Changing the policy agenda?
The impact of the Golden Dawn on Greek party politics

Daphne Halikiopoulou, Kyriaki Nanou and Sofia Vasilopoulou

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ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the impact of the Golden Dawn on the dynamics of domestic party competition by examining whether there has been a change in issue salience since the party's dramatic rise. Our main goal is to examine the salience of topics in the Golden Dawn's agenda from a comparative perspective vis-à-vis the other actors in the system, in order to identify whether attention on particular issues has shifted. We proceed with an analysis of programmatic and ideological materials produced by the Golden Dawn and its competitor parties, including election manifestos and public speeches. We analyse these documents through the employment of a comprehensive framework for coding policy agendas provided by the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP). We find no direct effect on the salience of the immigration issue. However, there is a rise of nationalism across the party system.

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1. Introduction

The success of the neo-Nazi Golden Dawn has been frequently linked to Greece's severe economic crisis. In May and June 2012, in the first national electoral contests that took place in Greece after the eruption of the crisis, the Golden Dawn gained 7.0 and 6.9% of the vote respectively, marking a dramatic rise. Despite the extremity of its ideology and its use of violence, the party sustained its support in subsequent elections. In the May 2014 European Parliament (EP) elections, it came third with 9.4% of the vote. In the two 2015 national elections of January and September it received 6.3% and 7.0% respectively. The rise of the Golden Dawn is important both within the context of Greece specifically, where the economic crisis has contributed to the rise of extremism and anti-establishment politics and the implosion of the party system; but also as part of the broader phenomenon of the upsurge of far-right parties across Europe as a result of the economic crisis (Bosco and Verney 2012; Halikiopoulou and Vlandas 2015).

Reflecting on the party's electoral breakthrough and its relevance within the broader context of increasing far-right party support, existing work has focused on the party's rise within the context of economic crisis (Ellinas 2013; 2015; Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015; Halikiopoulou and Vasilopoulou 2016), its discourse (Kyriazi 2016), its organisational

structures (Ellinas and Lamprianou forthcoming), and its local support (Dinas et al. 2013; Koronaiou and Sakellariou 2013). However, none of the existing research has examined the effects of the Golden Dawn's rise on the dynamics of party competition in Greece. While the party's electoral success in absolute terms may be debatable, and it has not had a direct effect through government participation, its rise could have significant policy implications. Its participation in parliamentary debates has the potential to shift the other parties' programmatic agendas, both in terms of issue salience and in terms of party positions, thus shifting the nature and scope of the debate itself with regards to a number of policies including immigration and asylum, economic and welfare, as well as foreign affairs and defence.

This paper focuses on the impact of the Golden Dawn on the dynamics of domestic party competition by examining whether there has been a change in issue salience since the party's dramatic rise. A change in the salience of an issue can be crucial for policy change (Jones 1994: 5–10), as particular parties may place particular emphasis on specific topics, making them more important to the political debate (Wagner and Meyer 2016). Our main goal is to examine the salience of topics in the Golden Dawn's agenda from a comparative perspective vis-à-vis the other actors in the system, in order to identify whether attention on particular issues has shifted. We proceed with an analysis of programmatic and ideological materials produced by the Golden Dawn and its competitor parties, including election manifestos and public speeches. This allows us to examine whether Golden Dawn's rise has reshaped patterns of competition in the Greek party system.

2. The far-right party family

The 'far right' is one of the most diverse party families (Ennser 2012). We use the term 'far' as an umbrella term, which includes parties that all claim ownership of nationalism and national identity, and justify all other policies on the basis of the nation. Within this broad range of parties, we distinguish between 'extreme' and 'radical'. While all far-right parties are authoritarian (Dunn 2015), the extreme variants oppose democracy not only on substantive, but also on procedural grounds, use violence as a means to an end, and maintain ideological links with fascism (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). The radical variants, on the other hand, distance themselves from fascism and violence, and often reject the far-right label altogether.

After WWII, the extreme-right variants became increasingly irrelevant in Europe. One of the consequences of fascism and Nazism was the discrediting of the ideology of National Socialism, which meant that those extreme-right parties which maintained ideological and/or organizational links with fascism were penalised by the voters, remaining at the margins of the European party systems. When, from the 1980s onwards, far-right parties re-emerged in some European countries, they did so with a more moderate agenda and attempted to distance themselves from inter-war fascism (Ignazi 1995). While these radical variants maintained a key emphasis on nationalism, their 'winning formula' in the 1990s (Kitchelt with McGann 1995) was an adoption of neo-liberal economic policies and therefore a departure from the statism that characterised fascism.

