



**University of
Reading**

Graduate Institute of Political and International Studies

**Effects of military bases established after conflict on their
communities and the implications for peacebuilding**

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**Submitted in fulfillment of the requirements
for Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
September 2017**

Declaration

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

All errors and omissions are my own.

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Abstract

Peacekeeping organizations have recently begun to critically evaluate their operations concerning the effects their activities have on the local community in post-conflict environments. There is now an increased recognition that local-level, or day-to-day, activities play a much more significant role in post-conflict stabilization than once attributed and that they affect policy goals more directly than previously thought. Yet, a systematic study of the effects of military bases in post-conflict environments is absent.

This research begins to fill this gap concerning military bases established in post-conflict environments. It uses process tracing through within case study comparison and livelihoods-focused political economy analysis of the Republic of Kosovo to address several questions: what are the impacts of the base construction activities; what are the effects of the day-to-day sustainment activities, and what are the effects of the continued presence of the base on relations between military and local elites. Noting the economic gains of shadow economies by war-time elites often translates into political power in a post-war environment, elites' relations with the military base may assure their dominance through control of access to high-paying base employment and profitable business relationships. Thus, the everyday practices of establishing and maintaining military bases in post-conflict environments, which directly affect the political, social and economic components of the local political economy, may permanently affect stability and development.

Field research of these questions finds substantial variance between bases, which have roots in the procedures of the lead contributing nation. Overall, political effects are limited, while social and economic effects are mixed. Given the size, characteristics and enduring presence of military bases in peace operations, it is therefore necessary to look beyond size of the base, and

interrogate more closely the specific practices, rules and regulations that they follow to identify their effects on the local political economy and implications for sustainable peacebuilding.

Acknowledgements

I wish to express my deep gratitude to my PhD supervisor Professor Dominik Zaum, who always pushed me to be better, and to my interpreter and field research assistant Mr. Edison Krasniqi, who never met a stranger. Without their questions, care, honesty, humor and support, I could not have completed this life-changing endeavor.

In addition, my heartfelt thanks to the men and women I interviewed for this research. Special thanks to those in public service in the Municipalities of Ferizaj, Gjilan, Gjakova and Prizren who gave generously of their time and resources – all were a continued source of inspiration throughout my research. I am especially indebted to the Director of the Agency for the Registration of Businesses, Mr. Gazmend Mejzini and his staff for their assistance, and for Mr. Sojeva and Mr. Jakupi in Ferizaj, Mr. Simitci in Prizren and Mayor Kusari-Lila in Gjakova for their insight.

Special appreciation to the Rexha family for their warmth and hospitality throughout my Kosovo visits and for the encouragement from cherished friends and colleagues in the military.

Finally, I am delighted to thank my husband Mark for his unwavering love and support, and for the opportunity to be reminded each day by his presence, “that it is better and nicer to be together.”

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List of Acronyms

AAK	<i>Aleanca për Ardhmërine e Kosovës</i> : Alliance for the Future of Kosovo
CIVPOL	UN Civilian Police
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JA	Yugoslav Army (1992-1999)
JNA	Yugoslav National Army (1945-1992)
KFOR	Kosovo Forces
KLA	Kosovo Liberation Army; also, UÇK, <i>Ushtria Clirimtare e Kosoves</i>
KPC	Kosovo Protection Corps (September 1999-January 2009)
KSF	Kosovo Security Forces: <i>Forcat e Armatosura të Kosovës</i> (September 2009 to present)
LCK	League of Communists of Kosovo
LCS	League of Communists of Serbia
LCY	League of Communists of Yugoslavia
LDK	<i>Lidhja Demokratike te Kosovës</i> : Democratic League of Kosovo
MNB	Multinational Brigade
MNTF	Multinational Task Force
MTA	Military Technical Agreement, describes tasks to Serb and NATO military forces
MTS	Mother Theresa Society
MUP	<i>Ministarstvo Unutrasnija Polsova</i> : Serbian National Police
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD	Organization for European Cooperation and Development
ONO	<i>Opstevodna Odbvana</i> : Total People's Defense
OSCE	Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe
PDK	<i>Partia Demokratike e Kosovës</i> : Democratic Party of Kosovo
PISG	Provisional Institutions of Self-Government (supervision ended Sep 2012)
QIP	Quick Impact Project

SASE Safe and Secure Environment

SEAHut Southeast Asia Hut

SRSR Special Representative to the Secretary General

TMK *Trupat e Mbrojtjes së Kosovës*: Kosovo Protection Corps (September 1999 - January 2009)

TO Territorial Defense

UÇK *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*: Kosovo Liberation Army

UDBA Yugoslav State Security Directorate

UNMIK United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo

UNRRA United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration

UNSCR 1244 United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244, ending Kosovo War June 10, 1999

YA Yugoslav Army (1992-1999); also, JA

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Chapter 1 Introduction to the Thesis

1.0 Introduction

Particularly since the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s, a period where competing Super powers had both suppressed and encouraged localized grievances, there has been a substantial increase in intra-state conflicts and a corresponding increase in peace operations to address them. Peace operations, a suite of activities to dispel violence and create the conditions for lasting peace (United Nations, 2017), have historically been deployed to monitor and patrol ceasefires, and create spaces for lasting diplomatic or political solutions to conflict. More recently, however, peace operations have been deployed to protect civilian populations from protracted armed violence, and to actively build peace and shape post-conflict settlements. In these contemporary cases, tens of thousands of peacekeepers and humanitarian actors may arrive to establish their offices and begin working in a conflict, or newly post-conflict environment.

Peacekeeping and humanitarian organizations have recently begun to critically evaluate their operations and the effects they have on the local community. There is now an increased recognition that their day-to-day activities play a much more significant role in post-conflict stabilization than once attributed, and that they affect peace operation goals more directly. Yet, a comparable study of the effects of military bases in this environment is absent. As the frequency of environments where military forces and humanitarian actors share space increases, persistent failure to understand the influence of the everyday activities of military bases on the local political economy invites less-than-optimum outcomes. This research begins to fill the gap in knowledge concerning military bases established in a post-conflict environment, and contributes to international relations theory by identifying the political, social and economic influences of the military base on the local political economy and their wider implications for peacebuilding.

1.1 Background of the Problem

Military bases have been a feature of the human landscape for millennia. Once simple walls for protection from predators, fortifications became indicators of wealth, social hierarchy and identity (Bradley, 2001; Fletcher, 1996). Settlements that bordered such fortifications often politically and economically benefited from their proximity, even as they 'paid' for their physical security through financial and military obligations (Bar-Yosef, 2001; Hammond & Barton, 1972). Yet, fortifications were also symbols of offense, and for some, defeat and humiliation. Military bases, as they are now known, ultimately possess significant coercive power over their communities. Hence, for those with whom the base aligns, there is the appearance of its tacit support. Particularly in a post-conflict environment, this appearance of support may inadvertently entrench actors with destabilizing agendas, reinforce pre-conflict activities, foster resentment and contribute to the return to violence.

Peace operations are fundamentally based on the concepts of the liberal peace and the normative ideals of democracy, particularly a common trust in resolving differences without violence; respect for political transparency and collective recognition of the benefits of economic interdependence (Doyle, 2004; Mitchell, 2009). These, according to Owen, tend to result in a positive, "self-fulfilling prophecy of peace" (Owen, 1994:92). Democratization, therefore, is typically integrated into post-conflict reconstruction programs (Chandler, 2013; Paris, 2004), despite its' often destabilizing effects upon implementation (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Sen, 1999), and its tendency to produce political, social and economic losers that did not exist before (Duffield, 2011; Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Höglund, 2008). Particularly in 'humanitarian interventions,' the intervenors generally overturn existing governments and marginalize the values, norms and customs of that state (Chandler, 2004; Kartas, 2007). Moreover, the new 'winners' may act to exploit and consolidate power, leading to renewed conflict (Braumoeller, 1997; Darby & MacGinty, 2008). It is in this early

environment that military forces will establish their bases, too new to grasp the ways their activities and early relations may contribute to the longer term political and economic dynamics and relationships.

While military forces possess significant coercive authority, they are also highly constrained by negotiated Rules of Engagement (ROE) and national caveats including an admonition to remain politically neutral (Guéhenno, 2008; Münch, 2013). Hence, military forces deployed in peace operations tend to become risk averse and avoid unnecessary interaction with the community (Duffield, 2011). They concentrate their efforts instead to maintain a sterile military-security 'safe and secure environment' (Blair & Fitz-Gerald, 2009; Mockaitis, 2004; Woodward, 2002) but in so doing, limit opportunities to leverage their presence for positive influence in the community.

With the increasing number of intra-state conflicts, there has been a determined effort to identify their causes and drivers. Conflicts, especially in weak states, can be a rational economic activity (Addison & Murshed, 2002; Berdal & Malone, 2000; Cramer, 2006; Justino, 2008; Keen, 1998), which ultimately establishes a war-based economy where a few powerful actors may profit from the influx of humanitarian and reconstruction aid (Ballentine, 2005; Cater, 2002; Doyle, 2006; Münch, 2013). This economy produces powerful actors, often warlords and local elites, who are able to translate economic gain into political power and take advantage of the absence of a capable government (Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Torjesen, 2013; Narten, 2009; Zaum & Cheng, 2008). It is these actors, or those who are affiliated with them, that the military forces are most likely to first encounter in the establishment of their bases. As a result, these relationships are likely to shape the wider political economy as they are legitimized and their practices become permanent, thereby undermining military effectiveness and peace operations.

Academics and international organizations have begun to critically study the effects peacekeepers have on the local population in a post conflict environment (Autesserre, 2014; Carnahan, 2004; Colletta, et. al., 2008; Duffield, 2011; Paffenholz, 2015; Sciarra; 2008). Chief among the findings are food, housing and fuel shortages and the emergence of a balloon economy, which places costs for basic goods well above the means of the local population (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Durch, 2004); and, the introduction of human trafficking and prostitution (Enloe, 2000; Stern, 2015). These findings have led to calls for stronger Codes of Conduct, greater accountability and a closer examination of the organizational political, social and economic activities influencing the community.

1.2 Statement of the Problem and Significance of the Study

A comparable examination of the practices of military bases, however, is nearly absent (Anderson, et. al., 2014; Marley, 2016). Instead, attention tends to focus on the effects of base closings (Cowan, 2012; Dardia, et al., 1996; Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990); in military involvement in humanitarian aid, particularly its unintended co-option (LeRiche, 2004, Münch, 2012; Rana, 2008) and gender-based exploitation and violence (Enloe, 2000; Colas & Peyroux, 2016; Haynes, 2010; Higate & Henry, 2004; Martin, 2005). While important for both stability and human rights, their emphasis overlooks the effects of the more ubiquitous daily practices of base employment and local purchasing on the community, which appear to have a more significant role in post-conflict stabilization than once understood (Collinson, 2003; Dobbins, 2013; Hudson & Leftwich; 2014; Vervoer & Junes, 2012). This research concerning the effects of military bases on the political economy of their communities begins to fill this gap in knowledge; it contributes to post conflict literature, International Relations theory, and provides additional insight to policy makers, military organizations and practitioners in the field.

1.3 Research Question and Design

This research asks, “How do the everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict environments affect the local political economy and what are the implications for peacebuilding.”

To do this, the research is structured around three principal concepts: first, the base as a primary employer and consumer of goods and services; second, the base as a catalyst for secondary economic benefits and effects, and third, the base as political agent in the local community, where community leaders and elites may leverage their relationship (Cheng, 2013) with the military to further local political and economic agendas contrary to peace operations.

The research design is a within case study comparison, and primarily uses a Political Economy Analysis (PEA) livelihoods approach, specifically because this PEA approach is oriented “to the meso and local level ... grounded in the people’s own perspectives, and how the totality of the economic, political, social and cultural factors affects people’s lives” (Collinson, 2003:4). This approach is also widely used by governmental and non-governmental organizations to understand the acquisition and distribution of power and identify the interrelationship between war-time coping and subsequent shadow economies. Case studies likewise facilitate understanding of the interrelationship of environmental and social systems, and thus highlight causal relationships and how they transform over time. This approach to PEA, coupled with case studies’ ‘thick description’ (Yin, 2015) will best illustrate the ways military bases may influence interests, incentives and constraints at the local level which have consequent effect on peacebuilding programs and initiatives.

The Republic of Kosovo was selected as the case study because it offers three useful characteristics: it contains a substantial military presence that has been active in the community for over ten years; it has operated under a long trusteeship, which tends to limit actors at both

the local and federal level, and Kosovo continues to receive a high level of technical and economic assistance from the international community, which operates independently of the military but shares the same geographical area. These provide controls and limit the effects of exogenous factors while examining the three Kosovo municipalities selected for comparison. This period also allows sufficient passage of time to examine the political, social and economic changes occurring since the arrival of military forces, and to observe its evolving political economy.

1.4 Summary and Thesis Structure

By their nature, military forces always represent ‘a side taken,’ and therefore bring a political-power component to their relationship with the local community. Their alliance with opportunists and malign actors therefore, may unintentionally reinforce pre-conflict inequalities and foster the advancement of their ability to control present and future economic and social resources, (Doyle, 2006; Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Sowell, 1981; Zaum & Knaus, 2013), and directly contribute to renewed conflict. Therefore, this research concerning the effects of the everyday practices of military bases established in a post-conflict environment on the local political economy begins to fill this wide gap in knowledge. It contributes to post conflict literature, and International Relations theory and provides additional insight to peacebuilding policy makers, humanitarian and military organizations, and practitioners in the field.

This thesis is comprised of 11 chapters, structured into three foundational themes: Historical context; military bases in post-conflict peace operations, and case studies. Chapters 1 and 2 introduce the thesis and the gap in the literature; Chapter 3 presents the research hypotheses and an innovative framework which examines key post-conflict political, social and economic factors pertinent to base communities to evaluate the intervening forces’ influence on the

community. Subsequent chapters provide historical context, research findings and analysis, and the thesis conclusion. The individual chapters are described below:

Chapter 1 introduces the thesis, including its aims, the significance of the study and the contribution to the fields of post-conflict studies and International Relations theory.

Chapter 2 provides a review of the literature relating to the central concepts, perceptions and outcomes of contemporary peace operations. It closely examines the political economy of conflict environments, and the peacekeeper activities to establish bases that have had harmful unintended outcomes in post-conflict environments, including the purchase of local goods and services, local employment on the base, and community relations. It also explores recent peacekeeper's lessons-learned and practices to mitigate these unintended outcomes. The chapter examines preconceptions of military bases held by many humanitarian organizations and the divergent perspectives held by military organizations. This chapter also surveys the primary characteristics of present-day military bases and assessments of Kosovo's post-conflict human and physical environment, noting a near absence of post conflict academic literature focused upon the meso- and micro levels. It concludes with observations concerning this gap in literature regarding the effects of the day-to-day practices of military bases on the local community and on wider peace operations literature.

Chapter 3 describes the methods and strategy used for this research, primarily a within-case study, that takes a livelihoods approach to political economy analysis. The thesis further employs three hypotheses based upon an innovative framework, assessing the hypothesis according to the key political, social and economic post-conflict factors in order to identify and gauge the influences of the military base. In addition, the chapter addresses the limitations to the cases' generalizability conceding Kosovo is a single NATO intervention in a unique post-conflict environment. It concludes with a discussion of research ethics, and this researcher's unique positionality.

Chapter 4 provides background of the political and economic history of the former Republic of Yugoslavia and its province of Kosovo. It demonstrates both the systemic discrimination of Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo, and the extreme development gap of the Province compared to other parts of Yugoslavia; and how the declining economic fortunes of the Yugoslav republics in

the 1980s and early 1990s exacerbated ethnic and nationalistic tendencies, leading to the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Kosovo War.

Chapter 5 contains an assessment of Kosovo's growing informal economy, its support for Kosovo

Albanians, and for the Kosovo parallel government prior to the Kosovo War in 1999. It also describes both typical and contentious military base practices and operations in the post-conflict environment.

Chapters 6, 7, and 8 are individual case studies: The Municipality of Ferizaj (Chapter 6) and Prizren (Chapter 7), both of which contain a military base, and the Municipality of Gjakova (Chapter 8) which does not contain a base.

Chapter 9 presents an analysis of the hypothesized and resultant political, social and economic effects of military bases revealed in the individual community case studies, finding the hypothesized effects on the community by the bases to be much less significant than anticipated, particularly the limited relations between the military base and community elites. The analysis demonstrates the necessity for a closer inspection of the activities and range of possible unintended political influences of the military Liaison Monitoring Teams, and a robust need to determine whether the community-based Teams act as proxies for military leaders.

Chapter 10 provides a focused examination of the military Liaison Monitoring Teams. Unique to Kosovo, these small teams of unarmed military personnel act as the 'eyes and ears' for the military commander and directly extend the reach of the military base. Unthreatening and community oriented, LMTS have become trusted bridges between the military base, the local government and community at large, but may also interfere with the communities' development and ownership of culturally-based conflict resolving solutions when they endure indefinitely.

Chapter 11 provides the thesis conclusion, the contribution to the literature, and recommendations for additional research. The thesis finds the three hypotheses representing the political, social and economic influence of the military bases are not well supported; rather, the military bases have a very limited effect on their community.

In addition to these conclusions, the significant contribution of this thesis is an innovative framework that provides a means to examine the effects of the bases that are established by intervening forces in a post-conflict environment through the assessment of political, social and economic influences, and comparison with key post conflict livelihood factors.

Lastly, this research provides a foundation for three areas of further study: investigation of the culture of humanitarian and military organizations while on mission; the 'gender effects' on both the individual and community as a result of women who had been employed on base, and an assessment of the political and social influences of unarmed teams, such as the Liaison Monitoring Teams and UN Observer teams operating in other post-conflict mission environments.

Chapter 2 - Literature Review

2.0 Introduction

This chapter introduces the literature surrounding the central concepts, perceptions and outcomes relevant to the establishment of military bases in the contemporary post-conflict environment. It is divided into five main themes that create a framework with which to view the basis of peace operations. They are examined and discussed individually to promote a deeper understanding of their effects: 1) concepts of liberal peace and intervention; 2) military forces in peace operations; 3) political economy of conflict; 4) peacekeepers' impact on the local political economy and lessons learned, and 5) an overview of military bases and their communities.

A consideration of the theoretical ideals of liberal peace are presented first, providing background for the emergence of the 'responsibility to intervene' and how the military forces and their base interacts with concurrent humanitarian space. It then considers literature concerning drivers of conflict and the post-conflict political economy, noting the lessons learned by many international organizations, particularly relating to long-term effects on the local community. The establishment of military bases is then introduced, including studies of base closures, its adjacent community and the Republic of Kosovo, which expand understanding of the relationships between military bases and their communities.

The grey literature concerning the impact of international organizations and military peacekeepers on the community is largely published from 1995 forward, mirroring the sharp rise in peacekeeping operations in response to the internal conflicts that followed the end of the Cold War, providing additional insight concerning the day to day practices of military bases, and provide a basis from which to examine the political, social and economic consequences of the military bases established in a post-conflict environment.

2.1 The Liberal Peace and Intervention

The philosophical foundation of peace operations rests heavily on the ideals of a perpetual peace. In its most rudimentary definition, it states that if all nations were constitutional republics – leaders of republics are directly accountable to their constituents - there would be no wars except for self-defense, as there would be no aggressors (Orend, 2004:175). A more modern derivative of liberal peace asserts sovereign democratic states are less likely to enter into armed conflict with each other due to shared social and ideological values (Finnemore, 2003; Newbrander, 2012:0; Verellen, 2012). Such states hold a common trust in non-violent means of resolving conflict; free and fair elections; a respect for political transparency and the collective recognition of the benefits of economic interdependence (Doyle, 2004; Mitchell, 2009). These together “prod normative ideals” and tend to result in a positive, generally self-fulfilling prophecy of peace (Owen, 1994:92). Hence, the foundations of liberal democracy are often actively promoted in post-conflict reconstruction programs (Chandler, 2013; Paris, 2004:5). Democracy is widely endorsed as the best form of governance to protect citizens’ rights; facilitate prosperity and ensure regional stability, (Bank, 1997; Doyle, 1986; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Hoffman, 2009; Jentleson, 2007; Kartas, 2007; Paris, 2004). Yet while there exists a general consensus for the basic ideals of liberal peace, assumptions concerning the “universal rightness” of direct or liberal democracy to establish it (Sen, 1999:3), especially post-conflict, is divided, and its overemphasis has negative implications for sustainable peace building. Fortna (2008) similarly questions early emphasis on democratization, noting fostering democracy tends to drain resources from the primary and more urgent human-goals of maintaining peace and stability (Fortna, 2008:40).

Layne (1994), contends that while democracy’s tenets are generally positive, the process of democratization is highly problematic, first because it is inherently destabilizing (Layne, 1994; also Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Paris, 2004), as it tends to disregard the presence of states’

existing socio-economic inequalities (Jahn, 2012). Second, it requires overwhelming political, social and economic changes to make both this form of governance and the open markets work (Barbara, 2008; Barnett, 2009; Cheng, 2013; Collinson, 2010; Fetherston, 2000; Chandler, 2010; Finkel, et al., 2006; Ghani & Lockhart, 2008; Kartas, 2007; Sabaratnam, 2013; Woodward, 2002). Moreover, the excessive focus on open markets also tends to underestimate the concurrent need for social and economic “safety nets” (Rowland, 2002) during the transition process, especially in formerly centrally governed states, including the Balkans (Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2008).

The critical peacebuilding literature likewise reminds that the democratization process tends to produce political, social and economic losers where they had not existed before (Duffield, 2011; Höglund, 2008; Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Jahn, 2012; Paris, 2011; Pugh, 2005; Richmond, 2010; Stewart, 2008), adding substantially to opportunities for renewed conflict. Moreover, democratization tends to favor pro-Western political and economic systems (Paffenholz, 2015: 861; Peou, 2014:380), or more simply, democratization is self-serving (Chandler, 2004:2). Particularly in the Soviet successor states, Braumoeller (1997) asserts that democratization has often led to “liberal *nationalism*” (Braumoeller, 1997:377), which often concentrates political power into a few people groups, or “nations”, within that state, and subsequently predisposes them toward the use of force (ibid) to consolidate power. Snyder (2000) similarly states the very tenets of liberal democracy, such as elections and freedom of speech and press, ‘may be hijacked by nationalists for illiberal ends,’ especially by elites that are threatened by democratization (Snyder, 2000), revealing a profound connection between nascent democratization and nationalism (ibid). These critics strongly suggest, therefore, that the tenets of democratization and subsequent liberal peace which generally foster positive opportunities for mutual political and economic benefit between mature republics, can be easily undermined or exploited by too rapid efforts to establish a modern liberal democracy in societies affected by conflict. In a post-conflict environment therefore, military forces, which

are most often representatives of mature Western and liberal democratic governments, often fail to recognize the ways that their activities may contribute to this transition instability. Moreover, by their presence, can add their coercive weight to the pressures for the local community to conform to the political agendas of these international actors.

2.2 Military Forces in Peace Operations

The peace operations in Kosovo was fundamentally based on UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 28, stating:

“Everyone is entitled to a social and international order in which the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration can be fully realized.”

The *right to intervene* subsequently emerged from this Article to address those situations where the State itself endangers or fails to protect its people, such as the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and ethnic cleansing in Srebrenica in 1995. It gave motion to the idea that there is a moral requirement for the international community to intervene when human rights are violated by their own state, and that that right to intervene transcends sovereign boundaries (Evans & Sahnoun, 2001; Johnson, 2008; Kaldor, 2005; Verellen, 2012; Weiss, 2007).

Yet, such interventions, regardless of its normative underlying reason, are ultimately contradictory and hostile acts (Paris & Sisk, 2009:305). Chandler, (2004) and Kartas (2007), both find intervention largely overturns existing governments and makes the societal customs, values and norms of the country intervened upon irrelevant. Further criticism of intervention ranges from interveners being “uninformed of local culture, values and power relationships” (Begby & Burgess, 2009:92; Evans & Sahnoun, 2001); being naïve, (Jones, et al., 2011; Paris, 2010); overusing top-down and ‘one-size-fits-all templates (Hoffman, 2009); and stifling local capacity to resolve conflict, (Campbell, et al., 2011; Peou, 2014).

2.2.1 Questioning the Military's Role

Military forces in this environment are often unwelcome by civilian organizations, and opponents of the use of military forces in humanitarian intervention are especially harsh. Chief among their contention is military intervention 'blurs impartiality and the roles of military, political and humanitarian actors' (Collinson, 2010; De Torrenté, 2006; Ferreiro, 2012; Jackson & Haysom, 2013), leaving humanitarian organizations more vulnerable (ibid.) Moreover, military participation in these interventions to 'save' failed states paves the way to securitization, especially as humanitarian assistance is used to achieve economic, political, security or other non-humanitarian interests, rather than to meet human need (Blair & Fitzgerald, 2009; Collinson, 2010; MacGinty, 2012; Mockaitis, 2004:29; Paris, 2010; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Pugh, 2005). This perception is exacerbated by claims by some, predominantly United States' military leaders, that the activities of civilian international and non-governmental organizations can serve as 'force multipliers' for combat operations (De Torrenté, 2006).

Hence, a significant portion of literature written by peacebuilding research organizations and 'think tanks' is clearly suspicious of the military's role in peace operations. Yet, these organizations also tend to hold several preconceptions of military forces. The first, while the military may be a 'necessary evil' in certain cases, its' personnel are unschooled in 'real' humanitarian work, and therefore can often cause more harm than good (Anderson, 2000; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Jackson & Haysom, 2013; LeRiche, 2004).

The second preconception is that intervening military forces are homogeneous and malign; the harm they precipitate varies only by the size of the forces on the ground (Jackson & Haysom, 2013). Third is a preconception that military forces operate all but autonomously, and their activities are virtually unaccountable to authority (Fishstein & Wilder, 2012). The fourth preconception is the short-term perspective, and risk averse, hierarchal operating style of the

military is fundamentally incompatible with the intangible, unpredictable and long-term work of peacebuilding (Mockaitis, 2004; Duffield, 2011). Thus, military bases and their personnel become unwelcome amateurs which only interfere and complicate an already difficult and fluid environment for civilian-led peace operations.

