only an inch’ it is still a measure of ‘tall’, thus there is still a tallness in this very lack of ‘tall’; this ‘tall’ is made up of inches, in this perspective, and the ‘tall’ which ‘she was’ is ‘only an inch’. Therefore, ‘she’ is constructed as lacking through how ‘tall’ she is. This is ‘for she was’, so being ‘only an inch tall’ is constituted as being why ‘she was actually trembling’, therefore her size is something in which there is ‘fright’ and ‘trembling’, according to this perspective.

Moreover, in this perspective, there is a claim to ‘she plucked up her courage’, therefore ‘courage’ is that of ‘her’, yet it is ‘she’ who ‘plucked up’ this ‘courage’. Thus, although ‘courage’ is constituted as being hers, the plucking is that of ‘she’. There is also the notion of direction in this perspective, as the ‘courage’ is being ‘plucked up’. This claim to ‘she’ follows ‘But’, therefore this is constructed as being an exception; although ‘she was only an inch tall and compared with her the bird was a great big creature’, ‘she plucked up her courage’. Therefore, although there is this notion of difference between the sizes of ‘she’ and ‘the bird’, it is only the potential for lack which is constructed regarding the ‘courage’ of ‘her’, and this is so through the ‘But’.

As with ‘the bird’, there is also a contrast in size through the ‘mint-leaf’. This ‘mint-leaf’ is that which ‘she herself used as a bedspread’, but here it is ‘laid’ ‘over the bird’s head’. Therefore, in this perspective, that which is ‘a bedspread’ to ‘she herself’ is in contrast to the ‘over the bird’s head’. This ‘the bird’ has a ‘head’, but it is ‘bird’s head’, so there is no bird in

this claim, just its 'head', and this 'head' has an 'over' as this is where the 'mint-leaf' is 'laid'. In the construction of 'the bird's head', there is a notion of ownership in that this 'head' is that of the bird. However, in this very claim to 'bird's head', there is a separation and an otherness as 'bird' is other to 'head' regardless of this 's', as bird alone cannot contain 'head'. What a bird is then, according to this claim, is that which is lacking 'head', and vice versa 'head' is lacking bird. Therefore, in this 'bird's head', there is a split and thus a deferral as that which this bird is does not contain this 'head', and this 'head' is not the bird. So, in this perspective, 'a mint-leaf' is 'laid' 'over the bird's head', and 'a mint-leaf' can also be 'used as a bedspread' by 'she herself'. However, it is not 'a bedspread', it is only 'used as' such by 'she herself'. There is a split in this 'she herself' who 'used' this 'mint-leaf', as 'herself' is other to 'she', thus there is a deferral of identity, according to this perspective. Although this is 'a mint-leaf', which is 'used' by 'she herself' 'as a bedspread' and is also that which is 'laid' 'over the bird's head', it still retains its being 'a mint-leaf', regardless of this 'used' and 'laid'. Therefore, what 'a mint-leaf is', according to this perspective, is still 'a mint-leaf', but it can be 'fetched', 'used', and 'laid'. This 'fetched', 'used', and 'laid' are subject to 'But she plucked up her courage', so this fetching, using, and laying are that which require 'her courage' to be 'plucked up'.

What is also subject to this plucking up of courage is 'tucked the cotton-wool more closely round the poor swallow'. Through the 'But she', it is 'she' who 'tucked the cottonwool', so 'she' can tuck, and 'the cotton-wool' is that which can be 'tucked'. This 'tucked' is 'more closely', so there is a closeness here; however, as this is 'more closely', there must already be a 'closely' if this is 'more'. Therefore, if this is 'more closely', then prior to this, there must already be 'cotton-wool' which is 'tucked' 'closely round the poor swallow'. This 'tucked' is also 'round', so 'the cotton-wool' can be 'tucked' both 'closely' and 'round'. As this is 'more closely round the poor swallow', then 'the poor swallow' must have a 'more closely', as well

as a 'closely', and a 'round' for 'the cotton-wool' to be 'tucked' in this way. There was a perspective on 'the bird' who 'was a great big creature', but only when 'compared with her', then this 'the poor swallow', and then 'the bird's head'. Both 'the poor swallow' and 'the bird's head' are in the perspective on the 'she', albeit a different construction of 'she' in 'she herself'. Therefore, although this is still a perspective on 'she', it is a different 'she', for there is the 'she' who 'plucked', 'tucked' and 'fetched' and then the 'she herself' who 'used' the 'mint-leaf' 'as a bedspread'.

she seated herself upon the bird's back, with her feet resting on its outstretched wings, and tied her belt firmly to one of its strongest feathers. [...] Thumbelina froze in the cold air, but she crept under the bird's warm feathers, and only popped her little head out to see all the beautiful scenery below her. (Kingsland: p.43)

In this perspective, there is a construction of 'she'. According to this perspective on 'she', 'she seated herself upon the bird's back'. Although it is 'she' who 'seated herself', it is 'herself' who is 'upon the bird's back', therefore there is a split between 'she' and 'herself', for 'herself' is that which is other to 'she'. So, 'herself' can be 'seated', but it 'she' who does this 'seated', in this perspective. Through the claim to 'upon', a position is constituted whereby 'herself' is 'upon the bird's back', thus positioning 'herself' as being above 'the bird's back'. This 'back' is constructed as being 'the bird's', but there is a difference between the bird and its 'back', thus there is a split and therefore a deferral, as the 'back' which is constituted as being that of the bird is in fact other to this very bird. Although there is a notion of ownership of this 'back' as being of the bird through 's', this 'back' is not contained within the claim to 'bird's'; it resides as other to.

Through this split and this otherness of 'back' to bird, this 'she seated herself' is 'upon the bird's back', therefore that which 'she seated herself upon' is something which is other to this bird. There is also a split between 'herself' and 'her feet', for 'herself' is 'upon the bird's back' and this is 'with her feet resting on its outstretched wings'. As with 'the bird's back', there is an implicit split with 'her feet', for 'feet' are other to 'her' and are therefore that which is not 'her' as there are 'feet' and there is 'her'. Through the claim to 'with', there is a connection between 'she seated herself upon the bird's back' and 'her feet resting on its outstretched wings', thus this 'resting' of 'her feet' is constructed as being part of the 'she seated herself upon the bird's back'. As this is 'her feet resting on its outstretched wings', 'her feet' can rest and are doing so on 'its outstretched wings'; therefore, according to this perspective, 'herself' can be 'upon the bird's back' and 'her feet' can be 'resting on its outstretched wings', thus there is a parallel construction between that which is her and that which is the bird. However, these 'outstretched wings' are 'its' opposed to 'the bird's' like 'back'. There is thus a shift between the construction of 'back' and 'wings'. Therefore, in this perspective, there is a construction of the 'she', 'herself', and 'her' alongside that which is 'the bird's' and the 'its'; there is the 'seated' of 'herself' by 'she' and 'her feet', and then 'the bird's back' and 'its outstretched wings'. The 'herself' can be 'upon the bird's back' and 'her feet' can be 'resting on its outstretched wings', thus there is a notion of both size and positioning regarding these claims in relation to one another.

This notion of size between 'her' and 'its' is further constituted in 'tied her belt firmly to one of its strongest feathers'. This 'belt' is that which is hers and it is that which can be 'tied'. This 'tied' is done so by the 'she' who 'seated herself upon the bird's back', and this is so through the 'with her feet resting on its outstretched wings'. So, as it was 'she' who 'seated herself', it is 'she' who 'tied her belt', thus, it is 'she' who 'seated' and 'tied' and it is that of 'her' ('herself' and 'her belt') which is 'seated' and is 'tied'. This 'tied her belt' is done so

'firmly' and 'to one of its strongest feathers', thus there is a specificity to this 'tied'. That which 'her belt' is 'tied' 'firmly to' is 'one of its strongest feathers'. In this perspective, there is a repetition of the 'its' which is of the bird; however, whereas it was 'its outstretched wings', this is 'its strongest feathers', therefore the bird has a 'back', 'outstretched wings', and 'feathers'. This 'tied' is 'to one of its strongest feathers', so there are multiple 'feathers', all of which are 'its'. As this is 'one of its strongest feathers', these multiple feathers have varying degrees of strength, but this 'tied' is only to 'one of' them, so there are 'strongest feathers' to which she did not tie 'her belt firmly to'. If 'she' is able to tie 'her belt firmly to one of its strongest feathers', then 'she' is being constructed in relation to these 'feathers', or, more specifically, 'one of these feathers, thus there is this notion of 'her' size and that of this feather. Through these claims to 'herself', 'her feet', and 'her belt' alongside 'the bird's back', 'its outstretched wings', and 'one of its strongest feathers', the 'wings' and 'feathers' are constructed in proportion and positioning to the 'back'; in 'herself' being 'seated' 'upon' the 'back', 'her feet' are 'resting on its outstretched wings' and 'her belt' is 'tied' 'to one of its strongest feathers', thereby constructing these parts of the bird in relation to not only parts of her but also in relation to one another.

There is a repetition of 'feathers' as it is then claimed that 'she crept under the bird's warm feathers'. This is a repetition, but it is a different perspective on 'feathers', as these 'feathers' are 'warm', whereas 'feathers' were constituted by their strength in 'one of its strongest'. In both constructions of 'feathers', they are constituted by that which is other to them: 'one of its strongest' and 'warm'. Therefore, what these 'feathers' are, according to the perspective on each claim to 'feathers', are not that which the 'feathers' themselves can retain in just being 'feathers'; these constructions are of that which is outside and other to the thing itself, 'feathers', and is thus the excess to the 'feathers'. These 'warm feathers' are 'the bird's', and they also have an 'under', as 'she crept under the bird's warm feathers'. Through this

‘under’, the position of ‘she’ is constructed in relation to these ‘warm feathers’; previously, it was ‘her belt’ which was ‘tied’ ‘to one of its strongest feathers’, but here it is ‘she’ who is ‘under the bird’s warm feathers’, thus it is ‘she’, or that which can be contained within the ‘she’, which is positioned in relation to the ‘feathers’. This ‘she crept under the bird’s warm feathers’ follows ‘Thumbelina froze in the cold air, but’, thus a relationship is constructed between these claims through ‘but’. In this perspective, the ‘crept’ of ‘she’ is constituted in relation to the ‘froze’ of ‘Thumbelina’ in the ‘cold air’, and there is a contrast between ‘the cold air’ and ‘the bird’s warm feathers’. There is a difference in perspective, for this was a perspective on ‘Thumbelina’, but is then a perspective on ‘she’; ‘Thumbelina’ is ‘in the cold air’, and ‘she’ is ‘under the bird’s warm feathers’, thus there is a contrast in the positioning of ‘Thumbelina’ and ‘she’, according to this perspective.

Furthermore, there is another shift as there is then a perspective on ‘her’: ‘and only popped her little head out to see all the beautiful scenery below her’. There is a construction of a ‘little head’, and this ‘little head’ is hers. However, there is a split in this claim to ‘her little head’, for ‘head’ is other to ‘her’, thus there is a split between ‘her’ and the thing which is hers: ‘her little head’. There is also an otherness in ‘little’ and ‘head’, as this ‘head’ cannot contain the littleness, as ‘her’ cannot contain this ‘little head’. This ‘her little head’ ‘popped out’, so this ‘head’ can pop, and it does so ‘out’, thus there is direction in this notion of ‘popped’. If this ‘popped’ is ‘out’, then where ‘her little head’ was before this ‘popped’ ‘out’ must, implicitly, have been in. However, prior to this ‘only popped her little head out’ is ‘crept under the bird’s warm feathers’ and ‘and only’. Therefore, before this ‘popped’ ‘out’, where ‘she crept’ is ‘under’, so ‘she’ is ‘under’ ‘and only popped her little head out’. In this being so, where ‘her little head’ is before this ‘out’ cannot be claimed other than its implicitly being in, for it is ‘she’ who is ‘under’. This ‘she’ is situated as being ‘under the bird’s warm feathers, and only popped her little head out’, therefore this ‘under the bird’s warm feathers’ is constructed as having an

‘out’ and this is where ‘her little head popped’. This is ‘and only’, therefore this is an exception, and this exception is ‘to see all the beautiful scenery below her’. There is a claim to an intention, according to this perspective, as this is ‘to see’; this is further constituted through ‘only’, therefore the ‘only’ reason for this ‘popped her little head out’ is ‘to see all the beautiful scenery below her’. This construction of intention is ‘to see’, so in popping ‘her little head out’, this allows for the seeing of ‘all the beautiful scenery below her’, according to this perspective on the seeing of ‘she’. As this is ‘to see’, there must be a lack of seeing, as seeing is facilitated through ‘popped her little head out’. Therefore, there is only a seeing in the construction of the potential ‘to see’, thus there is an implicit lack. This seeing has not yet happened; this is only an intention to see and is thus a retrospective claim to a potential seeing in this perspective on ‘Thumbelina’. A relationship is thus constructed between ‘her little head’ and seeing, and this seeing has a direction; this is an ‘out’ but also a ‘below her’, and this movement of her ‘head’ to this ‘out’ is required ‘to see’ that which is ‘below her’. Therefore, there is this required outness to this seeing which is not a seeing but a ‘to see’.

They looked at Thumbelina, and the young lady cockchafers shrugged their feelers and said, “But she’s only two legs - what a pitiful-looking thing she is!” “She hasn’t any feelers!” “Her waist is so thin - pooh, she looks lousy like a human! How ugly she is!” said all the lady cockchafers - and yet Thumbelina was really pretty! And that’s what the cockchafer who had carried her off thought, too, but when all the others said she was ugly, he believed so as well in the end, and would have nothing more to do with her - she could go wherever she would.

They flew down from the trees with her and set her upon a daisy; there she wept because she was so ugly that the cockchafers would have nothing to do with her, and yet she

was the loveliest little thing you could imagine, as bright and dainty as the most beautiful of rose-petals. (Kingsland: p.35)

In this perspective, there is a repetition of the notion of looking, for there is the 'looked at Thumbelina' of the 'They', and then a perspective on the 'said' of 'the young lady cockchafers': 'pitiful-looking thing'. This 'looking' is constituted as being 'pitiful' as it is 'what a pitiful-looking thing she is'. That which is 'pitiful-looking' is this 'thing', but this 'pitiful-looking thing' is 'she'. There is a construction of a split, in this perspective, as what 'she is' is 'a pitiful-looking thing', but 'she' is still 'she', thus what 'she is' is other to the 'a pitiful-looking thing' that 'she is' claimed to be. However, it is not that 'she is' 'pitiful', for this is 'pitiful-looking thing', thus this 'pitiful' is how 'she' looks, rather than what 'she is'; what 'she is' is a 'thing' which is constituted as being 'pitiful-looking'. This 'what a pitiful-looking thing she is' is subject to 'But she's only two legs -', therefore there is something in this 'only two legs' which is to do with 'what a pitiful-looking thing she is' through this claim to '-'. According to this perspective on the 'said', a lack is constituted in these 'two legs', as it is that 'she's only two legs', thus to the perspective on the perspective of the 'cockchafers', having 'two legs' is to be lacking. It is this lack, this 'only two legs', which constitutes the '- what a pitiful-looking thing she is', therefore, to have 'only two legs' is to be 'a pitiful-looking thing', according to these claims.

There is another construction of looking in 'she looks lousy like a human!'. In this 'she looks lousy like a human!', there is a comparison, through 'like', which is facilitated through this looking between 'she' and 'a human', according to this perspective on the 'said' of the 'lady cockchafers'. As this is 'looks lousy like a human', opposed to looks 'like a human', it is this lousiness which is a likeness to 'a human', not the look itself. Therefore, it is this 'lousy' which can be seen to be 'like a human'. As this is 'like a human', there is a lack of 'humanness' in the

like, for 'she' is not 'human', yet there is a 'humanness' in that 'she looks lousy like' one. So, what 'a human' is in this perspective is that which 'looks lousy', and in the looking 'lousy' of 'she', there is this notion of 'likeness' to 'a human'. In this construction of 'human', it is 'a human', thus there are other humans to this 'a human' which she 'looks lousy like'. Therefore, there is a generality to this construction of 'human', yet there is a specificity in that 'a human' 'looks lousy', and the look of 'she' is 'like' this. What 'a human' 'looks' 'like' is known in this perspective, and 'she' is known to look 'lousy like' one, thus there are multiple 'looks' which are known; there is the look of she and that of 'a human', for 'a human' is known to look 'lousy'. This is known to 'all the lady cockchafers' and is their perspective on 'she' and 'a human', according to the perspective on 'all the lady cockchafers'.

This 'she looks lousy like a human!' is subject to 'Her waist is so thin - pooh'. So, there is something in this 'waist is so thin' which constitutes the 'looks lousy like a human'. This is 'Her waist' and 'she looks', therefore that which is hers is constituting how the 'she looks'. In this perspective, 'Her' has a 'waist', and so do humans, for it is this 'waist' which foregrounds the notion of 'humanness'. This 'waist is so thin', so waists can be thin, but this 'waist' is constructed as being 'so thin', thus there is an excess to this construction of thinness. There is also a split in this construction of 'Her waist', as 'waist' is that which is other to 'Her', thus although this 'waist' is constituted as being hers, it remains as that which is different; it is not 'Her'. Therefore, according to this perspective, what is 'so thin' is that which is not 'Her'; it is this 'waist' which, in turn, constructs that which is other to her, 'waist', as that which has this excess.

In her essay, 'Reading Disability in Children's Literature: Hans Christian Andersen's Tales', Yenika-Agbaw, in an analysis of *Thumbelina*, argues that 'but for her size she could pass

for a human'.²⁴ In this perspective, 'size' is that which is hers; however, there is a split and thus a deferral as 'her' is other to the 'size' which is claimed to be hers. It is that 'but for her size', so 'her size' is an exception, and this is an exception to 'she could pass for a human'. Therefore, it is because of 'her size' that 'she could' not 'pass for a human' and is thus lacking in this 'pass for a human'. However, in this very 'pass for a human', there is a lack of 'humanness', as this is 'pass for', therefore although it is 'but for her size she could pass for a human', 'she' would still lack this 'humanness' regardless of 'her size' as 'she' is not 'a human', according to this perspective. There is thus a lack within a lack and a further absence in this presence of an absence. If it is 'but for her size she could pass for a human', then it is 'her size' in which this lack of 'pass for a human' resides. However, in the perspective on the 'said' of the 'lady cockchafers', although it is a lack through which this 'like a human' is implicated, it is not necessarily one of 'size'; there is the 'waist' which 'is so thin', but this is a 'thinness' opposed to a 'size', thus what constitutes 'size' is only claimed insofar as it is that of 'her' and that it is an exception through 'but' regarding the 'pass for a human', within the bounds of this perspective. This 'so thin' of 'Her waist' does constitute the 'she looks lousy like a human', but there is also the question of 'legs' which are 'two' and 'feelers' which 'She hasn't any', thus there is that which is other to the notion of 'size' which is about a lack. So, in this perspective, this is that 'she could pass for a human', and in the perspective on the 'said' of 'the lady cockchafers' it is that 'she looks lousy like a human'. Therefore, 'a human' is something that 'she' can look 'like' and it is something that 'she' 'could pass for'. This is 'could pass for', thus she does not 'pass for a human' and this is so because of this 'but for her size', so this is conditional in both the 'could' and the 'but for her size'.

²⁴ Yenika-Agbaw, Vivian, 'Reading Disability in Children's Literature: Hans Christian Anderson's Tales', *Journal of Literacy & Cultural Disability Studies* (January 2011).

This 'she looks lousy like a human!' is followed by 'How ugly she is!'. There is a repetition of 'she', as 'she is constituted as looking 'lousy like a human' and then 'she' is constituted as being 'ugly', thus there is a looking 'lousy' and a being 'ugly'. However, 'How ugly she is' is a different construction of 'she' to the 'she' who 'looks lousy like a human', for one 'she' is the 'she' who 'looks lousy like a human' and the other is the 'she' who is 'ugly', thus these are different claims to 'she'. However, the 'she' who is constructed as 'ugly' is other to this very ugliness, for there is this 'ugly' and there is 'she'; there is a split and thus a deferral of meaning as this ugliness cannot be contained within this construction of 'she'. This is a 'How ugly she is', thus this 'ugly' is about a 'How', but this is not a question, as it is 'she is'. Therefore, if this is 'How ugly she is', then the 'howness' of the ugliness of 'she' is known in this perspective; this is not a question but a 'said' of the ugliness, and this is known by the perspective to be known by 'all the lady cockchafers. This is so as both constructions of 'she', the 'she' who 'looks lousy like a human' and the 'she' in 'How ugly she is' are within the same ""', and this is 'said all the lady cockchafers'.

In her text, *Undoing Gender*, Judith Butler makes claim to the notion of 'human' and 'humanness':

The terms by which we are recognized as human are socially articulated and changeable. And sometimes the very terms that confer “humanness” on some individuals are those that deprive certain other individuals of the possibility of achieving that status, producing a differential between the human and the less than human.²⁵

²⁵ Judith Butler, *Undoing Gender* (New York: Routledge, 2004) p.2

In this perspective, 'human' is that 'which we are recognized as', thus this is not about a being 'human' but a recognition of being as such. This 'recognized as human' has 'terms' as this is 'The terms by which we are recognized as human', so this is not just a recognition, but a recognition which has 'terms'. If this is a 'we are recognized' then this recognition is that from the not 'we', it is that which resides outside of the 'we' and is thus other to the 'we'. Therefore, this 'recognized as human' is of the 'we' from that which is other to the 'we' and this is so by 'terms'. These 'terms' are 'The terms by which we are recognized', thus these are a specific 'The terms'; they are 'The' and those 'by which we are recognized'. These 'terms' are thus known in being claimed as such. These 'terms' are also 'socially articulated and changeable', so although these 'terms' are those 'by which we are recognized as human' they are also 'socially articulated and changeable'. As this is 'recognized as human', this is not a claim to being 'human'; this is 'terms by which we are recognized as' such, and these are 'socially articulated and changeable'. There is thus a lack in this claim to 'human'; it is a 'recognized as' and this is 'changeable'. There is a shift in the claim to 'human', as there is a construction of 'humanness', as well as a repetition of 'terms'. However, these are different 'terms', as these are 'the very terms', and they are 'sometimes', thus there is the notion of the conditional. This is that 'sometimes the very terms that confer "humanness"', so 'humanness' is that which is conferred, and this is so by 'the very terms', but this is 'sometimes'.

This 'she looks lousy like a human!' is followed by 'How ugly she is!'. There is a repetition of 'she', as 'she is constituted as looking 'lousy like a human' and then 'she' is constituted as being 'ugly', thus there is a looking 'lousy' and a being 'ugly'. However, 'How ugly she is' is a different construction of 'she' to the 'she' who 'looks lousy like a human', for one 'she' is the 'she' who 'looks lousy like a human' and the other is the 'she' who is 'ugly', thus

these are different claims to 'she'. However, the 'she' who is constructed as 'ugly' is other to this very ugliness, for there is this 'ugly' and there is 'she'; there is a split and thus a deferral of meaning as this ugliness cannot be contained within this construction of 'she'. This is a 'How ugly she is', thus this 'ugly' is about a 'How', but this is not a question, as it is 'she is'. Therefore, if this is 'How ugly she is', then the 'howness' of the ugliness of 'she' is known in this perspective; this is not a question but a 'said' of the ugliness, and this is known by the perspective to be known by 'all the lady cockchafers'. This is so as both constructions of 'she', the 'she' who 'looks lousy like a human' and the 'she' in 'How ugly she is' are within the same "", and this is 'said all the lady cockchafers'. However, there is a notion of multiplicity in the construction of these sayings. Regarding the 'cockchafers', there is a shift, as it was 'the young lady cockchafers', but is then 'all the lady cockchafers', so 'the lady cockchafers' retain their constitution of 'lady' and 'cockchafers', but where this was a 'young', this is then an 'all'. There is a saying of 'the young lady cockchafers': 'the young lady cockchafers shrugged their feelers and said', and there is another saying of 'all the lady cockchafers': 'said all the lady cockchafers'. Although these sayings are both constituted through 'said' and "", where one saying ends and the other begins is not claimed; there are "", however there is a lack as to which "" constitute the saying of which 'lady cockchafers'. If these "" are the 'said' of the 'lady cockchafers', whichever 'lady cockchafers' they may be, according to the perspective on the 'said' of the 'lady cockchafers', there is a construction of 'She' in 'She hasn't any feelers!'. In this perspective, 'She' is constructed in term of what she does not have, 'any feelers', and is thus constituted as lacking. What is lacking are these 'any feelers', and this is known by the perspective on the 'lady cockchafers'. This lack is in comparison to 'the young lady cockchafers' who do have 'feelers' as they 'shrugged their feelers'. However, these are different 'feelers' for there are 'feelers' which are theirs and can be 'shrugged', but those 'feelers' which the 'She' is lacking are 'feelers' which

are absent; although the 'She hasn't any feelers', the 'She' is known to not have them, thus there is a presence of the 'feelers' in their very absence.