Yet with the eruption of the Eurozone crisis in the late 2000s, the extreme-right phenomenon has again returned to the forefront of European politics. For example, other than the Golden Dawn in Greece, we have also witnessed the rise of the extreme-right Jobbik in Hungary, which increased its support dramatically in 2010 and maintained this in the subsequent 2014 elections; the People's Party Our Slovakia, which entered the parliament in 2016 with 8.0% of the vote and 14 seats; and the Cypriot National Popular Front (ELAM), which entered parliament in 2016 with 3.7% of the vote and 2 seats. This has coincided with an increasing electoral support for radical-right parties: for example, the True Finns, who received 17.6% in 2015, the French Front National whose support during the French regional elections reached 27.7% in 2015, and the Swedish Democrats who received 13.0% in 2014.

Since the late 2000s, therefore, both the extreme and radical variants of the far-right phenomenon have enjoyed electoral success across Europe. In this paper we focus on the Golden Dawn, which we define as an extreme variant of the far-right party family. The party claims ownership of nationalism and justifies all its policies on the basis of the nation; it espouses the use of violence and fascist ideals. The party's ideology goes beyond authoritarianism, understood as despotic rule, to the embrace of totalitarianism: the espousal of a system of total control by a party which sees itself not above the people but as the embodiment of the people (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). The party rejects liberalism and socialism and endorses what it terms the 'third biggest ideology in history' – nationalism – combined with support for an all-powerful state premised on 'popular sovereignty'. It shares with other fascist movements both a fixation on societal degeneration and the

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proposed solution, which encompasses the necessity for national rebirth through a collective movement from below, understood as embodied by the Golden Dawn and its leader (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015).

2.1 The effect of the far-right: Immigration

What is the effect of the rise of the far-right party on party competition and issue prioritization? And why is this important? Theories of party competition postulate that fringe parties may influence mainstream parties, both in terms of policy positions and issue salience (Meguid 2005; Van Spanje 2010). In terms of policy positions, successful rhetoric entails imitation: most of the literature expects that a contagion effect takes place when a far-right party enters the system (e.g. Van Spanje 2010). In the Downsian framework parties which are understood as suppliers in an electoral market model are expected to shift their positions in order to meet popular demand (Downs 1957). As a response to the electoral threat posed by far-right parties, centrist parties of both the left and the right are likely to readjust their position on key issues such as immigration, in order to compete for support (Wagner and Meyer 2016).

In terms of issue salience, the growth of far-right parties entails that mainstream parties may no longer side-line issues that are integral to far-right party ideology. Issue salience is important because it can change the nature of the debate, shifting the emphasis on what is actually discussed. Mainstream parties may either take an 'accommodative' or an 'adversarial' stance, but either position increases the salience of issues that the far right deems important (Meguid 2008).

Here, we are concerned with issue salience because we want to identify whether the issues on which the Golden Dawn centres its agenda have become more prominent in the political debate. Our starting point is immigration. This is because a large body of literature identifies immigration as an issue owned by the far right (e.g. Van Spanje 2010). There is consensus that since immigration is the key issue associated with the far right, the entry of far-right parties in the system will first and foremost influence the salience of immigration and hence, there is extensive research on the impact of far-right party success on immigration (Bale 2003; Ivarsflaten 2008; Van Spanje 2010; Alonso & Claro da Fonseca 2011; Immerzeel et al. 2015). From this we hypothesise that:

H1: The rise of the Golden Dawn is likely to be associated with an increase in the salience of immigration across the party system.

2.2 The broader effect of the far-right: Nationalism

So far we have identified the potential effect of the rise of the far right on the importance of immigration policy in party programmatic agendas. However, in our definition of the far-right party family, these parties are not single-issue parties, but rather, their programmatic agendas propose reforms on a variety of issues, where they offer 'nationalist' solutions (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2015). This entails that nationalism is the key to understanding the far right, and hence its impact on party competition, and this need not necessarily be confined to immigration policy.