2.2.2 Civilian Peace Operations in Military Battle Space

Federal governments, their research agencies and the military organizations themselves hold a far more positive perspective of their activities. Particularly since 2000, as predominantly Western governments, NATO members and partners recognized an overlap of social well-being with international stability and security, there have been wide changes in defense and civil-military strategies and doctrine (Army, 2013; AUSA & CSIS, 2002; CCOE, 2013; Cole, et al., 2009; Ikenberry, 2000; Mc Ivor, 2005). This has caused many of the national development organizations, such as the Organization for European Cooperation and Development (OECD) and development agencies in individual countries¹ to promote inter/national stability and security through humanitarian-like post-conflict reconstruction at the tactical level in support of military operations.

Thus, acknowledging the blurred lines between humanitarian and military actors, Dobbins, (2007) and Hamre & Sullivan, (2002) and tension created by military forces and humanitarian organizations sharing the same physical space, they remind the military often possesses equipment and resources that are useful to humanitarian organizations (Dobbins, et al., 2007; Hamre & Sullivan, 2002; Mockaitis, 2004; also Etchemendy, 2010). Likewise, as hostilities often continue after official cessation of combat operations, Weiss (2007) reminds that humanitarians directly benefit from the security provided by military forces for their own activities (Weiss, 2007:70). Covey, et. al. (2005) too maintains, that substantial threat to humanitarian organizations remains if violent competition for power has not yet ended (Covey,

¹ Such as AusAID, DfID, GIZ, USAID. This is a very small sample, many other government-led aid organizations exist.

et al., 2005:7), while Marley (2016) notes ‘... military forces competent to fight the Taliban, Yugoslav Army or Somali warlords may have something useful to offer ...’ the international community as well (Marley, 2016:50).

Nevertheless, while military forces in peace operations possess significant coercive authority, they also highly constrained by their national *Rules of Engagement*², especially restriction of direct involvement in criminal and civil policing matters. Military forces are typically mandated to remain neutral and apolitical in civilian affairs, (Guéhenno, 2008; Münch, 2013), a particularly challenging task when the military forces may have been specifically deployed to protect one group from another. Here, Duffield is especially critical, stating the result is military forces will avoid unnecessary civilian interaction, becoming increasingly risk-averse and security stability-oriented (Duffield, 2011). Non-involvement may also inadvertently imply consent and suggests that by strictly limiting their efforts to maintaining their military-focused, stable “safe and secure” environment, (Blair & Fitz-Gerald, 2009; Mockaitis, 2004; Woodward, 2002), the military forces are likely to continue to miss opportunities to have any meaningful positive influence on their local community.

These views, therefore, invoke several important questions, key among them, is this negative perspective warranted; in what ways, and to what degree? Specifically, are the communities surrounding military bases indeed made worse; to they become less secure, less socially and politically open, or less prosperous than those communities that do not? These questions therefore, return to this research concerning the effects the everyday practices of the military may have on the local community and their implications for peacebuilding.

² Rules of Engagement include how and when it is permissible to intervene to protect military forces; civilians and property, including the use of force, especially deadly force.

2.3 Political Economy of Conflict

2.3.1 Drivers of Conflict

There is a rich body of literature concerning the political economy of conflict. Especially since the mid-1990s, there has been a concerted study of the drivers and sustainers of conflict, and recognition of the emergence of distinct war formed economies. While conflicts have historically been conceived as politically or 'grievance' based (Sandole, 2010), this knowledge was increasingly challenged in 2000, particularly concerning civil wars in "weak states" (Berdal & Malone, 2000:2). These studies of exacerbating behaviors, environmental conditions and costs of war gave rise to a 'greed vs. grievance' construct, admonishing the earlier focus on grievance-based conflict, which tended to overlook conflicts' economic motivation and benefits (ibid). Hence, rather than 'ancient hatreds' (Kaplan, 1993) and 'mindless violence' (Keen, 2002:23), conflicts have purpose and are often the outcome of rational cost-benefit analyses to engage in conflict (Addison & Murshed, 2002; Ballentine, 2003; Ballentine & Nitzsche, 2005; Berdal & Keen, 1997; Cramer, 2002; Cramer 2006). Once established there are significant economic disincentives for peace, particularly where poverty and income inequality are high and better opportunities are low (Justino, 2008). Hence, Keen (1998) articulates conflict and wars offer "seven economic categories: pillage; extorting protection money; controlling/monopolizing trade; exploiting labor; gaining access to land, water and mineral resources; stealing aid supplies; and advantages for the military" (Keen, 1998:1), reaffirming that "there is more to civil wars than winning" (Keen, 1998:1; Berdal & Malone, 2000:2). As a result, the economic aspects of conflict can undermine the best of peace building efforts (Keen, 2002:9).

At the same time, econometrics quantified common conditions of civil conflicts in an attempt to predict the probability of conflict occurring between existing, competing groups. Economists Collier & Hoeffler (2000) proposed that conflicts occur within a feedback loop of grievances,

which not only spark the conflict, but also tend to create economic means to profit by sustaining the conflict (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000:27). Doyle & Sambanis, (2006) offered a similar quantitative approach by considering the ways conflicts' end was achieved, specifically whether the peace was realized through negotiated settlement or by military intervention. (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006:72; Fortna, 2008). However, Cramer (2002) takes a dim view of research that reduces complicated individual and group behavior to proxies and 'maximalizing monolithic agents' (Cramer, 2002; also 2006), which fails to either define how the conditions facilitate conflict, or adequately describe the diverse contributing factors that sustain conflict (ibid).

2.3.2 Conflict Economies

These explanatory models suggest the political economy of conflict is an outcome as well as a description. Robert Keohane aptly states "Economics and politics profoundly affect one another through the relationship between interdependence and power" (Keohane, 2008) as does Lake (2009), pointing to the economic effects of political hierarchies at the local level (Lake, 2009). Thus, in the post conflict environment, the absence of legitimate or capable government institutions can "cause the formation of local informal governance and shadow economic systems from the local community, often illicit, to survive" (Rubin, 2000:1793) and form new power structures. Moreover, the extreme post-conflict shifts in financial, legal, social opportunity and transaction costs allowed some local entrepreneurs to accumulate wealth and prestige that would have been unlikely otherwise (ibid). Particularly when economic sanctions prevent trade and degrade industry, and conflict damaged infrastructure and farmland prevent their use, shadow economies emerge to meet basic food, medicine and fuel needs, a structure that is often strengthened by humanitarian aid sent to offset sanctions' effects on the civilian population (Berdal & Malone, 2000). This economic and social environment then, may lead to a *war-based* economy, where a few may benefit from the continued influx of humanitarian and reconstruction aid, leading some to become increasingly predatory against the civilian

population (Ballentine, 2005; Berdal & Malone, 2000; Cater, 2002; Cramer, 2006; Cramer, 2009; Doyle, 2006; Keen, 1998; Münch, 2013; Pugh, 2004; Reno, 2000; Studdard, 2005:6; Weinstein, 2005; Woodward, 2002) as civilians caught in the unstable environment become a means to create wealth.

The complexity is compounded when former war leaders, local elites and opportunists take advantage of the absence of a capable government (Zaum & Cheng, 2008; Cox, 2001; Earle, 1997; Filipov, 2006; Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Lake, 2009; Newman & Schabel, 2002; Reno, 2000; Studdard, 2005; Torjesen, 2013) are able to leverage their self-declared positions to 'represent' their communities (Zaum & Cheng, 2008; Korf, 2003) with the newly arrived local military organizations. In this way shadow economies are strengthened and their leader legitimized, often leading to their permanence.

Particularly concerning military forces at the local level, the first relationships with community leaders are most likely opportunistic, as Cheng (2012) and Filipov (2006) specifically note the early unintentional support of predatory actors may occur for three reasons: imperfect knowledge of informal power brokers held by the intervening organization; the social and economically disruptive process of political liberalization and privatization (Filipov, 2006); and credible threats by leaders or elites to the interveners to return to violence (Cheng, 2013; Münch, 2013). As the relationships that develop between elites and military leaders are never neutral, especially at the local level (Winslow, 2007), the relationships and economic opportunity provided by the outsiders - including military forces - may reinforce pre-conflict inequalities and inadvertently foster the advancement of individuals or groups' ability to control present and future economic and social resources (Doyle, 2006; Filipov, 2006; Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Sowell, 1981), therefore undermining military effectiveness by delegitimizing peace operations for a substantial part of population.

The literature demonstrates that the arrival of military forces can have immediate and significantly negative outcomes on the local political economy. First, while military forces may be a relief for some by their interruption of the predatory environment (Cheng, 2013), those same forces may inadvertently “legitimize” the power and influence of these self-appointed actors by working with them (LeRiche, 2004; Münch, 2013; Weinstein, 2005). Secondly, the arrival of military forces may also further destabilize the community, as elites, war leaders, non-governmental and other actors may be compelled to ‘compete’ with the military for population influence concerning security and the use or control of aid and scarce resources (Lake, 2009:268). Therefore, the peacekeeping presence may negatively affect the community before it is able to produce positive outcomes or set the conditions for sustainable peacebuilding.

2.4: Peacekeepers’ Impact on the Local Political Economy

Peacekeeping organizations have only recently begun to critically study the effects they have on their local communities in a post-conflict environment, (AUSA & CSIS, 2002; Autesserre, 2014; Brahim, 2000; Campbell, et al., 2011; Caplan, 2005; Carnahan, et al., 2005; Colletta, et al., 2008; Duffield, 2011; Edelstein, 2009; Ferreiro, 2012; Finkel, et al., 2006; Frost, 2003; Hegre, et al., 2010; Heldt, 2004; Jackson & Haysom, 2013; Jeong, 2005; Jones, et al., 2011; LeRiche, 2004; Leonhardt, 2001; MacDonald, 2005; Natsios, 2009; Paffenholz, 2015; Roehner, 2012; Sciarra, 2008; Suhrke, et al., 2000; Toft, 2010; Tierney, 2010; USAID, 2009). These studies reveal four overlapping factors: first, organizational goals tend to be top-driven and are far more ambitious than their resources allow; second, there is insufficient advance knowledge of the complex political and social relations and conditions in the field prior to arrival, therefore, thirdly, trade-offs necessary to meet urgent political, financial or security needs are often at the expense of long-term improvements and program effectiveness and efficiency. Fourth, the peacekeepers and peace builders themselves too often create new problems in this environment and worsen those already existing. Crime, human trafficking and prostitution in particular, are too-

frequently stated outcomes of the arrival of international organizations (Enloe, 2000; Godec, 2010; Ingimundarson, 2003; Martin, 2005; Mendelson, 2005; Stern, 2015).

2.4.1 Civilian Peacekeeping Organizations in the Post Conflict Environment

The United Nations (UN) operations in 2000, and the ensuing UN Paper, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, (“Brahimi Report,”) was especially critical of its own performance, promulgating 20 recommendations to improve future UN peacekeeping operations (Brahimi, 2000). This paper was followed in 2004 and in 2009 with a further appraisal of UN base start-up procedures, and effects of operations on the surrounding community in which they operate (Durch, 2004, Durch, 2009; Edelstein, 2009). These have promulgated stronger organizational rules of conduct, better analysis of assumptions, planning and information sharing; and a closer examination of the political, social and economic factors influencing behavior and conflict at the local level.

2.4.2 Military Forces in Post Conflict Environment

Comparable examinations of the effects of military forces establishing a military base in the post-conflict environment are rather thin (Anderson, et.al., 2014; Marley, 2016). The small number of scholarly studies concerning the effects of military bases on the community tend to be concentrated on the consequences of base closures (Cowan, 2012), most often the economic consequences of closing bases; bases established in the 1940s for the Second World War (Lynch, 1970) or those established in the 1950-1960s for the US-Soviet Union Cold War, both ‘overseas’ and ‘at home’ (Dardia, et.al.,1996; Sharp, 1990; also, Reischauer, 1992; Spiegel, 2011).

The absence of scholarly literature concerning the effects of military bases is not insignificant. The arrival and establishment of bases for intervening international organizations and military

peacekeeping forces – whose numbers range from a few hundred to several thousand – can affect their communities in four principal ways. First, all of these require the use of office space or other facilities to operate, likely competing for space also needed by local residents, businesses and civil society organizations (Carnahan, 2006:6). Second, these personnel will require housing, meals and personal incidentals (ibid), some or all of which may be need to purchase these locally, possibly consuming scarce resources. Thirdly, these organizations bring in, and have access to, a vast amount of individual wealth and organizational resources (Autesserre, 2014), especially employment that alters the available skilled labor force for local reconstruction (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007). Fourth, legitimacy of the intervention in the eyes of the population is influenced both by how the intervention was brought about and how long it takes for life to return to a relatively safe and economic normal (AUSA & CSIS, 2002; Bhatia, 2005:208; Chandler, 2013:23). These groups and their activities place tremendous strain on the local physical, social and political infrastructure (Autesserre, 2014). While any of these single intrusive factors in a benign environment might be challenging to work through, in combination and in a post-conflict environment the opportunity for breakdown are immense. Thus, this absence of study concerning the effects of military bases and their forces in the local community in post-conflict environments prevents accurate knowledge for the military forces as well. In this case military forces may ‘misread’ and thus respond inappropriately to benign events, or conversely, underestimate deteriorating situations (Simons, 2011:4), leading to renewed conflict.

2.5 Peace Operations’ Lessons Learned and Observed

The principal concern found in the literature is the development of a “balloon economy,” a situation whereby the arrival of an influx of money into a community creates a disproportionate focus on servicing the wealthy international organizations, and at the expense of the local residents in two primary ways (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; Aolain, et al., 2011;

Woodward, 2002). These effects are comprehensive and ubiquitous, including, the inflationary effects upon food, housing/ offices and supplies due to demands made by a large number of internationals with money; the consequences of hiring of local staff and demands on local infrastructure (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, et. al., 2006; Durch, 2004; Gauster, 2006; Hegre, et al., 2010). Moreover, directly related effects are changes in acceptable social behavior and mores (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007, Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006:277), and gender-based criminal activity specifically resulting from interaction with peace operations' forces.

2.5.1 Inflated Prices

Academic and organizational literature often point to “the rise in prices for food that can place even the basic foods out of range and inaccessible for local residents” (Narten, 2009), while housing costs increase dramatically, and community members are displaced from their homes in order to capitalize on wealthy outsiders (Anderson, 2000). Businesses also emerge to suit outsiders' tastes and interests, and as Woodward notes, this rise occurs “even if there are an insufficient number of internationals to sustain (new) business” (Woodward, 2002:10).

However, the same body of literature also widely disagrees to the extent and scale of this balloon economy. The UN's organizational 'best practices' recommend field workers use the organizational commissaries, and similar UN resources that are brought in specifically to prevent overwhelming the local economy during this especially weak period (Carnahan, et. al., 2006; Durch, 2004). Carnahan (2006) also states price spikes are usually temporary; prices fall again once the demands of the initial surge of international staff are met. The increased prices also tend to be contained within the urban areas where international staff are located (Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006:55), or are offered specifically to the international staff (International Crisis Group, 2001). Moreover, Carnahan (2006) and Woodward (2002) both state that published

datasets showing the rise in food prices also tend to include the prices of expensive imported 'foreign foods' which are preferred by the international community.

2.5.2 Purchasing and Contracting

General information concerning military contracting may be found in an array of widely available military publications. In the simplest terms, military forces may purchase and transport its material, supplies and services from 'home' themselves; purchase directly from the local community; or, purchase through large contractors, who then hire local firms as subcontractors - the latter being a frequently promoted best-practice (Carnahan, 2006; Durch, 2004; Gauster, 2006). MacDonald notes however, that returning expatriates with outside financial connections and newly developed culture and language skills that are more compatible with the military forces, may be continually found to be the 'best qualified' subcontractors, and therefore marginalize the small local contractors, (Bhatia, 2005; MacDonald, 2005); reinforce patronage networks (Dobbins, 2013; Woodward, 2002); or, increase opportunities for corruption (Leonhardt, 2001:28; OECD, 2007). Consequently, even when contractors are hired from the surrounding area, additional consideration is necessary to determine the extent which the local community participates and benefits economically. Indeed, the arrival of military forces may lead to unrealistic expectations of economic opportunity for the community, and when those expectations are not met, lead to resentment or return to violence (MacDonald, 2005).

2.5.3 Housing and Office Building Scarcity

In addition to competing with local residents for usable structures to rebuild their livelihoods, peace operations organizations are often granted use of buildings and land by national-level political leaders, sometimes at no cost to the organization in exchange for their assistance, (Sharp, 1990; Williams, 2005), especially under conditions set by a negotiated peace agreement.

However, Carnahan states community members often move in with family members *explicitly* to take advantage of the opportunity to rent their property to international staff at inflated prices (Carnahan 2006). Likewise, legitimate owners as well as opportunists will offer use of their buildings and land in exchange for income or other personal benefit through various patronage networks (Torjesen, 2013), even as discerning legal ownership for payment is attempted at a time when cadastral records are often conflicting, lost or destroyed (Demarest, 2007; Riedlmayer, 2007; Sewell, 2011).

Yet Gauster & Maruszczak (2006) assert the arrival of international organizations can provide significant community-wide economic opportunity. In particular, new construction and refurbishment to bring hotel and residential property to the standards of the international staff typically hire local contractors and craftsmen, creating jobs and restoring livelihoods at a critical time (Carnahan, et. al., 2006:55). This initial economic benefit to the community remains when the international staffs continue to purchase food and other items for their daily needs; the benefit is further extended if the posting allows family members. In addition, the high number of restaurant meals consumed, and the natural proclivity for international staff to travel and buy local items for gifts and as souvenirs may lead to new industry such as tourism (Carnahan, et al., 2005), although such new industry may also cause disruptions to local labor markets (Bhatia, 2005; Dobbins, 2013), and the long term and unintended effects on this potential wealth are not yet well explored (Enloe, 2000; Weldon, et al., 2012; Woodward, 2002).

Nevertheless, while some of these initial conditions may be unknowable, the local community's ongoing inability to obtain suitable property and restore livelihoods, and the international organization's continued reliance on preferential treatment, or ill-gained benefits is likely to degrade the intervening organization's credibility and reputation of impartiality (Shaw & Kemp, 2012).

2.5.4 Bases' Effects on Local Infrastructure

The importance of civil infrastructure, especially roads networks used for military supply, patrolling, and civilian livelihoods is well studied (Transportation Research Board, 2013; also, Anderson, 2000:27; Army, 2000; Kaiser, 1995), and the physical and social effects of heavy equipment and military vehicles on civil roadways is a long-practiced planning factor in military operations (Army, 1958; Transportation Research Board, 2013). Similarly, road and bridge repairs and upgrades - whether due to deferred maintenance or battle damage - are frequently made by military forces to ensure not only their continued freedom of movement for military operations, but also to maintain local commerce and promote community good will (Anderson, 2000: 27; AUSA & CSIS, 2002; Blair & Fitz-Gerald, 2009; Collinson, 2010).

2.5.5 Hiring Local Staff

According to much academic and the organizational best practices literature, the employment of local staff by international and humanitarian organizations gives legitimacy and promotes acceptance of the operation (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Call & Cousens, 2007:18; Carnahan, et al., 2005; Narten, 2009). Moreover, locally hired staffs typically have the best knowledge of the area and its customs and are generally more cost effective than international workers (Gauster, 2006; Sciarra, 2008). Natsios affirms these salaries “directly inject much needed cash into the economy” as these workers often support extended families while the local economy is particularly weak and before substantial development initiatives begin (Natsios, 2009; Sciarra, 2008). Finally, it is ultimately the local staff that will ‘own’ and sustain peacebuilding activities (Narten, 2009).

Yet this literature also points to the unsustainably high wages usually paid by international organizations. While the rationale for high salaries is to recruit the best and most skilled (Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006), the discrepancy between salaries offered by the international

organizations and local government is most problematic when senior officials, civil servants and high-skill professionals that work in their communities earn much less than unskilled labor employed by an international organization, and with far less responsibility (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006; International Crisis Group, 2001; Sciarra, 2008). At the same time, employment outside their professions tends to erode those skills. Moreover, younger employees who tend to have the best English and technical skills are likely to use their work with international organizations as 'stepping stones' to find better employment elsewhere, collectively creating a 'brain drain' when their skills are needed most by their community (AUSA & CSIS, 2002). Gauster (2006) and Sciarra (2008) likewise argue the high wages and improved working conditions may become the new minimum "benchmarks" that cause pressure on the local community to continue both high salaries and well-resourced working conditions after the international organizations are gone (Gauster, 2006; Sciarra, 2008). Finally, where employment relies on word-of-mouth recommendations, self-appointed gatekeepers may arise, entrenching conflict power structures (Narten, 2009). Particularly where ethnicity or national identities were dominant features in the preceding conflict, this can easily appear as continued institutional discrimination (Sowell, 1981), thereby encouraging antagonism between international peacekeepers and the local population (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Higate & Henry, 2004).

2.5.6 Changes in Social Roles and Mores

Employment with international organizations can also have unexpected effects on social roles, particularly opportunities for women that would not have been possible otherwise, especially in traditional societies (Aolain, et al., 2011; Curtis, 2007). The "gender effect" of social roles is even more pronounced when the post-conflict primary family wage earner is female and holds a position of responsibility with an international organization, but is expected to assume her traditional position as a woman - wife or a child - at home (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007).

Feminist literature more often points to the “unequal power structure between international staff and local women, which tends to place local women in insecure positions which reinforce (negative) gender roles, or foster exploitation, including trafficking and prostitution” (Aolain, et al., 2011; Eifler & Siefert, 2009; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004). However, the typical relations described between local women and men working for international organizations are reliably one-sided: local women are victims, while local men are absent, indifferent to women’s insecurity or are similarly predatory. Yet this overarching perspective does both women and men a disservice, especially as it overlooks the social and cultural dynamics of gender relations and inequalities in place before the conflict (Agustin, 2007; Cahn, 2007).

2.5.7 Peacekeeper Prostitution

Human trafficking and prostitution by peacekeepers are among the most contentious unintended outcomes in the post-conflict environment. The arrival and spread of organized criminal activities in the sex and drug trades have consistently been directly traced to the arrival of peacekeepers (Ammitzbøll & Dons Tychen, 2007; Aolain, et al., 2011; Autesserre, 2014; Baker, 2010; Carnahan, et al., 2005; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004; Martin, 2005; Mendelson, 2005). This phenomenon appears to have two components: first, the early creation of brothels by opportunists and organized crime to ‘service’ the international community is cheap, easy and profitable (Carnahan, et. al., 2006:21). Second, this illicit ‘business’ provides cash and cover for its far more profitable component: trade in drugs and arms (Haynes, 2004:226). According to Haynes (2004), it is the tendencies of international organizations and peacekeeping forces to neither follow their own codes of conduct, nor hold offenders accountable, which allows these illicit and damaging activities to continue and thrive, and directly undermines the security they have specifically been sent to provide (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Haynes, 2004; Higate & Henry, 2004). Moreover, such activities tend to become

permanent and erode stability and security not just locally, but into adjacent countries as well (Colas & Peyroux, 2016:28).

2.6 Overview of Military Bases and their Communities

While the body of literature concerning the effects of international organization's bases is limited but nonetheless present, scholarly literature pertaining to the political and economic effects of the *military bases* on their surrounding communities is nearly absent. Instead, materials reviewed in this theme are predominantly grey literature, including military manuals, journal articles, websites and web logs (blogs). The internet sites were scanned, but not reviewed in detail for inclusion in this literature review unless their resources and materials were cross-referenced by academic sources or snowballing.

Within the materials reviewed, the term 'military base,' 'base,' 'facility,' 'garrison' and 'installation' were used interchangeably; each may refer to a temporary to long-term secured facility of any size for the primary function of housing, supplying, maintaining and otherwise supporting military and civilian support personnel engaged in conducting military operations (Defense, 2014). These operations include, but are not limited to, patrols on foot or by vehicle, skill building activities (such as weapons marksmanship, radio procedures, first aid) and training exercises (Army, 2017). Notably, bases established and situated in post-conflict and peacebuilding environments throughout this literature review are unaccompanied postings; military personnel are not joined by their family members, and thus family members will have no impact on the local economy.

A determined search of publicly available military sources pertaining to base openings also produced limited results, finding instead a dominance of material relating to base closures. A small number of commercial publications concerning new bases referred to the physical structure, such as its easy set up for use in post-conflict base camps, or exceeding minimum government criteria, (Anderson, et al., 2014). Defense-contractor promotional materials were

briefly reviewed for their applicability, however, these generally consisted of descriptions of the multiple uses or suitable environments for the rapid construction of their equipment for short-term operations and emergencies, usually in conjunction with military support to civil authorities and disaster management; in combination with base defense and security best practices; for logistics and transportation requirements or improved base management and procedures.

Pointedly, none of these commercial publications addressed purchasing, staff hiring, land and building acquisition, or any other areas of the procurement process that are applicable to the day to day operations of the base once it is physically established. Due to the absence of academic literature to draw upon, international organization literature serves as the primary resource, as it is expected there will be sufficient similarities concerning the establishment of international organization bases and military bases, to provide a point of departure for more specific research.

2.7 Base Closure Literature

Base closings and subsequent civilian worker redundancy dominates the official military, popular and grey literature concerning military bases, particularly the economic effects of military base closures on the surrounding community as a result of reduced defense spending (Cowan, 2012; Dardia, et al., 1996; Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990). Material concerning the selection and process of bases closures is often highly contested from the local to the national level. A large volume of the available literature was politically charged and antagonistic, mostly biased in favor of retaining the base, and anecdotal in nature, and thus unusable. Nevertheless, a small sample of official base closure literature was located and reviewed to gain an insight concerning how some military base communities were able to successfully transition both politically and economically to an all-civilian economy, and whether comparisons could be inferred towards base establishment and operation.

Two primary publications concerning base closures were selected for close examination, one each concerning domestic and overseas US bases, which appeared to be comprehensive and robust enough to be generalized for this review, and thus serve as a meta-view of the closure process. These were selected first because the sponsoring organizations are credible and fully independent of the base closure process, and second, these were among the most often cited in later similar, but less comprehensive studies. Notably these studies specifically occurred as the result of stable peace-time conditions, under a “peace dividend,” and both include the impact of military dependent’s spending and employment in the community, thus its direct applicability is limited. Nevertheless, there are several important insights that can be distilled from these publications.