Therefore, in this perspective on 'the young lady cockchafers' perspective on 'she', this 'she' is lacking: 'she's only two legs', 'She hasn't any feelers', 'Her waist is so thin'. This lack is that which can be 'looked at' and can thus be seen; 'legs', 'feelers', and 'waist' are that which are looked at and can be seen to be lacking or absent. What this lack constitutes, according to this perspective, is ugliness: 'How ugly she is'. Therefore, this ugliness of 'she' is so through the 'looked at' of 'They'. However, in the perspective on 'Thumbelina', it is that '- and yet Thumbelina was really pretty!'. In this perspective which is other to that on 'the lady cockchafers', what 'Thumbelina was', was 'really pretty', thus there is both a notion of ugliness and prettiness, but this is so in different perspectives. It is 'she' who is constituted as 'ugly', but it is 'Thumbelina' who is constituted as 'pretty'. Therefore, according to this perspective, there is a 'Thumbelina' who is 'looked at' and a 'Thumbelina' who 'was really pretty', but it is 'she' who is lacking. Thumbelina is also lacking, and this is so through the '- and yet'; it is this lacking of the 'she' which constructs 'Thumbelina' as that which needs to be claimed as 'really pretty' in a perspective outside of that which constructs 'she' as 'ugly'. This 'Thumbelina was really pretty' is constituted as 'what the cockchafer who had carried her off thought, too', therefore according to the perspective on 'the cockchafer who had carried her off', this 'Thumbelina was really pretty' is a 'thought', and this 'thought' is that of 'the cockchafer who had carried her off'. This 'thought' is 'too', therefore this is a 'thought' of not just 'the cockchafer who had carried her off' but also that of an other.

With these ideas of human, and that which is other to 'human', in mind, I will now conduct a close reading of a passage from 'The Little Mermaid':

Nothing made the princess happier than learning about the human world up above. She made her grandmother tell her everything she knew about ships and towns, people and animals. She found it strangely beautiful that flowers up on the land had a fragrance - at the bottom of the sea they had none - and also that the trees in the forest were green and that the fish flying in the trees up there sang so clearly and beautifully that it was delightful to listen to them. Grandmother called the little birds *fish*, because otherwise the little sea princesses, never having seen a bird, would have no idea what she was talking about.²⁶

In this perspective, there is a construction of ‘human’ in terms of ‘the human world up above’. This ‘human’ is other to ‘world’, so although this ‘world’ is constituted as being that of ‘the human’, this notion of ‘world’ is separate from ‘the human’. There is thus a lack of ‘the human’ in ‘world,’ as it is supplementary and in excess. This ‘the human world’ is ‘up above’, and this is in relation to ‘the princess’, so that which is constituted as ‘human’ is being situated as that which is somewhere other to ‘the princess’, and this other is ‘up above’. This ‘the human world’ is that which can be learnt ‘about’, and ‘learning about the human world up above’ is that which ‘made the princess’ happy. It is that ‘Nothing made the princess happier,’ so this ‘learning about the human world’ constitutes a happiness which is more than anything else. Thus, it is this ‘Nothing’ which sets this comparison for this ‘happier’. There is a claim to knowledge in this perspective, as it is known that ‘Nothing made the princess happier’, as well as knowing that this making happy of ‘the princess’ is by ‘learning about the human world up above’. This knowledge about ‘the princess’ is that of a perspective on ‘the princess’ which is other to ‘the princess’, rather than that of ‘the princess’ herself. Therefore, this ‘happier’ is that which can

²⁶ Hans Christian Andersen, ‘The Little Mermaid’, *The Classic Fairytales*, ed. Maria Tatar, (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017) pp. 283-300 (p. 284).

be known by an other – the perspective - about an other – the princess.

There is a further claim to knowledge as ‘She made her grandmother tell her everything she knew about ships and towns’. In this perspective, it is the ‘she’ who ‘knew’ yet this is a making of a telling from ‘her grandmother’. There is thus a shift in perspective as there is ‘grandmother’ and then there is ‘she’. There is thus a split in this construction of ‘grandmother’ as this ‘she’ is other to ‘grandmother’. There is a further split in the construction of ‘grandmother’ as it is ‘her grandmother’, so this is only ‘grandmother’ as far as this is about ‘her’.²⁷ There is a repetition of ‘her’, however there is still a difference, as although these are both claims to ‘her’, one is constituted by ‘grandmother’ and the other subject to ‘tell’. There is a specificity to this telling of ‘her grandmother’ as it is not just about what ‘she knew’, but ‘everything she knew about ships and towns, people and animals’. Although this is a ‘made’ her ‘tell her everything’, there is a limitation to this telling of ‘everything’ as it is ‘about ships and towns, people and animals’, thus what ‘everything’ is, according to this perspective, is that which is within the bounds of these particulars, but also within that which ‘she knew’. Therefore, this ‘knew’ is limited by not only being ‘about ships and towns, people and animals’, but also by the knowing of ‘she’. This ‘knew’ is limited even further by the perspective on ‘she’, for it is only the making of this telling which is claimed in this perspective.

Moreover, there is a further claim to ‘she’ as ‘She found it strangely beautiful that flowers up on the land had a fragrance’. In this perspective, this notion of beauty is subject to ‘strangely’, so it is strange that these ‘flowers’ ‘had a fragrance’. It is so that ‘at the bottom of the sea they had none’, so there are ‘flowers’ which lack ‘a fragrance’. Therefore, although there are ‘flowers’ which are ‘at the bottom of the sea’ and ‘flowers’ which are ‘up on the land’,

²⁷ See Stephen Thomson’s article ‘The Adjective, My Daughter: Staging T. S. Eliot’s “Marina”’, referenced on page 44 of this thesis.

there is this difference and separation between them in terms of 'fragrance', and this is, once again, known by 'her grandmother' according to the perspective. This 'fragrance' is that which 'flowers up on the land' 'had', so this 'fragrance' is other to the 'flowers', so there is still a lack constituted in this otherness. There is a repetition with this 'up', as there was 'the human world up above' and then 'up on land', so there is a consistency in this distinction between that which is 'up' and that which is 'not', with 'up' being that which 'the princess' is 'happier learning about' and which she 'found' 'strangely beautiful' regarding the 'fragrance' of the 'flowers'. However, this cannot be a repetition as that which constitutes each 'up' is different.

Another difference which can be read between 'up' and 'bottom' is through the punctuation of '-'. As there are two '-', there is a shift from one to the other. They are not the same as one is constituted by 'fragrance' and the other by 'none', and between these two "-" is "at the bottom of the sea they had none", so there is a separation. Therefore, if this is about an outside, then that which is in between must be about an inside, making this about both an inside and an outside through the different "-". This also frames a distinction between that which is inside and outside; 'at the bottom of the sea they had none' is not that which 'She found it strangely beautiful' because it is 'and also that the trees in the forest were green' which is 'found' to be 'strangely beautiful'. Therefore, the contrast between the outside and inside is even more distinguishable, not just by the '-', but by what comes before and after the '-'.

As well as 'the trees in the forest were green', that which is 'found' to be 'strangely beautiful' by 'She' is 'that the fish flying in the trees up there sang so clearly and beautifully'. So, 'fish' are that which can 'fly' and they do so 'in the trees up there'. There is a further claim to 'up', but this 'up' is constituting the where of 'the fish flying in the trees'. That which constitutes 'the fish flying in the trees' is that they 'sang so clearly and beautifully that it was delightful to listen to them'. However, that which is constituted as being 'strangely beautiful' is not that there are 'fish flying in the trees up there', but that they 'sang so clearly and

beautifully that it was delightful to listen to them’. So, it is this ‘sang so clearly and beautifully’ that is different to that which is “at the bottom of the sea”. This is also so with it being ‘delightful to listen to them’, as it is the ‘so clearly and beautifully’ of the ‘sang’ which is ‘that it was. This ‘sang’ is also about a ‘listen’ and this ‘listen’ is about a delightfulness, so ‘sang’ is something to be listened ‘to’.

So, there are the ‘fish flying in the trees’, but there is then a shift in perspective as ‘Grandmother called the little birds *fish*’. So, there is a shift because ‘fish’ were that which were ‘flying’ and then there are ‘*fish*’ which are subject to this ‘called’ of ‘Grandmother’. Therefore, these ‘*fish*’ are not ‘fish’ according to the perspective, as they are only ‘called’ ‘*fish*’, and that which are ‘called’ are ‘the little birds’. Yet, in this perspective on ‘Grandmother’, it is only ‘*fish*’ which ‘Grandmother called the little birds’, not ‘fish’. Therefore, ‘fish’ are not claimed to be anything other than ‘fish’ in this perspective. In the telling of ‘her grandmother’, perspective makes the claim to ‘the fish’, but in the calling of ‘Grandmother’ ‘*fish*’ are ‘the little birds’. Therefore, the telling of ‘her grandmother’ which is known to ‘the princess’ is different to that which the perspective knows of ‘Grandmother’ and her calling. In this ‘called’ of ‘Grandmother’, it is only ‘the little birds’ which are ‘*fish*’, so this is about a ‘littleness’ and there must be other ‘birds’ who are not ‘little’ and thus not ‘*fish*’, as it is ‘the little birds’ who are subject to this calling. However, there is a split in the construction of ‘the little birds’ as ‘little’ is other to ‘birds’. In this otherness, ‘little’ is that which is supplementary and in excess to these ‘birds’; if ‘birds’ are that which cannot contain this ‘little’ then these ‘birds’ are that which is other to them and that which they are lacking in their being ‘birds’: this notion of ‘little’. There is thus an implicit split and a deferral of meaning as the very thing that these ‘birds’ are – ‘little’ – is that which is not ‘birds’.

There is a repetition of this notion of littleness as it is that ‘because otherwise the little sea princesses, never having seen a bird, would have no idea what she was talking about’. As

well as ‘birds’, ‘sea princesses’ are that which are constituted by littleness; however, this is a different ‘little’ as that which is subject to it, ‘sea princesses’, is other to the ‘birds’. In this perspective, there is a lack of seeing constituted as it is that ‘the little sea princesses’ had ‘never’ ‘seen a bird’. There is a seeing here; however, it is not just a seeing as it is a ‘never having seen’, therefore it is about a not seeing. Although this is a ‘not’ seeing, there is still a seeing. Therefore, in this absence of seeing in ‘never having seen’, there is a presence, as there must be a presence for this absence to be known. There is thus a presence of an absence, as there must always be this implicit presence for there to be an absence. So, ‘the little sea princesses’ lack of seeing is the ‘because’ of the “Grandmother” calling ‘the little birds *fish*’. This is therefore a lack on the part of ‘the little sea princesses’ which ‘Grandmother’ knows about; this ‘never having seen’ of ‘the little sea princesses’ is why they ‘would have no idea what she was talking about. However, if ‘Grandmother called the little birds *fish*, because otherwise the little sea princesses, never having seen a bird, would have no idea what she was talking about’, then ‘a bird’ must be something of the ‘world up above’ and ‘up on the land’, as ‘flowers’ and ‘trees in the forest’ are not ‘called’ something else by ‘Grandmother’. The same must apply to ‘ships and towns, people and animals’ as ‘She made her grandmother tell her everything she knew’ about this, and there is no ‘called’ nor a ‘never having seen’. However, it must be known by the perspective on ‘Grandmother’ that ‘Grandmother’ knows about ‘the little birds’ as it is ‘otherwise the little sea princesses’ ‘would have no idea what she was talking about’, yet it is something that she could talk about.

In the following passages, I am going to read further constructions of repetition as well as doubleness in perspective, as well as reading shifts through Hansel and the animal in two passages from Grimm’s *Hansel and Grethel*:

When they had gone a little way Hansel stood still and looked back towards the house, and this he did again and again, till his father said to him, "Hansel, what are you looking at? Take care not to forget your legs."

"O father," said Hansel, "I am looking at my little white kitten, who is sitting up on the roof to bid me goodbye."

"You young fool," said the woman, "that is not your kitten, but the sunshine on the chimney-pot."

Of course Hansel had not been looking at his kitten, but had been taking every now and then a flint from his pocket and dropping it on the road.²⁸

In the perspective, there is a claim to 'When they had gone a little way Hansel stood still and looked back towards the house, and this he did again and again'. In this perspective, there is a construction of both 'they' and 'Hansel', so 'Hansel' is not 'they', but other to 'they', for 'they' are those that 'had gone a little way', but 'Hansel stood still'. This is constructed as a 'when', thus there is a specificity in time and this 'when' is about 'they had gone a little way'. In the perspective, there is a perspective on 'they' and then a perspective on 'Hansel', thus a there is a shift in perspective. In this perspective on 'Hansel', 'Hansel' is claimed to have 'stood still and looked back towards the house'. So, according to this perspective, this is about a past, for he 'stood' and he 'looked'. However, as this is all retrospective, it is already about a past, thus that which is constructed is a past of the past. Furthermore, in this perspective, 'stood' is about a 'still' and 'looked' is about a 'back' as well as a 'towards'. This 'towards' is then about 'the house'. So, this 'house', according to the perspective, is 'the', so it is constituted as the only

²⁸ Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, "Hansel and Gretel", *Grimm's Fairy Tales*, trans. Lucy Crane (Hertfordshire: Wordsworth Editions Ltd, 1993) pp. 88-95 (p.89). All further references will appear in parenthesis. As is the case with many translated works, there are differences in this translation, such as 'Gretel' rather than 'Gretel'. In

'house', and it is "back' in relation to where 'Hansel stood still'. There is a claim to Hansel's looking in this perspective; this is the narrative's perspective on Hansel, thus there is an absence of what is seen; only direction can be claimed in 'back towards' as a seeing cannot be seen by an other who is not the one seeing. A repetition is then constructed in 'and this he did again and again'. However, this is both a repetition and not a repetition, for although there are two claims to 'again', these are two separate and different 'agains', and thus not the same. For, in this perspective, the first 'again' is about the 'did' of the 'this' by 'he', and the second 'again' is about an additional 'again' to the already claimed 'again'. An interruption of 'again and again' is constructed through the constitution of 'till' and this is about 'his father said to him'. So, according to this perspective, it is the claimed saying of 'his father' which disrupts the looking 'back' of 'Hansel'. In the perspective on the perspective of 'his father', what is 'said' is "Hansel what are you looking at? Take care not to forget your legs". This is a questioning of 'Hansel'; however, the questioning is of the 'looking' of 'you'. This questioning is of the 'at', according to this perspective, thus it is not only the 'looking' which is being questioned in the perspective on his father's perspective, but the 'at' of this 'looking'. So, in the perspective on the perspective on 'his father', within his saying, there is a shift, as 'Hansel' becomes 'you' through the questioning of 'what' the 'you' is 'looking at'. So, there is a repetition in 'looking', in this perspective, as there is a claim to Hansel's 'looking'; however, this is not a repetition as this is a questioning of the 'looking' of 'Hansel' from the perspective on his father's perspective, opposed to another looking of Hansel. This 'looking' is also about a present, whereas the first claim to 'looked' is about a past. Although, this is about a past and present, according to the perspective, this is about a past and a past present, as these claims are all retrospective, and thus all in the past. Therefore, only in the perspective on the saying from a retrospective perspective of 'his father' does a second claim to 'looking' occur.

Furthermore, there is then a saying of 'Hansel' with "O father," said Hansel, "I am looking at my little white kitten, who is sitting up on the roof to bid me goodbye." In this perspective, there is a shift, as there is a further 'looking'. So, there was the 'looked' of Hansel, then a questioning of Hansel's 'looking', then the 'looking' of 'I'. This 'looking' is also 'at', thus there is a notion of direction constituted. In this previous 'looking', the 'at' of the 'looking' was questioned, whereas, in this perspective, what the 'I' is 'looking at' is constructed. In the perspective on Hansel's perspective, there is a shift, as there is a claim to 'I'. This 'I' is split, as this is a saying of 'Hansel' and is about the 'looking' of 'I'. So, in the perspective on Hansel's perspective, what is 'said' is that the 'I' is 'looking at my little white kitten'. In this perspective, the 'at' of the 'looking' is about 'my little white kitten'. There is a notion of ownership, according to the perspective, in the claim to 'my', so this 'little white kitten' is constituted as being that of 'my'. In this perspective, 'kitten' is that which is 'white' and 'little', so there must be kittens which are not 'white' and 'little', and which are not 'my', as well as those which are not being looked at by 'I'. This is also only about one 'little white kitten,' so it is the only 'little white kitten' in this perspective. There is a split in this construction of 'little white kitten', as this littleness is other to the 'white kitten'. There is also a split within a split as 'white' is also other to the 'kitten'. This 'little' and 'white' is thus supplementary to and in excess of the 'kitten', as that which this the kitten is, 'little' and 'white', is that which is implicitly other to the 'kitten' and cannot be contained within 'kitten'. there is thus a deferral of meaning as this 'kitten' cannot be that which it is claimed to be without this notion of an excess.

In the perspective on the perspective of 'I', this 'little white kitten' is constructed as being a 'who', through 'who is sitting up on the roof to bid me goodbye'. In this perspective, there is a shift, as 'my little white kitten' is now 'who', and this 'who' is that which is 'sitting up'. So, the 'who' that is 'my little white kitten' is not only 'sitting up' but is doing so 'on the roof'. Therefore, in this perspective, 'sitting' is about an 'up', and 'the roof' is something that

can be sat 'up' on by 'who'. This 'who', according to the perspective on the perspective of 'I', is also claimed to 'bid me goodbye'. There is a shift in perspective here, as the 'I' is now 'me', and the 'who' of the 'kitten' is about 'to bid' this 'me goodbye'. Thus, in this perspective, not only is 'my little white kitten' that 'who is sitting up on the roof', but this 'who' can also 'bid me goodbye'. However, this 'bid me goodbye' is conditional upon the positioning of the 'who' as 'sitting up on the roof' through the claim to 'to', according to this perspective. Therefore, it is only in the 'sitting up on the roof', that the 'who' can 'bid me goodbye'.

Moreover, there is a shift in the claim to 'said' as there is a claim to "'You young fool," said the woman'. In the perspective on the perspective of 'the woman', there is a claim to "'You young fool'", so there is also a shift in the perspective on 'You', as this 'You' is constituted by 'young fool', opposed to a 'looking at'. In the perspective, there is another claim to the saying of 'the woman' through the "" in "'that is not your kitten, but the sunshine on the chimneypot'". In this perspective on the 'said' of 'the woman', there is another claim to 'kitten'; however, this is 'not your kitten'. So, this 'kitten' is constituted as 'not your kitten', as it goes from 'that' to 'not your kitten' to 'the sunshine on the chimney-pot'. Therefore, this is not about a 'kitten', but in not being about a 'kitten' is about a 'kitten' for it is 'that' which 'is not your kitten'. There is thus a presence in absence as for there to be a saying of 'not your kitten', there must be 'your kitten' for it to be 'not'. Therefore, although there is a lack of 'your kitten', there is still a presence of 'your kitten' in the very lack that is 'not your kitten'.

In the perspective on 'the woman['s]' perspective, the claim to 'the sunshine on the chimney-pot' is constituted by 'but', thus this 'the sunshine on the chimney-pot' is about that which is 'not your kitten', and in being 'not your kitten' it is 'the sunshine on the chimneypot'. In this perspective, 'sunshine' is that which is 'on the chimney-pot', so a chimney-pot' is something which 'sunshine' can be 'on'. However, in the perspective on Hansel, there is then a claim to 'Of course Hansel had not been looking at his kitten'. Therefore, there is another

shift in the perspective on 'kitten', for 'kitten' was about 'my little white kitten', then it was 'not your kitten' and now this is 'not looking at his kitten'. So, there is also a shift regarding Hansel's looking; the looking of Hansel was 'at my little white kitten' but is then 'not looking at his kitten', thus there are different claims constituting that of 'kitten'. Although there are multiple claims to 'kitten', these are all different as what constitutes the 'kitten' is different in each instance. The different claims to 'kitten' are also constituted as being different in their belonging, according to their respective perspectives. At first, 'kitten' is 'my', then 'your' and then 'his'. There is also a loss of whiteness and littleness, as the first claim is to 'little white kitten', whereas those following are just 'kitten'. Thus, in perspectives of the negative, such as 'not your' and 'not been looking', the 'kitten' is simply 'kitten'.

Furthermore, this is also a claim to looking in the perspective on 'Hansel' opposed to the perspective on Hansel's perspective, thus the 'looking' or the 'had not been looking' is claimed from somewhere other to 'Hansel' which knows Hansel's 'looking', or his 'not been looking'. There is then a shift in perspective with 'but'. This 'but' is now a 'had been taking every now and then a flint from his pocket and dropping it on the road', rather than a 'had not been looking at his kitten'. In this perspective on Hansel, this is a 'had been taking every now and then', so this is not just a 'taking'. Here, 'taking' is 'every now and then', so there is a specificity in the 'taking' as being 'every now and again', but this is also not specific, as it is 'every now and then'. This 'taking every now and then' is about 'a flint from his pocket and dropping it on the road'. In this perspective, 'a flint' is 'from his pocket' and it can also be dropped 'on the road'. However, according to this perspective, it is only that 'flint from his pocket' which is being dropped 'on the road', thus this 'a flint' is constituted as being specific as 'from his pocket'. There is a claim to repetition in this 'taking every now and then a flint from his pocket and dropping it on the road', but also not a repetition, for although this is a claim to 'every now and then', each 'now and then' is a different 'now and then' which consists

of a different 'a flint' being dropped 'on the road'. Therefore, this cannot be a claim to repetition or sameness, for each 'a flint' is different.

Moreover, in consideration of the following passage in comparison to the latter, there is a claim to doubleness:

Early the next morning the wife came and pulled the children out of bed. She gave them each a little piece of bread - less than before; and on the way to the wood Hansel crumbled the bread in his pocket, and often stopped to throw a crumb on the ground.

"Hansel, what are you stopping behind and staring for?" said the father.

"I am looking at my little pigeon sitting on the roof, to say goodbye to me," answered Hansel.

"You fool," said the wife, "that is no pigeon, but the morning sun shining on the chimney pots."

Hansel went on as before, and strewed bread crumbs all along the road. (Crane: p.91).

In the perspective, there is a claim to 'Early the next morning the wife came and pulled the children out of bed'. In this perspective, there is a claim to 'the next morning', so there must be a before for there to be a 'next'. This 'next' is constituting 'morning', therefore, 'morning' is that which has a 'next', according to this perspective. This 'the next morning' is 'Early', so, there are different levels of 'the next morning;', in this perspective, as it is about the specificity of the 'Early' of this 'the next morning'. In this perspective, there is a perspective on 'the wife', in 'the wife came and pulled the children out of bed'. In this perspective on 'the wife', there is

only one 'wife', and it is 'the'. Also, this 'the wife' is constituted in terms of someone who is other to her, as she is 'the wife', opposed to another naming. According to this perspective, 'the wife' is that who 'came and pulled', thus 'the wife' is someone who can come and pull, and this coming and pulling is about 'the children out of bed'. So, 'the children' must be in 'bed' to be 'pulled' 'out of bed'. There is a shift in perspective as there is 'the wife' and then there is 'She', so this 'wife' is constituted as being 'She'. In the perspective on 'She', it is so that 'She gave them each a little piece of bread'. There is another shift in perspective, according to these claims, as 'the children' are then 'them'. However, it is not just 'them' as it is 'them each', thus there is a claim to both singular and collective, but the 'them' is split as this is about 'each' of 'them'. Although 'each' is a claim to 'the children' as separate, there is still a claim to sameness as they are both 'each'. So, in this perspective, what is given to 'them each' is 'a little piece of bread'. In this perspective, there is a 'piece of', thus there is a lack of wholeness in the 'bread'; it is only a 'piece', and 'a little piece' at that. In the perspective, there is then a claim to '- less than before'. Through the construction of 'a little piece of bread - less than before', the claim to '- ' is a claim to explanation; there is a continuation of 'bread' into 'less than before' through '- ', according to this perspective. So, in this 'less than before', there is a construction of time, as this is a 'before', but a 'less than before'. Therefore, there must be a 'before' when 'She gave them a little piece of bread', as this is a 'less than', thus comparison is necessary. In this perspective, a repetition could therefore be claimed, but also not a repetition, for this is not about an exactness; there is a difference in the '- less than before'.

Thus, this 'little piece of bread' which is given to 'each' of 'them' is about a 'less than' of a 'before'.

Furthermore, in the perspective, there is a claim to 'and on the way to the wood Hansel crumbled the bread in his pocket'. In this perspective on Hansel, 'the wood' is something which can be 'on the way to'. So, according to these claims, this is not about 'the wood', but the 'on

the way to', thus 'Hansel' is coming from somewhere other to 'the wood'. It is on this 'on the way to the wood' that 'Hansel crumbled the bread in his pocket', so 'bread' can be 'crumbled', and it is also 'in his pocket'. In this perspective on Hansel, 'his pocket' is constructed as that where 'bread' can be 'crumbled'. This 'pocket' is also constituted as being 'his', and it is constituted as having an 'in', thus this claim to 'Hansel crumbled' relies on the construction of 'his pocket' in this way. In this perspective on Hansel, there is a repetition in 'his pocket', that being of 'Hansel'. However, only in the claim to 'his pocket' is this possible, for previously this was about 'a flint', whereas this is about 'bread'. Therefore, 'his pocket' can only be claimed to be the same through the 'his', as 'pocket' was about 'a flint' but is now about 'the bread'. In the perspective on Hansel's perspective, there is then a claim to 'and often stopped to throw a crumb on the ground'. In this perspective, there is a claim to 'a crumb' which can be thrown 'on the ground'. Therefore, this cannot be a repetition, as, before, Hansel 'had been taking every now and then a flint from his pocket and dropping it on the road', whereas now 'Hansel crumbled the bread in his pocket, and often stopped to throw a crumb on the ground'. Therefore, in the first perspective, that which was 'from his pocket' was that which he was 'dropping' 'on the road'. However, in this perspective, that which was "in his pocket" is 'bread' and that which was thrown was 'a crumb'. In this perspective on Hansel, there is a shift in perspective, as "crumbled the bread" becomes about 'a crumb'. Therefore, according to these claims, 'the bread' which is 'crumbled' is then 'a crumb' which can be thrown. In the perspective on the perspective of Hansel, this "throw a crumb on the ground" is constituted by an 'often stopped to'. Therefore, 'to throw a crumb' is about an 'often stopped', so 'to throw a crumb' requires a stopping, and this stopping is 'often'. There is also a claim to 'on the ground' as this is where 'a crumb' can be thrown.