Differences between the extreme and the radical variants of the far right notwithstanding, nationalism is the core ideological characteristic of all

far-right parties, which idealise the nation (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). Nationalism may be understood as an ideological / political movement seeking the attainment and maintenance of unity, autonomy and identity of a deemed nation (Breuilly 2005). The core doctrine of nationalism emphasises the ultimate value of national self-determination. It assumes that the world consists of sovereign, individual and distinct nations with their own history and culture. Because the nation is the ultimate source of sovereignty, loyalty to it must override other loyalties. Self-determination is the ultimate goal; every nation's aspiration is to be free and secure. The nation is fully justified to pursue its self-determination, even if this should require violent means (Smith 1991).

Ensuring that national identity stays homogenous and unaltered is pivotal in ensuring that the nation will remain free and secure. As such, far-right parties focus on nationalism as a way of politicising the issue of identity (Hainsworth 2008). From this we might expect that the effect on party competition may not only be confined to a specific policy, but rather the extent to which nationalism is used as the master narrative to frame other key policy issues. From this we hypothesis that:

H2: The rise of the Golden Dawn is likely to be associated with an increase in the salience of nationalism across the party system.

2.3 The different effect of the far right: Ethnic and civic nationalism

So far we have identified the importance of nationalism as a master framework. However, nationalism is not necessarily a uniform ideology. The criteria for defining national membership vary in terms of their degree of inclusivity. Existing theories of nationalism address this

question of national inclusivity in terms of the ethnic-civic divide (Smith 1991). These theories often emphasise the Janus character of nationalism, by distinguishing between exclusive (ascriptive) and inclusive (institutional) criteria of national membership (Kohn 1946; Nairn 1975; Smith 1991; Hechter 2000). While ethnic ties are based on a sense of self-identity determined by 'natural' factors such as language or ethnic descent, civic ties are based on deliberate human commitment (Zimmer 2003).

The exclusive criteria may be described as ethno-cultural. We break them down in two categories:

1.   **Ethnic**: this refers to ascriptive criteria such as language, religion race and/or ancestry.

2.   **Cultural**: this refers to the reproduction of the pattern of values that constitutes a nation, including the preservation of traditional values and the national way of life.

The inclusive criteria are voluntaristic and legal-institutional, based on a community of law, the provision of rights and the democratic ideal of popular sovereignty. We break them down in two categories:

3.   **Territorial**: this refers to national self-determination and the identification of the nation with a specific and predefined territory.

4.   **Economic**: this refers to the existence of a common economy and currency.

This entails that parties of different ideological predispositions may draw upon different elements of nationalism, and therefore emphasise the

different categories of the nationalism master framework. The question then arises: which category of nationalism is more likely to be emphasised by which party family? The right appears the more straightforward answer, as nationalism tends to be associated with right-wing parties. This is both because of right-wing parties' emphasis on socially and culturally conservative values, including cultural unity and national pride (Van Spagne 2010), as well as their stricter stance on immigration (Alonso & Claro da Fonseca 2011). Right-wing parties have a 'tradition of defending the nation and its culture from external threats' (Bale 2008: 463), meaning that they have an additional incentive to accommodate far-right stances on nationalism, not least because they see themselves as direct competitors (Van Spagne 2010). From this we expect that all elements of nationalism that focus on ethno-cultural criteria are more likely to be accommodated by right-wing parties:

H3: The proportion of references to ethnic and cultural nationalism is likely to increase among right-wing parties.

The relationship between nationalism and the left is less straightforward. At first glance there appears to be an incompatibility between the two, primarily because key left-wing values tend to be associated with internationalism. For left-wing parties, the key societal cleavage is class rather than culture, ethnicity or national identity. However, research has shown that nationalism and the left can be compatible under certain circumstances (Alonso and Claro da Fonseca 2011; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012). The connection becomes possible when the left equates the nation with class and popular sovereignty (Schwartzmantel 1987; Yak 2001; Erk 2010). The nation is defined as a

democratic community bound by geographical borders in 'which all citizens can participate in exercising their democratic rights and in that way shape their own destiny' (Schwartzmantel 1987: 242). Therefore, the left is drawn to a voluntaristic type of nationalism, as opposed to a cultural one, emphasising civic criteria of national membership and popular sovereignty.