Lynch (1970) provides the first, a seminal study prepared for the US Department of Defense (DOD) to evaluate the impact of closing or significantly reducing some 950 domestic US military bases and defense support facilities between 1963 and 1969. Although the reductions were recommended and conducted in the midst of the Viet Nam War, these bases had already been determined to be excess following the end of Korean War in 1953; their closure was considered as part of that earlier ‘peace dividend’. The study found three interrelated factors to be necessary for a communities’ successful transition to a civilian economy: the initiative of the community to develop additional means of income sources; its proximity to a larger urban center and, the proportion of local hires as compared to the overall population (Lynch, 1970).

Two significant observations were found in Lynch’s forward, “While this problem (base closure) seems to be a large one, it would appear to be intrinsically manageable but for two considerations: the first is a political-protective attitude (of members of the US Congress) in response to the closings, and (the second is) the characteristic of no economic contingency plan for other work to be done in the event of base closure” (Lynch, 1970). These statements make clear that the entrenchment of political interest and protection of bases goes well beyond the

immediate locale even in the most benign of environments, and military bases can form a type of dependency: once established the military base becomes a significant part of the economic fabric of the community, and 'always be there.'

The second publication, an exploratory study prepared by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, (SIPRI), proposed several hypothetical scenarios of US military withdrawals from Europe, and studied the economic benefits and costs to the European NATO states due to the resulting military base closures. This study found two major factors for a smooth and successful transition to a civilian economy: first, the more skilled or technical a military facility was the better (Sharp, 1990). This implies the better educated and skilled civilian technical workforce is more easily able to find alternate work, thus easing transition to an all civilian community.

The second factor, similar to that noted by Lynch, is once military bases are established they begin to redefine the communities' identity. In this sense, political and economic choices made by the community appear to both integrate and depend upon the continued presence of 'their' military base in local decision-making processes, often significantly (Sharp, 1990). As inferred in Lynch's domestic base closing literature, the civilian workforce and community political leaders develop relationships with the military base, which strongly suggests not simply economic dependency, but also a center of local political and economic power where alliances, especially the change resisting alliances, are likely to occur (ibid). The volume of anecdotal literature and 'save our base' materials strongly reinforces this conclusion.

2.7.1 Civilian - Military relationships

The base-closing literature strongly suggests the quality of the civilian-military relationships, and ability for the community to see new opportunity is a key indicator of a successful transition to a non-military community (Cowan, 2012; Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990). However, the

literature concerning the post-conflict environment itself is far less positive. As Cheng described earlier, “the absence of the rule of law and a credible, capable government, criminalized war and conflict economies are quick to emerge to exploit the power vacuum, and in the absence of capable institutions, these conflict economies are likely to continue when conflict ends, becoming entrenched and permanent” (Cheng, 2013; Berdal, 2009; Pugh, 2004). Bardhan also states, “initial adopters, to suit their interests, may lock in the whole system ... denying a footing to later, more appropriate, institutions” (Bardhan, 2005), and therefore cause “seemingly innocent agreements and concessions with far reaching implications” (Barnett & Zurcher, 2009).

A uniquely complicating factor is the “impartial self-image and risk avoiding temperament” of military organizations, which are “by nature stability and security oriented” (Call & Cousens, 2007:12; Duffield, 2011). Moreover, the military “has a tendency to divorce contemporary events and ‘peacebuilding’ challenges from their specific historical and cultural contexts ...” (Berdal, 2009). Similarly, there is a “...Western blind spot, the tendency to underestimate the effects of a protracted foreign presence, however well intentioned, are likely to have in stimulating nationalist sentiments, encouraging various forms of local resistance and, more generally, in shaping the complex psychological environment post-conflict societies” (Berdal, 2009; Gauster, 2006). At the same time, intervening military forces are always the physical representation of a political “side taken” (OECD, 2007; Weinstein, 2005), hardly an impartial, apolitical position. Therefore, an early alliance with the military may give unintentional credibility and authority to opportunists (Cater, 2002) as well as reinforce an already sharp sense of wrong and injustice, making subsequent stabilizing measures and peacebuilding initiatives much more difficult (Barnett, 2009; Cheng, 2013; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Rubin, 2000).

Finally, an unspoken, but inescapable element within much of the literature concerning post-conflict political economy, is the need to acknowledge and resolve the lingering distrust and

hostility between the warring parties, such as the Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs in this case study. The success of NATO peacekeeping forces, Kosovo Forces (KFOR), to maintain a safe and secure environment is as much dependent upon a sense of psychological security as physical security (Lederach, 1997; Risner, 2013:61) and a related need to confront and move beyond the “lingering war-time narratives of betrayal, victimization and entitlement” in order to facilitate enduring economic measures (Mertus, 1999). Thus, the lack of widespread and sustainable economic improvement since the end of the Kosovo war in 1999 is also a barometer of the unresolved fear and uncertainties that contribute to political instability (Sklias & Roukanas, 2007).

2.8 Gaps in the Literature

The substantial body of literature concerning peace operations tends to focus on the macro and strategic levels, including questioning their undeclared intentions and legality. However, particularly since the end of the Cold War, a recurring response to contemporary conflicts has been intervention by international organizations and the deployment of military peacekeeping forces into a sovereign state or territory to end the violence there, and to prevent its spread to its neighbors. Despite the surface parallels with international organizations that may be inferred, military forces and their bases present in the post-conflict environment are also sources of coercive power, which opportunists and local elites may attempt to coopt for their own benefit. Current literature is particularly thin concerning the local-level practices between military bases and their communities, including those which may unintentionally create or entrench inequities and inequalities which may not only impede or prevent sustainable peacebuilding, but also lead to renewed violence. This research contributes to closing this significant gap in knowledge of military base activities at the micro and meso levels.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.0 Introduction

This chapter provides an overview of the methods and strategy used for this research posed with this question: *“How do the everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict environments affect the local political economy and what are the implications for peacebuilding?”* This chapter is comprised of two sections, pre- and post-fieldwork. Section One contains a synopsis of the literature review and purpose of the research; a discussion of the methods and processes to be used and, a general description of the anticipated data. An examination of researcher positionality completes this section. Section Two includes the challenges that were encountered in field work, a sample of field data, and an assessment of the divergence of field data from literature. This chapter concludes with a recap of significant findings and hypothesis refinement.

3.1 Literature Review

The effects of peacekeeping organizations on the local community within a post-conflict environment have been critically studied by academics, policy makers, and by the peacekeeping organizations themselves, for more than a decade (Arnall, et al., 2013; AUSA & CSIS, 2002; Baker, A., 2004; Baker, C., 2010; Boyce, 2002; Brahim, 2000; Caplan, 2005; Carnahan, et al., 2005; Colletta, et al., 2008; Duffield, 2011; Edelstein, 2009; Enloe, 2000; Ferreiro, 2012; Finkel, et al., 2006; Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Frost, 2003; Hegre, et al., 2010; Heldt, 2004; Jackson & Haysom, 2013; Jeong, 2005; Jones, et al., 2011; LeRiche, 2004; Learned, n.d.; Leonhardt, 2001; MacDonald, 2005; Natsios, 2009; Roberts, 1985; Roehner, 2012; Sciarra, 2008; Tierney, 2010; USAID, 2009; Zaum & Knaus, 2013). Yet a comparable examination of the effects of establishing a military base in the same environment is nearly absent in academic literature. The base-related studies that do exist are generally undertaken through the concerned government’s direction, or by an interested organization. These studies are more typically focused upon the

local impact of the economic losses resulting from the closure of domestic military bases, or upon the trade-off of anticipated cost-savings in comparison to decreased national security (Cowan, 2012; Lynch, 1970; Reischauer, 1992; Sharp, 1990). The use of contractors for logistic services to military bases has been studied more recently, especially for US bases in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, their emphasis is upon corporate accountability, and risk of increased political and military dependency on civilians to provide sustainment services (Krahmann, 2005; Singer, 2003) rather than their collective effect on the community. Finally, the small number of relevant studies in International Relations concerning military bases tend to focus on legal justification, strategy reforms, macro-level economic decisions, and broad policy effects on national and international security (Crocker, et al., 2005:363; Roberts, 2006) rather than their individual and collective effects on the ground.

A growing body of literature in International Development and International Relations suggests that micro-level, or day to day activities play a much more significant role in post conflict stabilization than once attributed, and that they affect policy goals more directly (Collinson, 2003; Dobbins, 2013; Hudson & Leftwich, 2014; Verkoren & Junne, 2012). Moreover, as the frequency of environments containing a combination of military forces and non-military humanitarian actors continues to rise, persistent failure to understand the role of every day relations and activities invites wasted resources and less-than-optimum outcomes. This research begins to fill this gap in literature concerning military bases that are established after conflict and their influences at the local, or community, level.

Unlike international humanitarian actors, military forces and the relationships that develop between the local community and military forces cannot be neutral; military forces always represent a State or other international body which has a political objective for its intervention. Therefore, with regard to the military, “the relationships and economic opportunity provided by

the outsiders may concurrently reinforce pre-conflict inequalities and inadvertently foster the evolution of an individual or groups' ability to control present and future economic and social resources, while withholding the same opportunity for others they wish not to include" (Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; also, Sowell, 1981). Particularly with regard to humanitarian aid and profits from natural resource extraction, elites and strongmen can use violence to exclude access by others and reinforce their control (Münch, 2013:2; von Billerbeck, 2012). The complexity of this situation is compounded in the absence of a legitimate and capable government to prevent malign actors from leveraging their positions and promoting their particular interests in the post-conflict and peacebuilding environment (Cheng & Zaum, 2008; Cox, 2001; Earle, 1997; Grzymala-Busse & Jones Luong, 2008; Korf, 2003; Newman & Schabel, 2002; Studdard, 2005; Torjesen, 2013; Verkoren & Junne, 2012). Hence, the arrival of a military force can quickly and unknowingly generate at least three negative outcomes.

- First, while the arrival of military forces may be a relief for many by interrupting the dangerous or predatory environment, military forces' presence may also represent, or be perceived to "side" with the government that had directly contributed to the conflict.
- Secondly, the military forces may inadvertently reinforce and "legitimize" the power and influence of malign self-appointed actors by working with them, and
- Thirdly, the arrival of military forces may destabilize the fragile stasis when confronting war leaders and similar actors, as the military competes with them for influence over the population³

³ Elite competition with the military tends to emerge concerning security; law enforcement, counter organized crime and antiterrorism.

This research therefore, begins to fill the gap in literature concerning these outcomes by examination of the comparatively minor scale day-to-day relationships and activities of establishing and maintaining a military base and its subsequent political economy.

3.2 Research methodology and rationale

This research takes a mixed method approach, primarily using political economy analysis (PEA) and within case study comparison. Both the case study method and PEA are frequently used by international organizations to explore the effect of their own peacekeeping forces on the local community, and evaluate the effectiveness of programs and development aid (Carnahan, 2006; Cowan, 2012; del Castillo, 2008; DfID, 2009; Durch, 2004). Case studies are particularly suitable for this research because they facilitate understanding of the interrelationship of environmental and social systems, allowing the researcher to ‘unpack’ meaning, as well as examine causal relationships and describe ranges of applicability for those causal mechanisms in context (Ng & Hase, 2008; Piekkari & Welch, 2011), and within social processes from empirical data when little suitable literature and knowledge exists (Yin, 2012). Likewise PEA is specifically useful to understand the relationships between key stakeholders, both individuals and groups concerning the distribution and acquisition of power, or the “rules of the game” (Hudson & Leftwich, 2014:9).

According to Yin (2003) and Campbell (2010), the case study method offers a depth of study within a bounded system over time, providing a “thick description” of phenomena in context (Campbell, 2010:174), and is well suited for a single or small number of examples (small – n) to be studied in their environment, within a complex context, and where the observer has little or no control of the environment (Yin, 2003; Yin, 2012; Buttolph-Johnson, 2005). Within case comparison further allows the comparison of phenomenon within the case, increasing its

explanatory capabilities through examination of similarities, differences and patterns across (sub)cases (Campbell, 2010:174) as exogeneous factors are more closely controlled.

This research begins with a preliminary hypothesis informed by desk work and uses a standardized procedure to gather data described later in this section; uses multiple sources and documents, and it examines communities with and without military bases in geographically disparate locations. These facilitate cross referencing and improves the validity of the gathered information (Bell, 1993). Interviews and observation techniques borrowed from ethnography provide historical and cultural context, however, the ethnographic method itself is not a significant contributor to analysis. A list of interview subjects is provided as Annex 1.

Political Economy Analysis is a process which can be used to assemble a portrait of actors and forces in the post-conflict environment. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) provides a broad definition of political economy analysis as it is to be used in this research:

*Political economy analysis is concerned with the interaction of political and economic processes in a society: the distribution of power and wealth between different groups and individuals, and the processes that create, sustain and transform these relationships over time.*⁴

This research takes a 'Livelihoods Approach' to political economy analysis, as this approach is oriented "to the meso-and local level ... it is grounded in the people's own perspectives, and how the totality of economic, political, social and cultural factors affects people's lives" (Collinson, 2003:4). The Livelihoods Approach also better explains post conflict economies,

⁴ Political Economy Analysis expands upon earlier Drivers of Change studies that were developed to challenge assumptions and provide better understanding of the local centripetal and centrifugal forces in context and therefore better able to address underlying concerns and facilitate more appropriate development solutions. In this research, PEA assists study of these forces specifically between the bases and local community.

particularly interrelation of coping and shadow or parallel economies. Political Economy Analysis therefore provides an additional tool to examine in what ways the presence of a military base affects the local community. Coupled with the 'thick description' of the case study including interviews with locally hired staff, local businesses and community leaders; and, governmental and non-governmental organization studies, the political economy analysis of the post conflict environment can illustrate the ways military bases influence interests, incentives and constraints at the local level and provide insights toward enduring and sustainable peacebuilding. Hence, the political, social and economic factors of the three communities of interest, Ferizaj, Prizren and Gjakova, are examined to ascertain whether, and in what ways, the military base influences its' surrounding community. This research therefore, helps to fill a wide gap in knowledge, and contributes to post-conflict studies and International Relations theory.

3.3 Case Study Selection

The Republic of Kosovo⁵ (Kosovo) is one of the newest states globally. As of the 2011 census, Kosovo's population was approximately 1.8 million, with an overall ethnic Albanian majority of just over 92% (ASK, 2012).⁶ Ethnic Serbs accounted for 5.3%, and all other minorities combined are estimated at 2.7% (Brunborg, 2002)⁷. According to the World Bank, Kosovo's population grew at a rate of 0.86% in 2012 (Bank, 2012), and thus these proportions are likely to be nearly identical at the end of the research period in 2016.

Prior to its unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008, Kosovo was the southernmost province of Serbia, and historically among the poorest regions in the Balkans.

Particularly during the Cold War period, the predominantly ethnic Albanian province of Kosovo

⁵ The Republic of Kosovo has not been fully recognized by all of 193 UN members, including Serbia, from which it declared independence in 2008. As of late 2015, 108 of 193 countries have formally recognized Kosovo's independence.

⁶ The 2011 Census was boycotted by Serbs in northern Kosovo, especially in vicinity of Mitrovica, and in southern Kosovo by Serbs and Roma, resulting in a population of 1.5 and 1.1% respectively, therefore, previous data are used.

⁷ Bromberg's 2002 population figures of 5.3% Kosovo Serb and 2.7% for all others identifying neither Albanian or Serb are used in place of the official 2011 percentages

experienced varying levels of economic investment; cultural and linguistic autonomy and local control. However, continued lack of adequate investment and regional political malfeasance, coupled with the persistent and increasing discrimination of ethnic Albanians, led to widespread demonstrations and eventually demands for independence. The “Dayton Accords”⁸ failure to include Kosovo’s status in its final agreement in 1995 incited guerilla style harassment of Kosovo’s Serb minority by the covert Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), to which the central, predominantly Serb government responded with overwhelming force, including ‘ethnic cleansing’ tactics. As conflict escalated into open war and Kosovo Albanian and Serb refugees threatened regional stability, the international community, particularly NATO military forces, intervened.

The war in Kosovo ended in June 1999 with the adoption of UN Resolution 1244 which established the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and authorized the posting of approximately 50,000 multi-national military forces, the Kosovo Forces, known as KFOR, for oversight and security. Although UNMIK officially terminated its oversight mission in 2012, UN advisors, EULEX⁹ and KFOR remain. The number of military personnel posted in Kosovo have been reduced from the initial deployment of 50,000 to less than 20,000, however continued strained relations between the governments of Kosovo and Serbia still fuel antagonistic acts by factions of former belligerents. These prolong a fear of renewed conflict by NATO and military leaders, thereby extending the presence of the multi-national military forces in Kosovo (Cook, 2008)

3.3.1 Kosovo as Case Study

Kosovo was selected as a case study because it offers three significant characteristics: first, a substantial and active presence of multi-national military forces operating in a peacekeeping

⁸ The Dayton Agreement or Dayton Accords is a colloquialism for the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) meeting held at Wright-Paterson Airforce Base near Dayton, Ohio, United States to end hostilities between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina

⁹ European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo: a civilian task force to support law enforcement, prosecutors and the judiciary to facilitate use of international legal standards.

environment that has continuously interacted with its community. Second, a long political trusteeship, which tends to limit the agency of actors at both the federal and the local community level, and therefore community leaders may establish relationships with the military base to serve as a 'political voice.' Third, Kosovo has received a high level of technical and economic investment by the international community¹⁰ in parallel with military operations within the same compact area for over a decade, thus comparison of the effects of the practices of military bases on communities may be more efficiently and effectively studied.

The period of study of these bases in Kosovo is approximately twelve years; beginning in 1999 upon the implementation of UN Resolution 1244, which ended open conflict in Kosovo, to mid-2012 when the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) officially terminated its supervision. This period also provides a sufficient passage of time to examine the social, political and economic changes occurring since the arrival of the international community and military forces in Kosovo, and to observe its evolving political economy.

3.3.2 Kosovo's Permissive Environment

In addition to Kosovo's structural usefulness as a case study to examine the effects of the day-to-day practices of military bases established in a post conflict environment, Kosovo's post conflict environment is also militarily suitable. Research where military peacekeeping forces are deployed is inherently risky. However, the Republic of Kosovo provides a uniquely safe, or permissive¹¹ environment; there have been few extended outbreaks of violence since the riots in 2004, and KFOR actively maintains a force of nearly 20,000 soldiers for a population of approximately 2 million people to maintain a "safe and secure environment". Thus, this research design was able to be conducted in a relatively straightforward manner, and required

¹⁰ Rossi states Kosovo is relatively stable in appearance, but remains in a 'frozen conflict' concerning relations between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, stultifying political, social and economic progress (Rossi, 2013)

¹¹ A combat environment where one does not need to have a high degree of fear for personal or unit safety. According to the United States Joint Publication 3-0 (JP 3-0) a permissive environment is one "in which the host country military and law enforcement agencies have control, as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct".

no extraordinary concerns for the physical security of participants or in the ability to travel freely, in contrast with locations where overt hostility and violence have not yet ceased.

3.3.3 Community Selection

KFOR bases are located in Kosovo's larger cities. This research is formed by a comparison of three cities, or communities, in their same-named municipalities: Ferizaj and Prizren, each of which has a Kosovo Forces (KFOR) military base that was established in 1999; and Gjakova, which shares several physical characteristics of both Ferizaj and Prizren but does not have a military base. Camp Monteith, a US military base in the municipality of Gjilan¹² is included in this research as it was operated concurrently by the US military for five years, and a large number of workers were transferred to Camp Bondsteel when Camp Monteith closed in 2005. The bases in Ferizaj, (Camp Bondsteel), and Prizren, (Camp Prizren), have continued their operations without interruption since 1999. The cities of Ferizaj and Prizren were chosen because they are both majority Kosovo Albanian cities, and the US and Germany deployed similar sized military forces¹³ to these bases. The largest city and capital of the Republic of Kosovo, Pristina, with an official population of 199,868 (OSCE, 2013) was specifically not included in the research. The reasons for its non-selection are twofold: first, Pristina includes the NATO Headquarters for Kosovo as well as a number of small single NATO-member military contingents. Second, Pristina also contains a substantial international non-military presence, including embassies and international and non-governmental organizations' headquarters, most of which are physically concentrated in the same small part of the city. Thus, discerning the particular effects of the military presence from the international civilian presence becomes problematic and Pristina was eliminated for study.

¹² The Municipality of Gjilan is adjacent to the Municipality of Ferizaj; the bases were approximately 15 miles apart, sharing administration.

¹³ The Italian military force in Peja is one of the smallest, 2,300 personnel, and is less than half of the US forces in Ferizaj (7,000) or German forces in Prizren (8,500). The French military deployed 7,000 personnel to Mitrovica, which has a substantial proportion of Kosovo Serb.

3.4 Terminology and Definitions

The research question contains four foundational concepts requiring definition: post-conflict, peacebuilding, political economy and, power. For the purpose of this research, *Post-conflict* is defined as the period following major armed conflict where open conflict and hostilities may have ended, but there is not yet real peace (Brahimi, 2007), a time period that may last several years.

The second, *Peacebuilding* is defined as specific initiatives and activities that are designed to prevent the eruption or return of armed conflict (AUSA & CSIS, 2002; Brahimi, 2007; Call & Cousens, 2007; Schirch, 2004; United Nations, 2017). These programs and activities include advocacy, economic investment and development; education, good governance and policy making training, and development of civil society organizations.

The third concept, *Political Economy*, is defined here as the outcome “of the social relations, particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources ...” (Mosco, 2009:2). The post-conflict literature broadly states political economy evolves and emerges as a result of the balance of responses between the populace and the local elite, within local context and history (Call & Cousens, 2007; Collinson, 2003; Dobbins, 2013; Doyle, 2006; Pugh, 2005), and continues to evolve, change and reproduce (Cheng, 2013; Coyne, 2008; Mosco, 2009; Wendt, 1992).

The final concept is *Power*, and is similarly socially constructed (Barnett & Duvall, 2005; Biersteker & Weber, 1996; Wendt, 1999). It is composed of an interaction of relationships, meanings, ideas, culture and context (Wendt, 1999). Power is often held as the capacity to have ‘compellance over’ or ‘compellance to,’ especially in relation to the control of resources and other “strategic interests” through overt or covert use of violence (Bilgin & Berivan, 2008; Mattern, 2008; Nye, 2006; Waltz, 1979). However, power is equally relevant in describing the hierarchy within social, ethnic and kin ties through the control of social relations and acceptable behavior, or control of information, opportunity and choices (Bardhan, 2005; Barnett & Duval,

2005; Earle, 1997; Lukes, 2005; Richmond, 2011). Bueno de Mesquita states “an orientation of power on State relations, is only a backdrop to consider power relations at the community level” (Bueno de Mesquita, 2008). Therefore, the arrival of military forces, and whose initial relationships with the local community are most likely formed by chance, may have a significant impact on both community stability and peacebuilding operations.

3.5 Research Questions and Hypothesis

The field research is based on the central research question:

“How do the everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict environments affect the post-war political economy and what are the implications for peacebuilding?”

The research examines three principal areas relating to the establishment of a military base and forms three hypotheses. The first concerns the economic impact of the initial construction and establishment of the military base on the local community. The emphasis is on the military base as an employer and direct consumer of goods and services.

Hypothesis 1

- *There is an initial surge in demand for labor, building material and construction services for base construction, where the military base becomes a ‘positive shock’ of employment and business opportunities at the local level (McClure, 2000; Williams, 2005).*

However, literature strongly suggests *returning expatriates and foreign-owned businesses arrive to take advantage of the economic opportunities* (Bhatia, 2005; LeRiche, 2004; Richmond, 2010; Studdard, 2005; Woodward, 2002), crowding out local residents and businesses, thus benefits of the early ‘positive shock’ to the local community may be denied, or limited.

Thus, Hypothesis 1 is supported by examples derived from archival material and interviews, including: the presence/absence of initial rapid and wide scale employment of unskilled and semi-skilled laborers from the local area; substantial hiring of local construction companies; large and ongoing purchase of building materials (quarried gravel, concrete mix, lumber) and equipment from local businesses; and the opening of small retail or restaurants in response to the increase in persons with disposable income. Archival and primary data will show a rise in local entrepreneurs, while anecdotes are likely to be the main source to support the influx of extra-community individuals and businesses that are often stated to arrive specifically to take part in economic opportunities created by the military base construction (Carnahan, 2006; Durch, 2004; Sciarra, 2008).

Hypothesis 2

The focus is the military base as a catalyst for secondary economic activities and effects. The outcomes of these circumstances are expected to be mixed and vary in relation to preexisting conditions and social and cultural norms; illicit business practices are projected to be largely negative and outside of the primary economy.

- Hypothesis 2 states, the *income generated by employment at the military base will have a temporary inflationary effect on the local economy, and the income generated by employment at the military base will create substantial new revenue generating opportunities.*

Hypothesis 2 examines fundamental economic effects noted in the international and non-governmental organization literature, including the indirect economic and social effects of hiring local personnel (Higate & Henry, 2004; Sciarra, 2008), and the emergence of a “balloon economy,” whereby prices for daily commodities such as food, lodging and fuel will rise to take advantage of the higher incomes of international actors and their local employees, placing

these commodities beyond the reach of many in the local community (Carnahan, 2006; Durch, 2004; Paris & Sisk, 2009; Woodward, 2002). Therefore, Hypothesis 2 will examine primary and secondary data for examples of inflationary effects, such as increases in the cost of food, fuel and rent in those communities with a high proportion of employees at the military base. However, the high incomes paid by international organizations may also catalyze sustainable revenue generating business enterprises that continue to benefit the base communities.

A separate, and concurrent issue concerns the economic effects of military use and/or damage to key infrastructure, such as roads and bridges, on civilian agriculture and commerce. The effects are expected to be neutral to positive overall due to the probable low level of commerce and agriculture in the early post-conflict environment, accompanied by the military proclivity of improving the local transportation infrastructure it relies upon for its own freedom of movement (Army, 2000). A high incidence of anecdotes and complaints noted during interviews or found in archival data with corresponding low evidence of remedy or repair will support the supposition that *continued use and unrepaired damage of transportation routes will limit and impede restoration of civilian commerce and agriculture.*

Hypothesis 3

The quality of relationships between the military base and local leaders will affect the comparable relationships between local leaders and the community at large (Lynch, 1970; Sharp: 1990). The emphasis is the military base as a political agent. Where elite control is destructive and high, the effects on the community will be stifled and constrained, thus the overall outcome of these relationships on the community would be expected to be neutral to negative (Münch, 2013).