Furthermore, in the perspective on the perspective of 'the father', there is a claim to

‘Hansel, what are you stopping behind and staring for?’. This claim is constituted as being a ‘said’ of ‘the father’, according to the perspective. There is a shift in perspective, as ‘Hansel’ was that who ‘crumbled the bread in his pocket’, but now ‘Hansel’ is the ‘you’ in ‘what are you stopping behind and staring for?’. This shift in perspective is within this ‘said’ of ‘the father’ as it is ‘Hansel’ and then ‘you’. This claim to ‘you’ is about ‘what are you stopping behind and staring for?’. So, in this perspective, ‘stopping’ is about a ‘behind’. Therefore, Hansel's positioning with his ‘stopping’ is a ‘behind’ to ‘the father’. In this perspective, then, ‘the father’ is questioning the ‘stopping’ of ‘Hansel’ from a position in which he would not be able to see the ‘stopping’ of ‘Hansel’, as ‘Hansel’ is ‘behind’ ‘the father’. Thus, this questioning must come from somewhere other to ‘the father’. According to this perspective, this is not just about the ‘stopping behind’ of the ‘you’, but it is also about a ‘staring for’. So, not only is the ‘you’ that is ‘Hansel’ ‘stopping behind’, but he is also ‘staring’, and this is known by the claimed perspective of ‘the father’. This questioning is claimed through the ‘what’, the ‘for’ and the ‘?’, thus there are multiple claims to questioning, in this perspective. There is another claim to Hansel in “‘I am looking at my little pigeon sitting on the roof, to say goodbye to me,” answered Hansel’. However, this is a different claim to Hansel as this ‘Hansel’ is subject to an ‘answered’. So ‘Hansel’ was the ‘you’ that was being questioned in a ‘what are you stopping behind and staring for?’ and is then that which ‘answered’. Therefore, that which is inside “”” is the ‘answered’ of Hansel’, according to this perspective.

In the perspective on the perspective of Hansel there is a claim to ‘I am looking at my little pigeon sitting on the roof, to say goodbye to me’. Within this perspective on Hansel's perspective, there are shifts, as within this ‘answered Hansel’ there is an ‘I’, thus there is a split. Between ‘Hansel’ and ‘I’. There is a further shift, as there is ‘I’ and then there is ‘me’, so there is both an ‘I’ and then a ‘me’ within the ‘answered’ of "Hansel’. In this perspective, there is also a ‘looking’ and this ‘looking’ is ‘at my little pigeon’. In the previous passage, there was a

claim, from the perspective on Hansel's perspective, to 'I am looking at my little white kitten, who is sitting up on the roof to bid me goodbye' (Crane: p.89). In this previous perspective, the 'looking' of the 'I' is 'at my little white kitten', whereas in this perspective, the 'looking' of the 'I' is 'at my little pigeon'. There is a repetition, as this is a 'looking' of 'I' and that which is constituted as 'my little'. However, this is not a repetition because it is a different perspective; the first perspective is on a 'kitten' and the second perspective is on a 'pigeon', according to the perspective on the respective sayings of 'Hansel'. There is also a difference in that that which comes after ',' in both perspectives. Concerning the 'kitten', it is a ', who is sitting up on the roof to bid me goodbye', but in the case of the 'pigeon', it is 'to say goodbye to me'. Although there is a 'goodbye' and a 'me' in both perspectives, these are different claims to 'goodbye' and 'me', so a repetition has not taken place, for they are different claims in different perspectives. In the perspective on Hansel's perspective on 'my little pigeon', 'goodbye' is about a 'say', so pigeons are that which can 'say goodbye'. This 'say goodbye' is also 'to me', thus there is a specificity in this construction of 'say goodbye'. In contrast, the 'goodbye' which is that of 'my little kitten', is a 'bid me goodbye'. Therefore, 'goodbye' can be constituted as both a 'say' and a 'bid'; however, the 'goodbye' of 'my little white kitten' is a 'bid', not a 'say', and the 'goodbye' of 'my little pigeon' is a 'say', not a 'bid'. Therefore, according to the perspective, both 'kitten' and 'pigeon' are about a 'goodbye', but they differ in their execution of claimed 'goodbye'.

Furthermore, in the perspective, there is a claim to "'You fool," said the wife, "that is no pigeon, but the morning sun shining on the chimney pots.'" In the perspective on the perspective of 'the wife', there is a claim to 'You fool'. This claim to 'You fool' could be read as a repetition, as in the previous passage, there was a claim to "'You young fool," said the woman' (Crane: p.89). However, although there is a notion of repetition in 'You' and 'fool', this is not a repetition, as, in the perspective on the 'said' of 'the woman', it is 'You young

fool', whereas in the perspective on the 'said' of 'the wife', it is 'You fool'. In these perspectives, there is a difference, as the 'You' which is a 'fool' in the first perspective is 'young', whereas there is no claim to 'young' in the second perspective. There is also the difference in perspective on the 'said the', as the saying of 'You young fool' is that of 'the woman', whereas the saying of 'You fool' is that of 'the wife'. Therefore, according to the perspective, the claim to 'said' can be by a 'woman' but it can also be by a 'wife', in these two instances.

In the perspective on the perspective of 'the wife', there is a claim to 'that is no pigeon, but the morning sun shining on the chimney pots'. In this perspective, there is a doubleness to the previous passage, as there was the claim to 'that is not your kitten, but the sunshine on the chimney-pot'. In the perspective on the said of 'the wife', there is a claim to 'that is no pigeon', This is a presence of an absence as there is a 'pigeon' in this perspective, but this is so through there being 'no pigeon'. So, there is only a perspective on 'pigeon' through a lack, according to this claim. In the perspective on the said of 'the woman', the claim is to 'that is not your kitten'. Thus, in this perspective, there is a 'your', whereas in the perspective on 'the woman', it is 'no pigeon'. Furthermore, in the perspective on the perspective of 'the wife', there is a claim to 'but the morning sun shining on the chimney pots'. In the perspective, 'that' which is claimed to be 'no pigeon' is constituted as 'the morning sun' through this 'but', and 'the morning sun' is that which is 'shining on the chimney pots'. Therefore, in this perspective, 'sun' is about 'morning' and there is a claim to the singular through 'the', so there is only one 'the morning sun'. This 'the morning sun' is constructed as that which is 'shining' and this 'shining' is done so 'on the chimney pots'. In relation to the previous passage, that which was claimed to be 'not your kitten' was 'the sunshine on the chimney-pot' (Crane: p.89), and in this perspective, that which is claimed to be 'no pigeon' is 'the morning sun shining on the chimney pots'. There is a repetition in this 'sun' and 'chimney' and 'pot'. However, in the perspective

on the perspective of 'the woman', 'sun' is constituted by 'shine', thus 'sunshine', and in the perspective on the perspective of 'the wife', 'sun' is constructed as being that of 'the morning'. There is a claim to 'shining' in the perspective on the perspective of 'the wife'; however, 'the morning sun shining' is not the same claim as 'sunshine', therefore there is a difference in perspective, and thus not a repetition. Also, in the perspective on the perspective of 'the woman', the claim is about "on the chimney-pot". In the perspective on the perspective of "the wife", the claim is about 'on the chimney pots'. There is a difference here, as not only is there the plurality of 'pots' opposed to 'pot', but there is a difference between 'chimney pot' and 'chimney-pot" with '-'. Therefore, according to these perspectives, there is not a repetition here.

In the perspective, there is then a claim to 'Hansel went on as before, and strewed bread crumbs all along the road'. In this perspective, there is a shift, as 'Hansel' was that who 'answered' but is now that who 'went on as before'. So, in this perspective, 'Hansel' is that which 'went', and this 'went' is 'on'. There is a specificity in this claim as to how the 'went' is, as it is 'on as before'; a repetition is therefore claimed as this is a 'went on' which has already happened; it is another to this 'before', and so there is more than one 'went on' of 'Hansel' according to this perspective. However, this 'went on' is not 'as before'; a sameness cannot be claimed for this 'went on' is 'as before', and so the 'went on' of 'as before' is not about 'as before' and thus they are not the same 'went on'. In this perspective, for 'Hansel went on' to be 'as before', there must be a 'Hansel went on' in the 'before' to this 'Hansel went on' for a comparison to be made. These can therefore not be the same, and thus not a repetition. In the perspective on Hansel, there is then a claim to 'and strewed bread crumbs all along the road'. In this perspective, 'Hansel' is that which 'went on as before', but "Hansel" is also that which 'strewed bread crumbs all along the road'. In this perspective, 'strewed bread crumbs all along the road' is constructed as an addition to 'Hansel went on as before' through this 'and'. There

is a shift in the claim to 'crumb', as 'crumb' was about 'throw a crumb on the ground' but it now about 'strewed bread crumbs all along the road'. So, in the perspective, 'crumb' is now 'crumbs', thus there is an addition of plurality. This is also a 'strewed' opposed to a 'throw', and what was 'on the ground' is now 'all along the road'. There is a claim to repetition in the association of 'Hansel' and 'bread', but one is about a 'crumb' which is 'throw[n]' and the other is about 'crumbs' which are 'strewed'. Therefore, this is a repetition but also not a repetition; it is split, for sameness cannot be claimed, as these are different claims from different perspectives.

Splitting the Fish Tail: The Presence of Absence

In their recent book *The Disabled Child: Memoirs of a Normal Future*, Amanda Apgar argues that if 'disability is a social and political experience, then “developmental delay” characterizes [...] the limitations imposed by ableism²⁹. If disability is ‘a political experience’, this frames disability as being political. This notion of 'limitation' and 'ability' is also discussed in Goodley et al's essay ‘Provocations for Critical Disability Studies’ where it is argued that ‘Disability becomes known as a malfunction of ability (either as lack or excess)’ thus implicating disability as being ‘more present than absent’.³⁰ In this sense, both texts raise the question of the relationship between disability and lack in relation to ableism and, in turn, the political. In this section, I will therefore be considering how this applies to thinking, for instance, about the construction of the disabled body.

I will be reading extracts from Hans Christian Andersen’s ‘The Little Mermaid’ in relation to discourses on disability to extend my reading of body, mermaid, and ownership, and to open more of what might be at stake with this engagement with temporary political discourses of body and disability. I will be exploring the split between body and self, and the notions of lack and absence which are implicated within these readings. In exploring these notions of disability and lack, my claim is that this absence and this lack is always present and always known, thus ‘disability is more present than absent’ (Goodley et al: p.987) in this very

²⁹ Amanda Apgar, *The Disabled Child: Memoirs of a Normal Future* (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2023) p.53.

³⁰ Dan Goodley, Rebecca Lawthorn, Kirsty Liddiard & Katherine Runswick-Cole, ‘Provocations for Critical Disability Studies’, *Disability & Society*, 34:6, 972-997 (p.987) (2019). All further references will be given in parenthesis.

notion of absence. Disability is associated with lack in the very construction of the term ‘disability’, and the implications of these terms: ‘lack’, ‘absence’, ‘excess’. There is always a lack; if lack is that which has been ‘revealed’, then the very notion of deferral is inescapable. Lack must be read; a lack that is constituted through difference, through perspective, through reading, and is therefore always other to itself.

The Absent Body

I shall start, then, by reading an extract which engages with notions of body and lack.

In their article, ‘The Cyborg Mermaid’, Martine Mussies and Emiel Maliepaard argue that:

Pioneering disability studies scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson developed an argument to show how the idea of the misfit manifests itself in three ways: First the disabled body itself (as compared to the perfect functioning human body), followed by the vulnerability and dependence of the misfit on others (incl. things and entities) and, lastly, social devaluation because of being given lower positions in the functioning social world. As a symbol for the misfit and the less-able bodied the mermaid struggles with her feelings between longing and belonging and has to biologically change to become accepted as a human being, to be seen as an acceptable human being³¹

³¹ Mussies, Martine & Emiel Maliepaard, ‘The Cyborg Mermaid’, *Multimodal Technologies and Interaction*, Vol.1, No.6 (2017) p.3.

In this perspective, there is the notion of both ‘the disabled body’ and ‘the less-able bodied’. ‘[T]he less-able bodied’ is constituted by its lack of ability, but not lack in its entirety. This is therefore about a scale of ability, for this claim to body is that which is ‘less-able’, in comparison to others. There is also the idea of ‘the disabled body itself’. In this construction of ‘the disabled body itself’, there is a multiple split. There is a split in ‘disabled’ and ‘body’, but also in ‘disabled body’ and ‘itself’. In this very claim to a ‘body’ which is ‘disabled’, this notion of disability is other to the ‘body’, thus ‘disabled’ resides as that which is not ‘body’. Similarly, ‘itself’ is other to ‘the disabled body’, therefore what ‘the disabled body’ is, is not ‘itself’; there is thus a deferral in its very self, in so far as ‘the disabled body’ is not ‘itself. It is ‘the disabled body’. Furthermore, a comparison is constructed in ‘(as compared to the perfect functioning human body)’. What we have here is ‘the disabled body’ in relation to ‘the perfect functioning human body’; ‘the disabled body’ is therefore not ‘the perfect functioning human body, but comparable and other to it. Therefore, lack is implicated regarding these terms: ‘perfect’, ‘functioning’, ‘human’ when it comes to the ‘body’ which is ‘disabled’. This ‘the disabled body’ is one of the ‘three ways’ in which ‘the idea of the misfit manifests itself’, therefore it is constructed as a manifestation of the idea of ‘the misfit’; a relationship is constituted between the disabled body and the misfit. So, in this perspective, ‘the disabled body’ is a manifestation of the misfit, but there is a repetition of this term ‘misfit’: ‘As a symbol for the misfit and the less-able bodied the mermaid struggles with her feelings’. Here, ‘the misfit and the less-able bodied’ is what rather ‘the mermaid’ is ‘a symbol for’. However, as this is ‘a symbol for’, this is not ‘the misfit and the less-able bodied’; ‘the mermaid’ is that which is other. This ‘the mermaid’ ‘has to biologically change to become accepted as a human being, to be seen as an acceptable human being’, therefore ‘the mermaid’ is constructed as that which is lacking. If ‘the mermaid’ which is lacking is ‘a symbol for the misfit and the less-able bodied’, then, once

again, ‘the disabled body’ is being constituted in relation to that which is lacking or absent. In this we may begin to read what I will take up as a recurring issue in disability studies: the difficulty of introducing absence as a way to recapture or return presence.

In his text, *Invalid Modernism: Disability and the Missing Body of the Aesthetic*, Michael Davidson also engages with this notion of disability and body, particularly in relation to absence:

the absent body, particularly the absent disabled body, is foundational for the aesthetic insofar as judgments about the beautiful and grotesque are often based upon an idealized or disparaged body.³²

In this perspective, there is a construction of the ‘disabled body’. Although this ‘body’ is constituted as ‘disabled’, there is a split in this claim. As this is ‘disabled body’, ‘body’ is other to ‘disabled’. If there is a split between ‘disabled’ and ‘body’, then this problematises the notion of the ‘disabled body’; this ‘body’ is not constituted within the claim to ‘disabled’, and disability is not constituted within this ‘body’, thus there is an implicit lack. This notion of ‘disabled body’ is problematised further in its being ‘the absent disabled body’. Although there is a knowledge constituted of ‘disabled body’, it is that which is ‘absent’, thus a paradox is constructed. This is a perspective on that which is ‘absent’, but in knowing this ‘disabled body’ to be ‘absent’, this ‘absent disabled body’ is only ‘absent’ in its being known as such. This brings us back to Goodley et al’s argument that ‘Disability becomes known as a malfunction

³² Michael Davidson, *Invalid Modernism: Disability and the Missing Body of the Aesthetic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019) p.24.

of ability (either as lack or excess)' and to the difficulty of presence being implicated in absence. There is a further split, as there is not only that of 'disabled body', but also in it being 'absent'. There is a constitution of a lack in this 'the absent disabled body', not only in the deferral of this claim, but also in absence itself, thus there is a lack within a lack in this perspective. There is also a repetition of this absence in 'the absent body, particularly the absent disabled body', as well as 'the absent' and 'body'. Although 'the absent' and 'body' are repeated, this is a different 'the absent' and 'body', for it is 'the absent disabled body'. This difference is the addition of 'disabled', yet the 'body' retains its constitution as 'the absent' and 'body' regardless of this 'disabled'. However, as this is 'particularly the absent disabled body', there is a construction of specificity; 'the absent disabled body' is constituted as being a particular type of 'absent body'. This therefore constructs 'disabled' as that which is supplementary to 'the absent body', which, in turn, constitutes this lack.

Here it is helpful to turn to the claim that 'particularly the absent disabled body, [that] is foundational for the aesthetic'. '[T]he absent body' is set against 'the absent disabled body' in that 'the absent disabled body' is that which is particular in this being 'foundational for the aesthetic'. Thus, there is something in this 'disabled' which constitutes this being 'foundational for the aesthetic' in a more particular way. However, although these constructions of 'body' are 'foundational for the aesthetic', this is only 'insofar as judgements about the beautiful and grotesque are often based upon an idealized or disparaged body'. Therefore, there is a limitation to this 'body' as being 'foundational for the aesthetic'; through this 'insofar' a boundary is constructed. In this perspective, there is a further repetition of 'body'. This 'body' is that which is 'idealized or disparaged', whereas 'body' was 'the absent body' and then 'the absent disabled body'. This 'body' is also implicated by a division, for this is 'an idealized or disparaged body'. According to this perspective, a 'body' can be 'idealized or disparaged', but regardless of whether it be 'idealized or disparaged', 'body' remains other to both 'idealized' and

‘disparaged’. Therefore, although these are multiple claims to ‘body’, all of which are different, ‘body’ is always constituted by that which is other to itself: ‘absent’, ‘disabled’, ‘idealized’, ‘disparaged’. The ‘body’ cannot contain this split; there is always a lack and an excess implicated in its construction. Returning to this ‘an idealized or disparaged body’, it is this which these ‘judgements about the beautiful and grotesque are often based upon’. Therefore, a ‘body’ is that which ‘judgements’ can be ‘based upon’ insofar as it being ‘idealized or disparaged’, and this ‘based upon’ is subject to ‘are often’. Thus, this is not a definitive claim to these ‘judgements’ being ‘based upon’ this ‘body’, for it is only ‘often’. These ‘judgements’ are ‘about the beautiful and grotesque’, therefore there is a specificity in what these ‘judgments’ are in their being ‘based upon’. So, if ‘the absent body, particularly the absent disabled body’ being ‘foundational for the aesthetic’ is so only ‘insofar’ as these ‘judgements about the beautiful and grotesque are often based upon an idealized or disparaged body’, then it is that the ‘is’ of these two claims to ‘body’ – ‘absent’ and ‘absent disabled’, are dependent upon and ‘often based upon’ a different claim to ‘body’ – ‘idealized or disparaged’. Therefore, in this perspective, there are multiple claims to ‘body’, and, in turn, multiple splits between ‘body’ and other, with ‘disabled’ constituting one of these others.

Moreover, in a discussion regarding a consideration of 'a young woman missing a hand', in her essay 'The Recuperated Materiality of Disability and Animal Studies', Sue Walsh provides a perspective on this missing hand in relation to lack:

[T]he missing hand is nevertheless consistently constituted as a lack, and moreover is still (always) a missing *hand*, known as such and produced as self-evidently so: it is 'the impairment itself - the missing hand - [that] is an attribute of the body' and it is only subsequently 'determined [...] by social factors and circumstances'. For example,

the question from whose perspective there is a 'hand' that is first constituted as 'missing' and then as 'absent' never arises here, but to *whom* is it a 'hand' that is missing, and at what point does it become so?³³

In this perspective, 'lack' is constituted in this claim to 'missing'; to be 'missing', there is an implication of that which should be there, and this is known to be so. In this known absence, there is a 'hand', and this 'hand' is still a 'hand', even in its absence, thus, the 'hand' retains its status of 'hand' even though it is 'missing'. A 'hand' that is 'missing' is still a 'hand', according to this reading of these claims. Although, there is still a 'hand' in the absence of a 'hand', there is a consistency in this constitution of a lack; it 'is nevertheless consistently constituted as a lack'. Therefore, it is that which is already lacking. In its being missing, the 'hand' is further constituted as a lack, thus this is a lack as being a lack; consistently constituted as what it already is. Furthermore, in this perspective, what is constituted as 'the missing hand' is constructed as being an 'impairment' in 'the impairment itself', yet it is still 'the missing hand'. However, there is a multiplicity of splits within this claim. Firstly, there is a split between 'the impairment' and 'itself'; if 'the impairment' is other to 'itself', then there is a split and a deferral. This is also the case with 'the missing hand'; that which is 'missing' is not the 'hand', for this 'missing' is other to the 'hand'. There is also a split in this being 'the body' and 'the missing hand': 'the impairment itself – the missing hand – [that] is an attribute of the body'. This 'hand' 'is an attribute of the body', therefore it is other to 'the body' in its being 'an attribute'. However, this 'missing hand' is still claimed to be 'of the body' even though it

³³ Sue Walsh, 'The Recuperated Materiality of Disability and Animal Studies', *Rethinking Disability Practice and Theory: Challenging Essentialism*, ed. Karin Lesnik-Oberstein (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2015) pp: 20-36 (p.25). All further references will be given in parenthesis.

is absent. Therefore, this 'body' has attributes, and these remain so even when they are 'missing'.

In the latter part of this section, that which is 'missing' and that which is 'absent' is not constituted as the same in this perspective. This 'hand' is about 'the question from whose perspective there is a "hand" that is first constituted as "missing" and then as "absent"', but this 'question' is that which 'never arises here'. Through the claim to 'first constituted' and 'and then', there is a constitution of order; this is a 'first constituted as "missing"' and then an 'and then as "absent"'. However, if this is a 'question' which 'never arises here', then there is 'never' a 'question' 'here' about 'from whose perspective there is a "hand"'. Therefore, this is a 'question' which is lacking in its arising here, thus what Walsh is doing is raising this lack of questioning 'from whose perspective'. Thus, this is a questioning of a knowledge of an absence.

Walsh continues in claiming that 'what remains predeterminately at issue is always a *hand* that is known to be *missing*' (Walsh: p.26). Therefore, this is about a knowing; this is what is known and what is not and there is always this subsequent knowledge. There is a split within this 'hand' and its being 'missing'; there is this division via a knowing (that which is known). In its absence there is a presence, as for that which is 'missing' to be known as a 'hand', there must have been a 'hand' to go 'missing', thus there is a deferral, as this 'hand' is implicated as this very lack.

If we now return to Goodley et al, we can read the claim that 'Disability becomes known as a malfunction of ability (either as lack or excess)' (Goodley et al: p.986) in relation to the reading of Walsh. In this perspective, 'Disability' is 'known as' that which is other to itself, thus 'Disability' is not a contained term. However, as Goodley's quote is that 'Disability becomes', there is this implication of process; there is a movement from 'Disability' to 'lack

or excess'. Here, there is a distinction between 'lack' and 'excess', as these are different claims, and they are not constituted as the same in this perspective as this is 'either' 'or'. Yet, what 'Disability' has become 'known as' is termed as 'a malfunction of ability', and is so 'either as lack or excess', thus rendering this terminology as what disability is 'known as', but was not before, as this is a becoming. Therefore, this is a becoming of a knowing; this is not what disability is, it is what it has become known as. If this is about a becoming and a knowing, then at what point does this become known? This raises the question of what is 'disability' and 'how can it be read'? This can be read in relation to Walsh's argument; although this disability is that which 'becomes known as a malfunction of ability', it still retains its claim to disability; there is still this disability. There is then a division, as this is 'either' lack or excess, thus there cannot be both lack and excess for it is 'either' 'or'; this is not about a 'sameness'. Therefore, what disability becomes known as, in this perspective, is inconsistent; we have disability which becomes known as a malfunction of ability which is so either as lack or excess.

Disability and Lack

This notion of lack and body can lead us into a reading of 'The Little Mermaid' text; through the construction of 'the fish tail', the notion of not having and the implication of lack can be read.

Her skin was as clear and soft as a rose petal. Her eyes were as blue as the deepest sea.

But like all the others, she had no feet, and her body ended in a fish tail³⁴

In this perspective, there is a construction of ‘body’ and a construction of ‘fish tail’. This ‘body’ is hers, whereas ‘fish tail’ is ‘a’ (not hers). This is ‘her body ended in a fish tail’, so ‘fish tail’ is part of ‘her body’. But ‘body’ is hers, and ‘fish tail’ is ‘a’, so this is a part of ‘her body’ which is not constituted as being hers, but instead ‘a’. Therefore, there is a claim to ownership in ‘her body’, but not to ‘a fish tail’. Although ‘a fish tail’ is not hers, ‘tail’ is constituted as being that of ‘a fish’. Therefore, ‘tail’ is that which is of ‘a fish’; there is specificity in ‘fish tail’, but it is ‘a’, so it could be any ‘fish’, whereas ‘body’ is exclusively hers. Thus, there is a division in not only ‘her body’ and ‘a fish tail’, but within the claim to ‘body’ itself. For if this is that ‘her body ended in a fish tail’, then that which ends ‘her body’ is not itself, but a part which is constituted as being that which is not hers but that of ‘a fish’. There is also an end here, so ‘her body’ has an end, and that which constitutes this end is ‘a fish tail’.