Hence, the immigration question is a challenge for the left. On the one hand, many of the arguments on immigration are based on an ethno-cultural understanding of the nation. On the other hand, far-right parties with anti-immigrant agendas are successful in drawing votes from left-wing constituencies premised on an argument of immigration as competition for welfare. For example, the United Kingdom Independence Party's voting base has been described as including left-behind, former Labour voters (Ford and Goodwin 2014). This anti-immigration rhetoric has a civic component, as the basis of exclusion is not ethno-cultural per se, but actually the right to access the collective goods of the state. In order to compete for these voters, the left is likely to adapt to the nationalism question but because of ideological limitations––due to the rejection of non-materialist cleavage, ethnic nationalism is not a viable option––it is more likely to adapt to civic nationalism, focusing on institutions, sovereignty and territory. Therefore we hypothesise the following:

H4: The proportion of references to territorial and economic nationalism is likely to increase among left-wing parties.

3. Data

This paper investigates the programmatic agenda of the Golden Dawn and the effect of the party's rise on issue salience as reflected in parties' discursive priorities and legislative debates. We analyse party-specific materials, which capture the ideological and programmatic agenda of the Golden Dawn and other parties in the Greek party system. These include two types of sources:

(1) Election manifestos issued by the political parties. These are official statements that signal to citizens on which issues a party is focusing its attention. We have selected to code party manifestos in five separate elections: 2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2015[3]. We do this in order to capture potential change across time. Our sample also includes the radical right LAOS in order to generate a comprehensive picture of the Greek party system since the early 2000s. Hence we have one election year without a far-right gaining parliamentary representation (2004), two election years when the radical-right LAOS was granted representation (2007 and 2009) and two electoral years when the extreme-right Golden Dawn achieved representation in the Greek Parliament (2012 and 2015). This includes a total of ten parties and thirty-three manifestos. More specifically, for 2004 and 2007, this includes five parties: the centre-left Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK), the centre-right New Democracy (ND), the far-left Coalition of Left and Progress (SYN), the Greek Communist Party (KKE) and the far-right Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS). For 2009, the Coalition of the

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[3] There were two national elections in 2012 and 2015. However, as the manifestos were the same at both elections, they were coded only once.

Radical Left (SYRIZA) replaces SYN. The other four parties remain the same as in previous years. In 2012 the crisis resulted in the fragmentation of the party system and thus an increase in the number of parties competing for parliamentary representation (Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou 2013). For this year we examine a total of eight parties, which, in addition to the five mentioned above, include the extreme-right Golden Dawn, the radical-right splinter party from ND Independent Greeks (ANEL), and the centre-left Democratic Left (DIMAR). In 2015, we expand the analysis to include two additional parties: the centrist RIVER and the centre-left Movement of Democratic Socialists (KINIMA) (see Table 1).

Political Party	2015	2012	2009	2007	2004
SYRIZA/SYN					
PASOK					
ND					
LAOS					
KKE					
GD					
DIMAR					
ANEL					
POTAMI					
KINIMA					

Table 1: Manifestos coded per election year.

(2) Public speeches in the national parliament: In addition to electoral manifestos, which provide us with 'snap-shots' of party behaviour, we examine the continuous presence of parties between elections through an analysis of their speeches. Looking at speeches allows us to directly examine the context of the crisis. We have thus identified four critical legislative junctures with significant consequences in terms of policy-making and implementation of reform during the Greek sovereign debt

crisis. These include party leader speeches during the signing of the three Memorandums of Understanding (2010, 2012 and 2015), as well as during the July 2015 Referendum on whether to accept the bailout conditions proposed jointly by the European Commission (EC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB) in June 2015.

Party leaders' reactions during these critical junctures allow us to measure the importance that they placed on specific issues. We compare two critical junctures (Memorandum I and Memorandum II) during which the Golden Dawn was not in the legislature, and two junctures (Memorandum III and Referendum) during which they were, thus allowing us to capture the extent to which there is a shift in the debate driven by the Golden Dawn in the legislature. For Memorandums I and II, we examined the speeches of five party leaders: Karatzaferis (LAOS), Papandreou (PASOK), Papariga (KKE), Samaras (ND) and Tsipras (SYRIZA). For Memorandum III, we examined the speeches of seven party leaders: including Gennimata (PASOK), Kammenos (ANEL), Koutsoumpas (KKE), Meimerakis (ND), Michaloliakos (Golden Dawn), Theodorakis (RIVER) and Tsipras (SYRIZA). For the debate on the 2015 referendum, we examined Gennimata (PASOK), Kammenos (ANEL), Koutsoumpas (KKE), Michaloliakos (Golden Dawn), Samaras (New Democracy), Theodorakis (RIVER) and Tsipras (SYRIZA). This is a total of twenty-four speeches (see Table 2).