- Hypothesis 3 submits *local elites will seek opportunities to further consolidate and strengthen their interests by increasing their relationships and proximity to the military base; the military therefore becomes a personal source for elites' economic opportunities*

The post conflict literature states that as the absence of legitimate governance and lack of economic progress continues, war leaders and local elites will increase negative pressure on their communities through informal relationships, especially with important familial, ethnic and other sub-groups, to remain loyal to them, even as these leaders will often exploit those same relations for social and/or financial support (Arnall, et al., 2013; Cheng, 2013; Coyne, 2008; Münch, 2013; Sorensen, 1991; Torjesen, 2013; Verkoren & Junne, 2012; Vlahos, 2005). Hence, *local elites will leverage real or ostensible relationships with the military base to cement their positions as leaders and power brokers in their community*, thereby entrenching themselves as leaders, a condition similar to the consequences of warlord-controlled aid distribution in Somalia and Afghanistan (Bhatia, 2005; LeBillion, 2008; Münch, 2013).

This post-conflict elite capture contrasts with urban planning and base closing literature which find the close economic and political relationships between the military and local elites, and between the military and the community tend to diffuse away from the military over time; more simply, the initial close relationships do not endure. In this non-post conflict alternate, direct economic effects decrease and become less centered on the military base, while non-military related economic effects increase (Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990). Therefore, a convergence of similar responses obtained from interviews, observations, and documents across the areas of interest pointing to particular individuals or exclusive groups is necessary to support the third hypothesis. Their absence or disagreement with material gained through desk and field research will demonstrate some other factor, whether in addition to, or instead of those

expected, is highly significant and will require additional inquiry, a valid result of both case studies¹⁴ and political economy analysis.

This third hypothesis is especially contextual and relies directly on understanding the political and social relationship between the community elites and the community at large to ascertain pre-war norms of leadership and cooperation (Call & Cousens, 2007; Coyne, 2008), in order to identify changes that may have resulted from the establishment and practices of the bases. Therefore, it is also necessary to determine whether the relationships between war elites, community leaders and the community are indeed as negative and predatory as anticipated from literature, *from the communities' point of view* (Filipov, 2006). Evidence of these relationships will include instances of exclusive business and contractor lists¹⁵, where tenders should have been broadly distributed but were not; pervasive examples of *quid pro quo* between community leaders and select businesses; and, formation of in-groups and out-groups, as a result. Corroborating details of these business opportunities gained from interviews in the field will reinforce the third hypotheses, even as that same data is acknowledged to likely be colored by the passage of time. Similarly, interviews and anecdotes will indicate whether local elites had resisted change or stifled community growth where they do not benefit, a finding that is constant within both post-conflict and base closing literature (Lynch, 1970; Münch, 2013; Robinson & Green, 1989).

3.6 Research Sample

The purpose of the research is to fill the gap in knowledge concerning outcomes of everyday activities and relationships between a military base established after conflict and its local community to understand its political economy and longer-term consequences for

¹⁴ Yin notes case studies "... may infer new propositions, hypothesis, addition of new variables, or synthesis of new theories."

¹⁵ Discovery of such flagrant lists will be unlikely. Instead, interviews with businesses would illustrate whether there is a predominance of contracts that favor a very small number of vendors, leading to further inquiry.

peacebuilding. Interviews were conducted in the cities of Ferizaj and Gjilan near Camp Bondsteel first due to the greater volume of material and literature available on these communities¹⁶ from which to locate interviewees, followed by the city of Prizren and Camp Prizren. A wide range of sub-groups were sampled; military leaders, community leaders/elites and community members to reach a minimum of 25 interviews per location, for a minimum total number of 50. The sample also included community members that presently work or have worked on the military bases, including retail contractors¹⁷, as well as vendors and businesses that currently or had supplied goods and services to the military base; and local businesses that have or have had military patrons. The sample of community leaders and elites are those that likely to have, or have had, a relationship with the military base¹⁸. These include formal, appointed or elected officials; informal unelected leaders and opinion shapers who control or influence community resources and beliefs, and those that hold special knowledge (Arnall, et al., 2013; Rubin & Rubin, 2005). This group also includes large business owners as well as 'elected leaders' of opposition or shadow governments, but excludes organized crime which may have influence, but is not generally community based. The community at large includes all other residents, comprised of the permanent and semi-permanent population of the persons, businesses and organizations geographically collocated to the military base.

The initial selection of persons to interview is by their relevant position or function, through review of grey (organizational) literature, including the US Army National Guard and NATO Kosovo Forces website, and former personal professional contacts. "Snowballing" was used as necessary to increase both the quantity and the quality of interviews. The interviews were

¹⁶ Predominantly US and NATO developed or focused materials, including books, journal articles and the organization's website.

¹⁷ Particularly for Camp Bondsteel, base retail shops are typically run by local businesses as contractors to the US contractor B&R, and are not employees.

¹⁸ Ongoing will be defined as meeting twice-monthly or more often for a substantive portion of the military leadership's posting, e.g., four months out of six months posting; for nine months out of a twelve-month posting.

semi-structured, opening with similar basic questions followed by situationally appropriate questions¹⁹ in a conversational manner and in an informal office or restaurant setting.

3.6.1 Data Quality

Due to the limited research concerning the establishment of military bases established after conflict, no comparable data is available. Therefore, the interview questions are based on the effects and influences of international organizations have had in the local community, such as the 2006 United Nations study “Economic Impact of Peacekeeping” (Carnahan, 2006). The 12-year lapse between the initial establishment of the KFOR camps in 1999 and the interviews increases the likelihood that memories of many events will have faded, were forgotten, or that events would be remembered either more positively or negatively than had actually occurred. This possibility is mitigated by advance deskwork to become familiar with the local community and, by asking the same basic open-ended questions, framing the questions with similar events when appropriate. As example, “A bakery owner I met recently told me his bakery was visited by KFOR personnel to buy bread for their cafeteria. *How did you come to provide ‘X product/service’ for the Camp?*” It is anticipated that responses to interview questions will be quite similar; unusual responses will stimulate further discussion and examination. Outlier responses will be examined on a by case basis for additional study or consideration for removal from the data set.

3.6.2 Researcher Positionality

This research is particularly unique as it is developed as a participant observer; the researcher is closely affiliated with a part of the group under study, yet is still an outsider. Corbin, Dwyer & Buckle (2009) quote Adler and Adler, who identify three “membership roles” of qualitative researchers engaged in [such] observational methods: (a) peripheral member researchers, who

¹⁹ All interviewees are asked the same broad questions; military personnel, local base employees, business owners, community leaders, etc. have additional questions relative to their position or function.

do not participate in the core activities of group members; (b) active member researchers, who become involved with the central activities of the group without fully committing themselves to the members' values and goals; and (c) complete member researchers, who are already members of the group or who become fully affiliated during the course of the research". This researcher falls in the third category. Although currently observing and conducting interviews as an outsider, this researcher had deployed to Kosovo as a member of KFOR as a civil military operations officer for over a year with US Army National Guard from 2008 to 2009 at one of the military bases under study, Camp Bondsteel, and is currently a member of the US Army Reserve. This military perspective and insider knowledge is rare in academic International Relations research: the review of grey and academic literature by non-military researchers often concentrates on macro and federal-level policies and plans. Moreover, these researchers tend to either over-generalize positive outcomes, or single-mindedly focus on the negative, excluding the wider context of civil and military operations.

It is anticipated as a member of the military, and former KFOR soldier will be viewed as more trustworthy by members of the military or military contractors in the interviews, and therefore likely to elicit more comprehensive responses than would a comparable non-military researcher. Undoubtedly, the potential for both positional blindness and bias, the inability to see how certain military processes or activities are experienced in terms of social and economic power by others, due to a long membership in the armed forces, are particularly high. Yet this same membership can also provide unique perspective and insight not otherwise possible. Nevertheless, positive conversations are not guaranteed. Membership in the military may solicit negative or limited responses in some civilian interviewees that hold oppositional stances to military intervention, including Kosovo Serbs and field workers for international and non-governmental organizations. This circumstance may evoke less cooperation and comprehensive responses than would otherwise be given. Acknowledging these tendencies, in interviews and analysis, will require diligent testing and a continual challenge of assumptions and

generalizations formed by the empirical data. Thus, the foremost principle is caution; to be continually aware of unintentional personal bias, particularly concerning how military membership may be perceived by the interviewees, and to address them as they occur.

3.6.3 Research Ethics and Confidentially

As Yin notes, particularly for qualitative research, it is incumbent upon the researcher to conduct their research with a high regard for accuracy and data integrity (Yin, 2015). There are three primary concerns for researcher ethics in field research: precautions to ensure research participant's privacy and confidentiality; to protect research participants from harm; and, to assure participation and response are completely voluntary.

Prior to interviewing, participants receive a research acknowledgement form in the participant's preferred language (Albanian, English, Serbian) describing the research, and emphasizing participation is voluntary and may be stopped at any time for any reason. To protect privacy and confidentiality, individual names acquired during the interviews are coded by initials and the date of interview, and listed in numerical order. Individuals are strictly referred to by their interview number in text. The original materials are disposed per university procedures.

While this research has been prepared in careful accordance with the University of Reading's research guidelines, as a participant-observer researcher, it is also necessary to be especially cognizant of continued membership in the US military which may infer some ability to assist with community issues. As a result, all interview introductions include the disclosure that this research is conducted solely as a scholarly endeavor, and is not related to present membership in the US military, nor an outcome of a previous deployment to Kosovo.

3.7 Overview and Challenges

The Kosovo field research was conducted between May and August 2014, with a follow up research visit to the Municipality of Gjakova in October 2016. The initial interview time frame

was approximately 50 days before the European vacation period²⁰, and the out-rotation of the Brigade Combat team from Camp Bondsteel, allowing good access to local officials, businesses and military personnel. Interviews were concentrated in the majority ethnically Albanian cities of Ferizaj, Gjilan, and Prizren; a total of 84 semi-structured interviews and an additional 10 informal conversations were held, the majority of which were with local business owners and community leaders. The second two-week research period in October 2016 was conducted to focus on business growth and local investment.

3.7.1 Loss of Access to Military Bases

With little prior notice all access, including accompanied access, to both Camp Bondsteel and Camp Prizren was denied. This prevented any review of on-site historical records and documents relating to the establishment or maintenance of the military bases, posing a significant barrier to examine or discuss hiring and purchasing procedures²¹. In addition, Camp Bondsteel is operated by US government civilians and contractors; all but one individual declined requests to be interviewed. Moreover, the US military unit is a tenant of the base with little influence on base operations or hiring and purchasing decisions. As a result, there was an immediate turn to remote civilian acquaintances from the 2008-2009 KFOR deployment; an outreach to former military co-workers and contacts for additional referrals, and to military, professional and organizational journals and websites to locate suitable interviewees. Cold-calling or visiting without an appointment was also used, especially in Prizren, due both to the absence of contacts, and the limited published and internet material concerning early Camp Prizren operations.

²⁰ Continental Europeans often take their annual vacations during the months of July and August. Kosovars living abroad return to visit family during much of this period, making local residents less available for interview.

²¹ The US Federal Acquisition Regulations and policies used at Camp Bondsteel is available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/dars/far.html>; corresponding regulation was not located for Camp Prizren.

3.7.2 Interviewee Fears

Lack of base access was amplified by the refusal of the overwhelming majority of both former and currently employed local residents to be interviewed for fear of losing their jobs²² or potential future opportunities. Business owners and vendors were likewise reluctant to meet for fear of losing their business relationship with their base. Especially in the cities of Ferizaj and Gjilan, and on the US base Camp Bondsteel, this anxiety is likely to have had root in the highly publicized National Security Agency (NSA) intelligence leaks by a former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) employee some six months earlier.²³ Casual conversations taking place between former acquaintances, or during occasional shopping and daily restaurant visits are not included in the total number of interviews, but their comments are occasionally included in background, and referenced accordingly. A breakdown of the interviewees is found in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 below.

Field Interviews: May-August 2014						
Interviewee type	Base Employee	Business Owner	Local elite/ leader	Community member	Military/Mil Contractor	IO/NGO member
Current	3	19	20	5	6	(Local) 7
Former	8				2	(Ex-Pat) 4

Table 3.1

Additional fieldwork was conducted in October 2016 to gain additional data concerning the locally perceived and actual economic benefit and likelihood of investment due to proximity to a military base. Local banks required permission through the Central Bank of Kosovo prior to interview, which was only granted at the end of the research visit, limiting the number of these

²² Local civilians working on the US base were polygraphed regularly. Although they were not prevented from being interviewed, most did not want to risk having participated in an interview.

²³ WikiLeaks and similar incidents often initiate increased security and threat awareness measures in government and military organizations, including safety briefings, minimizing unofficial visits and not speaking with personnel outside one's organization.

interviews. Government officials and academics were generally accommodating, providing a second meeting when necessary. Table 3.2 provides a breakdown of interviews in October 2016.

Field Interviews ²⁴ : October 2016						
Interviewee type	Business Investor	Academic: Economics	Bank/Finance Institution	Community member	Military/Mil Contractor	Gov't Official
Current	2	2	1	1		6
Former					1	

Table 3.2

3.8 Summary

Interviews were coded and/or transcribed at the end of each day and consolidated at the end of the week. As the interview questions were based on the initial hypothesis statements, the responses were roughly 'pre-binned' into categories. However, the interview responses contained more overlap between categories than anticipated. More importantly, the responses received during the interviews radically differed from the anticipated answers based on the literature review, especially concerning the absence of a balloon economy; the cool, formal relations between the military base and political elites/leaders, and an overall little indication of illicit activities, particularly prostitution. The literature-incongruent responses remained consistent throughout the interviews, and between the initial three cities²⁵, evoking further examination of the literature and initial hypotheses. Thus, this thesis broadened its inquiry to include a closer examination of the bases' effect upon each communities' unique political, social and economic characteristics.

²⁴ Additional interviews were scheduled but not completed due to interviewee no-shows, interviewee illness and interpreter scheduling conflicts.

²⁵ Similar responses were received in the October 2016 visit.

Chapter 4: Political and Economic History of Kosovo

4.0 Introduction

To understand the political-economic aspects of establishing military bases in a post-conflict environment, it is important to put the military base into the wider historical context of Yugoslavia's history and political economy. To that end this chapter provides an overview of the former Yugoslavia, including its early relationship with Soviet Russia.

The 1945 Yugoslavia was a federation that was formed by combining existing Balkan nations²⁶ and former kingdoms under Marshal Josip Broz Tito after the Second World War. In 1946, Yugoslavia became a communist state whose system was based upon the Soviet Union's political-economic plan; it was under Tito that Yugoslavia established wide ranging political, social and economic reforms to close the development gap between the six constituent republics, not only to increase the wealth of Yugoslavia, but also to solidify his central control and suppress nationalism. The redistribution required to improve conditions in less developed republics ultimately resulted in wide-ranging resentment in the wealthier republics. The circumstantial and systemic discrimination of ethnic Albanians in the Serbian province of Kosovo led, first, to their apartheid conditions, and then to their state authorized oppression. The collapse of communism, the war in adjacent Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the failure of international community to address the grievances of Kosovars about their conditions through the Dayton Accords enabled the formation of the guerilla-style Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The KLA, using hit-and-run tactics, successfully leveraged media attention of Serb "ethnic cleansing" to gain global interest in Kosovo. The resulting peace operations by the United Nations and NATO in 1999 established an international trusteeship and military presence that continues to the present day.

²⁶ Defined as people groups possessing a common heritage, language and cultural identity (Global Policy Forum, 2017)

This chapter is comprised of three sections. The first is a timeline of key political events in the establishment of Yugoslavia. The second introduces military bases in Kosovo; the third describes the military intervention in Kosovo by NATO in 1999 and establishment of KFOR. It argues that the influence of military bases must be viewed in relation to Yugoslavia's overall political and economic environment to be understood, rather than as either a political or economic phenomenon alone.

4.1 Section Introduction

This section first examines leading characteristics of Kosovo's history, politics and economy in the latter half of the 20th century. It opens with a brief study of the regional history and introduces the initial political setting, including the establishment of post-1945 Yugoslavia under Marshall Josip Broz Tito, and the break in relations between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia in 1949. It then examines four major political periods in Yugoslavia where crises brought about sweeping change from the Federal to the local levels, noting their effects on Kosovo in particular: the promulgation of the 1953 Yugoslav Constitution; the outcomes of the revised Yugoslav Constitution in 1974; the Kosovo State of Emergency until 1988, and the loss of autonomy in 1989. An examination of these events in view of Kosovo's specific political and economic conditions illuminates how these events have shaped contemporary relationships between the local community and Kosovo government. This section concludes with considerations of contemporary military base effects on the local overall political economy.

4.2 Establishing Yugoslavia

The nations, people groups and states located between the eastern-most edge of continental Europe, and western-most edge of Russia and Asia form the area informally known as the

Balkans²⁷. For centuries, this region has been geographically important as a bridge between East and West for trade. It was ruled by various empires for some 11 centuries, the most recent being the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, the latter lasting nearly 500 years until the early 20th century. At its peak, the Ottomans extended from their origins in Turkey to as far north as the outskirts of Vienna, Austria. Their influence on customs, language, government and religion remain throughout the Balkans, most especially in the southernmost regions, including Kosovo²⁸.

The political origin of the contemporary Balkans stems from treaties enacted at the Berlin Congress in 1878 and the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian empire after the First World War, which led to the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Bideleux & Jeffries, 2007; Hashi, 1992). This new kingdom was governed by Serb King Petar Karadjordjevic who established an aggressive pro-Serb dictatorship and relocation program. This forced out the mostly ethnic Albanians in the south from their homes and farms, replacing them with ethnic Serbs and Montenegrins. His successor, son Alexandar Karadjordjevic, renamed the kingdom 'Yugoslavia' in 1929, and he continued a similarly autocratic rule until 1945 when he was strongly encouraged to by Allied leaders to abdicate his throne in favor of the anti-Axis Marshall Tito.

During the Second World War Marshall Broz Tito had been the leader of an anti-Nazi resistance group, the *National Liberation Army and Partisan Detachments of Yugoslavia*, colloquially known as the *Partisans*, which liberated Belgrade from the German Army in 1944 (Benson, 2001; Lampe, 2000), and contributed to the withdrawal of German forces from Serbia. Tito was a committed communist but downplayed his participation and leadership in the Communist

²⁷ The Balkans are generally comprised of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia. Greece and Turkey are also, but less commonly, considered part of the Balkans. The word 'Balkan' is Turkish for mountain/ous, descriptive of the regional geography.

²⁸ The Ottomans introduced Islam to the Balkan region; much of Albania, Kosovo, parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina and enclaves in Macedonia continue to identify themselves as Muslim.

Party until he was formally recognized and had become president of the former Kingdom of Yugoslavia (Benson, 2001:84; Makai, 2014).

Tito's Yugoslavia was a federation of six republics, including what are now Bosnia-Herzegovina²⁹, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia's lands also included two regions containing large non-Serb ethnic majorities, known as the autonomous Provinces³⁰ of Vojvodina and Kosovo³¹. (See map of 1946 Yugoslavia, Map 4.1.)



Map 4.1. Map courtesy of ICRC

These six territories officially became Yugoslavia's Republics in 1946. Formally, each Republic had equal authority and voice in the central government; rights of secession and could maintain

²⁹ Bosnia-Herzegovina gained Republic status in 1946.

³⁰ According to the constitution, the populations of Vojvodina and Kosovo were not "a people." such as the Bosnians, Croats and Serbs, but were comprised of nationalities originating outside of Yugoslavia, and therefore the Yugoslav lands they occupied could not be recognized as a Republic.

³¹ Kosovo was legally a 'Region,' with less status and governing authority than a Province. However, for the sake of simplicity, the term 'province' is used throughout this thesis.

its own language and culture (Hashi, 1992). However, the two Provinces, ethnically-Hungarian Vojvodina on the northern border of Serbia, and ethnically-Albanian Kosovo on the south-west border of Serbia and Albania, remained a part of the Republic of Serbia and their internal governance was closely controlled, as were the extent and conditions of their autonomy.

4.2.1 The Nationalities Problem

The spirit of Communism was expected to overcome national identities (Gulyas, 2014).

However the practical details of unifying the individual ethnic groups into a single federated State of Yugoslavia, known as the *Nationalities Problem*, was unforgivingly complex. The dilemma of the Nationalities Problem was how to create political unity from recently antagonistic ethnic groups that were also on a wide spectrum of social and economic development levels. The relatively undeveloped republics, would require substantial investment from the wealthier republics for their development. In addition, each of the new republics contained varying proportions of its neighbors' ethnic groups, and these internal sub-groups often had their own history and had established ties and alliances outside that republic (Lampe, 2000). In addition, each of the population groups were likewise comprised of – and sometimes divided by – their three primary religions: Catholicism, Islam and Orthodoxy. This social-political mix was further leavened by the aforementioned large disparities in economic development. In general, those regions in northern Yugoslavia with established trade in Western Europe, or which had been part of the Austro-Hungarian or Hapsburg Empire, were far more socially and economically developed than the regions below the Sava River. The republics south of the Sava River had included most of Bosnia, Macedonia, Montenegro and the Province of Kosovo³².

Within the first year, Yugoslavia's central government had established a comprehensive investment program to lift the economic level of the less developed Republics "... to become

³² The development level of Serbia and the Province of Vojvodina were in the middle of these extremes.

closer to that of the more developed Republics. Only when the economic disparities are evened out can anything like the ‘equalities of nationalities’ be achieved” (Hashi, 1992:53). Yet the political structure of the Yugoslav government made either Republic unity, or economic parity alone difficult; the combination was practically impossible (Hashi, 1992; Wilson, 1980). Examples of the extreme disparities in social and economic development in Yugoslavia’s eight regions in 1947/48 are illustrated in Table 4.1, demonstrating the immensity of closing the social and economic gaps³³.

Yugoslavia = 100	Slovenia	Croatia	Serbia*	Vojvodina	Bosnia-Herz.	Macedonia	Montenegro	Kosovo
National income per capita	175	107	96	110	84	62	71	52
% of national average								
Share of population %	9	24	26	11	16	7	2	5
Share of social product %	15	25	26	11	14	5	2	2
Share of fixed assets (1952) %	20	28	23	9	13	4	1	2
Share of industry in social products %	36	30	20	17	21	20	10	20
Share of agriculture in social products %	30	39	53	67	41	55	52	66
Share of population in agriculture %	44	62	72	68	72	71	72	81
Illiteracy % **	2	16	27	12	45	40	26	63
Dependents per 100 active population	76	87	79	97	126	127	150	179
Natural increase per 1000 population	9	9	13	9	22	21	22	26
Infant mortality per 1000 births	81	112	91	130	126	136	41	133

Data courtesy of Iraj Hashi, 1992

Table 4.1 Key Indicators of Regional Disparity in Yugoslavia, 1947/1948

³³ * Republic of Serbia excluding the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina; “Serbia proper.”

** Share of illiterate population in total population over the age of 10.

Sources: *Jugoslavija 1945-1964*, p.87; *Yugoslavia 1945-1985*, pp.197-218; Mladenovic’ (1965) p.3004.

4.3 The Autonomous Region of Kosovo

While the variance of political and economic capabilities of the Yugoslav Republics were substantial, the disparities between the two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina and Kosovo, were immense. Serbia had been an important state in the Austrian, Hapsburg and Ottoman Empires and was well developed. Belgrade, its capital, had been a key military, political and economic center since the 9th century. Its northern province, Vojvodina, was agriculturally well endowed, and had benefited from a substantial investment in infrastructure during the Austro-Hungarian Empire. It had also realized some protection by its association with Austria and Hungary during the Second World War. Therefore, Vojvodina was not only considerably more developed before the Second World War, but also had sustained less damage during the War overall than Kosovo. Under the 1946 Constitution, it became the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina. It was lawfully allowed to "... 'manage enterprises of provincial importance;' manage its cultural and education systems and hold its own courts and elect its own judges" (Kola, 2003:65).

The agricultural and economic attributes of Vojvodina contrasted considerably with those of Kosovo. Kosovo was mountainous, and agriculturally poor, with mostly small isolated rural and undeveloped villages. It contained very little modern infrastructure, and much of that infrastructure had been damaged by the war. Kosovo was constitutionally made an Autonomous *Region* in 1946, rather than a Province, and was required to have its economic, governance and judicial systems approved and overseen by the Serbian Parliament (ibid), a substantially inferior status to Vojvodina. The final Constitutional decision to incorporate Kosovo as a Region in 1946, rather than a Province, was contentious among the six Republics, but its rural and undeveloped state is likely to be one of the major contributing factors.

4.3.1 Kosovo and Albania under Axis Occupation

For Kosovo Albanians, the decision to remain a part of the Republic of Serbia, and in a subordinate political status as a Region, was a betrayal. During the brief period Kosovo had been incorporated into the Italian Axis-occupied Albania, between 1940 and 1944³⁴, Kosovo Albanians had been given significant autonomy as well the promise that it would join Albania permanently after the wars end (Judah, 2000; Pavlovic, 2013; Singleton & Carter, 1982). The Italian Forces occupying Albania openly encouraged Kosovo Albanians to establish their own Albanian language media and education systems *specifically* to facilitate its integration with Albania. These language privileges were withdrawn with the founding of the Federal Peoples Republic of Yugoslavia in 1945, and Kosovo's subsequent reincorporation in a lesser status as a Region of Serbia. The retraction of the use of the Albanian language in an official capacity led to widespread protests by the Kosovo Albanians, some of which became violent (Judah, 2000). Similar demonstrations for Kosovo's autonomy and status as a Republic, and its demands to rejoin Albania occurred as well, but were swiftly quashed by Serb military forces before they could spread (Benson, 2001; Malcolm, 1998; Mertus, 1999).

Italy had also encouraged a Kosovo Albanian police force and judicial system during its occupation of Albania and Kosovo, and critically, had given Kosovo Albanians the right to bear arms, providing them with weapons and ammunition to fight against the communist Yugoslav partisans (Vickers, 2006). The arming of Kosovo Albanians led to the intimidation and revenge killing of thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins living on land confiscated under Karadjordjevic's Serb-centered colonization programs, (Elsie, 2011; Mertus, 1999; Vickers, 2006)³⁵. Therefore, the declaration in the 1946 Yugoslav constitution for Kosovo to become an Autonomous

³⁴ Kosovo Albanian's freedom to use the Albanian language was a tactic employed by the Italian occupation to further Kosovo's alliance with Albania. Italy had planned to colonize Albania and Kosovo for their resources and for greater control of the Mediterranean Sea.