This idea of what is hers and what is not is also apparent with ‘Her skin’ and ‘Her eyes’. In this perspective, both ‘skin’ and ‘eyes’ are constituted as being hers; however, there is a split, as there is ‘Her’ and there are ‘skin’ and ‘eyes’. Therefore, ‘skin’ and ‘eyes’ are not ‘Her’ as they are constructed as that which are hers, but not ‘Her’; they are ‘skin’ and ‘eyes’. These ‘skin’ and ‘eyes’ are constructed in what they are ‘as’, and it is this ‘as’ which is constituted; ‘Her skin’ is defined through its ‘clearness’ and ‘softness’, and ‘her eyes’ are defined through their ‘blueness’. Although ‘skin’ and ‘eyes’ are hers before they are ‘as’, this is still supplementary to their being hers. A repetition is constructed in ‘as’ for it is that ‘Her skin was

³⁴ Hans Christian Anderson, ‘The Little Mermaid’, *The Classic Fairytales*, ed. Maria Tatar (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2017) pp. (p.283). All further references will be given in parenthesis.

as clear and soft as a rose petal'. There is a layering in this perspective; 'Her skin' is that which 'was as clear and soft' and this 'clear and soft' is 'as a rose petal'. Therefore, it is not 'Her skin' which is 'as a rose petal', but the clearness and softness of it. This is also the case with 'her eyes', as 'her eyes were as blue as the deepest sea; it is the blueness which is 'as the deepest sea', not 'her eyes'. Therefore, this 'asness' constitutes the 'skin' and 'eyes' as being 'as' that which is other, or what it is not. This is not that which the 'skin' and 'eyes' are themselves, but that which they are 'as', thus, through the 'as' a lack is constituted; this is a division through that which is other.

As the 'skin' and 'eyes' constitute a lack, there is also a lack in 'feet': 'she had no feet'. In this perspective, the 'feet' are only known through a lack of the having of 'she'. There is a split between 'she' and 'her' as it is 'she' who 'had no feet', but it is 'her body'. Through the 'and', there is a connection between the lack of 'feet' and 'her body', but there is also not a connection, as there is a division between 'her body' and 'no feet'. It is 'she' who 'had no feet' and 'her' whose 'body ended in a fish tail', and this is 'But like all the others'. So, there are 'others' and this is 'like all the others', therefore this 'she had no feet, and her body ended in a fish tail' is a likeness to these 'the others'. Therefore, this is not just 'she', as this is the case for 'all the others'. Through this 'like', the condition of 'she' is not one which is personal, for it is 'like all the others'. However, this 'had no feet' is that of the 'she', and this 'her body ended in a fish tail' is a condition of the 'body'. Although this 'a fish tail' is constituted as a part of 'her body' through 'ended in', there is a split between 'her body' and 'a fish tail'. Not only is the perspective on 'body' on that of 'Her', and the perspective on 'fish tail' on that of 'a', there is a deferral in this claim to 'tail'. As with 'mer' and 'maid', 'fish tail' constructs 'tail' as that which is other to 'fish', thus rendering 'tail' as that which is other to not only 'her body', but to the 'fish' itself, in this perspective. Therefore, if the condition of this 'a fish tail' constitutes that which is other to 'her', then there is an otherness in this 'tail', as with 'like all the others'.

Therefore, this lack in ‘no feet’ is attributed as that of both ‘the others’ and ‘she’, whereas ‘body’ is that which is hers. However, there is a split with ‘her’ and ‘body’. Structurally, then, this cannot work, as there is a division between not only ‘her’ and ‘fish’, but also between ‘her’ and what is constituted as ‘her body’. Thus, that which is hers, implicitly cannot be hers, through this very claim to that which is other to ‘her’, being hers.

Your fish tail, which we find so beautiful, looks hideous to people on earth. They don't know any better. To be beautiful up there, you have to have those two clumsy pillars that they call legs (Tatar: p.291)

Whereas ‘fish tail’ was ‘a’, in this perspective, ‘fish tail’ is constructed as being ‘Your’. Before, ‘fish tail’ was ‘a fish tail’ and it was that which constituted the end of ‘her body’. In this perspective, ‘fish tail’ is that which is Yours, therefore, not only is this ‘tail’ that of a ‘fish’, it is also ‘Your’. Thus, there is a split in this claim to ownership regarding the ‘tail’; although this ‘fish tail’ is that of the ‘Your’, it is still ‘fish tail’. Therefore, ‘tail’ still retains its status of ‘fish’ in its being Yours. According to the perspective on the perspective of ‘the old woman’, this ‘Your fish tail’ is that ‘which we find so beautiful’. ‘Your fish tail’ is ‘so beautiful’, but it is only ‘so beautiful’ in that ‘we find’ it to be. This is therefore the narrative’s perspective on the old woman’s perspective on the ‘we’. This ‘we find so beautiful’ is set against ‘looks hideous to people on earth’. So, this ‘Your fish tail’ is found ‘so beautiful’ by the ‘we’, but it also ‘looks hideous to people on earth’. Therefore, there are multiple perspectives on ‘Your fish tail’, all of which are different, yet they both come from the perspective on the old woman’s perspective. Thus, ‘Your fish tail’ is something which can be found and looked at. Those to whom it ‘looks hideous’ are ‘people on earth’. Therefore, ‘people’ are ‘on earth’, and the ‘we’ are not.

However, it is these ‘people on earth’ who are the ‘They’ which ‘don’t know any better’, whereas the ‘we’ who ‘find’ this ‘fish tail’ ‘so beautiful’ are not questioned. So, this is a knowing, but a not knowing as it is ‘don’t know’, and this ‘don’t know’ is ‘any better’. Therefore, there are different levels of knowing regarding ‘Your fish tail’ and whether it is or is not ‘hideous’. However, ‘Your fish tail’ is neither constituted as ‘beautiful’ nor ‘hideous’, as this is a finding and a looking, therefore this ‘don’t know any better’ only concerns the ‘looks hideous’ of ‘Your fish tail’ from a perspective which is other than these ‘people on earth’ who are claimed to lack this knowledge.

Furthermore, there is another construction of ‘beautiful’, but this is concerning ‘legs’ rather than ‘fish tail’. In this perspective, ‘beautiful’ is ‘up there’, and this is ‘To be beautiful’. Therefore, this is a conditional ‘beautiful’ as ‘you have to have those two clumsy pillars that they call legs’. So, not only is there a conflict between ‘we’ and ‘people’, there is also a difference between ‘up there’ and not ‘up there’ in terms of what constitutes beauty. What this ‘beautiful up there’ is dependent upon is ‘those two clumsy pillars that they call legs’, and the beauty in this having of these ‘legs’. However, these ‘two clumsy pillars’ are only constituted as ‘legs’ through ‘they call’, therefore this status of ‘legs’ is a calling of ‘they’, rather than what they are. So, what ‘you have to have’ are ‘those two clumsy pillars’ in order ‘To be beautiful’. Therefore, there is beauty in clumsiness, according to this perspective on ‘up there’. As with ‘tail’, ‘legs’ do not stand alone. Here, ‘legs’ are ‘those two clumsy pillars’ which are called ‘legs’, and ‘tail’ is that of a ‘fish’ which is both ‘beautiful’ and ‘hideous’. Therefore, this is not simply about the ‘tail’ and the ‘legs’ but that which is other to this ‘tail’ and these ‘legs’; this is what constitutes the ‘beautiful’ and the ‘hideous’ and to whom these things are ‘beautiful’ and ‘hideous’.

We can read a further difficulty in the following:

You're hoping to get rid of that fish tail and replace it with two stumps to walk on like a human being ... Your tail will then split in two and shrink into what human beings call pretty legs. But it will hurt. (Tatar: p.293)

There is a shift in perspective as 'legs' are then 'what human beings call pretty'. Although these 'legs' are that which are 'pretty', this prettiness is constituted as the 'call' of 'human beings'. Therefore, these 'pretty legs' are not 'pretty legs'; this is what they are called, thus there is something supplementary in this 'pretty'. As with 'those two clumsy pillars that they call legs', this is a 'call' of that which is other to. In this claim, there is a process through 'and' as this is 'Your tail will then split in two', then the 'and', and then 'shrink into what human beings call pretty legs'. This process is going from 'tail' to 'legs'. In this perspective, 'tail' is that which is 'Your', thus there is an ownership in 'tail', whereas 'legs' are 'what human beings call pretty'. So, there is a construction of belonging with 'tail' in being yours which is not so with 'legs'. This 'Your tail' 'will then split in two', so 'tail' is singular as 'tail' and then multiple in 'legs'. Therefore, there is a transformation, as this 'split in two' of 'Your tail' is then an 'and shrink into'. So, 'legs' are about a 'split' and a 'shrink', but only in that they are 'what human beings call'. This is also 'pretty legs', so it is these specific 'pretty legs' which are about a 'split in two and shrink'. There is a shift in perspective, as through the 'split in two and shrink into' 'Your tail' has shrunk into this 'what', and this 'what' is being called 'pretty legs' and is therefore other to the 'tail'. However, this 'what' is not 'pretty legs', and neither is it 'Your tail', but this is so according to this perspective on the 'said' of 'the witch'. Therefore, although this is 'what the human beings call pretty legs', it is the 'said' of 'the witch', therefore it is a perspective on the witch's saying of the human beings calling. Furthermore, this 'Your tail will then split in two and shrink into what human beings call pretty legs' is constituted as 'it' in 'But it will hurt',

so this 'split in two and shrink' of the 'tail' and 'legs' is that which 'will hurt'. In this perspective, 'But' is consequential; it is constructing that which comes prior to it as that which will result in the 'hurt'. This is also a 'will hurt', so this is a claim to a futurity. There is a repetition in 'will', as 'will' was in 'Your tail will then split', but here it is 'it will hurt'. So, both the 'split in two and shrink' of the 'tail' and the 'hurt' are constructed as being in a future, albeit a retrospective future, thus within the frame of the narrative, this 'split in two and shrink' and 'hurt' are that which are not yet. Although these claims are to a retrospective future, 'what human beings call pretty legs' are in the present, retrospectively. Therefore, 'pretty legs' are 'what human beings call pretty legs' regardless of whether 'Your tail' does or does not 'split in two and shrink'.

Moreover, in the perspective, there is another construction of 'fish tail'. Although this is 'fish tail', this 'fish tail' is 'that fish tail', whereas 'fish tail' was that of 'Your'. Therefore, the 'fish tail' in this perspective is different to that which was 'Your', as this is now 'that'. This shift from 'Your' to 'that' indicates a withdrawal of and thus lack of ownership for this 'fish tail'. However, 'tail' is still constituted by 'fish', so although there is difference to that which presupposes 'fish tail', the 'fish' of the 'tail' remains. In this perspective, this is a 'You're hoping to get rid of that fish tail'. So, 'that fish tail' is something 'to get rid of', but this is not a 'get rid of' but a 'hoping to'. Therefore, 'that fish tail' can be gotten 'rid of', but as it is a 'hoping' it has not yet been gotten 'rid of'. '[T]hat fish tail' is also that which can be replaced through 'and replace it with two stumps to walk on like a human being'. In this perspective, 'to *get rid of that fish tail' is to 'replace it with two stumps', but it is also not to 'replace it with two stumps' because of the 'and'. This 'and' both separates and unites these claims, as 'to get rid of that fish tail' is not to 'replace it with two stumps', but this 'replace it with two stumps' is the result of this 'get rid of that fish tail'. Furthermore, both 'to get rid of that fish tail' and 'replace it with two stumps' are both subject to this 'You're hoping', therefore this is not a happening but a 'hoping'. Therefore, this is all conditional upon this hope which the 'you' in

question has. However, this is a perspective on the 'You're' who is 'hoping', therefore this is perspective which is other to the 'You're'. So, according to this other perspective on the 'You're', what the 'You're' is 'hoping' to 'replace it with' are 'two stumps to walk on like a human being'. Here, 'that fish tail' is 'it', so this 'it' which is 'that fish tail' can be replaced 'with two stumps'. As with 'Your fish tail' and 'those two clumsy pillars that they call legs', the 'fish tail' in question is that which will transform from something of the singular into something which is multiple, or 'two'. This 'twoness' was 'those two clumsy pillars', but here it is 'two stumps'. The 'two stumps' are 'to walk on like a human being'. So, 'two stumps' can be walked 'on', and this 'to walk on' is 'like a human being'. Therefore, this is not 'a human being' walking, but a 'walk' which is 'like a human being'; 'a human being' is thus not that which has 'two stumps to walk on', for this is only 'like a human being'. Thus, in having these 'two stumps', this 'You're' can only achieve a likeness to 'a human being', even in their 'hoping'. A lack is therefore implicated through this 'like', as 'You're' does not have 'two stumps to walk on like a human being'.

This idea of lack is further explored by Derrida. In 'The Purveyor of Truth', there is a perspective on 'lack': 'Something is missing from its place, but the lack is never missing from it'³⁵. In this perspective, there is a construction of 'lack' as that which is 'never missing'. If 'lack' is 'never missing', then, implicitly, there is always a 'lack'. If 'Something is missing from its place', then 'place' is that which something can be 'missing from', yet 'the lack is never missing from it'. Therefore, 'lack' is that which is always there; 'lack' cannot be deferred. However, in a critique of Lacan's perspective on 'lack', there is the claim that:

³⁵ Jacques Derrida, 'The Purveyor of Truth', *The Purloined Poe*, ed. John P. Miller and William J. Richardson (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988) pp.173-212 (p.184). All further references will be given in parenthesis.

By determining the place of the lack, the topos of that which is lacking from its place, and in constituting it as a fixed center, Lacan is indeed proposing, at the same time as a truth-discourse, a discourse on the truth of the purloined letter as the truth of "The Purloined Letter" (Derrida: p.185)

In this perspective, 'lack' is constructed as that which has a 'place'. This 'place' is 'the place of the lack', thus there is a split; 'lack' is other to 'the place', as although this 'place' is 'of the lack', it is not constituted as 'the lack', thus there is a division between 'place' and 'lack'; this cannot be 'the lack' itself, for it is 'the place of'. However, this is a 'determining' of 'the place of the lack', and this 'determining' is 'By'. According to this perspective, it is 'Lacan' who is 'determining this place of the lack', thus this is a perspective on the 'determining' of 'Lacan'. There is a construction of a listing in 'By determining the place, of the lack, the topos of that which is lacking from its place, and in constituting it as a fixed center' through ',', therefore this is all 'By' which 'Lacan is indeed proposing'. So, as well as 'the place of the lack', that which is subject to 'By determining', is 'the topos of that which is lacking from its place'. In this perspective, there is a shift in the claim to 'lack', for 'lack' was that of 'the place of the lack', whereas this is the 'lacking' of 'the topos' 'from its place'. Again, there is a division between lack and 'place', and this 'place' is constituted as being the 'its' of 'the topos'. Thus, this is not the 'place' of lack, but the 'place' 'of that which is lacking'. However, what is determined is not this 'that which is lacking from its place', but 'the topos of that which is lacking from its place', therefore there is another split through 'of'; this division is constituted in that 'the topos' is other to the 'that which' which it is 'of'. Alongside these two different claims to lack, in this perspective on 'Lacan', there is then a claim to 'and in constituting it as a fixed center'. Due to this 'and', this 'constituting it as a fixed center' is not subject to the 'By determining' as the previous clauses were; this is no longer a 'determining' but a 'constituting'. Thus, there is a shift

in perspective as this is a 'constituting' of the 'it' which is 'lack', and what this 'it' is being constituted 'as' is 'a fixed center'. There is a deferral in this perspective, for this is 'as'; there is a lack in this 'it' which is 'lack', for this 'lack' is being constituted 'as' that which is other to itself; 'a fixed center'. Therefore, according to this perspective on 'lack', there is a lack within a 'lack'.

Furthermore, in this perspective, 'Lacan' is 'determining', and 'By determining', 'Lacan is indeed proposing'. Therefore, this is a perspective on the 'proposing' of 'Lacan'. What 'Lacan is indeed proposing' is 'at the same as a truth discourse, a discourse on the truth of the purloined letter as the truth of "The Purloined Letter"'. In this perspective, there are multiple claims to 'truth'; there is 'a truth-discourse', and 'at the same time as' this 'a truth-discourse', there is 'a discourse on the truth of'. So, in this perspective, 'truth' is part of 'a truth-discourse'. Although there is a '-' which connects 'truth' and 'discourse', there is still a lack in this split; this 'discourse' is other to this 'truth', thus it is deferred. There is a shift in perspective, as 'truth' is 'truthdiscourse', but then it is 'a discourse on the truth'. There is also a shift in the claim to discourse. This 'discourse' is 'on the truth', therefore 'discourse' can be in 'truth-discourse' as well as 'on the truth'. However, there is a third claim to 'truth' in this perspective, as it is that 'Lacan is indeed proposing, at the same time as a truth-discourse, a discourse on the truth of the purloined letter as the truth of "The Purloined Letter"'. So, there is 'a truth discourse', and 'at the same time' as this 'a truth-discourse', 'Lacan is indeed proposing' 'a discourse on the truth of the purloined letter as the truth of "The Purloined Letter"'. If this 'discourse on the truth of the purloined letter' is being proposed 'as the truth of "The Purloined Letter"' 'at the same time as a truth-discourse', then there are multiple proposals to 'truth' simultaneously by 'Lacan', according to this perspective on 'Lacan'. However, this 'proposing' of 'Lacan' is consequential of this 'By determining', thus it is the determination of these multiple claims to 'lack' 'By' 'Lacan' that this proposal is constituted. There is a split in these claims to 'truth', for if 'a discourse on

the truth of the purloined letter' is 'as the truth of "The Purloined Letter"', then one is other to the other and, in turn, there is an implicit division. However, as this is 'a discourse on the truth' and 'the truth', then they cannot be the same, for 'a discourse' of something is different to the something itself. Therefore, according to this perspective, 'By determining' these claims to 'lack' and 'place', 'Lacan' is 'proposing' that a 'discourse on the truth' is 'as the truth', thus there is an implicit division in these constructions of 'truth'. This therefore problematises concepts of 'truth', for this perspective on Lacan's 'determining' and 'proposing' claims that 'truth' can be located as another 'truth', and absence or 'lack' can be identified. If 'lack' has a 'place' which can be identified, and if the 'truth' of absence is something which 'Lacan' can just locate, then ideas of 'truth' and 'lack' are problematised, because, in perspective, there is this split and deferral of meaning.

In light of this, if we are to return to the notion of the construction of the disabled body, these readings of claims to the fish tail contribute to the idea that there is always a lack; if disability is that which is more present than absent, then what is present in this inherent lack which must be read.

Disability and Pain

I will be continuing this thinking by introducing pain to my reading thus far of 'The Little Mermaid', a term which further problematises notions of lack and presence. This is especially significant to a reading of the text that situates it within contemporary disability studies, as the question of pain is central to its arguments. In 'The Little Mermaid' text, as well as disability and lack, disability and pain can be read in relation to one another. In reading disability and pain, I shall start with a disability discourse which engages directly with

Andersen's text and 'the mermaid'. In 'Special Affects: Mermaids, Prosthetics, and the Disabling of Feminine Futurity', disability, the construction of pain, and the connection between the mermaid and disability studies are explored by Cynthia Barounis:

For Dinnerstein, the pain of the mermaids new feet, like "sharp knives and piercing needles" can be understood as the "special female pain of traditional sexual initiation" (1967, 107). Thus, in becoming a woman, the little mermaid exchanges her voice and tail (the source of her mobility and agency) for the sexual vulnerability that comes with having a pair of female legs. Through this lens, we can understand Vessey's mermaid makeover, despite its strongly heterosexualized framing, as a powerful refusal of compulsory heterofuturity.³⁶

In this perspective, there is a construction of 'pain' in 'the pain of the mermaids new feet'. This 'pain' is 'of the mermaids new feet', thus there is a split, as she is still the mermaid, but she has 'feet', so this is a mermaid with 'new feet'. These 'new feet' are 'the mermaids', so 'mermaids' can have 'feet' and still be 'mermaids'. This, however, is 'For Dinnerstein', so this is a perspective on a perspective, and only in terms of 'Dinnerstein' is this how it 'can be understood'. According to this perspective on 'Dinnerstein', these "'sharp knives and piercing needles'" can be understood as the "special female pain of traditional sexual initiation". If this is a 'can be understood as', then this is not to say that 'sharp knives and piercing needles' are 'the "special female pain of traditional sexual initiation"' or vice versa; this is an 'as' something

³⁶ Cynthia Barounis, 'Special Affects: Mermaids, Prosthetics, and the Disabling of Feminine Futurity', *Women's Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 44, No. 1/2, SURVIVAL (SPRING/SUMMER 2016) pp.188-204 (p.196). All further references will be given in parenthesis.

else. As this is 'as', there is a lack in the thing itself, in these 'sharp knives and piercing needles'; they have to be supplemented with 'the "special female pain of traditional sexual initiation"' for an understanding to take place. Furthermore, in this perspective on Dinnerstein's perspective of 'pain', 'pain' can be 'the "special female pain of traditional sexual initiation"'. Therefore, 'pain' is 'special' and 'female', and 'initiation' is 'traditional' and 'sexual' in this perspective. As read in Part One, the 'traditional' concerned 'In universal tradition' and then 'the traditional mermaid symbol', thus 'tradition' was something to be 'In', and 'the traditional' was that which constituted the 'mermaid symbol'. In this perspective, what is 'traditional' is 'sexual initiation', and this is subject to 'special female pain'. Therefore, this 'traditional sexual initiation' is that which is painful, but this 'pain' is constituted by its being 'special' and 'female'. There is therefore something gendered in this 'pain', and this 'special female pain' is 'of traditional sexual initiation', thus there is a split through this 'of'. Therefore, tradition is, once again, split; there is something about tradition always being split in its having something in it which is other to tradition. As this 'special female pain' is 'of', this 'pain' is part 'of traditional sexual initiation', therefore this 'special female pain' is that of 'traditional sexual initiation' which is that otherness. So, tradition is split, and there is a split through the 'as' of 'can be understood as' which this 'pain' is subject to. It is this doubleness, contra Felman, that Barounis cannot see within sexuality. In this perspective, there is thus a link between 'feet' and 'sexual initiation', but it is the 'pain' which is the link, not the 'feet' themselves; it is through these 'new feet' that the 'pain' is felt. Therefore, although there are claims to 'pain' in 'the pain of the mermaids new feet' and 'the "special female pain of traditional sexual initiation"', and one can be 'understood' in relation to the other, there is still a division; one being 'understood as' the other is a claim to this very otherness

Furthermore, there is a construction of 'woman' and 'mermaid' in 'in becoming a woman, the little mermaid'. Through this 'becoming', a transformation is constituted; there is a

movement from 'mermaid' to 'woman'. However, by claiming that 'in becoming a woman, the little mermaid', there is a split, as although this is about 'becoming a woman' she is still 'the little mermaid'. Therefore, even in her 'womanness', 'the little mermaid' cannot escape her 'mermaidness', for she is still a mermaid just with 'new feet'; there is a division in her 'womanness' and her 'mermaidness'. In this perspective, 'in becoming a woman, the little mermaid exchanges her voice and tail', therefore this 'becoming a woman' is an exchange; there is a transaction in her movement from 'mermaid' to 'woman'. That which is exchanged is 'her voice and tail (the source of her mobility and agency) for the sexual vulnerability that comes with having a pair of legs'. So, 'her voice and tail' are 'the source of her mobility and agency' whereas 'legs' are that which aid 'sexual vulnerability'. Therefore, 'the little mermaid' cannot have both 'her voice and tail' as well as 'legs'. Although this is a movement from 'voice and tail' to 'legs', what the exchange is are 'voice and tail' for 'the sexual vulnerability that comes with having a pair of female legs'. Therefore, this is not 'voice and tail' for 'legs', as the transaction is in fact 'for the sexual vulnerability' which is enabled by these 'legs'; this is what 'comes with having' the 'legs', opposed to the 'legs' themselves. However, these 'legs' are 'a pair of female legs', therefore this 'sexual vulnerability' is constituted through the femaleness of these 'legs', rather than their simply being 'legs'. This is therefore about a femaleness; it is 'female pain' that the 'sharp knives and piercing needles can be understood as' and it is 'a pair of female legs' which carries with them this 'sexual vulnerability'. Thus, it is the 'femaleness' which has the most at stake in this perspective, rather than the 'woman' or the 'mermaid'.

However, there is a shift in perspective with the claim to 'Through this lens'; this therefore constitutes that which has come before as a 'lens'. In light of this, the tensions between 'woman', 'mermaid', and 'female', and the pain which is associated with sexuality, constitutes a 'lens' through which 'we can understand Vessey's mermaid makeover'. However, although 'we can understand', it does not mean that we do. This potential understanding is dependent upon

‘Through this lens’, therefore, it is only with these conditions of ‘this lens’ that this is the case.

So, ‘Through this lens’, 'mermaid' is a 'makeover, and this 'mermaid makeover' is constituted as 'Vessey's'. Whereas 'mermaid' was 'the little mermaid' who 'exchanges her voice and tail', 'mermaid' is now something which constitutes this 'makeover' which is 'Vessey's'. Although this 'mermaid makeover' is constructed as being 'Vessey's', Vessey is not a 'mermaid'; this is not about being a 'mermaid' but having a 'makeover' which is constituted by its ‘mermaidness’. This 'mermaid makeover' is also constructed as being 'as a powerful refusal of compulsory heterofuturity'. However, as this is a 'we can understand', this is just an understanding of it being so, rather than it being so. As with 'the pain of the mermaids new feet, like "sharp knives and piercing needles" can be understood as the "special female pain of traditional sexual initiation"', there is a split in the simile; through the 'as' a division is constituted, thus a doubleness through this other is claimed. In this perspective, this is a 'we can understand' which is subject to 'Through this lens', thus it is only in the boundaries of 'this lens' that this can be understood in this way. If 'a powerful refusal of compulsory heterofuturity' is what 'Vessey's mermaid makeover' is to be understood 'as', then there is an understanding of this other. However, there is another claim to a split; if this is a 'refusal' of the 'compulsory', then this compulsoriness of this 'heterofuturity' is undermined in the very potential for it to be refused. Furthermore, this understanding of 'Vessey's mermaid makeover' is also constituted 'despite its strongly heterosexualized framing'. So, in this perspective, this is an exception to this understanding; although this constitutes ‘Vessey’s mermaid makeover’ as having ‘strongly heterosexualized framing’, this is dismissed through ‘despite’. However, it is also not dismissed, as this ‘makeover’ is still claimed to have ‘strongly heterosexualized framing’. Therefore, according to this perspective, ‘Vessey’s mermaid makeover’ can still be understood ‘as a powerful refusal of compulsory heterofuturity’ regardless of ‘its strongly heterosexualized framing’, but only ‘Through this lens’. Therefore, this understanding is facilitated 'Through

this lens'; this is an application. If 'this lens' is being used to 'understand Vessey's mermaid makeover', then this understanding cannot be unless it is done so 'Through this lens'. Therefore, this understanding is what can be got through this 'lens', but this 'lens' is not part of the understanding; this 'lens' is the secure object through which understanding comes.