Party leader	Memorandum I	Memorandum II	Memorandum III	Referendum 2015
Karatzaferis				
Papandreou				
Papariga				
Samaras				
Tsipras				
Gennimata				
Kammenos				
Koutsoumpas				
Meimarakis				
Michaloliakos				
Theodorakis				

Table 2: Speeches coded per critical juncture.

4. Methods

We analyse these documents through the employment of a comprehensive framework for coding policy agendas provided by the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP)[4]. The CAP aims to create a series of commonly coded databases, which focus on the policy content of political parties. The CAP project provides standardised data, which are comparable across countries and applied consistently over time (Bevan 2014). The CAP framework includes 19 major topic codes: macroeconomics; civil rights, minority issues, immigration and civil liberties; health; agriculture; labour and employment; education; environment; energy; transportation; law, crime and family issues; social welfare; community development, planning and housing issues; banking, finance and domestic commerce; defence; space, science, technology and communications; foreign trade; international affairs and foreign aid;

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[4] http://www.comparativeagendas.info/

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government operations; and public lands, water management and colonial and territorial issues. Each code also includes a range of sub-topics. For example the macroeconomics category comprises the following sub-categories: general domestic macroeconomic issues; inflation, prices, and interest rates; unemployment rate; monetary supply, central bank, and the treasury; national budget and debt; taxation, tax policy and tax reform; industrial policy; and price control (for the Greek version of CAP, see Appendix 1 Greek codebook). These can be used to reliably compare issue attention longitudinally, across decision-making venues, and between nations. In terms of technique, the primary purpose is to identify an argument. This is done by breaking down sentences to their shortest form: the quasi-sentence, which contains a subject, a verb and an attribute. Long sentences are broken down into quasi-sentences for the purposes of coding.

4.1 Nationalism

We add a new 'nationalism' category to the CAP coding. Given that we have identified nationalism as key to the programmatic agenda of the far right, we coded whether each policy issue was framed in terms of nationalism. We coded nationalism for each quasi-sentence. Those sentences that were coded as nationalistic were further coded into the sub-categories of nationalism identified above (ethnic, cultural, territorial and economic). The rationale for our coding scheme is as follows:

1. **Ethnic**: the portrayal of the Greek nation as a perennial and un-eroded community of descent, bound by ethnic and biological identifiers.

2.   **Cultural**: an emphasis on the preservation of a traditional way of life and support for customs and cultural traditions including religion.

3.   **Territorial**: understanding the Greek nation as a geographical entity whose members are bound by a pre-defined territory and its borders. The emphasis here is on the defence of self-determination and the importance of borders for the continued existence of the Greek nation.

4.   **Economic**: this has two dimensions. First, the symbolic importance of the national currency – this includes references to the drachma and the euro. Second, the broader question of who governs the national economy, which is a question of sovereignty.

5. Findings

Our first step is to identify the most salient issues in the Golden Dawn's manifestos and see how these may have changed from 2012 to 2015. From our coding of the party's two manifestos, we make the following observations. First, there are quite a few policy issues, as identified by the CAP framework, that the party chooses not to address. These include the environment, transportation, planning and housing, technology, and foreign trade in both elections, as well as labour and employment in 2015. Second, the party focuses on three key issues in both years. These include government, defence and macroeconomics. While these three issues are prominent in the party's manifestos, the sequence of their importance is different. In 2012, 11.0% of the party's manifesto focuses on macroeconomics, as opposed to 16.3% in 2015. Similarly, while 22.2%

of the 2012 manifesto focuses on issues related to government, in 2015 this drops to 15.0%. While in 2012 defence was the second most important issue with 14.7% attention, in 2015 it dropped to the third place with 10.9%. Third, interestingly immigration has little coverage and does not constitute one of the top three salient issues for the Golden Dawn. In 2012 immigration amounted to 9.0% of the party's manifesto, and in 2015 to only 6.0%. See Figure 1 below.