³⁵ Arming the Kosovo Albanians also facilitated retribution for Serb forced emigration programs; Serb confiscation of Albanian land by King Peter, and the widespread killing of Kosovo Albanians occurring after the Balkan Wars, 1912 and 1913 (Elsie, 2011). Memories of these revenge killings would be still fresh in 1945.

Region, instead of Province should not be considered merely a shrewd negotiation tactic for Tito (Benson, 2001; Judah, 2000; Mertus, 1999), but as a direct result of his enmity with Kosovo Albanians: their collaboration and fighting against the (his) Partisans on behalf of the Italian Axis powers; their anti-Yugoslavia protests in 1945, and for suspicions of Kosovo Albanian irredentism to join Albania (Benson, 2001; Elsie, 2011).

4.3.2 Kosovo and Communism

The 1945 population of Kosovo was estimated to have been just over 700,000³⁶ inhabitants (Brumborg, 2002). Although ethnic Albanians comprised less than 10% of the total population of Yugoslavia, they comprised approximately 70% of the Province of Kosovo's population (ibid). Nevertheless, the 1946 constitution both codified Kosovo Serbs' privilege, and strengthened their ties to Serbia's central government. Hence, despite population numbers which made them an ethnic minority, Kosovo Serbs habitually held the majority of important and influential government positions. This was exacerbated by the small number of Kosovo Albanians who were communists.

Kosovo's Albanian communist party was slow to gain members; the communist party was typically viewed by Kosovo Albanians as 'a Serb or Slav entity,' rather than open to all Yugoslavs (Malcolm, 1998:300). Therefore, with the new constitution, Serbs dominated all levels of government. Particularly at the Municipal level and below, the same person could hold positions in both the Council and the powerful communist party People's Committee (Curtis, 1992; Hashi, 1992), thereby occupying two seats and thus further reducing ethnic representation and diversity. It can be argued that the use of one language would unify disparate groups by promoting a common understanding (Riley, 2007). However, once Serbian became the sole official language, and public use of the Albanian language was prohibited,

³⁶ The population figure of 700,000 for 1945 is an extrapolation based on 1948 census of 727,820, as Serbia was unable to conduct a census in 1941 due to war.

Kosovo Albanians were further limited in their political participation and excluded from full representation in their own communities (Palairt, 1992). This further deepened the suspicion and animosity between the ethnic groups.

It should be noted that the communist hierarchal structure was unpopular throughout much of Yugoslavia (Benson: 2001; Glenny, 1999) including Kosovo, and especially in the small rural villages and hamlets³⁷. There, an elder was selected to serve as mayor by the village assembly. This was a remnant of Ottoman era consensus building arrangements that were relatively efficient (Sevic, 2000). In contrast, under communism local governance was nearly a straight line from the Federal level in Belgrade to the community: Federal law was directed from Belgrade to the Republic level, where laws were promulgated at the municipal level. The municipality subsequently delegated enforcement of the laws to selected offices along with the minimum necessary authority to enforce them. In this way the municipality acted as an extension of the Central government, rather than an autonomous local administrative unit (ibid). As a result, much of the local civil administrative activity in Kosovo, such as resolution of land disputes and sale of personal property, would become a federal matter which would often favor Kosovo Serbs (Dimitrijevic, 1994), rather than be addressed locally. Ultimately, the communist system undermined and replaced the existing community and social structure, but failed to promote either confidence or loyalty to the municipal or federal government (ibid). This rigid governance framework continued until the termination of relations between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia in late 1949, when it was replaced by a succession of more decentralized systems (Benson, 2001; Sevic, 2000) that eroded unity and further decreased confidence in the federal government by the local community.

³⁷ The Ottoman Vilayet system of governance was still common in rural villages. The traditional patriarchal clan or family structures with common family lands, '*Zadruzas*,' were typical of all ethnic groups of the rural populace.

4.4 Yugoslavia's break with Soviet Russia

By 1946 Kosovo was part of the same farm land collectivization plans underway throughout Yugoslavia. The Federation-wide plans were permanently altered however, when Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia severed their political and economic relations (Glenny, 1999; Lampe, 2000). Tito's unique federation of equal republics, with oversight by locally elected representatives in the (local) communist People's Committees³⁸ had been a significant departure from centrally directed Soviet communism. However, it was Tito's refusal to abandon his regional Yugoslav aspirations and bring Yugoslavia more in line with the Soviet system (Benson, 2001:92), to become another "extracted-resource satellite for Soviet Russia [that] was unprecedented and intolerable" to Stalin (Glenny, 1999:534). Tito's refusal permanently damaged relations between Yugoslavia and Soviet Russia. In 1948 Stalin expelled Tito and Yugoslavia from the Cominform³⁹ (Benson, 2001:93; Judah, 2000), and ceased all military support and economic transactions with Yugoslavia (Curtis, 1992:48). This included refusal to deliver the post-war reconstruction materials and equipment that Yugoslavia had paid for in advance (Lampe, 2000:246). Stalin imposed punishing embargos and sanctions to halt Yugoslav trade with the Soviet Union or with its satellites and directed the Soviet Army to conduct military maneuvers in the countries on the Yugoslav borders⁴⁰ (Curtis, 1992:44; Gulyas, 2014:131). This threatened Yugoslavia and her neighbors, which led to renewed militarism in Yugoslav politics, its economy and in its foreign relations⁴¹ (Benson, 2001; Lampe, 2000:254).

³⁸ Peoples' Committee members were elected by the local membership by secret ballot to one to four year rotating positions; the committee structure was intended to facilitate the municipality to become economically and politically self governing (Djordjevic, 1953:189, 195; Petrovich, 1947:524).

³⁹ The Communist Information Bureau, comprised of communist party representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and led by the Soviet Union (Yugoslavia was expelled in 1948). The Cominform provided unified communist propaganda and direction (Curtis, 1992: 321).

⁴⁰ Bulgaria and Romania

⁴¹ The former Allied Powers and the United States in particular, welcomed the opportunity to assist Yugoslavia as a means to indirectly confront the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Benson, 2001:94; Heuser, 1989).

At the same time, Stalin openly increased his political and economic support for Albania at the expense of Yugoslavia (Kaser, 2013:179), which further increased animosity toward Kosovo Albanians (Malcolm, 1998:319). Trade between these two countries fundamentally ceased when Tito accepted Western aid⁴² to avoid Yugoslavia's financial collapse. By the end of 1949 Yugoslavia was politically and economically isolated from the Soviet Union, its satellites, and neighboring Albania. As a result, Tito abandoned rigid adherence to Soviet Russia's model and "reinterpreted" Marxist doctrine to restructure the Yugoslav economy, forming the distinctive Yugoslav system of economic self-management (Lampe, 2000:233).

4.4.1 Yugoslavia's Self-Management

The Yugoslav Self-Management was a new political as well as a new economic system, couched in terms of "a greater Socialist Consciousness that would supersede National Consciousness" (Mertus, 1999:289; also Curtis, 1992:69; Hashi, 1992). Although remaining a communist dictatorship, Yugoslav self-management diverged from the Soviet communist authoritarian model in three critical ways. The first of these was decentralized governance: The Republics would have substantially greater direct control over their internal administrative operations as well as those of their Municipalities,' although Tito personally continued to have veto and overall control of the Republics activities. Likewise, the Municipalities gained an increased control of their responsibilities. The second difference was a withdrawal of direct involvement by the central communist party at the Municipal level. The third difference was a liberalization, and the introduction of market or "capitalist" strategies, to improve the productivity and efficiency of state and social enterprises, particularly by promoting worker's ownership in their sources of employment. In total, the self-management changes were intended to stabilize and stimulate Yugoslavia's economy by promoting regional resource and infrastructure strengths,

⁴² Hoxha pursued a hardline communism, including no economic contact with the capitalist West. Tito's acceptance of Western aid was an ideological affront to Hoxha's absolutist position; Hoxha subsequently ceased all relations with Tito and Yugoslavia.

while maintaining ideological direction by the central party. The effect however, was to politicize industry and revive nationalism.

The increased nationalism that emerged by the delegation of central government operations to the Republic was particularly evident in the Republic of Serbia. Serbia was already first among equals by containing both the capitol of Yugoslavia, Belgrade and the center of the communist party, the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. Serb proximity and closeness to the central government also gave the Republic of Serbia an advantage, and Serbs were soon over represented in all levels of the Yugoslav government⁴³ (Curtis, 1992). Serb dominance in government likewise extended to the two less developed provinces, where the antagonistic history between Serbia and Vojvodina, and Serbia and Kosovo, was often enough justification for ethnically repressive central planning (Lampe & Jackson, 1982; Malcolm, 1998).

4.4.2 Systemic Exclusion in Kosovo

The years between 1946 and 1953, particularly those post-1950, were filled with many of the same demands for rapid growth and industrialization in Kosovo that were already taking place throughout Yugoslavia⁴⁴. Yet, the majority of political changes were often negative for Kosovo Albanians. It was during this time that Kosovo Albanians gained a recognized education system which permitted use of their language in government funded schools (Malcolm, 1998), however the primary use of Albanian would prove to significantly limit social, political and economic opportunities in the future.

In addition until 1953, Kosovo's legal status as a Region meant its local governance continued to be closely directed by the Republic of Serbia. As noted earlier, local administration, including

⁴³ Serb dominance in all levels of politics and governance was a source of contention with the non-Serb republics. Particularly with regard to the less developed regions, Serbia received federal investment monies intended for the economic development of Kosovo and Vojvodina, but was not subsequently obliged to invest in the provinces or be accountable for its use; the Federal development funds were not invested in Kosovo until 1947; significant development was postponed until 1957.

⁴⁴ Kosovo's economic growth and development are discussed in Chapter 5

the judiciary, was conducted through the municipality bureaus and offices, most of which were run by Serb and Kosovo Serb officials. As a result, Kosovo Serbs typically received preferential treatment and adjudication in civil matters (Dimitrijevic, 1994:20). Moreover, the communist party could tighten its demands on local government and civil organizations informally, rather than officially as it had through the People's Committees in the past. In this way, the local communist party would pressure for the hiring of its preferred candidates for government positions, and hence political acceptability to the party became the primary selection criteria for civil employment. Yet even as participation in the Communist Party⁴⁵ offered access, the number of Kosovo Albanian communists remained very small. As a result, Kosovo Albanians continued to be a minority in government leadership and had limited influence in their own affairs.

Under self-management, the Peoples' Committee was no longer a direct part of the municipal government, but was teamed with the Serb secret police *UBDa*⁴⁶ by the central government. These organizations aggressively searched for pro-Soviet communists, and potential and suspected Albanian irredentists throughout Kosovo. Individuals and groups were often accused of false and trumped up charges to make public examples of them and to prevent the emergence of a pro-Albania movement. Punishment ranged from long jail sentences, to years of hard labor, to execution (Mertus, 1999:290). In addition, religious schools, especially Islamic schools, and religious organizations were banned (Curtis, 1992:107), while Kosovo Albanians were encouraged to declare themselves Turks and emigrate to Turkey under a special Yugoslavia-Turkic arrangement in 1951 (Lampe, 2000; Malcolm, 1998:323) whereby some 34,500 Kosovo Albanians emigrated. With the Kosovo Albanians gone, ethnic Serbs and

⁴⁵ The Communist Party was still seen as a primarily Serb-benefitting organization, thus Albanians had little interest to join.

⁴⁶ The State Security Service, UBDA, was the Yugoslav secret police. It was known for its brutality, particularly against the Kosovo Albanians while under Aleksandar Ranković, Minister of the Interior from 1945-1966. UBDA was overwhelmingly Serb, especially Serb peasants and former Partisans; the UBDA was comprised of less than 15% ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, a source of contention Kosovo-wide.

Macedonians were given preferential assistance to encourage their relocation to Kosovo, especially especially among former Partesans. This not only reduced the likelihood of Kosovo Albanian's return, and but also marginalized those Albanians who had remained.

4.5 Revision to Yugoslavia's Constitution

The 1953 update to the Yugoslav Constitution "so radically changed the law that it is almost considered to be a new Constitution entirely" (Mertus, 1999:289). Specifically, revisions were initiated to promote increased self-governance at the Republic level, which had successive though unintended, adverse outcomes for the Kosovo Albanians. First, the new Constitution redefined the functions of Federal and Communist Party; and secondly, in conjunction with the first, it further delegated its governing authority to the Republics and Municipalities (Curtis,1992).

The first revision was to separate the functions of the Republic and Municipality. The primary strategy was to diffuse the authority of the Republic through the establishment of small, self-governing communities, known as communes⁴⁷ (Benson, 2001; Curtis, 1992; Trifunovska, 1994; Vratusa, 1961). The commune was much smaller than the municipality, and each Republic contained several hundred of them⁴⁸ (Benson, 2001; Curtis, 1992). They held "every political authority not specifically delegated to government at the federal or Republic level" (Curtis, 1992). Each commune contained a source of employment,⁴⁹ cultural, education and health services, as well as control of the local utilities and local planning (Vratusa, 1961). Law enforcement and elections were maintained at the larger municipal level, while defense remained at the national level.

⁴⁷ Communes were self-governing local communities; most would merge into the larger municipalities. The Commune initially contained its own political chamber, elected by popular vote, and the Chamber of Producers, formed of representatives of the Workers Councils.

⁴⁸ Benson cites over 400 communes in some Republics; Curtis states over 500 communes by 1988.

⁴⁹ Employment was typically a local factory or cooperative.

The Commune system unintentionally marginalized Kosovo Albanians. In Kosovo, Serbs still “held over 50 percent of the party positions, and 68 percent of the administrative and leading [government] positions, ... and were 50 percent of the factory workers” (Malcolm, 1998:323), despite comprising a population of just 27 percent of the Province. Thus, the Commune with its smaller population and economic capacity, had the effect of fragmenting and reducing both overall political representation and economic opportunity for the Kosovo Albanians, while strengthening the Kosovo Serb political and economic advantage.

A significant new responsibility for the Commune was to identify suitable representatives and provide a consolidated list of candidates for higher government offices, as well as the Commune itself, which would be subsequently vetted by the local communist party. Hence, the commune did not have real administrative authority over its hires, resulting in government organizations filled by politically appropriate candidates, the majority of them ethnically Serb. While this process was not limited to Kosovo, or even to local government, the comparatively small number of Kosovo Albanian candidates acceptable to the communist party, in addition to separation by language, ensured their near-absence in influential government offices (Malcolm, 1998).

At the same time, the responsibility of Peoples Committee’s increased to include ensuring unconditional loyalty to the communist Party, and “ ... a growing obsession with hunting for [irredentism and] weapons among Kosovo Albanians” (Malcolm, 1998:321). Through *UBDA*, Kosovo Albanian men were increasingly detained, interrogated, and beaten; or jailed on fictitious charges (*ibid.*). The escalating security directives were fostered by Aleksandar Ranković, a hardline Serb nationalist, and Tito’s second in command. Ranković was the director of the Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior until 1966⁵⁰ when he was dismissed for ‘discriminatory

⁵⁰ Ranković was relieved of his position and authority for abuse of power when it was discovered members of Tito’s senior staff and officers were wire tapped without Tito’s knowledge.

and illegal practices” (Mertus, 1998:290). However, it was only the official discrimination against Kosovo Albanians that ended when he was removed from office.

4.5.1 Relative Autonomy in Kosovo

Kosovo Albanians gained a series of new civil freedoms and authorities during the 1960’s. First among them was its designation as a “social-political community”,⁵¹ with significant autonomy of governance down to the local level. This granted Kosovo virtually all of the rights of a Republic (Benson, 2001). In 1967 Tito personally directed that Kosovo Albanians be allowed increased admission to the Serb-controlled Kosovo government, including hiring for civil and industry positions (Malcolm, 1998:324); they may be permitted to establish local laws and judiciary,⁵² and to receive Albanian language education to the university level⁵³. Kosovo Albanians soon began to join the communist party and eventually gained nearly two-thirds of local administrative positions in Kosovo (Malcolm, 1998:326). In addition, the tactic of holding simultaneous office in the People’s Party and position in government office was banned to “reduce the abuse of power through bureaucratic networks” (Benson, 2001:111; Curtis, 1992:175). This allowed Kosovo Albanians to hold high party positions that had been formerly out of reach. While new laws did not change the underlying antagonistic attitudes of Serbia or of Kosovo Serbs, the laws did reduce the overtly discriminatory practices. Kosovo Albanians quickly made significant civil, cultural, economic and social progress between 1966-1974. Moreover, despite the overall widening economic gap⁵⁴ between the Yugoslav Republics and Kosovo (Bennett, 1995:61; Malcolm, 1998:237; Woodward, 1995), Kosovo itself had improved significantly. Nevertheless as Malcolm reminds, this suite of gains and improvements was a

⁵¹ ‘Social-political communities’ is the same verbiage used to legally define the Republics.

⁵² Kosovo’s internal laws could not conflict with Federal law, or legislative direction of the Republic of Serbia, but were otherwise permissible.

⁵³ Use of the Albanian language, especially in education, became a linguistic ceiling as Albanian is not widely spoken outside of Kosovo and Albania.

⁵⁴ Among the greatest criticisms of the economic gap was the rise in the Kosovo Albanian population, though more typical of the high rural birthrates that are shared throughout the Balkans, than a concerted political strategy to push out Serbs (Malcolm, 1998:331; Pavlovic, 2013:52).

response to feared outcomes of the continued uneven political and economic conditions in Yugoslavia, rather than a national will to elevate the social and civil rights of Kosovo Albanians (Curtis, 1992; Malcolm, 1998:325) .

4.6 The 1974 Yugoslav Constitution

The period between the adoption of the Yugoslav constitution in 1974 and Tito's death in 1981 is one of contrasts. First, the 1974 revision to the Yugoslav Constitution gave Kosovo increased legal authority⁵⁵, including a veto over Federal and Serbia's lawmaking. This gave it nearly the same capability as a Republic (Dimitrijevic, 1994:17). However, this new right was given primarily to reduce the Republic of Serbia's dominance in Yugoslav politics (Johnson, 1974) rather than to benefit Kosovo.

At the same time, the increased autonomy also brought additional demands by Kosovo Albanians for Kosovo to be legally recognized as a Republic. Whereas it is unlikely that Kosovo Albanians would have had serious intent to join Albania, Kosovo Albanians continued press for full status as a Republic led many in Yugoslavia to believe that Republic status was only the next step toward secession. Consequently, the increased freedoms and gains promulgated by the 1974 Constitution, particularly freedom of the media and political expression, were tempered by closer scrutiny for evidence of Kosovo Albanian nationalism, and especially irredentism (Johnson, 1974; Lampe, 2000), which in turn, began a gradual reversal of the substantive civil protections recently granted to Kosovo Albanians.

Significantly, the 1974 constitution attempted to rein in growing nationalism throughout Yugoslavia with two decrees. The first was a further devolution of the administration of political and economic (industrial) activities, already at the sub-municipality or commune level, to be managed through local worker's boards and committees. The second decree was a reduction in

⁵⁵ Kosovo was not given the Republic's "Right of secession," but was a Republic in all but the name (Pavlovic, 2013:56)

the number of Republic level representatives that could be nominated to become delegates to the communist party, a strategic consolidation of federal power (Lampe, 2000). As active political membership in government and industry by Kosovo Albanians was already proportionately small, Kosovo Albanians were essentially marginalized in both the political and economic arenas⁵⁶.

Contributing to the rise in nationalism was Yugoslavia's struggle with the effects of its centralized and heavy industry economy; meeting its debt obligations and the internal pressures of high unemployment. Especially in Kosovo, the rate of young adults entering the workforce could not be absorbed by the market (Mertus, 1999). The aforementioned use of Albanian language in public education made finding work outside of Kosovo extremely difficult, especially as Kosovo Albanians within Kosovo competed with Kosovo Serbs, who were often less qualified, for the same positions (Lampe & Jackson, 1982; Mertus, 1999). Moreover, advanced education⁵⁷ delayed Albanian youths' entry into the workforce, severely overcrowding schools and universities as a result.

4.7 Post-Tito Yugoslavia and Rise of Slobodan Milošević

In March 1981, barely a year after Tito's death, students at the University of Pristina protested their poor and overcrowded living conditions. Protests as well as riots erupted again two weeks later at both the University of Pristina and University of Prizren. These and later protests became violent. Less than a week later, thousands of "civil servants, teachers, miners, factory workers, students and others also took to the streets" to protest for better conditions for Kosovo Albanians in Kosovo (Mertus, 1999:30). The government response was tear gas; tanks, and the mobilization of some 30,000 JNA soldiers to patrol the streets, and, the declaration of a

⁵⁶ Kosovo Albanians continued to hold some offices, but any substantive influence was reduced, especially outside Kosovo.

⁵⁷ Mertus also notes the curriculum was predominantly liberal arts, especially Albanian History, further limiting employment opportunities.

State of Emergency. These measures were followed by a wide sacking of Kosovo Albanian leaders in civil service positions. Many Kosovo Albanians in senior leadership positions were replaced by Serbs that had held similar positions under Ranković (ibid:42).

4.7.1 Revocation of Autonomy

From the early 1980's forward, Kosovo Albanians and Kosov Serbs lived in a growing apartheid. Sanctioned government hostility toward Kosovo Albanians strained years-long relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. As Clark reminds,"any gesture of friendship was perceived as treason against one's own community" (Clark, 2000: 77). Pro-Serb and anti-Albanian propaganda spread throughout Kosovo, and both sides accused the other of harassment and human rights' abuses.

In 1986, Kosovo Serbs formally demanded the federal government's protection from the Kosovo Albanians (Mertus, 1999:294; Malcolm, 1998:339). In mid-1989 Slobodan Milošević, an ambitious hardline Serb politician, became the President of the Office of the Presidency, then elected President of the newly formed Republic of Serbia in late 1990 (del Ponte, 2002). In mid 1990 he used Kosovo Serb demands as a reason to revoke the autonomous status of its provinces and consolidated their administration into Serbia (Curtis, 1992:193), followed by an amendment to the constitution to "centralize all essential functions" to Belgrade (Mertus, 1999:295). The revocation of autonomy resulted in protests and work stoppages throughout Kosovo, whereby Milošević established 'emergency measures' which included compulsory work orders, curfews, riot police patrol and administrative detention (ibid). These temporary measures became permanent as the Yugoslav Army and para-military forces were deployed onto local military bases throughout Kosovo. The remaining Kosovo Albanian civil servants and government employees, including educators and medical professionals, were also removed from their positions. Kosovo Albanians soon established a "parallel government" to provide

these services for themselves, funded by a “voluntary tax” on themselves and Kosovo Albanian diaspora.

4.7.2 Emergence of the Kosovo Liberation Army

Dr. Ibrahim Rugova, a popular political writer, was elected President by the dissolved Kosovo Assembly to lead the parallel government, the *Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK)*, in 1992 (Morina, 2011:24). He promoted a non-violent position against the Yugoslav government, in part because the Kosovo Albanians had no meaningful defence against the predominantly Serb police and military, but also as a means to gain international attention and legitimacy to its political situation. This strategy appeared largely successful until 1995, when the Dayton Agreement ending the war between Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Serbia failed to include Serbian violence against Kosovo Albanians in its negotiations (ibid:31). The absence of Kosovo from the Dayton negotiations delegitimized the passive resistance movement. In its place, a loose paramilitary group of a few hundred men formed, calling themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, as Kosovo Albanians now came to believe violence would be the only means to achieve independence from Serbia.

The KLA, also known as UÇK, *Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës*, remained a relatively small and unknown group of clans, family members and friends united in a common cause until 1997, when Albania’s economy and government collapsed due to financial malfeasance⁵⁸. Military arsenals and weapon depots that had been established throughout Albania by its former President Enver Hoxha, were opened by its current President Sali Berisha and Kosovo sympathizers. The weapons depots were looted and sold for cash (Abrahams, 2015:254; Judah, 2008), led by a network of individuals with suspected ties to organized crime. The KLA had become increasingly violent, however the climate of continued violence against Kosovo

⁵⁸ Albania’s economy collapsed when pyramid schemes involving Albanian banks, including the State bank, Bank of Albania, and key Albanian industries defaulted on their investors nearly simultaneously (Jarvis, 2000).

Albanians by the Yugoslav Army and paramilitary MUP, and easy access to cheap weapons from Albania encouraged tens of thousands of volunteers to join the KLA in the following months (Morina, 2011: 38; Perritt, 2008:41).

Especially in comparison to the professional Serb forces, the KLA was small, and virtually untrained. The KLA strategy therefore, was to conduct guerilla-style hit and run tactics in order to cause the Serb forces to overreact. It would then exploit the overreactions through international media and human rights' organizations in order to gain military assistance from NATO (NATO, 1999; Perritt, 2008). The strategy was extremely successful: stories and photos of displaced persons hiding in the snow of Kosovo mountains, and the news reports of hundreds of thousands of refugees⁵⁹ entering neighboring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro created fear of further destabilization in the Balkans and a global outrage against the increasingly hostile Serb nationalist Yugoslav Government. Eventually the strategy was rewarded with military assistance from NATO.

4.8 NATO Intervention and Support

The February-March 1999 negotiations at Rambouillet Chateau, France, between Yugoslavia and NATO members to stop the 'ethnic cleansing' in Kosovo failed. Yugoslav forces' action against the Kosovo Albanians accelerated and resulted in an unmanageable wave of refugees into Macedonia and Albania. On 23 March 1999 NATO was given the order to commence airstrikes against select military targets (NATO, 1999). Milošević's escalation of hostilities against Kosovo Albanians and continued intransigence led to 78 days of bombing Yugoslavia, including inside Kosovo. Over 38,000 sorties were conducted between March and June 1999 (OSCE, 2003). Bombing paused on 9 June with the capitulation of Milošević in Belgrade upon the signature of the Military Technical Agreement, and was suspended on 10 June with

⁵⁹ In the weeks leading to the start of the war in 1999, approximately 90% of the Kosovo Albanian population was estimated to have been displaced by Yugoslav forces (Wentz, 2002:21).

confirmation of the withdrawal of Serb tanks and armed forces from Kosovo. UN Resolution 1244 adopted the next day allowed NATO forces to enter Yugoslavia. The first NATO Kosovo Forces, (KFOR) entered Kosovo from Albania on 12 June 1999 (ibid). Barely 24 hours later, over 400,000 Kosovo Albanian refugees begin to return to their villages, while some 200,000 Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins began to leave Kosovo in anticipation of retribution (ibid.)