Barounis continues:

Here, the physical pain the mermaid feels when she walks signifies not only the gendered pain of sexual initiation, but also the pain and discomfort some disabled people experience as they attempt to mold their bodies to fit the contours of an inaccessible environment. (Barounis: pp.196-197)

In this perspective, there are different types of 'pain', but this 'pain' is about physicality. Pain is also felt: 'the physical pain the mermaid feels'. So, 'the mermaid feels' this 'physical pain', and it is felt 'when she walks'. Therefore, this 'physical pain' is not something which is constant, but 'when she walks'. In this perspective, 'the mermaid' is the 'she' who 'walks', therefore mermaids can walk, but only insofar as this is framed as being 'Here', so this is specifically about this 'the mermaid' rather than other mermaids. However, this 'Here' applies to that which this 'physical pain' 'signifies', as it 'signifies not only the gendered pain of sexual initiation'. There is a shift in perspective, as 'pain' and 'sexual initiation' were about 'the "special female pain of traditional sexual initiation"', which 'For Dinnerstein, the pain of the mermaids new feet, like "sharp knives and piercing needles" can be understood as'. Whereas this was a 'can be understood as', this is now a 'signifies'; it is also 'the physical pain the mermaid feels when she walks', opposed to 'the pain of the mermaids new feet'. So, that which is signified, in

this perspective, is 'not only the gendered pain of sexual initiation', therefore there is a split through this signification, as there was with the understanding previously. In this signification, 'sexual initiation' is lacking in that it is no longer 'traditional', and this pain is no longer 'special' nor 'female', but 'gendered'. Through this 'not only', this is a 'pain' which 'signifies' multiple things; it is 'not only the gendered pain of sexual initiation', thus it 'signifies' something other to this 'pain'. Therefore, the 'pain' felt by 'the mermaid' is a signification for things which are other to itself. In this perspective, 'pain' is 'gendered' regarding 'sexual initiation'. However, this 'gendered pain' is not 'physical'; it is that which 'the physical pain' 'signifies'. Therefore, although this 'gendered pain of sexual initiation' is itself a type of 'pain', this is still about the signification of 'the physical pain the mermaid feels when she walks'; that which 'the mermaid feels' is a symbol for something which is other to 'the mermaid'.

Moreover, there is this 'pain' which is 'gendered' regarding 'sexual initiation', 'but also the pain and discomfort some disabled people experience'. In this perspective, there is another 'pain', besides that which is 'physical' and 'gendered', but this is still that which is signified by 'the physical pain the mermaid feels when she walks' through this 'not only'. Although this is 'pain', this is also 'discomfort' which accompanies this 'pain', but it is other to 'pain' as it is 'discomfort'. This is also 'the pain and discomfort' which 'some disabled people experience', therefore there is difference within the frame of this 'pain and discomfort' alone, as this is not all 'disabled people', but 'some'. Difference is therefore constituted regarding 'disabled people'; although sameness is constituted as this is a claim to 'disabled people', there is difference in 'some'. This is also the 'experience' of these 'some disabled people'. Therefore, 'pain and discomfort' is something which can be experienced, and this 'experience' is consequential, for it is 'as they attempt to mold their bodies to fit the contours of an inaccessible environment'. So, this is an 'attempt', therefore that is not to say that this is happening nor successful. Here, 'bodies' are that which can be moulded, but as this is an 'attempt to mold',

there is a limitation; in these attempts 'to mold their bodies', this 'pain and discomfort' is experienced, thus constituting this limit. Regardless of this limitation, this 'attempt to mold their bodies' is 'to fit the contours of an inaccessible environment'; there is an 'environment', therefore, which is 'inaccessible', yet there is a way to 'fit' into it. However, this is not necessarily fitting into this 'inaccessible environment' as it is 'to fit the contours of an inaccessible environment'. Therefore, 'an inaccessible environment' has 'contours' which 'bodies' can 'fit', but the ability for these 'bodies to fit' is brought into question by this very inaccessibility. '[B]odies' are thus that which can be moulded and fitted, and it is this moulding of these 'bodies' and fitting of these 'bodies' which is constructed as causality for this 'pain and discomfort'. This is therefore what these 'bodies' can do, and what is being done to them, rather than the 'bodies' themselves'; this is a lack of accessibility.

In 'Thumbelina', this notion of accessibility can be read through the giving of prosthetic 'wings' to Thumbelina:

From every flower appeared a little lady or gentleman, so beautiful and dainty it was a joy to look at them; and every one brought Thumbelina a present, but the best of all was a pair of beautiful wings from a large white fly. They were fastened upon Thumbelina's shoulders, and then she, too, could fly from flower to flower. (Kingsland: p.44)

In this perspective, the 'little lady or gentleman' which 'appeared' 'From every flower' is constituted as being 'so beautiful and dainty it was a joy to look at them'. Here, this 'lady or gentleman' is constituted by their littleness. However, there is a split in the construction of this 'little lady or gentleman', as the littleness cannot be contained within the claim to 'lady or

gentleman'. This 'little' is thus constituted as being other to the things which is subject to it: 'lady or gentleman'. This littleness is therefore in excess of this 'lady or gentleman', and, through this otherness, the meaning is thus deferred. This 'a little lady or gentleman' are that which 'From every flower appeared'. So, 'a little lady or gentleman' can appear, and they do so 'From every flower'. There are thus multiple appearances (through 'every') of that which is singular ('a little lady or gentleman'), thus there is a multiplicity of singularities. However, although there are multiple flowers, there is only 'a little lady or gentleman', thus there is a lack of individuality in terms of the 'every flower' and the 'a little lady or gentleman'. There is also a specificity in that this is 'a little lady or gentleman' which 'appeared'; it is one or the other in 'every flower'. Although there is this difference between 'little lady or gentleman', there is a shift in perspective as there is then the 'them' which were 'so dainty it was a joy to look at'. So, it is that, in this perspective, the 'little lady or gentleman' which 'appeared' 'From every flower' is constituted as being 'so beautiful and dainty it was a joy to look at them'.

In this perspective, there is a 'look', and this 'look' is 'at them'. There is direction to this 'look' as it is 'at them', but it cannot be read where this 'look' comes from; we can only read where it goes: 'at them'. With this notion of 'look', it is 'them' which are 'look[ed] at', and this 'look at them' is 'a joy'. So, 'look' can be constituted as having 'joy', but this 'joy' is other to the 'look', and it is 'them' which can and are looked 'at', according to this perspective. This 'so beautiful and dainty' is constituted as being why 'it was a joy to look at them', so 'a little lady or gentleman' is that which can be seen, and so can this 'beautiful and dainty'. There is a shift, as these 'a little lady or gentleman' are the 'every one' who 'brought Thumbelina a present'. However, 'the best of all' of these 'present[s]' 'was a pair of beautiful wings'. According to this perspective, 'a pair of beautiful wings' are a 'present', but not only are they a 'present', but 'the best of all'. There is a split in these 'beautiful wings', as they are 'wings' but also 'beautiful'. This 'beautiful' cannot be contained within this claim to 'wings' and are

other to the 'wings' in turn making them supplementary to 'wings'. If this 'beautiful' is supplementary, its meaning is thus deferred. This 'a pair of beautiful wings' is 'from a large white fly', so 'a large white fly is that which has 'a pair of beautiful wings'. However, these 'wings' are 'brought' to 'Thumbelina' as 'a present', thus this 'a large white fly' is that which lacks 'a pair of beautiful wings' as they are 'from' the 'fly'. This 'a large white fly' is therefore that which is other to these 'beautiful wings' as, although they are 'from' the 'fly', they are that which can be 'brought' to an other (Thumbelina), and then 'fastened upon Thumbelina's shoulders'. There is a further otherness with this 'a large white fly', as 'large' and 'white' are other to 'fly'. This 'large' and 'white' is thus supplementary to this 'fly' as there is a split between 'large' and 'fly' and a further split with 'white'. There is thus a deferral of meaning, as what this 'fly' is constructed as being, 'large white', is other to the 'fly', and in turn, this 'fly' lacks that which it is claimed to be: 'large white'.

There is a shift in 'wings', as they were 'from a white fly' and are then the 'They' which 'were fastened upon Thumbelina's shoulders'. These 'wings' are thus that which comes 'from' somewhere other, 'a large white fly', to 'Thumbelina's shoulders'. In this 'fastened upon', this is something other to 'her' which is being 'fastened upon her'. They also are 'fastened upon her shoulders', not 'her'. In this perspective, 'shoulders' are constituted as that which belongs to Thumbelina through 'Thumbelina's' but is not 'Thumbelina', so this is that which is hers, 'her shoulders', not her. There is thus a split between 'her' and 'shoulders', as 'shoulders' are not contained within this notion of 'her' as they are supplementary to 'her'. Therefore, 'her' is that which lacks 'shoulders', so there is an absence in what 'her' is, according to this claim. This 'fastened upon' is also done so by that which is other to 'Thumbelina'. Following this 'They were fastened upon Thumbelina's shoulders', it is so that 'and then she, too, could fly from flower to flower'. So, before this 'fastened', 'she' could not 'fly from flower to flower'; 'she' was unable 'to fly' but is then able to 'fly'. In this being 'she, too, could', it is so that

these 'little ladies or gentleman' can already 'fly from flower to flower', but 'she' could not. Therefore, Thumbelina has been 'brought' 'a present' which enables her to do that which they can already do; there was a lack of her ability to 'fly' but is then given the 'wings' that able her. So, in thinking about these 'little ladies or gentleman', 'she' is lacking until she has these 'wings' which are 'brought' to her as 'a present' and this is 'the best of all'.

In the following passage from 'The Little Mermaid', a division is constructed in the movement of 'she':

he took her by the hand and escorted her into the palace. Every step she took, as the witch had predicted, made her feel as if she were treading on sharp knives and piercing needles, but she willingly endured it. Hand in hand with the prince, she moved as lightly as a bubble. He and everyone else marvelled at the beauty of her graceful movements. She kept on dancing, even though it felt like she was treading on sharp knives every time her foot touched the ground. (Tatar: p.295)

This movement is 'as lightly as a bubble', therefore there is a split in the simile with 'as', thus a doubleness is constituted. If this is an 'as lightly as a bubble', then this movement is constituted as being 'lightly', but only insofar as it is 'as a bubble'. This movement is then 'graceful' as 'He and everyone else marvelled at the beauty of her graceful movements'. Therefore, there is a 'she moved' and a 'her graceful movements', thus there are two claims to movement with one in relation to 'she' and the other 'her'. These 'graceful movements' are that which are 'marvelled at', but it is not 'her graceful movements' as it is 'the beauty of'. Therefore, it is not the movement itself which is 'marvelled at', but that which is 'of' the movement. Thus, there is a division; this

is 'the beauty of her graceful movements', so there is a split between the thing itself and 'the beauty of'. It is this 'of' which is 'marvelled at'. So, it is 'she' who 'moved', and this is 'as', and it is 'her' 'movements' which are 'of'. Therefore, moving is always constituted as something other to itself in relation to 'she' and 'her', according to these perspectives.

This split in movement and body is further constituted in 'he took her by the hand and escorted her into the palace'. In this perspective, there is a construction of movement in 'took' and 'escorted'. Although this 'took' and 'escorted' is by the 'he', it is 'her' who is subject to this taking and escorting, therefore this movement is also hers, even though it is 'he' who initiates. In this 'took' and 'escorted' of the 'her', it is 'he' who is active and thus in control. This 'took her' is 'by the hand', so this is not her 'hand' but 'the hand', therefore it is 'her' which is 'took' and 'escorted', but this is done so through 'the hand'. Thus, there is a split between 'the hand' and 'her', as although 'he took her by the hand', 'her' is other to 'the hand'. In this perspective, there is a repetition of hands. With this 'Hand in hand', hands are other to hands, but there is also a repetition of 'hand' which undercuts the taking of woman by man, but only insofar as there is an 'in', that a 'hand' is 'in' a 'hand'. Both 'she' and 'the prince' have a 'hand', and if a 'hand' is 'in a hand', then there is an equality between the 'she' and 'the prince' through 'with'. As they are both constituted within this 'Hand in hand', there is no difference between the 'hand' which is his, nor the 'hand' which is hers. However, there is an otherness in 'Hand in hand', for 'Hand' is other to 'hand' in that they are both constituted. Therefore, there is a split and a doubleness in this repetition of hands.

Moreover, there is a further construction of a split, and thus a division, in 'She kept on dancing, even though it felt like she was treading on sharp knives every time her foot touched the ground'. In this perspective, there is pain associated with 'her foot'. This 'foot' is constituted as hers, therefore there is ownership of this 'foot'. However, there is a split, as it is the 'She' who

'kept on dancing', and it is 'she' who 'was treading on sharp knives', but it is 'her foot' which 'touched the ground'. Therefore, it is 'her' who suffers the consequences of the doing of the 'she' as the claim to 'her' is different to the claim to 'she'. There is also a split between 'her' and 'foot'; although this 'foot' is constituted as being hers, 'foot' is other to 'her'. Thus, there is a division; although this pain is implicated in the 'treading' of 'she', it is 'her foot' which 'touched the ground'. This 'her foot' is singular, so this is one 'foot' which belongs to 'her'. As this 'her foot' 'touched the ground', feet can touch, and this 'touched' is multiple as it is 'every time'. What also constitutes this 'every time' is the 'felt like she was treading on sharp knives', therefore this 'treading on sharp knives' is that which is 'felt' by 'her foot'. So, 'her foot' can feel, and what it feels is 'like she was treading on sharp knives'. However, this feeling is 'every time her foot touched the ground', therefore this 'felt' is conditional upon 'her foot' touching 'the ground'. Feeling is therefore connected to touch, in this perspective, and this is channelled through 'her foot', as 'her foot' is that which can both feel and touch as well as tread. However, this is a 'felt like', therefore, she was not 'treading on sharp knives', and this is consequential of 'She kept on dancing, even though'. So, this is an 'even though it felt like', therefore there is a questioning as to why 'She kept on dancing' if this is why 'it felt like she was treading on knives'. Although the 'dancing' is the cause for the 'felt like she was treading on knives', it is not exactly, as it is the 'every time her foot touched the ground'. Therefore 'her foot touched the ground' is linked to the 'dancing', and this is a 'kept on'. Thus, there is a continuity; this is not a danced which 'felt like', but a 'kept on dancing, even though'. So, this is a 'dancing', a 'treading' and a 'touched', all of which are subject to 'every time her foot'. It is therefore 'her foot' which is doing these things, so this is not just 'her foot', but that which 'her foot' is doing. This is therefore never implicitly about the thing itself, 'her foot'; this is the action of said thing, 'her foot'.

In the perspective, there is a further construction of pain in association with movement in 'Every step she took, as the witch had predicted, made her feel as if she were treading on

sharp knives and piercing needles, but she willingly endured it'. This 'took' is the 'took' of 'she', rather than 'he', therefore there is a different taking to that whereby 'he took her by the hand'. This is also a different taking as this 'took' is of 'step[s]', whereas 'took' was 'by the hand'. Therefore, hands and steps can both be taken, but, in this perspective, 'hand' is that which is taken 'by' 'he' and 'step' is that which is taken by 'she'. However, in 'he took', 'he' is in control, which is not the case with the 'she took' as it is 'as the witch had predicted'. So, there is a 'took' against a 'took', where one of them is directed by another and the other is not. But the taking of steps is also in accordance with the prediction by another, as although it is 'she' who 'took' the steps, this is still something of 'the witch'; the steps are those of 'she', but they are 'as the witch had predicted'. Therefore, his taking can stand alone, but her steps cannot. These steps 'made her feel as if she were treading on sharp knives and piercing needles', and this is what 'the witch had predicted'. Through the claim to 'made', this is both consequential and definite; the taking of the steps are claimed as the cause. This pain is also a 'made her', thus there is a lack of freedom. There is also an infiniteness in 'Every'; 'Every step' is making 'her feel as if she were treading on sharp knives and piercing needles'. It is therefore the steps which 'she took' which have the consequence of pain. However, this is an 'as if she were', therefore she is not 'treading on sharp knives and piercing needles', but that is how she feels. So, there are no 'sharp knives and piercing needles'. Although there are no 'knives' and 'needles', there are still 'knives' and 'needles' in this claim, and these 'knives' and 'needles' are 'sharp' and 'piercing'. Therefore, these 'knives' and 'needles' are characterised by how they 'feel'; this is how 'Every step she took' feels, thus it is the taking which is painful. However, this pain is that which 'she willingly endured'. There is a split and a doubleness in this 'willingly endured', as this is that which 'she' 'endured', yet she does so 'willingly'. This is a repetition, as there was previously a claim to 'If you are willing to endure all that' (Kingsland: p.293). So, this was an 'If', yet this 'she willingly endured

it' is that which has been done. This very repetition of 'willingly endured' returns to the 'hand in hand' as repetition; there is a split in 'willingly' and 'endured'.

Shame

‘Shame requires an audience’³⁷

Small children are essentially without shame, and at some periods of their earliest years show an unmistakable satisfaction in exposing their bodies, with especial emphasis upon the sexual parts.³⁸

In this perspective, ‘children’ are constructed in terms of their ‘smallness’. This ‘small’ is what these ‘children’ are, yet this ‘small’ is also that which is other to ‘children’; the claim to ‘children’ cannot contain this ‘small’ and is therefore lacking in terms of ‘small’, according to this perspective. If ‘children’ are ‘small’, then ‘children’ are other to what they are: ‘small’. This otherness of ‘small’ to ‘children’ constitutes a split in this construction of ‘small children’, and there is thus an implicit deferral. If ‘Small children are’ constituted as being ‘essentially without shame’, then ‘Small children’ are constructed in terms of a lack. If ‘Small children’ are lacking in their being ‘essentially without shame’, and they are also lacking in being split in their very constitution as ‘Small children’, then what we have is a lack within a lack. There is also a split within a split, as in being ‘essentially without shame’, what ‘Small children are’ is that which is something other to themselves; they *are* ‘Small children’, but what these ‘Small

³⁷ Jacqueline Rose, *On Not Being Able to Sleep* (London: Random House, 2003) p.1.

³⁸ Sigmund Freud, *Three Essays on The Theory of Sexuality*, trans. James Strachey (London: Imago Publishing Company, 2011) p.70.

children are' is 'essentially without shame. If it is that 'Small children are essentially without shame', then 'shame' is that which 'Small children are essentially without'. In this being 'essentially without shame', there is a level of lacking in terms of this 'shame'; these 'Small children' do not completely lack 'shame' as, according to this claim, they are 'essentially without it'. Therefore, this is not a whole 'without' as it is 'essentially'. As this is a perspective on these 'Small children', this 'shame' which they 'are essentially without' is known to that which is other to these 'children', and it is known to be somewhat lacking; there is a presence of this 'shame' which is, 'essentially', absent. As well as being 'essentially without shame', these 'Small children' also 'show an unmistakable satisfaction in exposing their bodies', but this is conditional upon it being 'at some periods of their earliest years'. So, as well as being 'small', these 'children' have 'earliest years', as they constituted as being 'their[s]' and these 'earliest years' have 'periods'. Therefore, this showing of 'unmistakable satisfaction' is conditional to both the 'smallness' of the 'children' and these 'some periods of their earliest years'.

As well as 'earliest years', 'bodies' are constituted as being 'their[s]'. In this being 'their bodies', there is split in what 'bodies' are. If these are 'their bodies', but this 'their' exists outside of this claim to 'bodies', there is an otherness and thus an implicit split. If these 'bodies' cannot be contained within this 'their', then what 'their' is, is that which lacks 'bodies'. There is thus a deferral of these 'bodies' in terms of this 'their'. As well as 'their', these 'their bodies' are that which can be exposed, and this 'exposing' is 'with especial emphasis upon the sexual parts. So, these 'their bodies' have 'parts', and the parts with 'especial emphasis upon', in this perspective, are those which are constituted as being 'sexual'. However, as with 'their bodies', there is a split in this very construction of 'sexual parts'; not only are 'parts' that of 'their bodies', but they are also 'sexual'. Yet, this 'sexual' is not something which can be contained within these 'parts'. This notion of 'sexual' is thus other to the 'parts' which are claimed to be

‘sexual’, just as ‘parts’ are other to ‘bodies’. There is thus a deferral through this implicit split of ‘sexual’ and ‘parts’, as although these ‘bodies’ have these ‘the sexual parts’ they remain other to the ‘bodies’ themselves. It is also important to note that ‘bodies’ are ‘their’ yet ‘sexual parts’ are ‘the’. There is thus a notion of ownership when it comes to ‘bodies’ which is lacking in terms of ‘the sexual parts’ which, in turn, constitutes ‘the sexual parts’ of ‘their bodies’ as being something other to that which is theirs.

Furthermore, these ‘the sexual parts’ are constituted as ‘parts’ ‘with especial emphasis upon’. In this perspective, there is ‘especial emphasis upon’ this notion of exposure when it comes to ‘the sexual parts’ of these ‘their bodies’. As stated previously, there is a difference between the claim to ‘bodies’ and ‘the sexual parts’, but there is a further difference through this notion of ‘especial emphasis’. Although ‘bodies’ as a ‘whole’ can be exposed with ‘unmistakable satisfaction’, this ‘especial emphasis upon the sexual parts’ fragments further these parts from other parts of ‘their bodies’. However, it is so that these children ‘show an unmistakable satisfaction’, so this is not what is; it is that which is shown. It is through this ‘show’ that this is known from a perspective this is other to these ‘Small children’ as this is a perspective on them. So, this ‘unmistakable satisfaction’ is that which ‘Small children’ are known to ‘show’ ‘at some periods of their earliest years’. There is also a lack of specificity in this being ‘some periods’ and also ‘earliest years’; there is a lack of consistency if it is that this is only ‘some periods’ and although this is ‘some periods of their earliest years’, again, there is a lack of specificity as to what ‘earliest years’ are.

In thinking about the passage above, in her book *On Not Being Able to Sleep*, Jacqueline Rose reads:

Freud famously said that small children are “essentially without shame” (they show an

“unmistakable satisfaction” in exposing their bodies) [...] What the little child exposes to us is the precarious nature of our ethics - even innocent exposure or self-exposure, Freud hints, contains a dimension of mastery in itself³⁹

This claim that ‘small children’ are ‘essentially without shame’ is highlighted by Rose and the inclusion of ‘(they show an “unmistakable satisfaction” in exposing their bodies)’ being in brackets, is a claim of Freud’s perspective from Rose’s perspective. This notion of ‘exposing’ is repeated in ‘What the little child exposes to us is the precarious nature of our ethics’, and again with ‘even innocent exposure or self-exposure’. There is a shift in the claim to ‘exposure’ as there is that which ‘the little child exposes us to’ but there is then that which ‘Freud hints’: that ‘even innocent exposure or self-exposure’ ‘contains a dimension of mastery in itself’. Therefore, in this perspective on Freud’s perspective, there is a ‘hint[s]’ of this notion of ‘mastery’ in these different claims to ‘exposure’. If this is so, then this is not just about ‘small children’ and their ‘exposing of their bodies’, but also the ‘dimension of mastery’ that is contained. So, if there is dimension of mastery in this exposure, how can we read this notion of mastery? In her book, *Literature and Psychoanalysis*, Shoshana Felman claims:

In its efforts to master literature, psychoanalysis ... can thus but blind itself: blind itself in order to deny its own castration, in order not to see, and not to read, literature's subversion of the very possibility of psychoanalytical mastery. The irony is that, in the

³⁹ Jacqueline Rose, *On Not Being Able to Sleep* (London: Random House, 2003) p.2. All further references will be given in parenthesis.

very act of judging literature from the height of its masterly position, psychoanalysis ... in effect rejoins within the structure of the text the masterly position⁴⁰

In light of this, I will now read two passages from Lewis Carroll's *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland*:

'You ought to be ashamed of yourself,' said Alice, 'a great girl like you,' (she might well say this), 'to go on crying in this way! Stop this moment, I tell you!' But she went on all the same, shedding gallons of tears, until there was a large pool all round her, about four inches deep, and reaching half down the hall.⁴¹

In the passage above, there is a claim to "'You ought to be ashamed of yourself," said Alice'. In this perspective, there is a shaming of 'self', but this is 'yourself' and 'you', so it is that which is other to the 'Alice' which 'said'. It is the 'you' who 'ought to be ashamed' and it is 'yourself' that this 'ashamed' 'ought to be of'. This bracketed '(she might well say this', is in the perspective on the 'she' rather than that on the 'said' of 'Alice'. These '()' constitute this as being other to the 'said'. So, this claim on the 'she' is from that which is other to the perspective of the 'said'. There is a difference between 'I' who tells and 'you' which is told. This 'Stop this moment, I tell you!' is a telling within a saying. This 'ashamed' is about 'to go on crying in this way'; so not 'crying' but to do so 'in this way' and 'to go on'. This is 'You ought'; so there isn't actually an 'ashamed'

⁴⁰ Shoshana Felman, 'Turning the Screw of Interpretation', *Literature and Psychoanalysis: The Question of Reading Otherwise*, ed. Shoshana Felman (London: John Hopkins University Press, 1989) pp.94-207 (p.199).