Figure 1: Relative issue salience in Golden Dawn's manifestos (2012 and 2015)

However, it is important to raise two issues here. First, in the CAP scheme, coverage of an issue refers directly to policy content. This means that an issue may be raised, but if it does not contain policy content – a substantive focus on a specific policy and / or direct policy recommendations – then it is not coded. As a result, while a Golden Dawn manifesto may have numerous references to immigration, unless it is linked directly to a specific policy recommendation, the issue is not coded. Second, relatively low issue salience does not necessarily affect party position. The Golden Dawn may not discuss the question of immigration as frequently as other topics in terms of specific policy recommendations, but its position on the issue remains fervently against. Our qualitative analysis of the party's manifestos reveals that when immigration is mentioned, the references are clearly anti-immigrant. The party distinguishes between Greeks and foreigners, irrespective of whether those foreigners may have Greek citizenship, and takes issue with the concept of 'legal immigration'. Illegal immigrants are portrayed as invaders and an 'alien body' in Greek society. According to the 2015 manifesto, each foreign worker amounts to an unemployed Greek person. The deportation of all illegal immigrants will result in the opening of thousands of jobs for Greek people' (Golden Dawn 2015).

Has the rise of the Golden Dawn influenced the salience of immigration? We have hypothesised above that given the far right's ownership of the immigration issue, the salience of immigration is likely to have increased across the party system. We test this hypothesis by examining the relative change of the three most important issues in party manifestos from 2004 to 2015. Table 3 identifies the three most salient issues for

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each party in each of the five electoral years. It shows that the policy of immigration and minority issues has little salience both before and after the Golden Dawn's rise. Instead, from 2012 onwards, the issues of government, macroeconomics, banking and finance, defence, labour and employment and international affairs are the most salient issues across the party system. Given the context of the severe economic crisis that altered political opportunity structures in the first place, it is expected that the issues related to the economy and governance would be the most salient in parties' agendas.

2004	1	2	3
PASOK	Government	Banking & Finance	Education
ND	Education	Health	Government
KKE	Government	Macroeconomics	International
LAOS	Government	Law & Crime	Health
SYN	Government	Civil Liberties	Macroeconomics
2007	1	2	3
PASOK	Government	Education	Banking & Finance
ND	Banking & Finance	Law & Crime	Government
KKE	Government	Labour & Employment	Education
LAOS	Government	Education	Macroeconomics
SYN	Government	Labour & Employment	Civil Liberties
2009	1	2	3
PASOK	Government	Education	Banking & Finance
ND	Labour & Employment	Transportation	Energy
KKE	Labour & Employment	Government	Macroeconomics
LAOS	Macroeconomics	Government	Law & Crime
SYRIZA	Environment	Macroeconomics	Government
2012	1	2	3
PASOK	Macroeconomics	Government	Banking & Finance
ND	Labour & Employment	Government	Transportation
KKE	Government	International	Macroeconomics
LAOS	Macroeconomics	Government	Defence
SYRIZA	Macroeconomics	Government	Labour & Employment
GD	Government	Defence	Macroeconomics

	1	2	3
DIMAR	Macroeconomics	Government	International
ANEL	Macroeconomics	Government	International
2015	**1**	**2**	**3**
PASOK	Macroeconomics	Banking & Finance	Government
ND	Macroeconomics	Labour & Employment	Government
KKE	Government	Labour & Employment	Macroeconomics
LAOS	Banking & Finance	Macroeconomics	International
SYRIZA	Government	Macroeconomics	Banking & Finance
GD	Macroeconomics	Government	Defence
DIMAR	Macroeconomics	Government	Banking & Finance
ANEL	Education	Government	Banking & Finance
POTAMI	Government	Education	Civil Liberties
KIDISO	Macroeconomics	Government	Law & Crime

Table 3: Most important issues per party per election year.