As NATO forces moved into Kosovo, Serb forces retreated; the victorious KLA entered Pristina, Prizren and other significant urban areas, and occupied the primary government buildings, apartment blocks, hotels and other properties, often violently displacing the legal owners. The KLA also installed its own members in key government and civil leadership positions, and made demands for financial support from the local population (Interview 73). Soon afterward, the KLA began a system of intimidation and killing, especially of Rugova's LDK party members; those Kosovo Albanians that had protested their activities, or those individuals and families the KLA believed had not been sufficiently supportive during the war (Human Rights Watch, 2001; International Crisis Group, 1999; Interview 73). Forceful intimidation inhibited any significant objections to the KLA's activities by the community⁶⁰. The near-absence of law enforcement, and KFOR's initial rules of engagement preventing military forces from taking action against criminal activity, allowed former KLA soldiers and organized crime to prey on the local communities (International Crisis Group, 1999) and made strong man governance a permanent feature in much of post conflict Kosovo (ibid).

⁶⁰ There was also likely to have been a sense of entitlement for having fought in the war.

4.9 Introduction to Military Bases in Kosovo

This section introduces military bases. It describes the functions and activities of military fortifications in history in general, and military bases in the former Yugoslavia specifically. The section also defines the intervention in Kosovo and introduces the Kosovo Forces (KFOR) and their activities, established in accordance with UNSCR 1244 and the Military Technical Agreement, MTA, after the 1999 Kosovo War (NATO, 1999; United Nations, 1999).

The earliest military bases were simple fortifications, typically walled villages and watch towers, such as Jericho, Uruk and Mehrgar, which were established as early as 8,000 BC throughout Mesopotamia, south-east Europe, and the Indus Valley (Fagan, 1996; Ring, et al., 1996). These fortifications were built to protect their inhabitants from outsiders, to safeguard domesticated animals from predators, and to shelter and store harvests for later use (Hammond & Bartson, 1972). As their construction required significant commitment and resources by the community, fortifications also became indicators of wealth, social hierarchy and place identity (Bradley, 2001; Fletcher, 1996). Archeology shows that settlements often bordered walled cities to take advantage of its wealth and protection (Hammond & Bartson, 1972). Inhabitants of the walled cities and the communities surrounding them typically “paid” for their physical security with financial and military obligations (Bar-Yosef, 2001; Hammond & Bartson, 1972) forming a very early type of social contract.

Fortifications were more than a means of defense and economic opportunity. They were also a display of authority and power. Fortifications are equally a symbol of *offense*, demonstrated in two ways. First, the physical fortification itself is evidence of military capability: its size is a clear display of strength and capability demonstrated by the amount of land taken to contain its personnel and equipment. The location of its center, the citadel, also infers dominance. The citadel was typically built on the highest ground or other superior physical position to prevent surprise by potential enemies; its walls and materials were not only deliberately difficult to

breach, but were also designed in a way to channel invaders into tactically vulnerable positions once inside⁶¹.

The second, and more confrontational demonstration of offense is when the victor occupied, or built its own fortification on the defeated peoples' lands. This coercive power and ability to rule is a common theme of victory and humiliation in ancient stories and legends. Thus, for those defeated, the local fortification was much less likely to be a source of security and pride than a source of overt domination and resentment.

4.10 Military Fortifications and Bases in Yugoslavia

As a defensive measure, Yugoslav president Josip Tito had improved the larger bases established during the Second World War and introduced new ones as he strengthened the Yugoslav National Army, (*Jugoslavenska Narodna Armija, JNA*) in response to Stalin's seizure of Czechoslovakia in February 1948 (Heuser, 1987). By 1952 Yugoslavia had directed 22 percent of its Gross National Product⁶² to support its half-million strong military force (Pavković, 2000), and its military/defense industry (Curtis, 1992). The JNA appeared to have had little interaction with their civilian communities⁶³, concentrating instead drills and maneuvers in the field to maintain a high level of readiness (Pavković, 2000). The military ranks were predominantly conscripts, who would return to their communities in their home republics after their two-year obligation⁶⁴ led by a small number of professional officers who were predominantly Serbs and Montenegrins.

⁶¹ Such techniques are narrow passages, gates and dead ends which limit movement or confine assailants.

⁶² The defense industry included heavy weapons and munitions production, both major Yugoslav exports.

⁶³ Excluding those in military policing.

⁶⁴ Conscripts performed their mandatory military duties outside of their home republic. Few if any Kosovo Albanians soldiers would have been posted in Kosovo.

Yugoslavia was further militarized in 1968 following the invasion⁶⁵ of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union, whereby Tito initiated a three-part campaign for the defense of Yugoslavia, “*The Total People’s Defense*” (*Opstena vodna Odbvana, ONO*), to “make combatants of all Yugoslavs that could resist” (Dulic & Kostic, 2010:1061; Johnson, 1971:5)⁶⁶. First, he constructed a network of small bases throughout Yugoslavia⁶⁷, second, State-owned industries prepared standby plans to shift their operations to support war efforts when necessary (Dulic & Kostic, 2010:1062; Johnson, 1971:5). Third, the “Territorial Defense” or TO, forces⁶⁸ trained the Yugoslavia populace to mobilize themselves and to take arms against aggressors (Curtis, 1992). Even children learned of their martial responsibilities in the “Young Pioneers” program in primary school⁶⁹ (Kostovicova, 2005:40; also Dulic & Kostic, 2010; Erdei, 2006). The *ONO* campaign was abandoned soon after Tito’s death in 1980 and most of the military facilities fell into disrepair. Nevertheless, as federal conscription had been in place since 1948, and each of the six Yugoslav constituent republics and the two autonomous republics had had some version of its own TO forces, the military was undoubtedly very familiar to Kosovo’s population at the time of the 1999 Kosovo war (Curtis, 1992; Dulic & Kostic, 2010).

4.10.1 Military Bases under Milošević

In the late 1980’s, then-President Slobodan Milošević restored the larger camps to train the JNA and a new paramilitary force under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, *Ministarstvo Unutrasnija Polsova*, (MUP). The MUP was used extensively to control of the Kosovo Albanian populace

⁶⁵ Yugoslavia’s fears were already raised by the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary. While Czechoslovakia had been governed by a communist party loosely supported by the Soviet Union, the failure of the 1968 coup for greater democracy led the Soviet Union to oust and replace the Czechoslovakian communist party with its own, completely folding Czechoslovakia into the Soviet Union.

⁶⁶ Tito understood the JNA was no match for the Soviet Army in a surprise attack. However, he believed the TO could hold it off long enough for the JNA to mobilize and reach the fight (Johnson, 1971).

⁶⁷ Commune/Municipality based units were approximately 500 community members (Johnson, 1971).

⁶⁸ The TO was mix of JNA soldiers, reservists that had completed their two-year conscription and civilians; both women and men, from ages of 15 to 65, were required to join the TO (Pavković, 2000).

⁶⁹ The declared intent of the Young Pioneers was to bring all Slavic people together in a united Yugoslav identity, rather than to specifically militarize children. The Young Pioneers and Total People’s Defense were also a part of the wider effort to deepen commitment to Socialist ideals (Erdei, 2006)

(Sreckovic, 2010). The JNA was a disciplined and well-respected Yugoslav institution (Curtis, 1992; Human Rights Watch, 2001), while the MUP was less professional and antagonistic (ibid). Particularly in Kosovo, where the MUP was especially oppressive, their use of the former TO bases was viewed as Serb occupation (Interviews 35, 74).

4.11 Modern Characteristics of the Military Base in Peace Operations

Military fortifications, better known today as bases are, fundamentally, secured areas for the exclusive use of military forces to perform and sustain their military, and military support operations. Title 10 U.S. Code § 2801 provides a general definition of the contemporary usage of a military installation:

“the term ‘military installation’ means a base, camp, post, station, yard, center, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of a military department or ... under the operational control of the Secretary of a military department or the Secretary of Defense, without regard to the duration of operational control” (Cornell University, 1992).

While the terms base and camp tend to be defined interchangeably, historically, *bases* are permanent facilities, while *camps* are considered to be temporary, even if such camps are in use for several decades. These terms are consistent for military land, air and sea⁷⁰ facilities. Bases also tend to possess similar minimum infrastructure: housing for personnel; facilities for dining, medical treatment and recreation; offices and other work areas; training areas, and maintenance and storage areas. Depending upon the mission requirements, they may also contain weapon practice ranges, hospitals, detention facilities, port facilities, and helipads and/or airfields, all of which are excluded from public use and protected by armed personnel.

⁷⁰ Naval bases are often referred to as ‘Stations’ when combined with an airfield, and are named after their home city, e.g. Yeovilton Naval Air Station in the UK, Pensacola Naval Air Station, in the US.

Military bases established to support peace operations, especially since the mid-1990's, have added a new dimension to the relationship between the base and local community, as the occupants of the base are often viewed as liberators, rather than oppressors. This is particularly so in the Balkans where there is little doubt the arrival of intervening NATO forces was welcomed by many on the ground. However, some in the academic community view such interventions and the establishment of bases as hardly more than a new form of neo-colonialism; a breach of national territory and gross affront to sovereignty (Duffield, 2011; Johnson, 2000; Mertus, 2001; Shimibuku, 2014; Sreckovic, 2010). These 'intervention' bases increasingly blur the lines between military interventions for humanitarian purposes and humanitarian activities within a military environment⁷¹. Moreover, their use of existing bases is described as merely the "possession of territory with concealed political motives" (Duffield, 2011; Sreckovic, 2010).

While the rationale for intervention is complex and often politically contentious, victors of war have historically occupied existing fortifications, and there are several practical reasons for doing so. First, the base tends to be located on comparatively elevated ground, which provides better views of the countryside and roadways, and are better suited for communications equipment (Army, 1958; Anderson, et al., 2014). Secondly, the occupation of existing military bases reduces competition for the use of remaining serviceable buildings, a frequent complaint against international intervenors, and it lessens use of industrial facilities, (farm)land or other scarce resources that would otherwise be taken and used for a new base in the post-conflict environment (Army, 1958; Anderson, et al., 2014). The earliest arriving KFOR forces therefore purposely occupied former JNA bases when possible, and in so doing, they occupied fewer of

⁷¹ Although this research fills a gap in literature concerning the effects of everyday practices of establishing a military base in a post conflict environment, it does not take a specific position on the political decisions made, or with the appropriateness of the military base itself.

the office buildings, hotels, factories or similar facilities that had survived bombing, looting and vandalism.

Thirdly, occupation of military bases by victorious militaries denies their use by others, and sends a powerful political message to former belligerents. Ultimately, however, the use of existing military bases by victorious forces is practical: the bases have been *specifically built* for a military purpose, hence they already contain the necessary barracks, training and assembly areas, defensive positions and secured weapons and ammunition storage (Anderson, et al., 2014: 43). Therefore, the primary advantage to using existing bases is simply the significant reduction of time necessary for military forces to become fully operational.

4.12 Post-conflict Military Bases and Law Enforcement

While military bases are generally similar in function, bases that have been established in recent post-conflict environments often perform additional and at times, controversial activities. These activities include law enforcement, civilian detention, and prison support operations. As an example, while the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) was ultimately responsible for civil law enforcement through the UN civilian police (CIVPOL) through the terms of UNSCR 1244 (Jones, et al., 2005:27) Kosovo's civil policing activities were almost exclusively conducted by KFOR military forces for months, as UNMIK and the police necessary for CIVPOL were slow to deploy into Kosovo (ibid:33), and despite law enforcement being a task outside of the authority and responsibility of military police. Moreover, KFOR continued to actively reinforce UNMIK and local police for several more years: international paramilitary forces,' the Italian Carabinieri, French Gendarmerie and Netherlands Marechaussée also performed these duties (Etchemedy, 2010; UNMIK, 1999; Wentz, 2002) until UNMIK was sufficiently staffed and a viable police force was established. This tasking of military and paramilitary police to perform civilian law enforcement duties was not only the result of the too-slow buildup of a new professional police force, but also an unforeseen absence of existing

capable and trained police in Kosovo (Commission, 2000:7; Garcia-Orrico, 2009; Judah, 2002; UNMIK, 1999; Interview 27).

A second contentious activity performed by military bases in Kosovo was the operation of confinement and prison facilities. Yugoslavia's prisons were typically collocated with military and para-military bases, and many had been damaged during the NATO bombing campaign to destroy the bases (McClure, 2000:72; Wentz, 2003:237). Given that each of the Multi-National Brigade operational areas contained numerous damaged prison facilities, the lead nation of that Brigade area was directed to manage a temporary detention facility inside its base⁷². Then, as Wentz finds, the lack of prison facilities was [further] exacerbated by the lack of a trained civilian police force to turn prisoners over to (Wentz, 2003:247). Therefore, contrary to its own guidelines, KFOR operated, and then extended, several of the its temporary facilities and expanded others to serve as civil confinement facilities, or prisons for nearly a decade. The final KFOR detention facility, located at US Camp Bondsteel, closed in mid-2008 (Kramer, 2012).

4.13 Military Intervention in Kosovo

4.13.1 Operation ALLIED FORCE

The memories of UN failures to protect civilians in Bosnia (1992-1996) and Rwanda (1994) were undoubtedly still fresh in 1998 (Kosovo, 2000; Sreckovic, 2010; Weiss, 2007), as the JNA and MUP were systematically terrorizing and killing Kosovo Albanians (Caplan, 1998; Commission, 2000; Shea, 1999; Human Rights Watch, 2001). Provocative actions by the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, along Kosovo's border with Albania and Macedonia, (Caplan, 1998; Garcia-Orrico, 2010) and the tens of thousands of Kosovo Albanian refugees pouring into neighboring Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia severely strained the capabilities of these countries (Morris, 1999;

⁷² Wentz states the prisons in Ferizaj and Gjilan were small and in particularly poor condition, likely the same conditions applied throughout Kosovo. Civilians accused of serious crimes and Serbs (for their protection) detained for interviews and hearings were temporarily housed at the Camp Bondsteel detention facility until suitable civilian facilities could be established, 1,800 the first year (Wentz, 2003:247).

ReliefWeb, 2000). The enormous number of refugees greatly raised NATO and UN fears that the violence would spread outside of the Balkans (UNMIK, 1999; Wentz, 2002). Thus, Milošević's continued refusal to cease the "ethnic cleansing" of ethnic Albanians and non-Serb minorities in Kosovo, despite nearly a year of negotiation, international sanctions and demands, triggered the UN to invoke Chapter VII⁷³ to authorize military action, and led to Operation ALLIED FORCE. Initially planned as a short air campaign, Operation ALLIED FORCE began operations 24 March 1999, intending to bomb only pre-selected Serb air bases. The objectives⁷⁴ of the air campaign were for Milošević to:

- Ensures a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression
- Ensures the withdrawal from Kosovo of the military, police and paramilitary forces
- Agrees to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence
- Agrees to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organizations
- Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work on the basis of the Rambouillet Accords in the establishment of a political framework agreement for Kosovo in conformity with international law and the Charter of the United Nations.

The bombing was naively expected to force the end of almost seven years of fighting in the Balkans and decades of hostility in Kosovo in just a few weeks (Commission, 2000; Schuster, 2014). Milošević continued to defy the international community; the well trained JNA with recent combat experience gained from fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia proved to be surprisingly difficult for NATO aircraft to locate, pin and defeat. In response, NATO first

⁷³ The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) broadened its interpretation of Chapter VII in 1999. This specifically authorized the UN to intervene in Kosovo with force on matters "related to action with respect to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression" to prevent the spread of violence and conflict, despite its affront to Serbia's sovereignty and valid legal arguments by Russia and other UN members. The International Commission of State Sovereignty and International Commission on Kosovo both acknowledged the tension between the humanitarian need and Serbia's sovereignty, stating "the NATO military intervention (in Kosovo) was illegal, but legitimate."

⁷⁴ The concurrent military goals were to deter further Serbian attacks against the people of Kosovo; reduce the ability of the Serbian military forces to continue their offensive operations against the people of Kosovo and degrade Serbian air defense systems to reduce the risk and threat to NATO aircraft and crews (Global Security, 2013).

increased the number of sorties against Serbia's military forces, and then extended its target list to include land bases, military equipment parks, and finally, Serbia's critical infrastructure, such as key bridges, telecommunication sites and oil refineries (GlobalSecurity, 2013; Sreckovic, 2010). The air campaign ceased when Milošević was unequivocally confronted with continued NATO bombing and further destruction of Belgrade (Wentz, 2002). Faced with his growing unpopularity and loss of influence over the JNA, on 9 June 1999, Milošević finally agreed to withdraw the JNA and all para-military forces from Kosovo. This ended NATO's air campaign of 78 days and over 38,000 air sorties (Security, 2013; Wentz, 2002).

4.13.2 Operation JOINT GUARDIAN

With the adoption of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 on 9 June 1999, and the Military-Technical Agreement (MTA) the next day, the NATO-led Kosovo Forces (KFOR), were directed to undertake the overarching security responsibilities as Operation JOINT GUARDIAN under Chapter VII⁷⁵ of the Charter of the United Nations (NATO, 1999):

- Deterring renewed hostilities, maintaining and where necessary enforcing a ceasefire, and ensuring the withdrawal and preventing the return into Kosovo of Federal and Republic military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Demilitarizing the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and other armed Kosovo Albanian groups;
- Establishing a secure environment in which refugees and displaced persons can return home in safety, the international civil presence can operate, a transitional administration can be established, and humanitarian aid can be delivered;
- Ensuring public safety and order until the international civil presence can take responsibility for this task;
- Supervising demining until the international civil presence can, as appropriate, take over responsibility for this task;
- Supporting, as appropriate, and coordinating closely with the work of the international civil presence;
- Conducting border monitoring duties as required;
- Ensuring the protection and freedom of movement of itself, the international civil presence, and other international organizations.

⁷⁵ Chapter VII allows use of armed forces for "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression" (United Nations, 1945)

The specifically directed MTA security tasks for KFOR are commonly expressed as those to ensure a “Safe and Secure Environment,” (SASE), and are derived from the task, “Establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order.” They include:

- Assistance with the return or relocation of displaced persons and refugees, including escorts for minority groups
- Reconstruction and de-mining
- Medical assistance
- Security and public order, including regular patrols near minority enclaves
- Protection of patrimonial and religious sites; and heritage and culturally significant sites
- Border security, especially interdiction of cross-border weapons smuggling
- Implementation of a Kosovo-wide weapons, ammunition and explosives amnesty program and weapons destruction
- Support for the establishment of civilian institutions: law and order, the judicial and penal system, the electoral process and other aspects of the political, economic and social life of Kosovo.
- Donations, including food, clothes and school supplies
- Stand down the Kosovo Protection Corps, and establish the Kosovo Security Forces
- Support the NATO advisory group to establish a civilian-led organization to control the Kosovo Security Forces

Several of these responsibilities, particularly military assistance to returning displaced persons, were greatly reduced or discontinued by mid-2000. Other tasks such as demining, medical assistance, protection of religious and culturally significant sites, reconstruction and management of donations are now only performed in a secondary or tertiary support role as Kosovo’s stability and civil capacity to perform these have increased.

4.14 KFOR’s Multinational Brigade in Practice

With the adoption of UNSCR 1244 and the MTA on 10 June 1999, Kosovo was divided into five geographically distinct operational areas, each led by the military forces of one of the principal NATO states: France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States⁷⁶ These lead

⁷⁶ The NATO website relating the history of Operation Joint Guardian in 1999 identifies four operational areas, while the accompanying map (Map 4.1) clearly indicates five. The map is correct; the five operational areas reflect the “Quint,” the five principal nations: France, Germany, Italy, UK and US, and the original order of battle of their military forces (Garcia-Orrico, 2009). See also McGrath, 2006.

NATO states were coupled with additional NATO and NATO-partner countries. Partnering was based on physical characteristics, such as military strength and capacity, as well as intangible factors, such as historical relationships, such as France and Serbia (Lampe, 2000:157). The lobbying efforts of Kosovo Albanian Diaspora, particularly in Germany and the United States, are also likely to have influenced the assignment of NATO-partners and lead nation operations areas (International Monetary Fund, 2012:21; Mockaitis, 2004; Palmer, 2010). Ultimately, 38 NATO and non-NATO countries participated in Kosovo Forces (McGrath, 2006:55). The resulting mixed-nation organizations were known as Multinational Brigades (MNB). The NATO Headquarters, located in Kosovo's capital city Pristina, was inside the United Kingdom's operational area (Wentz, 2002).

The MNB forces shared a common NATO-led military command structure and mission focus, however, especially in the earliest days, their operations varied with individual interpretation of NATO doctrine in relation to specific national caveats, variances in national military doctrine or other normal differences in the common organizational procedures of the lead and participating nations⁷⁷. Moreover, each Nation brought its own military culture, experience and prior military training to the MNB, as well as disparities in the quantity and quality of the resources that each military was provided. These factors, coupled with shifting political interests from home, contributed to inaction, frustration and unmet expectations that have been sources of both public criticism and lessons learned. Nevertheless, there was a remarkable unity of effort, in great part because the commanders themselves made the effort to work together (Wentz, 2002:407).

The Multinational Brigades that entered Kosovo in June 1999 were established in the following locations:

MNB-North: led by France, located near the majority Kosovo Serb city of Mitrovica

⁷⁷Such differences include use of the use of deadly force and roles and authority of commissioned and non-commissioned officers and enlisted personnel (Wentz, 2003).

MNB-Center: led by the United Kingdom, located near the Kosovo Albanian village of Lipjan

MNB-East: led by the United States, located near the majority Kosovo Albanian town of Ferizaj

MNB-West: led by Italy, located near the majority Kosovo Albanian city of Pec

MNB-South: led by Germany, located outside the multiethnic city of Prizren

The NATO headquarters was located in Kosovo's capital city of Pristina, within MNB-Center

Figure 4.1 and Map 4.2 shows the national contribution of uniformed military forces and location.⁷⁸

<u>Principal Nation Contributions</u>		
Military forces deployed:		
Country	11 June 1999	1 July 1999
United Kingdom	7,600	13,000
Germany	4,200	8,500
United States	1,800	7,000
France	3,100	7,000
Italy	2,300	2,300
Others	600	11,000
Total	19,600	48,800

Figure 4.1: Contribution of uniformed military forces

⁷⁸ Table and figures from GlobalSecurity: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/joint_guardian-tasks.htm



Map 4.2: June 1999 location of the five Multinational Brigades

4.15 KFOR Activities and Functions

The most visible activity performed by military forces in a post-conflict environment is patrolling, both on foot and in vehicles (mounted). Even months after the war's end, Kosovo Albanian and Serbs continued to shoot at each other, vandalize and set fire to homes and property (Commission, 2000; McClure, 2000; Wentz, 2003). Hence, the KFOR patrols were well armed and traveled in two to four vehicle convoys to prevent or stop violence, enforcing an unfriendly peace. KFOR also led joint patrols with local police and civil law enforcement until they had completed their training and became available, eventually reversing lead roles. This joint patrolling has continued to provide a visible deterring presence and give support to local and international civil authorities.

Particularly along the remote and mountainous forested areas close to the Albanian and Macedonian borders, KFOR patrolled to interdict weapon smuggling, and deter illegal civil activities, such as harassment of minorities, tobacco and alcohol smuggling, and drug and human trafficking. Other activities performed by KFOR military patrols and combat teams varied widely and included stationary and mobile vehicle check points; cordon and search for illegal weapons and explosives; escorting minorities to markets or school; escorting returning refugees and refugee 'go and see' visits coordinated by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); protecting religious and cultural sites, and critical infrastructure; debris clearance⁷⁹, recommending road and bridge repairs and other minor infrastructure reconstruction projects, and home winterization in support of UNHCR (UNMIK, 1999).

The post-conflict literature is frequently critical of contemporary military activity, ranging from comments against risk-averse 'bunkerization,' and its over-focus on military forces' security at the expense of meaningful interaction with the populace⁸⁰ (Berdal & Ucko, 2015; Duffield, 2005; Zaalberg, 2006:335), or for its 'mission creep,' the tendency to engage in humanitarian and non-military activities outside of the military organization's core responsibility, as had occurred in Bosnia-Herzegovina (Haynes, 2010; Williams, 2005:84). Such arguments aptly reflect the tensions created by the everyday practices of maintaining 'a safe and secure environment' in Kosovo.

These critics must recall however, that military organizations often concurrently straddle their peacekeeping mandates with local needs and their own organization's capabilities on the ground in time-constrained environments, and by what is allowed by international law and permissible by national doctrine. Military leader's decisions and actions are also filtered by their

⁷⁹ KFOR often cleared roads blocked by mud, snow and ice. However, road clearing is only permissible when the road clearing sustains patrol routes; KFOR cannot clear local travel and commerce routes specifically for non-military purposes.

⁸⁰ The failure of the risk averse, standoffish posture by military forces was most recently noted in Afghanistan and Iraq. It has been improved by wider use of counterinsurgency doctrine (Petraeus, 2006).

own understanding of what is politically acceptable, globally and at home, which is typically explained by media coverage they cannot control. In these circumstances, both risk aversion and mission creep may become their best possible response.

4.16 Base Support to Military Operations

Base support for military operations can be best understood as two separate, but interrelated systems, base *administration* and base *sustainment*, which may include the employment of local civilians and purchasing from local businesses. It must be noted that while much of the terminology and activities in this section are US-specific, the general concept of base support is relevant for all military bases.

4.16.1 Employment of Local Civilians

The US Installation Management Command divides base administration into three service areas: Base Infrastructure (including grounds maintenance, consumable supplies, medical facilities, roads); Natural Infrastructure (training areas and ranges, air space, energy and water); and, Services (human resources, housing, food service, security services, laundry) (IMCOM, 2014). Base administration and base sustainment activities may be performed by either military or civilian personnel, or a combination.

o Base Administration -- Highly skilled and educated local civilians typically support base administration in select positions which require cultural and regionally appropriate technical knowledge, including cultural and political advising to senior leaders; interpretation of national and local codes or regulations, particularly for local architecture, design, or an analysis of construction methods (Army, 1958; Interview 43). The number of local civilians working in base administration is low.

o Base Sustainment -- Base sustainment may be considered a subordinate, though equal and distinct function of base administration: it is the hands-on piece of base administration which

physically brings elements of the three service areas together for the end user and is typically what comes to mind as base operations, colloquially known as “life support.” These services and activities include housing allocation, dining facility operations, morale and recreation activities; military equipment issue and military equipment repair; fuel services, contracting for language services, internal base transportation, snow/ice clearing, base cleaning and minor building maintenance and are those activities that are best known for the large number of local civilians hired to perform. Each KFOR base recruits, screens and hires local personnel for services in accordance with the policies of its lead nation⁸¹. Base security, however, is consistently performed by the military or skilled security company employees⁸², a contrast with international organizations which tend to hire guards locally.