⁴¹ Lewis Carroll, *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland and Through the Looking-Glass*, ed. Peter Hunt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p.17. All further references will be given in parenthesis.

here, only the potential for there to be, as well as the notion that there should be this 'ashamed'. A claim to shame but always from somewhere other; this is a claimed said from somewhere other to the said; it is a perspective on the saying of the potential 'shame'. This 'you' who 'ought to be ashamed of yourself' is 'a great girl like you'; there is this split between this girlness and the 'you'. This 'girlness' is constituted as being 'great', so this greatness is something of the 'girl' which is necessary to be claimed outside of this girlness, according to this perspective. There is also a shift in the claim to 'you', as there is the 'you' who 'ought', 'like you' and 'I tell you', all within this 'said Alice', according to ". If this 'ashamed' is of this 'to go on crying in this way', not just the 'crying' itself, then this shame is about a repetition. There is a further continuation of this in 'But she went on all the same', thus there is a 'sameness' as well as a repetition in this 'went on'. That which 'ought to be ashamed of' is 'to go on crying in this way', so there is something about this 'to go on crying in this way' which one 'ought to be ashamed of'. However, is it the 'to go on', the 'crying' or the 'in this way' that this 'ashamed of' 'ought to be' of?

There is a further claim to 'You ought to be ashamed of yourself'; however, these are different claims as they are in different perspectives and what constitutes each claim is different:

'You ought to be ashamed of yourself for asking such a simple question,' added the Gryphon; and then they both sat silent and looked at poor Alice, who felt ready to sink into the earth. (Carroll: p.84)

There is a repetition of 'You ought to be ashamed of yourself', but this is an 'added the Gryphon', rather than 'said Alice'. Therefore, although this has been claimed previously with 'said Alice', this cannot be a repetition as it is from a different perspective. This 'ought to be ashamed' is 'for asking such a simple question', rather than 'to go on crying in this way'. So, the shame of 'crying' was about a 'to go on in this way', a continuation, whereas this is a singular 'asking'. Thus the 'ashamed' of the 'yourself' which the 'You ought to be' is 'of this repetition, not the act itself, in the perspective on the 'said' of 'Alice', whereas, in the perspective on the 'added' of 'the Gryphon', this is the only claim to an 'asking' of 'such a simple question' is relation to shame.

Thus this 'crying' and 'asking' are both things that the 'You ought to be ashamed of yourself' for, in their respective perspectives. This is a perspective on a saying of a potential shame; this is a perspective on the Gryphon's perspective on what the 'You ought to be'; this is all from an otherness. However, in both instances, the only claim to shame is an 'you ought to be ashamed', thus there is only a presence of shame in that this is what the respective 'you' 'ought to be'. Therefore, there is a lack of shame, yet there is still a presence of 'shame' in this 'absence'

Returning to Rose, it is claimed that 'People without shame are merciless. Rather like the small child.' (Rose: p3). Is this to say that this 'like the small child' is about a lack of 'shame', or is that being 'merciless' is 'like the small child'? Rose continues:

Guilt, it is said, always arises in relation to others; whereas with shame it is your narcissism, the ideal you like to nurture about yourself, that you betray (psychologists describe shame as the only affect which works internally, passing from one to another part of the self) (Rose: p.4)

In this perspective, there is a thinking about the difference between guilt and shame. If 'Guilt' is that which 'always arises in relation to others', according to this 'it is said', then an otherness is necessary in the construction of 'Guilt'. If 'the Gryphon' is that which is other to 'Alice', which can be read in the passage above, and it is the claimed 'added' of 'the Gryphon' which can be read as 'reason' for the 'felt ready to sink into the earth' of 'Alice', then could guilt also be read in light of this?

So, in reading Rose and Freud, we have thought about 'shame' (and lack thereof) in terms of the child and the body, but what about the body and that which is not the child? In *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, Derrida claims: 'He would be a man only to the extent that he was able to be naked, that is to say, to be ashamed, to know himself to be ashamed because he is no longer naked' (Derrida: p.5). In this perspective, this 'being ashamed' is about being a 'man', and this 'nakedness' is that which constitutes the 'shame', according to this claim. In this 'was able to be', this is about ability – the ability to be or not be 'naked'. If 'to be naked' is 'to be ashamed' then:

The animal, therefore is not naked because it is naked. It doesn't feel its own nudity. There is no nudity "in nature." There is only the sentiment, the affect, the (conscious or unconscious) experience of existing in nakedness. Because it *is* naked, without *existing* in nakedness, the animal neither feels nor sees itself naked. And therefore it isn't naked. (Derrida: p.4)

In this perspective, 'nudity' is about 'feeling' and that which is 'its own'. There is split in this notion of 'its own nudity', as 'nudity' is other to both the 'its' of the 'animal' and this claim to 'own'. If 'nudity' is other to the 'own' which it is constitutes as being, then this 'nudity' is

supplementary and thus in excess. There is a deferral of meaning as this 'nudity' must reside outside of this 'own', thus there is this implicit lack of 'nudity' in terms of one's 'own'. So, 'in nature', there is a lack regarding 'nudity', yet 'nudity' is implicit in this very lack; there must be for there to be this lack. As 'the animal neither feels nor sees itself naked', it 'therefore' 'isn't naked'. It does not 'feel' nor 'see' 'itself' as, and therefore is not. A lack of feeling and seeing thus constitutes a lack of nakedness, rather than a state of being. This feeling and seeing, however, is only so in terms of 'itself' as 'naked', yet it still 'is naked', according to this perspective. 'it is naked', but this is 'without existing in nakedness', so it is this lack of 'existing' which constitutes its neither feeling nor seeing. Thus, here, 'it *is* naked', yet in the animals neither feeling nor seeing of itself, it therefore isn't 'naked'. However, 'At least that is what is thought'.

5. Hair, nakedness, and what it means to read

I will now return to fairytales in reading 'The Little Mermaid'. I will be working through the text as far as I can go to problematise identity. There is always a limit, the comfort of the symbol, the certainty of pain. Here, I will read through what this text has to say about truth, nakedness, and meaning, particularly through constructions of 'hair'. I will now return to the text and further explore these ideas of identity, body, and difference, and, finally, this notion of 'what does it mean to read'?

She had as charming a pair of white legs as any young girl could want. But she was quite naked, so she wrapped herself in her long, flowing hair. (Tatar: p.295)

In the narrative perspective, there is a construction of nakedness in 'But she was quite naked, so she wrapped herself in her long, flowing hair'. There is a repetition of 'she'; however, these are different shes, as there is a 'she' which 'was quite naked' and a 'she' which 'wrapped', and each 'she' is a retrospective 'she', as this is a 'was' and a 'wrapped'. It follows that there is a 'naked' which 'was quite', thus nakedness is something which 'was'. Therefore, this is a past nakedness. This nakedness is 'quite', so this is not an absolute nakedness. Thus, that which nakedness is, is constituted as not only being past, but also in excess; there is a deferral in the 'quite' of the nakedness. This 'quite naked' is constituting 'so she wrapped herself in her long, flowing hair'. That is to say that this nakedness is claimed as reason, in this perspective, for the 'wrapped herself' is through both the 'so' and the 'But'.

There is a split in 'she' and 'herself', as it is 'she' who 'wrapped' but it is 'herself' who is 'wrapped', and what 'she wrapped herself in' is 'her long, flowing hair'. Therefore, it is the 'she' who 'wrapped' the 'herself' who is 'wrapped in', and the 'her' who has the 'long flowing hair' in which the 'herself' is 'wrapped'. There is a repetition in this perspective in the 'her', but there is a difference as the first 'her' is about 'self' in 'herself'. Thus, that which is 'wrapped' in the 'so' of the 'was quite naked' is 'herself'. In this perspective, 'hair' is that which is 'long, flowing', and it is constituted as being hers. Therefore, in this perspective, nakedness is constituted as something which 'she was', but 'hair' is something which is hers. If nakedness is what 'she was' and 'hair' is in excess of 'she', then 'hair' is not part of nakedness but is a covering up. Hair is therefore separate from the nakedness in that it is the thing which the nakedness is 'wrapped in'. Here, nakedness requires covering, thus that which 'she was' is the thing to be covered. Therefore, lack is implicated in this nakedness. However, as this is a past nakedness, this is also a past 'wrapped in', thus this is a past covering up of a past thing to be covered.

So, if nakedness requires covering, then nakedness must be that which is uncovered; it is a revelation. If this is about an uncovering, then it is, in turn, about a denuding. In 'The Purveyor of Truth', it is claimed that:

one has taken as essential what actually remains an after-the-fact construction, a garment, a disguise, a material added to the literal *Stoff* precisely in order to mask its nudity.

The denuding of this *Stoff*, the discovery of the semantic material - such would be the end of analytic deciphering. By denuding the meaning behind the formal disguises, by undoing the work, analytic deciphering exhibits the primary content beneath the secondary revisions.⁴²

In this perspective, there is a construction of 'nudity' as being that which can be masked. Here, there is a multiplicity of what 'nudity' can be masked by; 'a garment, a disguise, a material'. However, it is not just these things, as these are that which are 'added to the literal *Stoff*', and this is 'precisely in order to'. So, 'to mask its nudity' is about precision, regarding this 'the literal *Stoff*', and there is also a claim to intention with 'in order to', thus there is a knowledge in this masking. As this is a masking of 'its nudity', this is the 'nudity' of 'the literal *Stoff*', thus 'nudity' is something which 'the literal *Stoff*' has. Therefore, there is something about ownership in 'nudity'; this is not simply 'nudity', as this is a perspective on the 'nudity' of the it which is 'the literal *Stoff*'. Thus, there is a specificity in this claim to 'nudity'. There is also a construction of a dependence regarding 'nudity', as 'nudity' cannot stand alone in this perspective as it is the 'nudity' of this 'the literal *Stoff*'. Therefore, according to this perspective, the ownership of 'nudity' cannot be escaped, as it is 'its nudity'.

Furthermore, there is a construction of literality in this '*Stoff*,' as it is 'the literal *Stoff*', and this is claimed in relation to this masking of 'its nudity'. So, if 'nudity' is the thing which is to be masked, whether that be through 'a garment, a disguise, a material', then there is something about gain here; this is an 'added to'. Therefore, lack is implicated in this 'nudity' as 'the literal *Stoff*' requires something other to itself 'in order to mask its nudity'. Through this

⁴² Jacques Derrida, 'The Purveyor of Truth' in *The Purloined Poe*, ed. by John P. Miller and Willian J. Richardson (London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1988) pp.173-212 (p.175). All further references will be given in parenthesis.

masking, there is a claim to a covering; this is a masking of 'its nudity' through 'a material added' from that which is other to the thing which is masked: the 'nudity' of 'the literal *Stoff*'. Therefore, there is something in this specific 'nudity' which requires a covering; this 'nudity' only exists in its need to be masked. This 'nudity' is only 'nudity' in the need for a lack of 'nudity'; there is 'nudity' so that it can be masked. However, through this need for a lack of 'nudity', there is 'nudity'. In this very masking, there is a revealing of 'nudity'; there is still 'nudity' here, it is just covered, but in the very claim to covering this 'nudity', there is 'nudity'. Thus, through this 'nudity' there is a split between 'the literal *Stoff*' and 'its nudity'; 'nudity' is that which is other to 'the literal *Stoff*' as it is the 'nudity' which is masked, not the '*Stoff*'.

However, there is a shift in perspective regarding '*Stoff*', as there is a claim to 'The denuding of this *Stoff*'. Therefore, there is a difference between these two claims to '*Stoff*'; 'this *Stoff*' is not constructed in terms of its literality and is instead about 'denuding'. So, if this is about the 'denuding of this *Stoff*', then 'this *Stoff*' must have been covered in some sense before this 'denuding', otherwise it could not be denuded. Thus, there is an uncovering of 'this *Stoff*', whereas the previous '*Stoff*', 'the literal *Stoff*', was about an 'added to'. Therefore, this was an 'added', but is now a taking away. So, according to these perspectives on claims to '*Stoff*', there is both a covering and an uncovering. However, it is the 'nudity' which is covered. Therefore, 'the literal *Stoff*' is not covered; it is the covering of the 'nudity' through that which is 'added to the literal *Stoff*'. So, the nudity is covered through that which is other to 'the literal *Stoff*', and 'this *Stoff*' is uncovered through this 'denuding'. Therefore, 'this *Stoff*' is only covered in the sense that it is then uncovered; it is only the 'nudity' which is claimed to be masked.

Furthermore, this 'denuding of this *Stoff*' is constituted as the 'such' which 'would be the end of analytic deciphering', but only so far as it is 'The denuding of this *Stoff*'. There is a

specificity in this 'denuding'; this is not just 'denuding' as it is 'of this *Stoff*' which is implicated in this 'denuding'. However, this is a 'would be the end of analytic deciphering', thus there is a conditionality to this 'denuding'; this is a retrospective claim to a 'denuding' which has not yet happened. There is then a shift in the claim to 'denuding', as it was the 'denuding of this *Stoff*', whereas it is now 'denuding the meaning behind the formal disguises'. Therefore, 'this *Stoff*' and 'meaning' are both that which can be denuded. However, the 'denuding of this *Stoff*' is constituted by 'such would be', therefore this is something which has not yet happened. Thus, 'this *Stoff*' has not yet been denuded. In the case of 'the meaning', this is a 'By denuding' which 'exhibits', therefore this claim is not dependent upon a conditional. So, in this perspective, 'denuding' is about 'meaning', and this 'meaning' is that which is 'behind the formal disguises'. Here, 'meaning' is constituted as that which has a place; it is 'behind'. Therefore, there are layers; if 'meaning' is 'behind', then these 'formal disguises' are that which are in front of, or mask, 'meaning'. Thus, as 'nudity' is masked, as is 'meaning'. Although 'meaning' and its place is constituted in this perspective, this is precisely not about 'meaning' as being 'behind', as it is about the 'denuding' of this 'meaning'; there is a revelation here. However, even in its 'denuding', this 'meaning' is still 'the meaning behind the formal disguises', thus a covering is implicit in the very act of its uncovering.

So, not only is this an uncovering in this 'denuding', there is also an uncovering in 'analytic deciphering exhibits the primary content beneath the secondary revisions'. There is another claim to position in this perspective; whereas 'the meaning' was 'behind the formal disguises', here 'the primary content' is 'beneath the secondary revisions'. This 'primary content' is that which 'analytic deciphering exhibits', so this is an exhibiting of that which is 'beneath'. These 'the secondary revisions' are therefore that which is covering 'the primary content,' as this 'primary content' is 'beneath'. So, this is an exhibiting of that which is 'beneath,' and this is so 'By denuding', but also 'by undoing'. Therefore, 'the meaning behind the formal

disguises' is denuded, and 'work' is undone, and this is done so 'By' 'analytic deciphering'. So, 'analytic deciphering' is that which denudes, yet 'The denuding this *Stoff*, the discovery of the semantic material' is that which 'would be end of analytic deciphering'. Therefore, the very thing which 'would be the end of analytic deciphering' is the thing that 'analytic deciphering' does, through the claim to 'By', which, in turn, is necessary to 'exhibit[s] the primary content beneath'. Thus, these claims to denuding are all constituted as that which is 'behind' and 'beneath'; that which is covered. Therefore, according to these perspectives, 'the literal *Stoff*' possesses the potential to be nude, and 'this *Stoff*' possesses the potential to be denuded. In turn, 'meaning' is also that which is denuded, thus there is more to 'meaning' than just 'meaning'; it is that which is to be uncovered.

With this notion of deferred meaning in mind, we can now return to Andersen: 'She covered her hair and chest with sea foam so that no one could see her' (Tatar: p.289). Although this is a covering, difference is constituted; in the previous Andersen passage, it was about a nakedness; here it is not. Also, in the covering of her nakedness, it was 'her long flowing hair' which was doing the covering through 'wrapped herself', whereas in this perspective, 'her hair' is that which is to be 'covered'. In covering 'her hair and chest', seeing is prevented: 'so that no one could see her'. According to this perspective, it is only 'her hair and chest' which needs to be 'covered' to achieve this lack of seeing. Previously, it was 'her long, flowing hair' which covered 'herself'; it was something of hers. However, here it is the 'sea foam' which is facilitating the 'covered', thus it is something other to 'her'. In this perspective, it is that which is hers, 'hair and chest', which require covering. Furthermore, there is a lack of seeing here, but it is a 'so that no one could see her'; although this is a not seeing, to know this a perspective on 'her' is required. It is 'She' who 'covered', but it is 'her hair and chest' and 'no one could see her', therefore there is a split between that which is 'She' and that which is 'her'. This is not about the 'hair and chest' itself; it is only in so much that they are the thing to be 'covered'

to prevent the seeing of 'her'. Therefore, this is a 'so that no one could see her'; this is not about not seeing 'her hair and chest'; they are 'covered' so that 'her' cannot be seen.

She tied her long flowing hair tightly around her head so that the polyps wouldn't be able to grab hold of it. Then she folded her arms across her chest and darted forward like a fish shooting through the water, right in among the hideous polyps that reached out to snatch her with their nimble arms and fingers. She noticed how each of the sea polyps had caught something and was holding it fast with a hundred little arms that were like hoops of iron (Tatar: p.293)

This notion of hair and covering is further constituted in 'She tied her long flowing hair tightly around her head'. In this perspective, there is another repetition of 'hair', and this 'hair' is that which is 'tied'. There is a shift in perspective, as 'hair' was 'her long, flowing hair' in which she 'wrapped herself', and then it was that which 'She covered' 'with sea foam'. Therefore, 'hair' can be 'wrapped', 'covered', and 'tied'. With 'wrapped herself', this was a covering up of her nakedness with 'hair', whereas this is a 'tied' which is 'tightly around her head'. Although there are these differences, the 'hair' is still constituted as being 'long' and 'flowing', thus this is something which the 'hair' retains in both perspectives. However, as with 'She covered her hair and chest with sea foam', there is a split; there is a division between 'She' and the 'hair' which is constituted as hers, thus there is this implicit doubleness. In all three perspectives, this 'hair' is that of 'her'; although the 'hair' retains its 'herness', it also remains other to this 'her' throughout. In this perspective, 'hair' can be 'tied' and this is done so by 'She', regardless of it being 'her long flowing hair', thus there is this split between that which is 'She' and that which

is 'her'. This 'tied' is done so 'tightly around her head', thus constituting this 'hair' as that which can be 'around her head' as well as that which can be 'tied' 'tightly'. This 'tied' therefore constructs a positioning of 'hair' and 'head' in relation to one another; 'hair' is that which can be 'around her head', and 'her head' has an 'around' for 'her hair' to go, but only in that it is 'tied' 'tightly' by 'She', according to this perspective. So, if 'hair' and 'head' are both constituted as being that of 'her', there is this split between not only 'her' and 'hair', but also 'her' and 'head'. This notion of division is further constituted through this 'tied' which is of the 'She', thus there is this implicit otherness. Furthermore, this 'tied her long flowing hair tightly around her head' is 'so that the polyps wouldn't be able to grab hold of it'. In this perspective, there is a shift, as 'her hair' is then the 'it' which 'the polyps wouldn't be able to grab hold of'. Through this claim to 'so that', there is a claim to reason for the 'tied her long flowing hair tightly around her head', thus there is something in this 'tied' 'tightly around her head' which prevents 'the polyps' from being 'able to grab hold of it'. However, in this constitution of 'the polyps wouldn't be able to grab hold of it', there must be this ableness for them 'to grab hold of it', just not in this perspective where 'She tied her long flowing hair tightly around her head'. Thus, in this perspective, 'hair' can be 'tied' and because of this 'tied', 'the polyps' cannot 'grab hold of it'.

Whereas 'hair' can be 'tied', in this perspective, 'arms' can be 'folded'. As with 'She tied her long flowing hair', there is a split in 'she folded her arms'. This division is constituted, as 'arms' are other to the 'her'. It is 'she' who 'folded', so there is also a split between that which is of 'she' and that which is of 'her'. There is a shift in perspective, as 'she' was that who 'tied', but 'she' is then that who 'folded', thus with 'she' comes action. This is a past action, as this is a retrospective perspective, thus this is a past 'She' who 'tied' and a past 'she' who 'folded' from a perspective which is other. So, in this perspective, 'hair' is that which can be 'tied' and 'arms' can be 'folded', and it is 'her arms' which are constituted as being 'folded', as was 'her hair' 'tied'. In this perspective, this 'folded her arms' is 'across her chest', therefore 'chest' is also constituted

as being that of 'her', thus 'hair', 'arms', and 'chest' are all constructed within these claims to 'her'. Therefore, although it is 'she' who is active, it is 'her' to whom these 'hair', 'arms', and 'chest' are constituted. This 'chest' is hers, and 'she folded her arms across' this 'her chest'. Therefore, 'her chest' has an 'across' which the 'she' can fold 'her arms across'. '[A]rms', when 'folded', can be 'across her chest', thus there is a layering; there is a layering in 'her arms' being 'folded', and then another layer with the 'across her chest'. Therefore, there is both a division and an addition; there is a division in the split of both 'arms' and 'chest' being other to the 'her', but there is also an addition of 'arms' being 'across' this 'chest'. In this perspective, this 'she folded her arms across her chest' is subject to 'Then', thus this is after 'She tied her long flowing hair tightly around her head so that the polyps wouldn't be able to grab hold of it'. Through this 'Then', there is something sequential; there is the notion of order, or process, in this perspective, as this 'Then' situates 'she folded her arms' as being after 'She tied her long flowing hair'.

Furthermore, there is a continuation of this sequence through 'and', for 'she folded her arms across her chest and darted forward like a fish'. In this perspective, there is a division between 'she' and 'fish'. In 'she folded her arms across her chest and darted forward like a fish', 'she' is constituted as other to this 'fish'; there is a likeness to this 'fish', but 'she' is not 'a fish', only 'like'. This likeness to 'a fish' is in the 'darted forward'. Thus, it is through this action of 'darted forward' that this 'like a fish' is constituted. So, if this 'darted forward' is 'like a fish', then 'a fish' must be that which can dart 'forward', according to this perspective. This 'darted forward' is 'like a fish shooting through the water', thus this likeness to 'a fish' is implicated in the 'shooting through the water'; this is not only a likeness to 'a fish', but to the 'shooting through the water' of this 'fish'. Therefore, through the 'and', this 'darted forward like a fish' is consequential of the 'she folded her arms across her chest'; this 'she folded her arms across her chest' allows for this 'darted forward like a fish shooting through the water'. In this perspective, the positioning of 'hair', 'arms', and 'chest' have implications for this 'like'; this sequence allows

for the likeness to 'a fish shooting through the water'. However, this is only a 'like' in the movement of 'she'; 'she' remains other to this 'fish' for 'she' is not 'a fish shooting through the water'.

Moreover, there is a directionality to this movement of 'like a fish shooting through the water', as it is 'right in among the hideous polyps'. This 'right in among the hideous polyps' is where the 'she darted forward like a fish'. Although direction is constituted in this perspective through 'she darted forward', this 'right in among the sea polyps' constructs where the 'darted forward' is to. This is therefore an extension of this forwardness. In this perspective, 'the hideous sea polyps' are constituted in 'she' being 'right in among' them, thus the position of 'she' is constructed through these 'hideous polyps'. '[T]he hideous polyps' have an 'among', therefore there is a multiplicity in both the 'she' as being 'among', and the plurality of 'polyps'. There is a further construction of movement and direction in this perspective; however, this movement and direction is that of 'the hideous polyps' rather than 'she'. These 'the hideous polyps' 'reached out to snatch her with their nimble arms and fingers'. Therefore, in this perspective, 'the hideous polyps' can reach and 'snatch'; the outwardness of this 'reached' positions 'her' as 'out' to 'the hideous polyps'. Therefore, although 'she' is 'right in among the hideous polyps', they still have to reach 'out' to 'snatch her'. In this 'reached out to snatch her', 'the hideous polyps' are constructed as having 'their nimble arms and fingers'. Although these 'nimble arms and fingers' are theirs, there is a split, and thus a division, between 'the hideous polyps' and 'their nimble arms and fingers'. There is also a split between 'their' and 'nimble arms and fingers', thus there is a split within a split in this perspective. Not only is there a divide between 'the hideous polyps' and 'their', there is also the division between 'their' and 'nimble arms and fingers'. These 'nimble arms and fingers' are other to 'the hideous polyps', but they are also other to 'their', for these 'nimble arms and fingers' are constructed as that which is not 'the hideous polyps' nor the 'their'. As these 'nimble arms and fingers' are this other, they are problematised in that they cannot be

contained within the claim to 'the hideous polyps' nor the 'their'. Therefore, although these 'nimble arms and fingers' are claimed to be the theirs of 'the hideous polyps', it is these 'nimble arms and fingers' which enable this 'reached out to snatch her'. In this perspective, there is a shift in 'her'; 'her' was that which 'long flowing hair', 'head', 'arms', and 'chest' were subject to, but this 'her' is that which is subject to this snatching. Whereas 'her' has been the split with that which is claimed to be hers, this 'snatch her' is not about that which is hers; this is 'her' in 'her' being 'her', opposed to that other which is constituted as hers. Therefore, in this perspective, that which 'the hideous polyps' 'reached out to snatch' is 'her', rather than the implicit other to 'her'.