Figure 2 below, which focuses on the issue of minority rights and immigration, shows how attention to this issue has changed over time for each of the parties. One overall observation is that there is no consistent pattern of change in the salience of immigration and minority rights across the party system. Certain parties have politicized the issue of immigration more than others – although this picture does not show whether their stance is one of accommodation or polarization. On the one hand, the two mainstream parties, PASOK and ND, appear to pay relatively less attention to immigration. Both focus more on the issue in 2007 and 2009, while attention levels decline in 2012. PASOK pays slightly more attention to immigration in 2015 compared to ND. On the other hand, LAOS, the River, the Golden Dawn, SYN/SYRIZA and DIMAR pay more attention to immigration. Surprisingly ANEL, which is another far-right party, does not mention the issue much. These findings partially confirm Hypothesis 1. The River and DIMAR are the only two parties that address the issue of minority rights and immigration in their manifestos

substantially. This is consistent with party competition explanations that see centrist parties as competing on issues relating to civil liberties.


Figure 2: Attention to minority rights and immigration per political party.

5.1 Nationalism

Because nationalism forms a fundamental part of the programmatic agenda of the far right, we expect that the rise of the Golden Dawn will be associated with an increase in the salience of nationalism across the Greek political spectrum. We start by examining the presence of nationalism in the Golden Dawn's manifestos. Figures 3 and 4 below show the proportion of nationalist references per policy issue. We find nationalism is present among most issues. In accordance with research that identifies immigration and defence as key policy areas of the far-right agenda (e.g. Hainsworth 2008), we find that these two issues have the highest proportion of nationalist references in Golden Dawn's

manifestos. Also, a high proportion of nationalist references may be observed in the party's discussion of international affairs, foreign trade, education and culture, agriculture, banking and finance. We also observe a significant increase in nationalist references in 2015 compared to 2012 in the issues of health, public lands and territorial issues and energy.


**Figure 3:** Nationalism per issue in the 2012 Golden Dawn Manifesto.

Figure 4: Nationalism per issue in the 2015 Golden Dawn Manifesto.

We proceed by examining the presence of nationalism across the party system. Figure 5 below measures the proportion of overall nationalist references in party manifestos in the five election years. It also shows the proportion of references to each separate category of nationalism. The figure illustrates that nationalist references overall had a significant increase from 2009. This was sustained in 2012 and dropped slightly in 2015. The proportion of references to nationalism is much higher in 2012 and 2015 compared to 2004 and 2007. The greater amount of nationalist references may be observed in the category of economic nationalism. In 2012, the proportion of references to ethnic and cultural nationalism has increased slightly compared to 2009.


Figure 5: Proportion of nationalist references in party manifestos per election year, overall and in subcategories.

We proceed to test the extent to which the proportion of nationalist references have increased in particular issues. Our interest is in two specific policy areas – macroeconomics and government – because these issues have been of high salience across the political system since the eruption of the crisis. Our rationale is to determine whether the way in which political parties portray these issues has become more nationalistic. Figures 6 and 7 below illustrate both attention to the specific issue and the proportion of nationalist references. Figure 6, examining the issue of macroeconomics, shows that the proportion of nationalist references increased across time. In 2004 and 2007, political parties paid less attention to the issue of macroeconomics compared to 2009, 2012 and 2015. This attention contains relatively fewer nationalist references. The KKE 2007 manifesto is an exception. The party makes the most nationalist references during that electoral year compared to the other parties. In 2009 nationalist references made by most parties increased. This trend is broadly sustained in 2012 and 2015 with some fluctuations. The references to nationalism in LAOS's 2009 manifesto increased dramatically compared to 2004 and 2007. In 2012 and 2015 nationalist references declined; however, they remained higher compared to 2004 and 2007. This can be explained by the party's participation in the pro-Memorandum coalition government. In 2015 nationalist references made by KKE, PASOK and SYRIZA increased compared to 2004 and 2007, while DIMAR and ND remained broadly stable.

Similar trends are observed in Figure 7, which focuses on the issue of government. Nationalist references increase from 2009 onwards with LAOS, SYRIZA, KKE and ANEL making the most nationalistic references.

DIMAR, PASOK and ND contain the fewest. These findings provide support for Hypothesis 2. There are, however, differences between the different parties.


Figure 6: Proportion of nationalist references per issue per year: Macroeconomics.


Figure 7: Proportion of nationalist references per issue per year: Government.