4.16.2 Local Purchasing

To sustain day-to-day operations, local purchasing may range from individual purchases for personal use, to multi-million dollar and multi-year contracts to support the entire base. Especially since the late 1990s, military bases have been organized to be as self-supporting as possible, hence modern intervening militaries have become increasingly reliant on their own forces and contractors for base supplies and material, which are imported from sources outside of the conflict area. Particularly concerning Kosovo, the lead countries had prepositioned military supplies and construction material in Albania or Macedonia to be ready for transport into their sectors when the NATO bombing ceased. As a result, with the exception of gravel and crushed stone, very little was purchased from the local community by the bases for several months. This practice likely prevented the emergence of a post-conflict ‘balloon economy,’ a condition typically caused by large numbers of peacekeeping forces and international organization personnel that purchase food, supplies and equipment, and lease the much of the

⁸¹ As example, local civilians are hired by a US contractor on the US base, while German KFOR hires directly from the community.

⁸² On US bases, contracted security is provided exclusively by US citizens; there is no comparable contracted civilian security on the German base.

remaining housing and office buildings, that is frequently noted in post-conflict literature (Ammitzball, 2007; Carnahan, et al., 2005). Although this self-sufficiency is in keeping with post-conflict economic 'best practices' it generally contributes little to the local economy when it is needed most (Natsios, 2009). A comparison and examination of base purchasing is presented more fully in the individual case studies found in later chapters.

4.17 Community Relations

Studies of military base closure note four common characteristics relative to the positive impact of the base on the community: the proportion of the local community working on the base; the base's proximity to a larger urban area; the technical expertise of workers on base, and the relationship formed between the military and community leaders. Of these, the relationship between the military and community leaders was the leading reason for success following base closure (Cowan, 2012; Dardia, et al., 1996; Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990). This assessment is congruent with post-conflict literature, where early relationships between the military and local community leaders can have lasting destructive effects when the military inadvertently sanctions informal actors who illicitly control human and material resources (Barnett & Zurcher, 2009; Cheng, 2013:64; Münch, 2013; Pugh, 2005).

Chapter 5: Kosovo's Economy

5.0 Introduction

This chapter provides a review of the economy of the former Yugoslavia. It presents an examination of the strong political and economic influence which the Soviet Union had upon the early Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, and its break from the Stalinist system in 1948, which led to Yugoslavia's unique form of communist self-management governance.

The Yugoslav government established a comprehensive investment program to address the *Nationalities Problem*, the low economic capabilities of the less developed Republics, "to become closer to that of the more developed Republics ... [because] only when the economic disparities are evened out can anything like the 'equalities of nationalities' be achieved" (Hashi, 1992:53), and to reinforce Yugoslavia's resource independence. However, these economic policies accentuated national differences; stirred secession of its wealthiest republics; civil war and ultimately, the dissolution of Yugoslavia.

This chapter is comprised of two sections: a review of key political events in Yugoslavia and Kosovo, and corresponding analysis of the economic effects of these events. It examines five major political periods in Yugoslavia where crises brought about change from the Federal to the local levels, noting their effects on Kosovo: (1) the establishment of Yugoslavia in 1946 through the 'Administrative Years' ending in 1953; (2) outcomes of the revised Yugoslav Constitution in 1974; (3) investment in Kosovo after the removal of Ranković in 1966 and growing apartheid in Kosovo until 1988, and (4) Kosovo's loss of autonomy in 1989 and return to an informal economy, and (5) economic sanctions against Serbia until the end of the war in Kosovo in 2000. Each of these periods facilitated direction changing economic decisions in response to domestic and international political crises, with consequences that were increasingly destructive to the Yugoslav federation, and damaging for Kosovo. This chapter concludes with an examination of

the significant economic decisions and events that characterized Kosovo's economic environment at the arrival of KFOR in 1999.

5.1 Establishing Communist Yugoslavia

As described in Chapter 4, Tito reformed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia⁸³ into a federation of six republics; he brought together what are today Bosnia-Herzegovina⁸⁴, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Macedonia and Montenegro. Serbia's borders also included two regions containing large non-Serb/non-Slavic speaking ethnic majorities, the autonomous ethnically Hungarian Province⁸⁵ of Vojvodina and the ethnically Albanian Region of Kosovo⁸⁶. Kosovo's population is estimated to have been just over 700,000⁸⁷ inhabitants in 1945, (Brumborg, 2002). Although ethnic Albanians comprised less than 10% of the total population of Yugoslavia, they comprised approximately 70% of Kosovo's population (ibid), and apart from its trade cities near the Albanian, Macedonian and Montenegrin borders, Kosovo was poor, and its' economy was primarily based on subsistence farming.

The 1936 Soviet Russia Constitution was the political and economic model for Tito's Yugoslavia in 1945. This model, organized around a centrally managed system to direct the government and economy from the federal to the local level, was "designed explicitly for the social and economic development of Russia" (Dyker, 1990:16).⁸⁸ Yugoslavia contained far less of its human, land, energy and natural resources (Singleton & Carter, 1982). Nevertheless, Yugoslavia

⁸³ The Balkans are generally comprised of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia and Slovenia. Greece and Turkey are also, but less commonly, considered part of the Balkans. The word 'Balkan' is Turkish for mountainous, descriptive of the region's geography.

⁸⁴ Bosnia-Herzegovina gained Republic status in 1946.

⁸⁵ According to the constitution, the populations of Vojvodina and Kosovo were not "a people," such as the Bosnians, Croats and Serbs, but were comprised of nationalities originating outside of Yugoslavia, and therefore the Yugoslav lands they occupied could not be recognized as a Republic.

⁸⁶ Kosovo was legally a 'Region,' with lesser status and governing autonomy than a Province. However, for the sake of simplicity, the term 'province' is used throughout this thesis.

⁸⁷ The population figure of 700,000 for 1945 is an extrapolation based on 1948 census of 727,820, as Serbia was unable to conduct a census in 1941 due to war.

⁸⁸ Singleton (1982) states the initial Five-Year Plan was directly based on Russia's plan for development. Tito adopted it despite Yugoslavia's land size of less than 2% of Russia's; its absence of skilled and educated labor, and a complete inability to meet its own fuel and power needs.

created a nearly identical plan; it established a powerful central government to control all of its' significant infrastructure, including media and communication, power generation/distribution, transportation and water works; major privately-owned income producing enterprises, particularly manufacturers of consumer goods; and banking and financial services (ibid).

The resulting *Five-Year Plan* was a framework based on Marxist principles to manage a nationalized economy, which was comprised of two primary sectors, agriculture and industry (Gordon, 1959). The plan developed, allocated, and directed Yugoslavia's resources to meet national production goals for the next five years. These goals were both idealistic and extremely aggressive; "overcoming technological and economic backwardness, strengthening economic and military power; eliminating disparities between Republics, improving the Yugoslav people's welfare and fostering a greater Yugoslav identity" (Curtis, 1992:125). Like the Soviet Plan, the Yugoslav plan concentrated on heavy, capital intensive industries, including military vehicles and munitions, industrial equipment manufacturing, raw material extraction and energy production. The Soviet-based Plan also required collectivized agriculture, and greatly de-emphasized the use and production of consumer goods, including basic foodstuffs.

From its inception in 1945, the Yugoslav plan was unrealistic, especially within that post war environment (Singleton & Carter, 1982:99; Sirc, 1979:34). The Five-Year Plan simply assumed away much of the physical reality of a near-starved post-war population with a high percentage of war injuries; the extensive physical damage to homes and farms; the ruined or destroyed infrastructure and broken equipment resulting from German scorched earth tactics⁸⁹ (Ramet, 2011; Moore, 1967:3; Singleton & Carter, 1982:95; Woodward, 1995:63). This condition was especially the case in the southern-most regions, such as Kosovo, where fighting was both very

⁸⁹ Scorched earth tactics refer to the destruction of an area of conquered territory to prevent its use by its owner's. Destructive activities included burning buildings and crops, breaking equipment and destroying key infrastructure such as bridges.

heavy and the built infrastructure was already less robust (Ramet, 2011). Even so, “post-war enthusiasm⁹⁰ for the new Yugoslavia motivated the Republics to meet most of the scheduled goals for the first two years” (Curtis, 1992:125; also, Hashi, 1992:25; Lampe, 2000:239). This enthusiasm masked the weaknesses in central planning that had already begun to emerge (Lampe, 2000:242; Sirc, 1979:3; Woodward, 1995:100).

5.2 Economic Break and Blockade with Russia

The Soviet economic model was comprised of parallel courses of collective farming and intense industrialization. The Yugoslav Five Year Plan was largely based on active trade with Russia and Yugoslavia’s neighbors. Farmland collectivization was underway throughout Yugoslavia, including Kosovo by 1946; industrialization was mostly concentrated in the better developed Republics.

Nevertheless, those plans were permanently altered when Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union severed their political and economic relations. Tito’s refusal to bring Yugoslavia in line with the Soviet system and “become another extracted-resource satellite for Soviet Russia” (Glenny, 1999:534) permanently damaged relations between the two countries. Stalin’s response to Tito was to break all relations with Yugoslavia to force him to capitulate. Stalin expelled Yugoslavia from the Cominform⁹¹ in 1948 (Benson, 2001; Judah, 2000) and ceased economic relations (Curtis, 1992) including refusal to transport an estimated \$135 million in raw materials and industrial equipment⁹² that the Yugoslav Plan had relied on and had paid for in advance (Lampe, 2000:246; Woodward, 1995:101). In addition, Russia imposed an economic blockade against

⁹⁰ More accurately, unpaid volunteer brigades of not-yet employed youth, women, war prisoners and ‘unproductive labor’ such as farmers between the major farm activities of plowing and harvesting, were pressed into industry (Woodward, 1995).

⁹¹ The Communist Information Bureau, comprised of communist party representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Romania and led by the Soviet Union (Yugoslavia was expelled in 1948). The Cominform provided unified communist propaganda and direction (Curtis, 1992:321).

⁹² Among other things, Yugoslavia exchanged raw ores and basic agricultural goods for Russian petroleum products, coke, farm and mining equipment, seeds and fertilizers (Woodward, 1995).

trade with Yugoslavia, followed by punishing sanctions against trade between Yugoslavia and with its neighbors – now Russia’s satellites - which had long been traditional markets for its products. (Lampe, 2000). Stalin also initiated military maneuvers on the Yugoslav borders⁹³ (Curtis, 1992; Gulyas, 2014) to intimidate both Yugoslavia and her neighbors. These actions by Stalin subsequently led to an increased emphasis in Yugoslavia on defense; it militarized politics and the economy, and warmed foreign relations⁹⁴ with non-communist countries (Benson, 2001:99; Heuser, 1987; Lampe, 2000).

By the end of 1949 Yugoslavia was politically and economically isolated from the Soviet Union, its satellites and neighboring Albania; and the Yugoslav economy rapidly began to fail (Lazarevic, 2009). Without better options to prevent the collapse of the economy, Tito accepted direct economic assistance in 1949 under the United States’ Marshall Plan, and obtained additional loans, credits and materiel from UNRRA⁹⁵ (Benson, 2001:99; Hudson, 2003:39).

The initial Western aid package in the form of food; seeds and agricultural supplies, and bank loans (Benson, 2001:95) alleviated the most urgent economic crises. Soon afterwards, the West⁹⁶ held that supporting Yugoslavia was in its strategic interest against the communist Soviet Union (Heuser, 1987:26; Lazarevic, 2009:220), thus in 1950 many previously closed Western markets were opened to Yugoslav products, as well as its raw materials and labor (Curtis, 1992:104). Western markets compensated for most of the loss of the Soviet markets, and promoted Yugoslavia’s domestic economic growth for nearly three decades, from 1950 to 1975. In addition, when relations between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union had warmed again after Stalin’s death, Tito used his relationship with the Soviet Union as political leverage against the West to ensure their continued foreign aid (Heuser, 1987). However, the generous

⁹³ Bulgaria and Romania

⁹⁴ The former Allied Powers, and the United States, welcomed the opportunity to assist Yugoslavia to indirectly confront the Soviet Union during the Cold War (Benson, 2000:95).

⁹⁵ United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. Yugoslavia received US \$416 million between 1945 and 1947.

⁹⁶ The West in this context is comprised of France, the United Kingdom and United States (Heuser, 1987).

economic packages had also allowed Yugoslavia to continue to invest in unproductive heavy industry, and to spend well above its means for decades, which ultimately engulfed it with unpayable and destabilizing debt (Curtis, 1992).

Concurrent with the acceptance of Western financial aid, Tito abandoned the Soviet economic model and “reinterpreted” socialist Marxist doctrine to restructure the economy into “economic self-management” (Lampe, 2000:233). Yugoslav Self-Management was a new political as well as new economic system, intending that the “greater Socialist Consciousness would replace National Consciousness” (Curtis, 1992:69; also Hashi, 1992; Mertus, 1999). Although it remained a communist dictatorship, the Republics gained greater direct control over their internal administrative operations and those of their municipalities,’ while the municipalities were given more authority over their local level activities. However, self-management’s most significant characteristic was the introduction of market liberalization, or ‘capitalist strategies,’ to improve the productivity and efficiency of state and social enterprises, particularly by promoting worker’s ownership in their sources of employment (Curtis, 1992). The undergirding intent of self-management was to stabilize and stimulate Yugoslavia’s economy by promoting regional resource and infrastructure strengths, while maintaining ideological direction by the central communist party. The effect however, was to politicize industry and revive nationalism.

5.3 Post War Economy of Kosovo

Kosovo was not only the least economically developed region of Serbia, it was unquestionably the least developed of Yugoslavia as a whole. Even prior to the Second World War, its economy had been primarily barter and subsistence agriculture based on small family plots (Curtis, 1992:124). Kosovo was known for its mineral resources, including bauxite, coal, copper, tin, silver, gold and lead, the latter of which had been actively and almost continuously mined since the Ottoman rule (Malcolm, 1998:291). However, modernization had been primarily to facilitate

crude ore extraction, while infrastructure improvements were chiefly to aid the transport of raw materials out of Kosovo to be processed elsewhere, thus there was little significant economic benefit to Kosovo. After the end of the war in 1945, Serbia likewise resumed mining operations in Kosovo with only minor repair to the mines and infrastructure (Elshani & Pula, 2015:7). Hence, Kosovo remained a primarily agricultural and extractive economy until national investment began in the late 1960's.

5.3.1 Land Collectivization in Kosovo

Yugoslavia accelerated its land collectivization when Russia broke relations with Tito, a tactic Benson decribed as “a means [for Yugoslavia] to squeeze out of the peasantry the resources it needed for survival” (Benson, 2001:95)⁹⁷. By 1950 approximately 96% of Yugoslavia's most productive agricultural land was under state control (Curtis, 1992:125). Collectivised land in Kosovo was generally in the fertile north and western regions. Land collectivization was intended to more efficiently increase agricultural yields needed for export in order to obtain revenue to purchase imports, mostly consumer goods, that Yugoslavia did not to produce itself (Lampe, 2000:243).

Table 5.1 shows the agricultural land collectivized in Yugoslavia between 1945 -1952.

⁹⁷ Lampe (2000) and Singleton (1982) remind that Yugoslavia's Five-Year Plan allocated only 7% of its annual revenue to be invested in agriculture until 1951, an amount that was insufficient even to return to 1939 pre-war levels, thus impossible achieve the ambitious Plan's production goals (Singleton & Carter, 1882).

Year	1945	1946	1947	1948	1949	1950	1951
Number of cooperatives	31	545	779	1381	3325	6968	6994
Number families in cooperatives (1000's)		25.1	49.6	60.2	340.7	418.7	429.8
Total surface of cooperative farms (1000 ha)	121.5	211.0	324.0	868.8	1839.9	2226.2	2595.0

Table 5.1 Source: C. Borkowski: *La Yougoslavie Socialistes* (Armand Calin, Paris, 1956)⁹⁸

Land collectivization, with its ruthless quotas, was consistently unpopular throughout Yugoslavia, but it was particularly unworkable in Kosovo for five reasons. First, agriculture was at subsistence⁹⁹ level for over 90% of the population of Kosovo prior to the war and had had only a very low commercial output. The damaged and neglected farms at the end of the war worsened their already tenuous condition. Secondly, collectivization still allowed private holders to keep five hectares. Most farms in Kosovo were small, family run and fragmented, typically comprised of up to six, non-contiguous plots of about .45 hectares¹⁰⁰ each, for a combined size of less than three hectares (Curtis, 1992:90), and therefore were not required to be collectivized. To give perspective, each plot was less than half the size of an average football pitch, often only accessible by foot, and plowed by animal¹⁰¹. Thirdly, and a causative reason for manual plowing, was much of the arable land was on a slope of varying degree, rather than

⁹⁸ Table from archived material, (Heuser, 1987)

⁹⁹ Substance agriculture is a level that produces approximately enough for family consumption. Any surplus is typically sold to buy items/supplies that could not be made by hand, or bartered for basic services, such as medical treatment.

¹⁰⁰ The dimensions of a hectare vary by location; in Yugoslavia, a hectare is 100 meters by 100 meters. The combined plot size of an average farm was approximately three hectares to support up to nine adults (Curtis, 1992; Consortium, 2006)

¹⁰¹ Private ownership of tractors was not allowed until 1957

being generally flat. Mountains cover over 40% of Kosovo and the sloped farm land limited the use of the large agricultural machinery necessary to create industrial efficiencies (ibid). The sloped and mountainous land also promoted erosion; valuable top soil washed away, while the remaining soil lacked sufficient nutrients for most commercial crops (Sauer, et al., 2010). Moreover, land at high elevations has shorter growing seasons, making suitable export crops additionally challenging. Fourth, unlike farm land in Serbia and Vojvodina, over half of the arable farm land¹⁰² in Kosovo was of marginal quality and best used for meadow¹⁰³ and animal pasture. Except for foodstuffs from farms in the valleys, Kosovo's agriculture production was historically of low quality and unmarketable. Finally, the anticipated surplus labor, the farmers themselves, proved very difficult to convert into factory workers; most farmers were illiterate and unprepared for work in industry or in urban professions (Singleton & Carter, 1982). They often left their jobs during the day to return to their farms to work, especially during planting and harvest seasons, causing work disruptions and stoppages in factories. Some collective farms that produced foods for domestic consumption did succeed¹⁰⁴ however, particularly those in north and western Kosovo, where there had been a small number of farmers with large holdings. By 1949, however, only 22% of Kosovo's arable land was collectivized (Cox, 2002:112; European Stability Initiative, 2003:6).

Table 5.2 shows the pre-1999 conflict distribution of productive land of private and collectivized, or Socially Owned Enterprises (SOEs) in Kosovo (ibid).

¹⁰² Literature consistently states Kosovo has a significant amount of arable land. However, this is the same land used for homes, transportation and industry, reducing net land available for food farming. Moreover, pasture land (for grazing) is of a lower quality than land used for food production.

¹⁰³ Meadow is the cultivation of grasses for animal food.

¹⁰⁴ The majority of Kosovo's collective farms were marginal and unprofitable (Hudson, 2003:46). Processing of otherwise unmarketable produce for domestic consumption was an exception. Produce and raw animal products, e.g. wool and leather, were more successful than cereals agriculture (Singleton & Carter, 1982).

Hectares	Private	% of total	SOE	% of total	Total
Cultivated, of which:	361,631	91%	37,377	9%	399,008
Arable	261,045	90%	30,407	10%	291,452
Orchard	10,312	91%	1,056	9%	11,368
Vinyard	4,433	51%	4,285	49%	8,718
Meadow	85,841	98%	1,629	2%	87,470
Pasture	50,874	29%	127,435	71%	178,309
Agricultural	412,505	71%	164,812	29%	577,317
Forest	164,000	38%	266,000	62%	430,000
Rural	576,505	57%	430,812	43%	1,007,317

Table 5.2 Pre-conflict land distribution in Kosovo Source: Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Official Yearbook, 1997

Land collectivization ultimately proved politically, socially and economically untenable in Yugoslavia; the policy was informally abandoned by the end of 1950, and formally terminated in 1953. However, not all of the land was returned to the original owner. Especially in Kosovo the better farm land was given as a reward for war service, generally to Serb and Macedonian Partisans (Curtis 1992:104; Singleton & Carter, 1982).

5.4 Industrialization in Yugoslavia

As noted, the strategy of the initial Five Year Plan required wide industrialization of the economy in parallel with land collectivization. Land collectivization and efficiencies in agriculture were expected to free farmers from the land, and the former farm labor would be available to work in state owned industry (Woodward, 1995:66). This industrialization was assumed to diffuse nationalistic tendencies as the underlying economic and development differences were eliminated. Yet the unintentional result of Yugoslavia's industrialization was chronic and increasing unemployment. Especially in the less developed areas, industry was never able to provide enough employment for the growing supply of available low- and unskilled-labor. The influx of displaced farmers and residents of rural villages into the urban and industrialized areas continued to outpace the industrial sectors' ability to absorb them.

Moreover, as the number of places of employment increased, new job seekers increased as well¹⁰⁵, which tended to be equally unable to absorb the surge in job seekers (ibid:210).

Like the Soviet plan, the Yugoslav plan had concentrated on heavy industry: raw material extraction; energy generation and distribution; and, farm and mining equipment for export at the expense of meeting domestic needs¹⁰⁶. The manufacture of military hardware¹⁰⁷ gained importance after the Russian maneuvers on Yugoslav borders in 1948, and defense manufacturing grew from 6% of Yugoslavia's annual budget in 1948 to nearly 22% by 1953 (Lazarevic, 2009:219; Sirc, 1979:3). Together, Yugoslavia "routinely dedicated 50 percent to 60 percent of its annual outlay to defense" (Curtis, 1992:267) at the expense of domestic needs. These industries required substantial amounts of cash or credits to purchase expensive machinery, as well as to house that machinery in "prestige buildings, typically too-large and far out of proportion¹⁰⁸ to the availability of raw materials, skilled workers or end-product demand" (Sirc, 1979:37). Moreover, the high cost of machinery and long lead time before production could begin meant it was difficult to redirect new capital investment or modernize to meet the inevitable changes in domestic and external markets. Ultimately, both short and long-term benefits of Yugoslavia's emphasis on heavy industry were low, and the unrecoverable costs¹⁰⁹ were very high.

5.4.1 Industrialization in Kosovo

The rushed pace of collectivization and industrialization, fueled by growing economic and political uncertainties had two damaging outcomes for Kosovo. It further delayed investment in

¹⁰⁵ Woodward (1995) points to the Harris-Todaro Models and the "paradox of growth induced unemployment" typical of less developed regions, whereby increased development draws people from undeveloped areas for better wages and conditions, causing a new cycle of high unemployment. Moreover, new investments were typically heavy industries which did not require a large number of employees.

¹⁰⁶ Production of exportable goods to raise income was the foremost priority of Yugoslavia; employment was secondary.

¹⁰⁷ Tanks, artillery, aircraft and ammunition were produced for both national defense and foreign sales.

¹⁰⁸ Sirc (1979) notes that "bigger was better" and a source of national pride, regardless of appropriateness to the need.

¹⁰⁹ Also known as sunk costs.

non-extractive industry and it facilitated ad hoc development. Firstly, major capital investment in Kosovo was impractical in the early years because of the absence of already present industrial resources; the prevailing subsistence economy and near-absent infrastructure of Kosovo offered little industry to re/invest in. “New investments had a considerable time lag before they were able to contribute to the national income” (Singleton & Carter, 1982:221), and “the frailty of the Yugoslav economy forced Tito to concentrate investment on sectors such as lead ore mining ... where financial returns were more certain.” (Ramet, 2006:264; also, Singleton & Carter, 1982; Sirc, 1979:34). In addition, the necessary physical infrastructure, such as roadways and trains to move the large amount of materiel and equipment into, or raw materials and semi-finished products out of, Kosovo had to be developed for their transport and processing elsewhere. These factors were exacerbated as Serbia had retained and used Kosovo’s designated Federal investment resources for its own reconstruction. Ramet (2006) notes Serbia only began investment in Kosovo’s industry under pressure of the other Republics¹¹⁰ in 1955 (Ramet, 2006:265), and further delayed any significant investment in Kosovo’s development until the late-1960’s (Palairret, 1992:898; Ramet, 2006:274).

Secondly, and notwithstanding the Five-Year Plans to industrialize Yugoslavia generally, Serbia invested in Kosovo without a balanced *industrialization plan* (Curtis, 1992:152; Sirc, 1979:34; Vanek, 1967:383; Woodward, 1995:118). Kosovo’s market was primarily vertical and internal to Yugoslavia. Kosovo’s firms tended to be organized as subsidiaries; as producers of raw materiel; or producers of sub-components for larger industrial enterprises located within other Republics. The negative economic effects were fourfold: first, Kosovo’s industries did not supply products for markets, but provided products for specific *buyers*. This structure would have appeared to streamline the supply chain, yet it also suppressed product diversification and therefore the ability for many of Kosovo’s industries to sell a wide-enough range of products to

¹¹⁰ Serbia used Federal investment monies intended for Kosovo to improve damaged infrastructure in Serbia proper.

sufficient number of industries to efficiently scale production with demand. In addition, when a single firm is a sole or primary supplier and becomes unable to meet quantity and quality requirements¹¹¹ the absence of suitable alternate suppliers impaired multiple levels of manufacturing, especially as seen in the automotive industry (Palairret, 1992) both in Yugoslavia and for buyers abroad. A second factor, an ongoing failure to synchronize sub-component production with industrial finishing schedules, or component distribution of semi-final/final products to end users, meant the factory would rarely meet either domestic needs or export demands, whether from inside or outside of Kosovo¹¹².