Furthermore, this 'noticed' is also of 'and was holding it fast'. Therefore, this 'something' which is 'caught' is also being held 'fast' by 'each of the sea polyps', so this is not just the 'caught' of 'something' but also the 'holding' of 'it'. Thus, this 'something' is that which is 'caught', and 'it' is 'something' which they 'was holding', and this 'holding' is constituted as being 'fast'. This 'holding it fast' is 'with a hundred little arms that were like hoops of iron'. In this perspective, there is a shift in the claim to 'arms', as 'arms' were 'nimble' and are now 'little'. However, those which were 'nimble' were those of 'the hideous polyps', whereas these 'a hundred little arms' are constituted as being those of 'the sea polyps'. There is therefore a difference in these constructions of arms. Although these 'arms' are constructed differently, both kinds of 'arms' are subject to 'with': 'reached out to snatch her with' and 'holding it fast with'. Therefore, in both perspectives, it is the 'with' of these 'arms' which is constituted. There is also a split with these 'arms'; there is a division in 'a hundred little arms', for these 'little arms' are not part of this 'a hundred', and there is a split between 'little' and 'arms'. Therefore, the condition of these 'arms', as being 'little' and 'a hundred', are other to these 'arms'. So, in this perspective on the 'She' who 'noticed', this 'caught' and 'holding' is 'with a hundred little arms

that were like hoops of iron'. As this is 'like', there is a lack in the thing itself, in these 'a hundred little arms'; they have to be supplemented with 'hoops of iron'. Therefore, these 'a hundred little arms' are not 'hoops of iron'; they are only constituted as being 'like'.

There is another construction of a split regarding 'arms', but these are the 'arms' of 'the little mermaid': 'the little mermaid raised her beautiful white arms, lifting herself on the tips of her toes' (Tatar: p.295). In this perspective, 'arms' are constituted as hers, and they are 'beautiful' and 'white'. Although there is a difference in 'beautiful' and 'white', these 'arms' are that which can be both. However, there is a split and thus a division in these 'her beautiful white arms'; there is a deferral as these 'arms' are other to 'her', thus 'arms' are that which cannot be contained within this claim to 'her'. There is a split within a split, in this perspective, as there is then a division within the 'arms' themselves: 'beautiful white arms'. Although these 'arms' are being constituted as 'beautiful' and 'white', these claims are other to the 'arms', thus rendering a split. In this perspective, 'arms' are that which are 'raised', and this 'raised' is a 'lifting herself on the tips of her toes'. As with 'her beautiful white arms', there is a split in 'the tips of her toes'; these 'toes' are other to the 'her'. So, these 'arms' and 'toes' are constituted as being hers, but it is 'the little mermaid' who 'raised her beautiful white arms', and thus 'lifting herself on the tips of her toes'. Therefore, there is a perspective on 'the little mermaid', but there is also a perspective on 'her' and 'herself'; 'arms' are that of 'her', 'herself' is who is lifted, and 'the little mermaid raised'. Furthermore, in this perspective, this 'lifting herself' is 'on the tips of her toes'. Therefore, 'toes' have 'tips', but these 'tips' are not hers like the 'toes' but 'the'. There is thus a split within these 'toes', for 'tips' are other to the 'toes'; 'toes' have different parts, and this split is through the 'of', so 'the tips' are something 'of her toes', but they are not 'her toes'. Therefore, if these 'tips' are 'of her toes' then although the 'toes' are constructed as being hers, there is something which is not hers in 'the tips'. These 'the tips' are those which 'herself' is 'lifting' 'on', so 'the tips' have an 'on', and this 'on' is where the 'herself' is. So, regarding 'arms', 'beautiful' and 'white' are hers,

but regarding 'toes', 'the tips' are not hers. Therefore, there is a difference within these constructions of 'arms' and 'toes', as that which constitutes 'arms' are hers, but that which constitutes 'toes' are not. There is also a lack in 'the tips of her toes', in comparison to the 'arms'; in the 'raised her beautiful white arms', it is not part of her 'arms' which are 'raised', but simply her 'arms'. With 'the tips of her toes', it is only part of 'her toes': 'the tips'. Therefore, there is an otherness in 'her toes' as to have 'the tips' there must be parts of 'her toes' which are not in this 'lifting herself on', thus there is this implicit lack.

Moreover, lack is also constructed in 'She had as charming a pair of white legs as any young girl could want'. There is a lack of specificity in 'any', but there is a specificity in that it is 'any young girl'. So, there is a 'girlness', but only that which is 'young'. Therefore, 'any' is not just 'any' as it has to be a 'young girl', according to these claims of 'any young girl could want'. This is a 'want', but it is a 'could want'. Thus, this is not a 'want', but a 'want' which is conditional. There is a tension in this 'could want', as both terms are about a lack, but there is a limitation in 'could'; there can be nothing beyond the 'could' as it is the limit of the wanting. However, it is also a futurity in that this conditionality is the wanting of these 'as charming a pair of white legs'. Therefore, this 'charming a pair of white legs' is something which is wanted by 'any young girl'. In this perspective, there is a 'She' with 'had' and a 'young girl' with 'want', thus the 'She' which 'had' is not 'any young girl', but other to 'any young girl'. This is therefore about a having against a 'could want', but the having does not secure it. If the 'could want' and the 'as' are about deferral in some sense, the having is not simply opposed to that. However, the having is not simply her thing, as this is something that the young girls want. Rather, the having is constituted precisely through the 'could want' of the girls. These 'legs' are therefore something 'she had' only on the condition of 'any young girl' wanting them, thus these 'legs' are bound to the other, as 'legs' are constituted through the 'as' of 'any young girl could want'. Therefore, if nakedness is something 'she was', 'legs' fall out of the nakedness to

the extent that they are something she has, as is with the 'hair'. If nakedness is her being, 'legs' cannot coincide with her being because they are what she has. So, there is something about 'hair' as being the thing that is hers and that is the connection with the 'legs', as they too are a having. That is the excess to her nakedness, as the 'hair' repeats something of the condition of the 'legs'. There is also an irony here, as in the young girls wanting the 'charming [a] pair of white legs', it must be something which the young girls lack. However, this is also about a lack of the 'she' in that having opens up the possibility of lack. Therefore, not only is there a deferral in these 'legs', but there is also a lack in both the young girls and 'she', as 'young girl' and 'she' are bound together in otherness.

However, this is not just a problem of deferral; as seen previously, there is not an easy split between fish and woman because they have been implicated in each other through their difference, and this is also the case here with 'She' and 'any young girl'. So, if this is not deferral, but is the implication of difference, then the question of truth arises. In *The Animal That Therefore I am*, it is claimed:

What does this bottomless gaze offer to my sight [...]? What does it "say" to me, demonstrating quite simply the naked truth of every gaze, when that truth allows me to see and be seen through the eyes of the other, in the seeing and not just seen eyes of the other? (Derrida: p.12)

In this perspective, there is a claim to 'What does this bottomless gaze offer to my sight' There is a questioning through 'What' and '?' and this questioning is of 'this bottomless gaze'.

If this is a question of 'What does this bottomless gaze offer to my sight', then there has to be the potential for 'this bottomless gaze' to 'offer' something 'to my sight'. If it is so that 'this bottomless gaze' can 'offer' something 'to my sight', then this is the potential for an offering from one thing, 'this bottomless gaze', to another thing, 'my sight'. There is thus an otherness and a difference between 'this bottomless gaze' and 'my sight'; they are not the same thing as 'gaze' is constituted as that which is other to 'sight'. However, both 'gaze' and 'sight' are constituted as being split in this perspective, as what they are subject to is other to 'gaze' and 'sight' - this is 'bottomless gaze' and 'my sight'. This 'gaze', although claimed to be 'bottomless' is other to this very 'bottomless' that it is claimed to be, and this 'sight' is other to this 'my'. There is thus a deferral of meaning in terms of both 'gaze' and 'sight', yet these remain as different claims. Furthermore, 'this bottomless gaze' is that which can 'offer', and 'my sight' is that which can be offered 'to'. There is a specificity in this 'bottomless gaze' as it is 'this' 'bottomless gaze' rather than just 'bottomless gaze'. There is a further constitution of 'gaze' as there is an 'every gaze' following 'this bottomless gaze'; there is thus a shift in the perspective on 'gaze'. If this is now 'every gaze', is 'this bottomless gaze' included within this 'every gaze', or does this 'every' constitute this as being a 'gaze' which is other to 'this bottomless gaze'?

There is a further questioning of 'this bottomless gaze' in this 'What does it "say" to me, demonstrating quite simply the naked truth of every gaze, when that truth allows me to see and be seen through the eyes of the other, in the seeing and not just seen eyes of the other?'

In this perspective, 'the bottomless gaze' is that which "say" and this "say" is 'to me'. There is also a questioning of the 'What' of this "say". So, this 'every gaze' is constituted as having a 'naked truth', and there is this 'naked truth' for 'every gaze' as this is 'the naked truth of every gaze'. Is it that this 'the naked truth' is the same 'of every gaze' or is it that 'the naked truth' is subject to each of these 'gazes' within 'every gaze'? In this perspective, 'gaze' is that which has a 'naked truth', and this is something which can be demonstrated 'quite simply'. However, there

is a split in this 'naked truth' as the 'nakedness' is other to the 'truth' and cannot be contained within this claim. So, not only does 'every gaze' have 'the naked truth', but it is also other to 'the naked truth' which has an otherness within itself. There is a repetition of this notion of 'truth' as it is 'when that truth allows me to be seen'. So, there is 'the naked truth of every gaze' and then a claim to 'that truth'. There is thus a shift in 'truth' as this cannot be the same truth as 'truth' is subject to 'the naked' and then 'that'. It is so that 'that truth allows me to see and be seen', so 'truth' is that which can 'allow' something other – this notion of seeing.

In thinking about the 'naked truth', if this 'construction' of the 'gaze' is not necessarily wholly concerned with deferral, but is the implication of difference, then the question of 'truth' is crucial. In 'The Purveyor of Truth', it is claimed:

Exhibiting, denuding, undressing, unveiling: the familiar acrobatics of the metaphor of the truth. And one just as well could say the metaphor of the metaphor, the truth of truth, the truth of metaphor. When Freud intends to denude the original *Stoff* beneath the disguises of secondary fabrication, he is anticipating the truth of the text. The latter, from its original contention, would be coordinated with its naked truth, but also with truth as nakedness. (Derrida: p.175)

In this perspective, there is a construction of the 'truth'. Here, there is a claim to 'the truth', in 'the familiar acrobatics of the metaphor of the truth'. So, this is a perspective on 'the metaphor of the truth', and this 'metaphor of the truth' has 'familiar acrobatics'. These 'familiar acrobatics of the metaphor of the truth' are 'Exhibiting, denuding, undressing, unveiling'.

There is a listing here of that which contributes to ‘the familiar acrobatics’. So, ‘Exhibiting, denuding, undressing, unveiling’ are ‘acrobatics’, but they are those ‘acrobatics’ which are ‘familiar’. Therefore, there is a familiarity in this listing, and this is ‘of the metaphor of the truth’. If this is ‘the metaphor of the truth’, then ‘the truth’ is constructed as ‘the metaphor’, and ‘denuding’ is a ‘familiar acrobatic[s]’ of this ‘metaphor’. There is a shift in the perspective on ‘metaphor’ and ‘truth’, as there is a construction of ‘the metaphor of the metaphor, the truth of truth, the truth of metaphor’. In this perspective, there are multiple claims to ‘the metaphor’ and ‘the truth’. However, this is an ‘And one just as well could say’. Therefore, this is not a definitive claim; there is a construction of the conditional in this perspective. So, if ‘Exhibiting, denuding, undressing, unveiling’ are ‘the familiar acrobatics of the metaphor of truth’, but ‘one just as well could say the metaphor of the metaphor, the truth of truth, the truth of metaphor’, then there is the potential for ‘Exhibiting denuding, undressing, unveiling’ to be any of these combinations of ‘truth’ and ‘metaphor’. Therefore, ‘denuding’ is implicated as being a ‘familiar acrobatic[s]’ of both ‘truth’ and ‘metaphor’; if ‘denuding’ is about ‘truth’ and ‘metaphor’, then this has implications for ‘When Freud intends to denude the original *Stoff* beneath the disguises of secondary fabrication’.

So, if ‘denuding’ is a ‘familiar acrobatic[s]’ of the metaphor of truth’, and if ‘When Freud intends to denude the original *Stoff* beneath the disguises of secondary fabrication, he is anticipating the truth of the text’, then there is a construction of ‘denuding’ and ‘the truth’ in relation to one another. In this perspective, there is a claim to the intention of ‘Freud’, in ‘intends to denude the original *Stoff*’. So, ‘the original *Stoff*’ is that which can be denuded, and this ‘original *Stoff*’ is that which is ‘beneath the disguises of secondary fabrication’. Therefore, ‘the original *Stoff*’ is in the position of ‘beneath’, and this is where ‘the original *Stoff*’ which ‘Freud intends to denude’ is. Furthermore, in denuding ‘the original *Stoff*’, there is a shift in perspective, as it is ‘he’ who ‘is anticipating the truth of the text’. So, in this perspective on

‘Freud’, there is the intention ‘to denude’, and in this perspective on the ‘he’, there is anticipation for ‘the truth of the text’. If in denuding ‘the original *Stoff*’, ‘he is anticipating the truth of the text’, then ‘the truth of the text’ is constructed in relation to this denuding. However, as this is ‘When Freud intends to’, this is not a denuding but an intending to denude. Therefore, this denuding of ‘the original *Stoff*’; is only a denuding insofar as it is conditional upon the intentions of ‘Freud’.

Moreover, there is a shift in perspective as ‘the truth of the text’ is now ‘The latter’. This ‘The latter’ is constructed as that which ‘would be coordinated with its naked truth’, and this is ‘from its original contention’. In this perspective, there is a shift in the claim to ‘truth’, as there is ‘the truth of the text’ and ‘its naked truth’. Therefore, there are different types of ‘truth’ as one is constituted by its being ‘of the text’, and the other by its nakedness. So, if ‘the truth of the text’ is that which ‘would be coordinated with its naked truth’, then this is about a coordination of these different truths. There is movement in this perspective, as this is ‘from its original contention’, therefore there is movement of ‘The latter’ ‘from its original contention’ to this being ‘coordinated with its naked truth’. There is a shift in the perspective on ‘original’, as ‘original’ was constituted as being about ‘the original *Stoff*’ which ‘Freud’ intended ‘to denude’, whereas it is now about the ‘original contention’ of the ‘its’ which ‘The latter’ which was ‘the truth of the text’. Therefore, ‘the truth of the text’ is implicated in this originality, but this is a movement ‘from’ the ‘original’. So, although this is a coordination ‘with its naked truth’, there is a claim to ‘but also with truth as nakedness’. In this perspective, there is a construction of ‘truth’ and ‘nakedness’, but, in this instance, this is ‘truth as nakedness’. However, this is still a claim to ‘truth’, therefore, although this is ‘truth as nakedness’, ‘truth’ is still ‘truth’ in its very construction of being ‘nakedness’ through the claim to ‘as’. As this is ‘as’, ‘truth’ and ‘nakedness’ are still different to one another, through the very construction of them being ‘as’ one another. Thus, the ‘as’ which connects ‘truth’ and

‘nakedness’ is implicitly the thing which also disconnects them. Therefore, in the perspective on ‘truth’, there is the ‘naked truth’ which is subject to ‘its’, and this ‘truth as nakedness’. There are distinctions here in that this ‘naked truth’ is constituted as being ‘its’, thus constructing it as being part of something which is other to itself as ‘naked truth’; it is the ‘naked truth’ of the very ‘its’ which is ‘the truth of the text’. This is therefore a perspective on a ‘truth’ of ‘the truth’. There are therefore three different perspectives on ‘truth’ in the anticipations of ‘Freud’; ‘the truth of the text’, ‘its naked truth’, and ‘truth as nakedness’. Two of these perspectives are implicated as being about the ‘naked’ or ‘nakedness’, and this ‘naked truth’ is of the ‘its’ which is ‘the truth of the text’. Therefore, there are multiple constructions of ‘truth’ and versions of ‘nakedness’. If all of this is constituted as being subject to ‘Exhibiting, denuding, undressing, unveiling: the familiar acrobatics of the metaphor of the truth’, then there is a discernible constitution of ‘denuding’ in relation to ‘truth’ and ‘nakedness’; they are all implicated in one another as being about each other. So, if this is about the other, then the symbol is that which refers to something else which is always there: the denuding truth. Thus, this is about what is there, this is about revelation, but this is done so through something which is other.

So, if ‘truth’ and ‘nakedness’ are about revelation, and this is so through an implicit other, then what does it mean to read this revelation in Andersen? The problem with reading this ‘truth’ is that it is not the denuded truth, even when it is the denuded truth; it is a denuded truth which is deferred and can never be there. Although we get caught up in it, it never becomes the thing itself; this is a reading, and that is the crucial thing. This is about a revelation, not a resolution; even in my own deconstruction, am I not being ‘suckered in’ to reading this ‘truth’? This very act of reading, or ‘deciphering’ is that which is problematising:

What happens in the psychoanalytic deciphering of a text when the latter, the deciphered itself, already explicates itself? When it says more about itself than does the deciphering (Derrida: p.174)

In the perspective, there is a claim to 'deciphering'. This 'deciphering' is constituted as being 'the psychoanalytic' and 'of a text'. There is a split in this 'psychoanalytic deciphering', as 'psychoanalytic' is rendered other to the 'deciphering' in the very claim to it being 'psychoanalytic'. There is also a split in 'the psychoanalytic deciphering of a text', through this 'of'; there is a division between 'the psychoanalytic deciphering' and 'a text', for this 'psychoanalytic deciphering' is other to 'a text' in its being 'of'. This is therefore a split within a split, thus constituting a deferral in this 'deciphering'. There is a shift in the perspective on 'deciphering', as there is 'the deciphered itself'. However, this is 'the psychoanalytic deciphering of a text when the latter, the deciphered itself'. Therefore, there is a shift in the claim to decipher, but this 'the deciphered itself' is constituted as 'the latter', thus there is a construction of order regarding this 'the deciphered itself'. This is 'the deciphered itself', thus there is a split between 'the deciphered' and 'itself'; there is a division, as 'the deciphered' is constituted as being other to 'itself', thus constructing a deferral in this very claim to 'itself'. If 'the deciphered' cannot be 'itself', because of this deferral, then there is an implicit lack; 'the deciphered' is lacking in 'itself', and 'itself' cannot be contained in its very being 'the deciphered'. However, there is a construction of a split within a split, as this is 'the latter, the deciphered itself'. So, there is a split between 'the latter' and 'the deciphered' and there is also a split within this through 'the deciphered itself'. Therefore, there is a deferral of the deferred.

In this perspective, this 'psychoanalytic deciphering of a text' and 'the latter, the deciphered itself' are subject to 'What happens in', and these claims are followed by '?', thus

there is a questioning of this 'deciphering'. However, this questioning is 'What happens in the psychoanalytic deciphering of a text when the latter, the deciphered itself, already explicates itself?'. This questioning is therefore constructed as being about this 'already explicates itself' of 'the deciphered itself'. A repetition is constituted in this second claim to 'itself', but there is a difference, as the first 'itself' is 'the deciphered itself', and this is 'explicates itself'. So, 'if the deciphered itself is that which 'already explicates itself', then the 'deciphered itself' is that which can explicate, and 'itself' is that which can be explicated. '[I]tself' is therefore that which can explicate in its being 'the deciphered', but there is a lack of this 'deciphered' after this 'explicated'. However, there is also a lack in 'the deciphered itself' through this split; 'itself' cannot contain 'the deciphered', and 'the deciphered' cannot contain 'itself', therefore there is this implicit lack in 'itself'. In this perspective, this is an 'already explicates itself', and this questioning is a 'What happens' 'when'. This is therefore not a claim to 'the deciphered itself, already' explicating 'itself', 'in the psychoanalytic deciphering of a text', but a questioning of 'What' and 'when'.

However, there is another shift in perspective, as there is a deciphering which is constituted as being outside of this questioning. This 'deciphering' is subject to a 'When', rather than a 'What happens' and then a 'when'. Although there is a 'when' in the questioning, this 'When' is different, thus there is a shift. This 'When' is a 'When it says more about itself than does the deciphering'. In this perspective, there is another construction of 'itself'; 'itself' was 'the deciphered itself, then 'explicates itself', and is now 'says more about itself'. This 'itself' is therefore that which 'it says more about', thus there is a saying. This saying is a 'says more', thus saying is quantitative, in this perspective, and this is an 'about itself than does', thus 'itself' has a saying 'about itself'. This is 'than does the deciphering', therefore 'deciphering' is constituted as being about a saying. This 'it' is 'the deciphered itself', so this 'deciphered itself

'says more about itself than does the deciphering'. As this is all subject to 'What happens', these claims are conditional. However, within this conditionality of 'What happens in the psychoanalytic deciphering of a text when', this 'itself' is comparable to 'the deciphering', and both 'itself' and 'the deciphering' can say. Therefore, according to these claims, the 'itself' has the potential to say 'more' than 'the deciphering'. So, if there is the possibility for that which is being 'deciphered' to say 'more about itself than does the deciphering', then this question of reading comes into play. If there is the potential for that which is 'deciphered', or deconstructed, to say more when it is not 'deciphered' or deconstructed, then this problematises and brings into question this very act of deconstruction. There is always a lack; if lack is that which has been 'revealed', then this notion of deferral cannot be escaped. Returning to Derrida's reading of 'Lacan', lack is that which has to be read; this is a lack that is constituted through difference, through perspective, through reading, and is therefore always other to itself. It is that which is caught up in the play of meaning and deferral. As we have read through the nakedness, there is this deferral of meaning; there is this difference even when it has been stripped down to reveal this notion of 'certainty' or 'truth'.

So, if there is the possibility for that which is being 'deciphered' to say 'more about itself than does the deciphering', then this question of reading comes into play. If there is the potential for that which is 'deciphered', or deconstructed, to say more when it is not 'deciphered' or deconstructed, then this problematises and brings into question this very act of deconstruction. There is always a lack; if lack is that which has been 'revealed', then this notion of deferral cannot be escaped. Returning to Derrida's reading of 'Lacan', lack is that which has to be read; this is a lack that is constituted through difference, through perspective, through reading, and is therefore always other to itself. It is that which is caught up in the play of meaning and deferral. As we have read through the nakedness, there is this deferral of meaning; there is this difference even when it has been stripped down to reveal this notion of 'certainty' or 'truth'.

To conclude this penultimate section, I will now return to the notion of the ‘animal gaze’, as read in the introduction of this thesis. At the beginning of *The Animal That Therefore I Am*, we have ‘the eyes of a cat’:

I often ask myself, just to see, *who I am* - and who I am (following) at the moment when, caught naked, in silence, by the gaze of an animal, for example, the eyes of a cat, I have trouble, yes, a bad time over coming my embarrassment (Derrida: p.3 – p.4)

In this perspective, there is ‘the gaze of an animal, for example, the eyes of a cat’. There is both ‘the gaze’ which is constituted as being that ‘of an animal’ and an ‘example’ of this is ‘the eyes’ which are constituted as being those ‘of a cat’. Although, there is something of ‘the gaze of an animal’ in ‘the eyes of a cat’, this is ‘for example’, thus this is not ‘the gaze of an animal’, but an ‘example’ of one. However, an otherness is constituted between ‘the gaze of’ and ‘the eyes of’ through this ‘example’; ‘gaze’ is other to ‘animal’ and ‘eyes’ are other to ‘cat’, thus it is that which is other to ‘animal’ and ‘cat’ that constitutes this ‘caught naked’ of the ‘I’. There is a split in this ‘I’, as there is the ‘I’ who asks and the ‘I’ who is ‘caught naked’, thus a difference is constituted. Furthermore, this ‘I’ is that which can be ‘naked’, and in this being ‘naked’, ‘I’ can be ‘caught’. It is ‘in silence, by the gaze of an animal, for example, the eyes of a cat’ which constitutes this ‘caught naked’, so there is a lack in this ‘caught’. There is a presence of absence in this ‘caught’ as this is all ‘by’ that which is other to the ‘caught naked’; this is all ‘by the gaze’. Derrida continues:

Ashamed of what and naked before whom? Why let oneself be overcome with shame?

And why this shame that blushes for being ashamed? Especially, I should make clear,

if the cat observes me *frontally* naked, face to face, and if I am naked faced with the cat's eyes looking at me from head to toe (Derrida: p.4)

In this perspective, there are different types of nakedness: this is a 'naked' which is '*frontally*', therefore this nakedness is constituted by that which is other to 'naked'. This '*frontally* naked' constructs the positioning of 'the cat' who 'observes' and the 'me' who is observed; as this is an observation of 'the cat' and that which is observed is the 'me *frontally* naked', then 'the cat' is situated as being in front of the 'me'. This position is also constituted in 'the cat' and 'me' as being 'face to face'. In being 'face to face', a level between the 'face' of 'the cat' and the 'face' of 'me' is constructed; there is an equality in that both 'the cat' and 'me' have a 'face', and these faces are 'to' one another. However, this level of 'face to face' is disrupted, as this is then an 'I' who is 'faced with the cat's eyes looking at me from head to toe'. In this perspective, the 'me' who is being looked at is done so 'head to toe' by 'the cat's eyes'. Therefore, this is no longer a 'face' and a 'face', for it is 'eyes' and 'head to toe'. In this 'looking at me from head to toe', there is a notion of movement; this is a 'from head' which is then 'to toe', thus there is a start of this movement, 'from head', and a finish, 'to toe'. There is also a shift as it is 'the cat' who 'observes' and then 'the cat's eyes' which are 'looking', therefore there is a split between 'the cat' and its 'eyes'. There is thus a deferral in this perspective, as 'the cat' is that which is other to these 'eyes' in the very claim to the 'eyes' being those of the cat. These 'eyes' are not the cat; they are constituted as being different and therefore other.