In addition to our overall nationalism hypothesis, we have also tested a series of assumption with regards to the relationship types of nationalism and particular political parties. Our hypotheses here are that ethnic nationalism is more likely to increase among right-leaning parties, whereas civic nationalism is more likely to increase among left-leaning parties. In Figures 8 and 9, we measure references to ethnic nationalism by merging the ethnic and cultural nationalism categories, and references to civic nationalism by merging the territorial and economic nationalism categories.

Figure 8, which examines party manifestos, shows an overall prevalence of references to civic nationalism among most political parties. Consistent with our expectations from the literature (Halikiopoulou et al. 2012), the far right LAOS, ANEL and Golden Dawn have the highest proportion of ethnic nationalist statements. In addition, the proportion of their civic nationalism is also high. Among far-left parties, the proportion of references to ethnic nationalism is low. However, references to civic nationalism are relatively high in KKE manifestos. The proportion of SYRIZA's references to nationalism is high, but notably declined since the party entered government, which is to be expected in its shift from a party of opposition, to a party of government. Surprisingly, we observe higher than expected levels of both ethnic and civic nationalism in the mainstream PASOK and the centrist KIDISO manifestos. These findings support Hypothesis 3, illustrating that ethnic nationalist references are predominant among right-leaning parties. They partly support Hypothesis 4, in that the proportion of references to civic nationalism is high among left-leaning parties, but they are high among the other parties as well.

Figure 8: References to ethnic and civic nationalism in Greek party manifests (2004, 2007, 2009, 2012 and 2015).


Figure 9: References to ethnic and civic nationalism in Greek party leader speeches (Memorandum I 2010, Memorandum II 2012, Memorandum III 2015 and Referendum 2015).

Figure 9, which focuses on party leader speeches during the four critical junctures, reveals a similar picture. As expected, the far-right LAOS, ANEL, and Golden Dawn have a high proportion of references to both ethnic and civic nationalism. KKE and SYRIZA have a high proportion of references to civic nationalism. An interesting finding is that during the first Memorandum in 2010, Tsipras' speech includes an equal proportion of references to ethnic and civic nationalism, which both decline in subsequent years.

6. Conclusion

This paper has examined the impact of the Golden Dawn on the dynamics of domestic party competition in Greece by focusing on issue salience. Using the Comparative Agenda Project's coding scheme, we have examined two sets of sources - party election manifestos and leaders' speeches. We did so in order to capture changes in issue salience, as reflected in parties' discursive priorities and legislative debates, across time. In addition to coding policy issues identified in the CAP framework, we added a nationalism category to the Greek codebook, seeking to capture the extent to which nationalist references frame each policy issue. In order to determine whether particular types of nationalism are associated with the agendas of specific parties, we have distinguished between four nationalism categories (ethnic, cultural, territorial and economic), merging them into two broad types in accordance with the existing literature (Smith 1991).

Our findings indicate that the three most salient issues in the Golden Dawn's manifesto are macroeconomics, defence and government. The salience of minority issues and immigration is lower than these three policy areas, and much lower than expected. This may be explained by the rise of the Golden Dawn coinciding with the economic crisis, meaning that an increased emphasis on issues such as the economy and governance is to be expected. There is no indication that there is a clear link between the rise of the Golden Dawn and the salience of the immigration issue in the programmatic agendas of other parties.

Our data indicate that the Golden Dawn's framing of policy issues is highly nationalistic. We also observe a high proportion of nationalist references across the party system. However, there is no clear discernible pattern; nor a clear indication that the Golden Dawn's rise has driven this increase in references to nationalism. Lastly we tested whether specific types of nationalism are more prevalent among particular political parties. Here our findings confirm that that the ethnic component of nationalism is more prevalent among right-leaning parties. The civic component of nationalism is widespread both among left-leaning parties and other parties in the system.

Our contribution is both theoretical and empirical. In terms of theory, we contribute to the literature that examines the impact of the far right on the programmatic agendas of other parties in the system. In addition, we theorise the impact of the far right in terms of nationalism, which is core to the far right's ideology but remains understudied. In terms of our empirical contribution, we advance scholarly knowledge on the ideological profile and programmatic agenda of the Golden Dawn by

coding source materials. We also examined its impact on the Greek political system by coding the materials of other parties and assessing the extent to which there has been a change in the issue prioritization of these parties' agendas. Finally, we produce data that can enable researchers to directly compare the ideological and programmatic content of the Golden Dawn with that of other far-right parties in Europe.

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