6. Conclusion

To conclude this thesis, I am going to think about the consequences of my reading in this way and think about them in a context which is other to 'the fairy tale'. These are ongoing conversations and discussions which are apparent and relevant. So, I want to end on a reading to show that this is not just about fairy tales or a specific 'type' of literature or disability: this is what people are thinking about and this is why this is important. Although fairy tales have occupied a large part of my thinking in this thesis, my 'main' focus has been 'what does it mean to read?'. So why would I only focus on fairy tales? In this conclusion, I will be thinking about *Our Mutual Friend*. In this reading of body, parts, and disability, I am emphasising that my readings need not *only* apply to fairy tales. When it comes to reading out the implications of bodies and how these bodies are seen, looked at, and framed within a narrative, this is crucial in any text and need not only be limited to only one 'type' of text. I will therefore be reading hair, hands, and eyes across three passages from *Our Mutual Friend*, and will be conducting a close and in-perspective reading of Jenny and Lizzie whilst thinking about the implications of reading in this way.

[...] if you'll remove the third party upstairs, my dear, the third party will retire."

Lizzie took the hand which the dolls' dressmaker held out to her for the purpose of being supported away, but only looked at her with an inquiring smile, and made no other movement.

"The third party hobbles awfully, you know, when she's left to herself," said Miss Wren, "her back being so bad, and her legs so queer; so she can't retire gracefully unless you help her, Lizzie." .

"She can do no better than stay where she is," returned Lizzie, releasing the hand, and laying her own lightly on Miss Jenny's curls.⁴³

In this perspective, it is so that 'Lizzie took the hand which 'the dolls' dressmaker held out to her'. This 'the hand' is that which is constituted as that which 'Lizzie took' and that 'which the dolls' dressmaker held out to her', so hands can be both taken and 'held out'. This 'held out to her' is 'for the purpose of being supported away', so this 'took the hand' can facilitate this 'supported away' and there is a 'purpose' behind this 'held out' of 'the hand'. This 'the hand' is that which can be 'held out', and this is 'to her'. There is a shift in perspective as it was 'Lizzie' that 'took the hand', but it is 'her' which it is 'held out to'. This 'the hand which the dolls' dressmaker held out' is 'the hand'; it is not claimed to be the dolls' dressmaker's hand. This 'hand' is thus constituted as being something which is other to 'the dolls' dressmaker' and is therefore in excess of and supplementary to 'the dolls' dressmaker'. There is a further shift, this time concerning 'the hand'; in the first instance, 'Lizzie took the hand' and in the second, Lizzie is 'releasing the hand'. Although this is 'the hand which the doll's dressmaker held out' and that 'Lizzie took', there is a shift in the perspective on this 'the hand' as there is a repetition of 'the hand' but there also is not a repetition. This is not the same 'the hand', according to this perspective, as there is 'the hand' which was 'took' and 'the hand' which was released. There is thus an implicit difference between these two claims to 'the hand'. In this 'returned Lizzie,

⁴³ Charles Dickens, *Our Mutual Friend* (London: Vintage, 2011) p.284. All further references will be given in parenthesis.

releasing the hand, and laying her own lightly on Miss Jenny's curls', there is a construction of that which is Lizzie's. However, there is no claim to 'Lizzie's hands' in this perspective but to that which is 'her own'. It is after this 'releasing the hand' that this 'laying her own' occurs, so it is through this 'releasing' that this 'laying' can happen. There is thus a notion of sequence as this 'laying her own' is dependent upon this 'releasing'. This 'laying her own' is 'lightly on Miss Jenny's curls', so 'laying' can be done so 'lightly' and 'on' something which is other to itself – in this instance, 'Miss Jenny's curls'. There is thus a notion of otherness in this 'releasing' and 'laying'. Furthermore, it is 'Miss Jenny's curls' which Lizzie is 'laying her own [hands] lightly on', so there is a contrast between that which is 'Miss Jenny's' and that which is 'her own'. There is a perspective on 'Miss Jenny's curls', so these 'curls' are constituted as being that of 'Miss Jenny'. However, there is a split in this construction of the 'curls' as although these 'curls' are 'Miss Jenny's', they are not 'Miss Jenny' but that which 'Miss Jenny' has. There is thus an otherness between 'Miss Jenny' and 'Miss Jenny's curls' as these 'curls' cannot be contained within 'Miss Jenny' but instead rely on this 's'. There is a presence of an absence in this construction of these 'curls' as they are in excess of Miss Jenny and are thus supplementary.

In this perspective, there is a construction of 'her back' and 'her legs'. There is a split in both constructions of that which are of 'her'; although these are 'her back' and 'her legs', 'back' and 'legs' are other to and thus supplementary to 'her'. In this sense, that which is said to be 'her' in the perspective on the perspective of 'Miss Wren['s]' 'said', is in fact other to the very 'her' that they are claimed to be. There is thus a deferral of meaning in these 'legs' and 'back', and that which is hers is in excess of 'her'. This 'her back' is 'being so bad' and 'her legs' are 'so queer', so that which 'her back' and 'her legs' are constituted as being are other to this 'back' and 'legs'. There is a 'so-ness' to this 'bad' and 'queer', so there is once again an

otherness and something supplementary to that which is being 'said' within the perspective. There is a third 'so', and through this claim to 'so' there is reason given for this inability to 'retire gracefully unless you help her, Lizzie': 'her back being so bad, and her legs so queer'. Within this claimed 'said' of 'Miss Wren', it is 'said' that 'she can't retire gracefully unless you help her'. In this perspective, there is not an inability to 'retire', but an inability to do so 'gracefully', thus the concern of 'Miss Wren' is subject to the lack of grace rather than the notion of retiring; this is about how she retires rather than the retiring itself. This 'retire' is that which lacks 'gracefully', without 'help', specifically the 'help' of 'Lizzie', so to 'retire' cannot contain this notion of grace thus this 'gracefully' is deferred. This 'retire gracefully' is dependent upon this 'help' through the claim to 'unless', thus a conditionality is present in this specificity of the 'help' as it is 'unless you help her, Lizzie' and so it is this 'you' which shifts to 'Lizzie' in this necessity.

However, there is not a complete inability as 'The third party hobbles awfully, you know, when she's left to herself'. In this perspective, 'hobbles' is something that 'The third party' does, and it is constituted as being 'awfully', so there are different levels of 'hobbles'. This 'hobbles awfully' is something that 'the third party' does which is known by 'you' through 'you know'. However, this 'hobbles awfully' is 'when she's left to herself', so this is conditional upon a lack of the 'you help[ing] her'. There is a further dependence on the 'you' by 'the third party' as 'the third party' is that which can be removed, and this 'remove' is dependent upon 'you[ll]'. There is another claim to 'the third party' in 'the third party will retire', and this 'will retire' is dependent on the 'you'll remove' through the claim to 'if'. This 'third party' is thus dependent upon the actions of 'you'. As well as multiple claims to 'The third party', there are also claims to 'her' and 'she' from the perspective on the perspective of 'Miss Wren'. Although that within the "" are constituted as this 'said', 'Miss Wren' addresses 'The third party', makes claim to 'her back' and 'her legs', 'when she's left to herself, and 'she

can't retire'. There are constant shifts within this 'said', and there is an otherness between 'Miss Wren' and that which is 'said' by 'Miss Wren'; in this sense, there is a deferral of meaning in what 'Miss Wren' has 'said' in terms of these 'she[s]' and 'her[s]' and this is all supplementary and in excess of 'Miss Wren'.

It being Lizzie's regular occupation when they were alone of an evening to brush out and smooth the long fair hair of the dolls' dressmaker, she unfastened a ribbon that kept it back while the little creature was at her work, and it fell in a beautiful shower over the poor shoulders that were much in need of such adorning rain.

"Not now, Lizzie, dear," said Jenny; "let us have a talk by the fire."

With these words, she in her turn loosened her friend's dark hair, and it dropped of its own weight over her bosom, in two rich masses. Pretending to compare the colours and admire the contrast, Jenny so managed a mere touch or two of her nimble hands, as that she herself laying a cheek on one of the dark folds, seemed blinded by her own clustering curls to all but the fire, while the fine handsome face and brow of Lizzie were revealed without obstruction in the sober light.

"Let us have a talk," said Jenny, "about Mr. Eugene Wrayburn."

Something sparkled down among the fair hair resting on the dark hair; and if it were not a star - which it couldn't be - it was an eye; and if it were an eye, it was Jenny Wren's eye, bright and watchful as the bird's whose name she had taken. (Dickens: p.288)

In this perspective, there is a claim to 'hair'. This 'hair' is 'long' and 'fair' and it can be brushed out and smoothed. There is a split in the construction of this 'long fair hair'. Although it is claimed that this 'hair' is 'long' and 'fair', these claims to 'long' and 'fair' are other to this 'hair'. In this sense, 'hair' cannot contain this notion of 'long' and 'fair' in and of itself, thus constituting this 'long' and 'fair' as being supplementary to the 'hair'. There is thus an implicit split in this 'long fair hair'; if 'hair' is that which is other to the 'long' and 'fair' which it is claimed to be, then 'hair' is that which is lacking 'long' and 'fair' and that which requires the necessary supplement, according to this perspective. There is thus a deferral of meaning within this claim to 'hair'. This 'hair' is 'of the dolls' dressmaker', so this is something which is 'of something other to itself. If this otherness is so, then 'hair' is that which is supplementary to 'the dolls' dressmaker' and, in turn, deferred. In this being 'the long fair hair', there is a notion of singularity in terms of this 'hair'; this is 'the' 'hair' 'of the dolls' dressmaker'; 'hair' is that which can be brushed and smoothed, and this brushing and smoothing of this hair is the 'regular occupation' of someone who is other to 'the dolls' dressmaker': Lizzie. In this being 'Lizzie's regular occupation when they were alone of an evening', this 'brush out and smooth' of 'the long fair hair' is that which happens multiple times; a repetition is constituted in this being 'regular'. However, although this brushing and smoothing happens regularly, a claim to repetition cannot be made; although this is the same in it being brushing and smoothing, it is not the same brushing and smoothing. Therefore, there is an implicit difference and in turn a presence of a lack. These claims are all according to a perspective in which there has to be a present lack for that lack to be read. This regularity is also conditional upon 'when they were alone of an evening'.

Furthermore, it is then claimed that 'she unfastened a ribbon that kept it back while the little creature was at her work'. In this perspective, there is shift in this 'hair' being the 'it' which can be 'kept' 'back' with 'a ribbon'. 'hair' is therefore that which can be fastened with

‘a ribbon’ and it is this ‘unfastened’ which results in the falling of ‘it’: ‘and it fell in a beautiful shower’. In this perspective, ‘a beautiful shower’ is not what the hair ‘is’ but how ‘it fell’, so ‘in a beautiful shower’ is a way in which the hair ‘fell’, and it does so ‘over the poor shoulders that were much in need of such adorning rain’. In this perspective there is a construction of ‘shoulders’ in relation to ‘hair’. There is a notion of covering in this claim to ‘over’ as the position of this ‘beautiful shower’ is ‘over the poor shoulders’. This ‘fell’ is therefore ‘over’ the thing which is constituted as ‘poor’; that which is ‘beautiful’ is ‘over’ that which is ‘poor’ and, in turn, covers it. As well as being ‘poor’, these ‘shoulders’ ‘were much in need of such adorning rain’. So, according to this perspective, ‘hair’ can ‘fall’ and be ‘rain’ and do so ‘over the poor shoulders’ and there is a ‘need’ for this. In this sense then, these ‘poor shoulders’ are ‘much in need’ of the covering which this ‘long fair hair’ can provide.

However, although there is a claim to ‘brush out and smooth the long fair hair’, there is no brushing and smoothing in this perspective, only the claim to it being ‘Lizzie’s regular occupation’. Through the perspective on the saying of Jenny, ‘Not now, Lizzie, dear’, there is only the potential for this ‘brush out and smooth [of] the long fair hair of the dolls’ dressmaker’ through the unfastening of the ribbon. In this sense, although there is lack of this happening, as it does not happen, there is also a presence through the potential for it to happen. There is a comparison between Jenny’s hair and Lizzie’s hair in this ‘loosened her friend’s dark hair’: Jenny’s hair is ‘over her poor shoulders’ and Lizzie’s hair is ‘over her bosom’. There is a repetition in this being ‘over her’ in both instances, however these are different claims as there is a shift in ‘her’ from being ‘Jenny’ to ‘her’ being ‘Lizzie’; these are not the same ‘her’. There is a difference in these ‘overs’ as one is about ‘her poor shoulders’ and one is about ‘her bosom’. In this perspective, these ‘shoulders’ are constituted as being ‘poor’ as well as hers, whereas ‘bosom’ is just that which is hers. These ‘shoulders’ are also that which are ‘in need’ whereas ‘bosom’ is not, yet both ‘poor shoulders’ and ‘bosom’ are things which are covered.

There is a further contrast between these two claims to 'hair' as, in the first instance, 'it fell in a beautiful shower', but in the second instance, 'it dropped of its own weight' 'in two rich masses'. Thus, not only can 'hair' fall, but it can also 'drop'. In this perspective, hair can drop 'of its own weight', so hair has 'weight' which is its 'own'. However, there is a split and thus a deferral, as this 'own weight' is other to the 'its' of the hair. Although this is claimed to be 'its own weight', this 'own weight' is separate from the 'its'. There is also a further split in 'own weight' as this 'weight' is other to the 'own' which it is claimed to be'; there is thus an implicit lack as this 'weight' is supplementary to 'own', just as 'own weight' is supplementary to the 'its' of the 'hair'.

Moreover, 'hair' is that which has 'colours' and 'contrast', and 'the colours' are that which can be compared whereas 'the contrast' is that which can be admired, and both are done so by 'Jenny'. However, this 'managed' is subject to this 'pretending'; it is by 'pretending to compare the colours and admire the contrast' that this 'mere touch or two' can happen. Through this 'pretending', it is that 'Jenny so managed a mere touch or two of her nimble hands'. There is a construction of 'hands' here and these 'hands' are constituted as being those of 'her'. There is a shift in perspective as it is that 'Jenny so managed a mere touch or two' and 'her nimble hands' thus these 'her nimble hands' are those of 'Jenny'. These are 'her nimble hands', but there is a split and thus a deferral of meaning in these 'hands' as 'nimble' is other to 'hands'. In this 'nimble' being other to 'hands', the nimbleness of these 'hands' is in excess of the 'hands' and in turn supplementary to them. These 'hands' therefore must be claimed to be 'nimble', according to this perspective, thus 'hands' are that which lack nimbleness without the claim to them being so. Although these 'hands' are 'nimble', 'hands' in and of themselves have an absence of 'nimbleness' and through this absence there is a presence. These 'her nimble hands' are that which can 'touch', but this 'touch' is 'mere', and it is that which is 'so managed' as a result of the 'pretending'.

Furthermore, 'she herself' is that which is 'laying a cheek on one of the dark folds'. According to this perspective, as well as having 'colours and contrast', 'her friend's dark hair' also has 'dark folds'. This 'laying a cheek' is 'on one of the dark folds', so there are multiple 'dark folds' here. In this perspective, it is so that 'she herself' 'seemed blinded' by 'laying a cheek on one of the dark folds' of 'her friend's dark hair'. In this 'seemed blinded', although there is a claim to 'blinded', 'she herself' is not blinded, but seems that way, thus there is something which is like a lack, but is not. Through this being 'seemed', there is the appearance of a lack or an absence, but instead there is the presence of the potential for lack - there is the potential for blindness. However, this 'seemed blinded' is 'to all but the fire', so there is a further lack of 'blinded' in that to 'the fire', 'she herself' did not even seem to be 'blinded'. There is thus a separation between 'the fire' and 'all', as it is the 'all but the fire' that 'she herself' could be subject to this potential blindness. In this perspective, it is 'her own clustering curls' that are cause for this 'seemed blinded'. So, 'curls' are that which can be 'clustering' and they are also constituted as being 'her own'. Therefore, 'curls' are that which can be owned by 'her', yet they are other to 'her' in them having to be claimed as 'her own' rather than 'her'. These 'own curls' are also that by which she 'seemed blinded', so there is a covering by 'she herself laying a cheek on one of the dark folds', yet this covering does not result in a blindness but a 'seemed' one. This 'seemed blinded' is 'to all but the fire', so this is about perspectives other to this 'she herself'; there is the perspective on 'she herself', but also the claimed perspective of the 'all' and 'the fire'. In this sense, this notion of 'blinded' comes from that which is other because of this covering.

There is a further comparison and contrast in the claim to 'while the fine handsome face and brow of Lizzie were revealed without obstruction in the sober light'. Whereas there was a notion of a covering which 'seemed blinded' for Jenny, that 'of Lizzie' is 'revealed without obstruction'. In this perspective, there is 'the fine handsome face and brow' and these are 'of

Lizzie'. So, 'Lizzie' has a 'face and brow', both of which are constituted as being 'fine' and 'handsome'. However, there is a split within a split with 'the fine handsome face and brow of Lizzie'. In this 'face and brow' being 'of Lizzie', they are implicitly other to 'Lizzie' and are thus in excess of 'Lizzie'. If this 'face and brow' are supplementary to that which it is 'of', i.e. Lizzie, then there is a lack of 'face and brow' in the claim to 'Lizzie' herself as 'Lizzie' cannot contain these notions of 'face and brow' in them needing to be otherwise claimed. There is thus an implicit deferral in this 'face and brow'. Yet, there is a further split regarding this 'fine handsome face and brow of Lizzie', as 'fine and handsome' are other to the 'face and brow' to which they constitute. There is a separation between this 'fine handsome' and 'face and brow', as 'face and brow' cannot contain this 'fine handsome' which, in turn, is deferred. Furthermore, it is so that 'the fine handsome face and brow of Lizzie were revealed without obstruction in the sober light'. This notion of revelation constitutes an implicit covering or hiding; for something to be revealed 'in the sober light', it must first be covered in that which is not 'the sober light'. In this sense, 'the fine handsome face and brow of Lizzie' is that which has needed to be 'revealed', according to this perspective, and this 'revealed' is 'without obstruction in the sober light'. Therefore, this 'face and brow of Lizzie' have the potential to be obstructed and in need of this revelation.

In this perspective, there is 'the fair hair' and 'the dark hair', and these different notions of 'hair' are claimed in relation to one another through 'resting on'. So, 'hair' can 'rest', and it is so that 'the fair hair' is 'resting on the dark hair', so 'the dark hair' is underneath 'the fair hair'. This 'the fair hair' also has 'something' which 'sparkled down among' it, so 'the fair hair' also has an 'among'. There is a notion of layering here, as there is 'something sparkled down' and 'the fair hair resting on', so 'the dark hair' is that which has other 'hair' 'on' it which has this 'something' which 'sparkled down', thus there is a covering of 'the dark hair'. Besides this

layering, there is a direct contrast between ‘the fair hair’ and ‘the dark hair’. There is a repetition of ‘hair’, but this is also not a repetition as the ‘hair’ in question is different ‘hair’. Furthermore, as well as ‘hair’, there are also multiple claims to ‘eye’. In the first instance, it is so that in the perspective on this ‘something’ which ‘sparkled’, it is that ‘if it were not a star – which it couldn’t be – it was an eye’. So according to this perspective, this ‘something’ which ‘sparkled’ cannot be both ‘a star’ and ‘an eye’, as it is ‘if it were not a star [...] ‘it was an eye’. There are two more claims to eye in ‘and if it were an eye, it was Jenny Wren’s eye’. In the claim to ‘it was an eye’, there is a notion of certainty in that ‘it was’ – it is known by the perspective on this eye that ‘it was an eye’. However, in this being ‘it was an eye; and if it were an eye’, a degree of uncertainty is implicated through this ‘if’. There is thus a certainty which then shifts into a lack of certainty. Although this ‘if’ is uncertain, it is that ‘if it were an eye, it was Jenny Wren’s eye’, so there is once again a knowledge that ‘if it were an eye’ then ‘it was’ that of Jenny Wren. There is a shift in perspective with this third claim to an eye, ‘Jenny Wren’s eye’, as this is a different claim to ‘eye’ than the two previous eyes. In this claim to ‘Jenny Wren’s eye’, there is a notion of ownership in that this ‘eye’ is ‘Jenny Wren’s’. However, there is an implicit deferral of this ‘eye’ as this ‘eye’ is other to the thing it is claimed to be part of: ‘Jenny Wren’. This ‘eye’ is thus ‘supplementary to and in excess of Jenny Wren, as although there is ‘s’, this eye is still separate from it. If ‘Jenny Wren’s eye’ is ‘bright and watchful as the bird’s whose name she had taken’, then this ‘eye’ is that which is other to itself: ‘bright and watchful’. In this sense then, an ‘eye’ is not simply an ‘eye’, according to this perspective, as it is constituted by that which is other to and in excess of itself – ‘eye’. There is a comparison between the eye of ‘Jenny Wren’ and this ‘bird[s]’ as this ‘eye’ is ‘bright and watchful as the bird’s whose name she had taken’. Through this ‘as’, both eyes in this perspective are ‘bright and watchful’ but it is ‘Jenny Wren’s eye’ which is ‘as’ this other eye – that of ‘the bird[s]’.

There is thus a further otherness to this 'eye' as it is not what it is – an eye which is 'bright and watchful' - for it is 'as' the very thing to which it is other: 'an eye'.

The doll's dressmaker had an arm round her friend's waist. Adjusting the arm, she slyly took the opportunity of blowing at her own hair where it fell over her face; then the eye down there under lighter shadows sparkled more brightly and appeared more watchful.
(Dickens: p.288)

In this perspective, there is 'an arm' in relation to the 'waist' of someone other – this is 'an arm' which 'the doll's dressmaker had' 'round her friend's waist'. This 'waist' of that which is other to the 'doll's dressmaker', 'her friend[s]', is constructed in terms of the 'doll's dressmaker'. This is 'her friend's waist', so although this is the 'waist' of 'her friend[s]', through this 'her' this is still about the 'doll's dressmaker'. In thinking about this 'arm', this is 'an arm' rather than something that is hers; in this perspective, 'arm' is simply 'an', whereas this 'friend's waist' is constructed as being 'her[s]'. Therefore, the thing which 'The doll's dressmaker had', 'an arm', is more other to 'The doll's dressmaker' than the thing which is constituted as being that of someone other, 'her friend's waist'. There is a shift in the perspective on this 'arm' as it is then 'the arm', so there is a shift from 'an arm' which was 'had' by 'The doll's dressmaker' to 'the arm' which is 'Adjusting' via 'she'. Thus, both arms in question are constituted as belonging to the 'doll's dressmaker' or 'she' but are subject to that which the 'doll's dressmaker' and 'she' do, that is 'had' and 'Adjusting'.

There is a further perspective on 'her' in the claim to 'she slyly took the opportunity of blowing at her own hair where it fell over her face'. In this perspective, there are two things

which are subject to 'her': 'her own hair' and 'her face'. Both 'hair' and 'face' are constituted as being that of 'her', however there is split as that which is hers – hair and face – are other to the 'her' which they are claimed to be. This notion of 'hair' and 'face' are not contained within the claims to 'her', thus implicating a notion of lack. In this sense, if 'hair' and 'face' are that which are other to 'her', then 'hair' and 'face' are absent in the claim to 'her' alone, according to this perspective. Both 'hair' and 'face' are supplementary to their respective 'her', thus there is an implicit deferral of meaning. However, there is a difference in that 'hair' is 'her own', whereas 'face' is 'her[\'s\']'. This difference is subject to the previous claims to the 'hair' of this 'friend', Lizzie. That being so, there is also a previous claim to 'face', so there is something else in this 'own hair'⁴⁴.

In this perspective, it is 'she' who 'slyly took the opportunity of blowing at her own hair where it fell over her face', so it is that of 'her' which is implicated by the doing of 'she'. That which 'she' did, is 'slyly took the opportunity of blowing at her own hair', so 'own hair' can be blown 'at', and this can be done so 'slyly'. Following this 'blowing at her own hair', it is that 'then the eye down there under lighter shadows sparkled more brightly and appeared more watchful'. So, this 'sparkled' and 'appeared' of 'the eye down there' is subject to this 'blowing' and the act of this 'blowing' and the result of this 'sparkled' is what constitutes this 'slyly'. However, although this 'slyly took the opportunity' is followed by appearance of 'the eye', intention cannot be read, for it cannot be known. In thinking about this 'the eye' in relation to 'the arm' and 'her own hair', this 'the eye' is situated as being 'down there under lighter shadows', thus 'the eye' is 'down' in comparison, but it is also 'under'. There is thus a notion of covering in terms of both this 'the eye' but also 'her face' as this 'her own hair' is 'over her face'. There is a layering of 'parts', as 'an arm' is 'round her friend's waist', 'her own hair' is 'over her face', and 'the eye' is 'down there under'. As well as being 'down there under lighter

⁴⁴ See page 41 of this thesis for readings of 'own'.

shadows', this 'the eye' 'sparkled more brightly and appeared more watchful. So, in this 'the eye' sparkling 'more brightly', this 'sparkled' is something which was already happening for it to be 'more', and in turn there must have also been a 'brightly' to this 'sparkled' again because of this 'more'. However, this 'the eye' is also constituted as having 'appeared more watchful'. This is not to say then that it was 'more watchful' for this is how it 'appeared'. Therefore, according to the perspective it is known in this perspective that 'the eye down there under lighter shadows sparkled more brightly' and it is known that 'the eye' 'appeared more watchful'. Although this 'appeared more watchful' is known, it is still an appearance of 'more watchful' opposed to being 'more watchful'

So, this is not just about fairy tales, and this is not just about children's literature; this is about the way we read and what it means to read. These shifts in perspective with body, the gaze, disability, the child, the human, and the animal: this can all be read.

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