Third, the ad hoc establishment of industry provided little ability to regionally coordinate manufacturing processes in order to leverage economies of scale or create some comparative advantage. Not until the mid-1960s were factories for products for domestic use, such as textiles, shoes and leather goods that were more compatible with existing local industrial capability¹¹³ established in either Yugoslavia or Kosovo. Palairret (1992) particularly notes the technical and skill requirements¹¹⁴ of the capital-intensive factories were likely to have been inappropriate and too advanced for its employees who had only recently left the agrarian environment (Palairret, 1992:909; also, Singleton & Carter, 1982), citing attitude, work quality and absenteeism as continual challenges.

Fourth, the unplanned industry failed to maximize the existing physical infrastructure to form business corridors, which would have reduced transportation and infrastructure costs, and generated supporting industries that would have created additional employment and local

¹¹¹ An example is Ramiz Sadiku, a manufacturer of subcomponents for Zastava, a subsidiary of Italy's Fiat. Yugoslavia attempted, unsuccessfully, to export the Yugo automobile to the United States, particularly due to its poor quality.

¹¹² Palairret (1992) describes perpetual work stoppage due to late or missing sub-components for Zastava automobiles.

¹¹³ Small, localized foodstuffs, tobacco, leather and wooden handicrafts industry already existed.

¹¹⁴ Palairret finds in his case study of Ramiz Sadiku, local Kosovo Albanians often lacked both the work habits and the necessary expertise for high performance machinery. Management by Serbs, including Kosovo Serbs, typically possessing the higher level skills were often viewed by the Albanian workers as oppressors, rather than necessary to the function of the plant. Similarly described by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, 1968).

revenue. Therefore, the absence of such an industrialization plan in Kosovo created a patchwork of stand-alone enterprises that neither synergized their industrial specialties for mutual benefit, nor substantially contributed to Kosovo's development. The absence of authentic markets and the relatively low diversity of products contributed to Kosovo's negligible participation in the global market after the end of 1999 Kosovo War.

5.4.2 Significance of Industrialization

Industrialization in Yugoslavia was more than the establishment of new factories and collective farms; it was the primary means to rapidly move the largely agrarian State to modernity and a higher standard of living. Critically, to be employed in Yugoslav State industry or civil service was to have access to all of the political and economic benefits of Yugoslav communism, such as a regular income, subsidized food and housing, monetary stipends for raising children, social insurance¹¹⁵, health care, advanced technical education, and employment opportunities for one's children (Bonfiglioli, 2013:6; Palairt, 1992; Woodward, 1995:315). Women were actively recruited into industry with generous maternity allowances; such provisions were particularly welcome as benefits related to child bearing were not automatically provided to the wife of a factory worker (Bonfiglioli, 2013:6; Woodward, 1995:152), nor widely available through public or private means (Rodwin & Saric, 1993). Most factory workers could depend on at least one hot meal daily; many large factories offered child care as well as paid vacations at State subsidized resorts (Palairt, 1992).

However, only factory workers – considered to be producers under the Marxist-based structure – enjoyed these benefits or had the right to vote in and hold locally elected offices. Small farmers who were not part of collectives, the small non-nationalized enterprises and the self-employed did not receive the substantial majority of these benefits, nor could they vote or fill a

¹¹⁵ Social insurance protected against lost wages if workers were made unemployed by restructuring, not due to personal resignation.

communist party held office. Hence the absence, or loss, of one's state employment "was to be excluded from full membership in society" (Woodward, 1995:4). This codified exclusion meant the unemployed and those employed in the private sector could only participate and be represented at the local or neighborhood level (ibid, 321). Kosovo, predominantly small farms and villages, had both a lower number of civil servants and limited industry. Given that its primary industries were concentrated in the low skill capital intensive trades; in ore extraction, food processing and forestry which required relatively few employees, the inhabitants of Kosovo, in total, realized fewer opportunities to fully benefit from industrialization. Further noting Kosovo Serbs held over 50% of the total industrial employment positions until 1967, despite their numerical minority of less than 30% of Kosovo's population (Malcolm, 1998:323), Kosovo Albanians therefore established informal kin networks to provide some level of these same benefits for themselves, and thus laid the foundation for the shadow economy of the 1980's and subsequent parallel government system of the 1990's.

5.5 Investment in Kosovo: 1966 – 1974

While northern and central Yugoslavia rapidly became more urban and industrialized, Kosovo remained far behind. The social and political marginalization of Kosovo Albanians was primarily through the direction of Aleksandar Ranković, Tito's deputy, and the head of the Yugoslav special secret police *UBDA*, (Palairt, 1992; Woodward, 1995:248). Ranković was not only aggressively pro-Serb, he also considered the Kosovo Albanians to be a security threat to Yugoslavia's unity (Ramet, 2006; Ryan, 2010:118). Ranković continued to enforce the 1945 state of emergency restrictions in Kosovo, including curfews, invasive weapon searches and arbitrary arrests, which had been lifted from the Republics and Vojvodina by 1948 (Ryan, 2010:119). Moreover he used *UBDA* to intimidate Kosovo Albanians (Clark, 2000:37; Palairt, 1992:898) and filled key civil positions with his supporters (Curtis, 199:522). As a result, Kosovo Albanians

realized only token political and economic opportunity or mobility until Ranković was dismissed from his position in mid-1966 (Palairt, 1992:898).

Tito visited Kosovo for the first time after Ranković's removal¹¹⁶ and personally directed the Kosovo Serb controlled government to increase its hiring of Kosovo Albanians in government and industry (Malcolm, 1998:234). Investment in Kosovo was soon expanded to include small industry and light manufacturing, and several new plants were established to further decentralize critical defense industries (Singleton & Carter, 1982:222)¹¹⁷. "Political factories"¹¹⁸ were also built throughout Kosovo to provide employment in areas without previous investment, although their locations were often logistically impractical (Palairt, 1992:900). The majority of these political factories were built to provide a minimum level of employment, rather than to support local business or stimulate sustainable local economic initiatives (Palairt, 1992:899; Ramet, 2006). Table 5.3, shows in investment in Kosovo from 1947 - 1982.

Period	Infrastructure Type	Heavy Industry	Small Industry	Light Manufacturing
1947 – 1965	Primary schools, electricity in major cities	Crude ore mining, forestry, oil refining, military hardware	Local farm produce processing for domestic use	Clothing, tobacco, leather, small wooden products, traditional handicrafts
1966 – 1974	Asphalt roads, energy production, wide electrification, treated water; sanitary sewerage, secondary schools; University	Ore refining, large agriculture equipment, communications, automobiles and subcomponents	Chemicals and fertilizers, batteries, shotgun ammunition, cigarettes, furniture, textiles, tourism, cement and gravel	Agribusiness, shoes, electronics for industry, irrigation, sugar, beef, cigarettes, wood furniture
1974 – 1982	Additional improved roads, electrification, treated water	Metallurgy, electric power generation	White goods, plastics, building materials	Consumer electronics

Table 5.3 Yugoslavia's Industrial Investment in Kosovo 1947 – 1982¹¹⁹

¹¹⁶ Tito visited Kosovo in March 1967 to see its conditions for himself and allay tensions, as well as to promote his further decentralization (Malcolm, 1998).

¹¹⁷ Critical defense related industries were duplicated and spread throughout Yugoslavia in response to continued mistrust of the Soviet Union, such as the steel mills in Niksic, Montenegro. Singleton and Carter also remind such industries were status symbols and a source of pride (Singleton & Carter, 1982:223).

¹¹⁸ Political factories are those factories and enterprises that were specifically built in a particular location to employ large numbers of people, often for political favor or control, rather than in response to legitimate economic needs. Most political factories were unprofitable and required substantial federal support to remain open (Palairt, 1992:899).

¹¹⁹ Multiple sources, primarily Curtis, (1992), Singleton and Carter (1982), and OECD (1968).

Nevertheless, 1967 – 1974 was a period of rapid social liberalization and modernization for Kosovo Albanians, and the standard of living increased for many. Primary roadways were asphalted and many more communities gained modern infrastructure including electrification, treated water and sewerage. Literacy, which had already been improving since 1947, received additional emphasis when Kosovo Albanians were allowed to receive education up to the university level in the Albanian language. Girls were not only finishing primary school, but were also attending university in impressive numbers. Women began working outside the home in significant numbers for the first time, while youth began to seek employment opportunities outside of agriculture.

However Kosovo's *per capita* federal investment was insufficient for its birthrate, which produced far more potential employees for industry than there were employment opportunities¹²⁰, worsened by the substantial time lag for federal investment and the continued predominance of extractive industries. The result was both a widening of the development gap between Kosovo and the rest of Yugoslavia, and extremely high unemployment, especially for Kosovo's youth ages 20-25 (Palairret, 1992:899; Pavlovic, 2013:13). The differential also contributed to the negative and ethnically charged stereotypes of Kosovo Albanians as "backwards baby-makers" (Mertus, 1996:7; also, Palairret, 1992:911; Pavlovic, 2013:12).

5.6 Outmigration and Remittances

The inadequate level of investment and employment in Kosovo caused both Kosovo Albanians and Serbs to leave for better opportunities. Kosovo Serbs were more able and likely to travel outside of Kosovo for employment than Kosovo Albanians until the removal of Ranković, but emigration of young men to work abroad as 'guest workers' was already well established since the Ottoman period (Clark, 2000:36). Beginning in the mid-1950s and through the 1980s, the

¹²⁰ Kosovo's population grew 220% between 1950 and 1983; Yugoslavia's total population grew only 39% for the same period (Curtis, 1992).

number of Yugoslav guest workers increased dramatically. Benson (2001) and Curtis (1992) state some 20% of Yugoslavia's employed population were employed as guest workers outside the country in the 1970s (Benson, 2001:114; Curtis, 1992:104), mostly rural men for unskilled labor (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012:7). However, from the mid-1960s forward, growing unemployment in Yugoslavia and energetic reconstruction in West Germany and Austria encouraged over one million Yugoslavs, including a substantial number of women who chose to emigrate as well (Curtis, 1992:104),

5.6.1 Emigration in Kosovo

Emigration initially took the employment pressure off of the local industries, and hard currency remittances helped to stabilize Yugoslavia's balance of payments (Curtis, 1992:128). At its peak, Gashi and Haxhikadrija estimate nearly 20 percent of Kosovo's adult population worked abroad as guest workers, primarily in Germany and Switzerland¹²¹ (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012:7), and Curtis states remittances totalling an estimated \$2 billion were sent home to Kosovo in the period between the 1970s and 1980s (Curtis, 1992:160). Yet as youth completed vocational training and experienced workers were made redundant, the number of educated and skilled workers leaving Yugoslavia also increased and mortgaged its future (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012:7). The large number of family members abroad became "socially demoralizing," and ultimately did little to benefit either Yugoslavia or Kosovo (Benson, 2001:115).

Three challenges emerged with the high numbers of emigrants from Yugoslavia, and from Kosovo in particular: the drain of the most ambitious and skilled workers, lost labor on farms (Curtis, 1992:90) and the negative impact of continued remittances on the families left behind. First, the emigration of men from the rural areas left women and the less able behind to tend to family farms, decreasing levels of agricultural production and thus their income. This loss was

¹²¹ Manual labor from Yugoslavia and other less developed European countries was invited as temporary workers to Germany and Switzerland as part of their own reconstruction efforts.

exacerbated for the elderly when the emigrant's move became permanent, and the immediate family joined the emigrant (Curtis, 1992:90; Singleton & Carter, 1982:219).

Secondly, while Gashi and Haxhikadrija (2012) found the early groups of emigrants were the traditional unskilled laborers from rural areas, Curtis (1992) and Singleton & Carter (1982) stress the later guest workers tended to be those with better skills; emigrants were those who had been made redundant, and the young with the highest skill and education levels. Their departure similarly left the elderly and unskilled behind (Singleton & Carter, 1982:219). The latter trend continued through the 1980's as employment could not keep up with the output of university-educated youth (Curtis, 1992:90). Thus, many of the most productive members of society were unavailable to contribute to their communities.

Thirdly, while remittances from family abroad enabled both better education and healthcare for the family members who had been left behind, remittances often tend to decrease the efforts of recipient family members' to seek employment of their own¹²² (Gashi & Haxhikadrija, 2012:14). Therefore, the substantial outmigration had an overall negative effect not only on the immediate family, but on the community as a whole.

5.6.2 Embargos and Emmigrant Return

The outflow of Yugoslav labor decreased in the mid-1970s, the result of both global economic slowdown and the Middle East oil embargos (Orford, 2003) first in 1974 and again in 1979. In response to the economic slowdown, the central Yugoslav government attempted to raise hard capital with increased sale¹²³ of newly-underpriced raw domestic materials on the global market. It also suppressed imports¹²⁴ and reduced domestic industrial investment, all of which

¹²² Although findings are based upon contemporary research on remittance effects in Kosovo conducted for UNDP and USAID between 2008 and 2009, similar effects are reasonably expected to have occurred prior to the study period as well.

¹²³ Also known as 'dumping,' this unsustainable tactic is a last resort to raise cash to prevent collapse

¹²⁴ This both reduced tariff income and promoted grey marketing.

undermined both real revenue and economic development (Radosevic, 1996). The extractive and heavy equipment manufacturing industries that Yugoslavia relied on for hard currency were almost completely dependent upon imported oil, and such industries were mostly located Kosovo, Macedonia and Montenegro. Hence, oil shortages and the subsequent four-fold¹²⁵ price increase forced cuts in those operations and subsequently reduced the production of hard cash generating exports. At the same time, “increased protectionism throughout Western Europe and led to bans and limits on a wide range of Yugoslav products” (Woodward, 1995:251). Critically, the economic slowdowns in Western Europe caused thousands of guest-workers to become redundant, both losing their ability to send remittance income home and returning to Yugoslavia at a time when employment there was stagnant or dropping¹²⁶ (ibid), and the quality of life falling (Adamovic, 1995:276). This increased personal hardship and economic uncertainty made the security of one’s own family and national group the primary means of stability and survival, and subsequently facilitated the return of traditional and informal economies.

5.7 Development of Yugoslavia’s Informal Economies

Yugoslavia’s continual un/underemployment and strained domestic and international finances were partially offset by its ubiquitous informal economy. This alternate economy not only provided basic services¹²⁷ and consumer goods that would otherwise be unavailable or unaffordable, it also became a means of additional income to offset continual layoffs, wage cuts, shortages, and the growing inflation and unemployment. Legally, income derived outside of a tax, tariff or other official regulation may be considered informal¹²⁸. However as Krasniqi &

¹²⁵ The price of Middle East oil increased approximately 400% in four months. The price of Russian oil increased much less, providing 40% of Yugoslavia’s oil (Singleton & Carter, 1982).

¹²⁶ Curtis notes political pressure forced the hiring large numbers of returning workers; overstaffing overwhelmed cost reduction measures (Curtis, 1992).

¹²⁷ Services included minimal skilled workers such as drivers, casual labor for construction, farming and forestry and, tourism as well as mid to highly skilled professions including accounting, medicine, law and engineering.

¹²⁸ International Labor Organization; the definition tends to exclude agricultural activities such as selling home grown produce at a local market (ILO, 2000)

Topxhiu (2012) stress, informal economies are the result of “the interaction of numerous economic, political, social and institutional factors. They emerge particularly when the economy is unhealthy, and grow as the formal economy cannot absorb ... participants out of the informal economy” (Krasniqi & Topxhiu, 2012:7). Thus, Yugoslavia’s rapid transition toward industrialization, without a concurrent capacity for large numbers of its citizens to participate equally, created and eventually entrenched, its informal economy.

The informal economy had been unofficially tolerated by the Yugoslav government as it relieved the pressure to provide these services or goods (Curtis, 1992:160), yet the outcomes had four increasingly negative consequences. First, the informal employment denied tax revenue to the local governments. Local governments were continually stretched by the devolution of social services that had been previously provided and funded by the Republics and Municipalities, and therefore limited the ability of local government, such as small town and villages, to provide adequate services to the public (Krasniqi & Topxhiu, 2012:9; Woodward, 1995:270). Secondly, informal employment harms the worker by depressing wages overall and failing to protect those who provided the labor or performed the service. Further, it tends to trap them in a continuum of low paying temporary jobs (Krasniqi & Topxhiu, 2012:7). These were especially the outcomes for employees in high hazard private businesses such as construction, forestry and day labor in which many Kosovo Albanians tended to be relegated to.

Thirdly, the channels and networks through which goods and services were acquired were often corrupting and malign; “the same networks that smuggled firewood, food and consumer goods across borders were easily adapted for arms, human trafficking, and organized crime in which government officials would become increasingly complicit” (Danielsson, 2015:137).

Unsurprisingly, this informal structure would be later adapted to establish and support a parallel government and economy to provide Kosovo Albanians with government services from the 1980s forward, as well as support armed combatants in the late 1990’s. Lastly, once

established as the new normal, the informal economy elite are increasingly unlikely to support future government-led economic development and the return to a legitimate government and economy (Cheng, 2013; Münch, 2013).

5.8 Revocation of Kosovo's Autonomy

Stapleton & Carter (1982) provide a fitting summary of Yugoslavia as it entered the 1980's:

“Since the passing of the 1974 Constitution ... the regulation of the economy has been officially left to the complicated machinery of self-management. However, such an intricate mechanism is dependent upon a high level of civil responsibility, and an awareness by the decision makers of the consequences to the national economy of the actions they take at the local level. ... [now when] the machinery fails to work ... the federal authorities no longer have the ability to take anticipatory action ... [and] they have relinquished most of the instruments that would enable them to fine-tune the economy, leaving [only] the blunt instruments of administrative orders” (Singleton & Carter, 1982:251).

The leadership vacuum following Tito's death in May 1980 presented political and economic challenges that increasingly required solutions which proved too difficult for the ineffectual Federal government to manage (Morrison, 2016:50)¹²⁹. Singleton & Carter (1982:161) describe Yugoslavia's 1981-1985 plan¹³⁰ to continue to focus on energy and engineering which were intended to complement its high energy-consuming industries, as 'not encouraging', especially as Yugoslavia could no longer acquire sufficient international funding to do so. Moreover, “Western states had already dumped stockpiles of strategic raw materials¹³¹ into the global market to bolster their own economies” (Woodward, 1995:254), which caused the price of comparable Yugoslav exports to fall. Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund led to the end of Yugoslav self-management, replacing it with closely monitored austerity programs (ibid), including a restructure toward a market economy (Morrison, 2016:50). At the same time, the West curtailed its wider investment in Eastern Europe in 1983 for fear that the civil unrest

¹²⁹ Cerra and Saxena find that countries that sustain major economic shocks almost never recover, but tend to continue to slide downward (Cerra & Saxena, 2007).

¹³⁰ A continuation of the 1976-1980 Plan which focused on the energy producing sectors.

¹³¹ Base materials such as aluminum and copper, and phosphates for making other chemicals and industrial products

seen in Poland's anti-communist *Solidarność*, Solidarity Movement could spread (Woodward, 1995:256).

The ambitious Serb politician Slobodan Milošević used the economic hardships in Yugoslavia and fanned Serb nationalism to build his influence, rising to the presidency of the Regional Party, and then the President of Serbia's Communist Party in 1986. He courted Serbs antagonistic to Tito's 1974 reforms, especially those reforms that significantly benefitted Kosovo Albanians; Milošević was elected President of Serbia in 1989, and publicly overturned the 1974 Constitution soon afterward.

By 1990 Yugoslavia's annual inflation rate was 2,700 percent, up from 160 percent in 1986. The official unemployment rate was 20 percent (Bennett, 1995:117; Benson, 2001:152), but was unofficially much higher, especially in the less developed Republics. The economy realized a short improvement between 1989 and 1990 when the Yugoslav dinar was devalued, wages frozen and prices liberalized under IMF guidance (Bennett, 1995:118). However, the improvements vanished when Milošević granted himself a loan from Serbia's central bank to support his reelection and the IMF recommendations were abandoned (ibid, 121). Within the following twelve months both the Republic of Croatia and Slovenia declared their independence from Yugoslavia in June 1991, followed by the Republic of Macedonia in September. The secession of Macedonia was barely challenged by Milošević who was heavily engaged in arming Bosnian Serbs to fight against Croatians, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats in neighboring Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5.9 Embargo and Sanctions against Yugoslavia

The United Nations Security Council adopted UNSCR 713 in 1991, an arms embargo, and adopted Resolution 757¹³² (UNSCR 757) in May 1992, which was a list of economic sanctions to pressure Milošević to cease fighting and undermine his popular support. Sanctions included freezing Yugoslav business assets in foreign banks¹³³; denial of economic aid; embargo of foreign oil and embargo of trade for Yugoslav exports. Imports were limited to food and humanitarian supplies (Camras, 2011; Matthews, 1992). The sanctions continued until December 1995¹³⁴, when Milošević was faced with a winter without either natural gas or oil for heat¹³⁵. Isolated and having exhausted his cash reserves, rising inflation and trade at barely 20 percent of its pre-war volume, Milošević signed the Kumanovo Agreement (also known as the Dayton Peace Accords) under the terms of UNSCR 1031¹³⁶ on 14 December 1995 to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, allowing the NATO Implementation Forces, IFOR, to enter Yugoslavia as peacekeepers (Benson, 2001:171).

By 1995 however, Kosovo had already lived in near invisibility under the apartheid conditions and martial law imposed by Milošević in 1989¹³⁷. Thus, the failure to address Kosovo's conditions in the Dayton Peace Accords and increasing ethnic cleansing tactics against Kosovo Albanians by Serbia in the late-1990s, led many Kosovo Albanians to conclude that violence was the only means for change (ibid). A loose group of men calling themselves the *Kosovo Liberation*

¹³² Seven resolutions had been passed prior to UNSCR 757, including UNSCR 713 in 1991 to embargo sales and delivery of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia, and further resolutions authorized observers and UN peacekeeping forces.

¹³³ Yugoslavia had deposits of \$214 million in United States' banks alone; the United States had already embargoed trade with Yugoslavia earlier in 1992 (Matthew, 1992).

¹³⁴ UNSCR 1022 removed sanctions from Bosnia and Croatia; sanctions against Serbia continued.

¹³⁵ Russia upheld the sanctions of UNSCR 757, but continued to sell natural gas to Yugoslavia for household use. Yugoslavia failed to pay for its gas, and Russia's own post-communist financial crisis prevented its ability to continue support.

¹³⁶ Terms of UNSCR 1031 include peacekeeping with NATO Implementation Forces, continued sanctions on weapon and limits/responsibilities of civilian police

¹³⁷ Kosovo's martial law had been established in 1989 during the war between Serbia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Army, KLA, emerged and initiated provocative guerilla actions to bring Kosovo to international attention. Negotiations between Milošević and the Contact Group¹³⁸ failed to halt the Yugoslav Army ethnic cleansing tactics in Kosovo and UN economic sanctions were re-instated in March 1998¹³⁹. These new sanctions were followed by NATO airstrikes on Serb military targets and supporting infrastructure, including inside Kosovo, from March 1999 and continued for 78 days until early June. By 9 June 1999 Milošević conceded and directed the Yugoslav Army to cease offensive operations in Kosovo.

5.9.1 Embargo and Sanction Effects on Kosovo

The airstrikes and five years of sanctions against Yugoslavia ended the fighting, but the economic sanctions also had wide-ranging and enduring damaging effects on the Yugoslav economy (Garfield, 2001), and on Kosovo in particular.

First, in addition to the lack of imported raw materials to restart operations, much of Yugoslavia's heavy industry and manufacturing sectors were crippled by air strikes¹⁴⁰. Kosovo's facilities, already degraded by a lack of maintenance, vandalism and pilferage became nearly useless. Yugoslavia's output was further impaired by the destruction of supporting infrastructure to transport products to market. Second, the lost income from Croatia and Slovenia since 1991, and restrictions on export trade meant little income had been generated that could rebuild infrastructure or the more critical industries. Third, many foreign businesses and investors closed or had relocated their offices out of Yugoslavia during the sanctions, and considered the post-war environment still too risky to resume operation (Garfield, 2001).

Similarly, restoration of the pre-sanction relations with Yugoslav businesses, academics,

¹³⁸ The Contact Group was comprised of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, the United Kingdom and United States

¹³⁹ UNSCR 1160

¹⁴⁰ Serbia contained many large military equipment, munitions and weapons manufacturers, while smaller factories were spread throughout Yugoslavia often served as local military bases making them legitimate military targets, as well as their supporting infrastructure.

professionals, and researchers remained too complicated to reestablish. As a result, Yugoslavs, including Kosovars, were increasingly excluded from participation in international conferences and organizations where they were once welcome (ibid).

5.10 Kosovo's Deindustrialization

In a developed economy, deindustrialization can be the positive result of moving from low-skill industries to services and digital technology, which require fewer employees and physical resources. This was not the case in Kosovo, where deindustrialization was the physical loss of industrial assets, resources and infrastructure, and societal return to subsistence living.

Benson notes as early as 1965 a "third of Yugoslav enterprises operated at a loss" (Benson, 1982: 112) and by the 1970's, a few of the worst performing and non-essential industries were likely to have been closed or consolidated with profitable industries to establish some economies of scale (ibid). Their labor expenses¹⁴¹ were contained by "not expanding, by lowering wages, or by shedding those employees with other means of support"¹⁴² (Woodward, 1995:233). Such deindustrialization typically effected regions in the least developed areas of Yugoslavia with high concentration of extractive industries, such as Kosovo (ibid). While the reduced or lost industries increased unemployment and promoted outmigration throughout Yugoslavia, the sanctions dramatically accelerated deindustrialization in Kosovo for two reasons.

First, Kosovo had already been fully incorporated into Serbia by 1992 when the UN sanctions in protest of Serb violence in Bosnia began, thus the transfer of the assets out of Kosovo's better State owned enterprises to Serbia was well underway (Clark, 2000:112). As the sanction terms prohibited trade by or with Serbia, asset stripping of Kosovo's industry was an uncomplicated means of acquiring suitable material and equipment that could be used by Serb industry for its

¹⁴¹ Consolidation often required the employment of all or the majority of the employees from the failed enterprise.

¹⁴² Particularly youth and women.

wars with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina or sold for cash to support the Serb government (ibid). Asset stripping was worsened by Serb forces who looted any remaining useful property as they withdrew from Kosovo in June 1999.

Secondly, the loss of State and civil employment led many Kosovo Albanians to return to family farms (Clark, 2000:113; Warrander & Knaus, 2010:23), or open small retail businesses and coffee shops (ibid), which often relied on barter or on the extensive government-protected sub-economy market of smuggled food and basic medicines (Benson, 2001:171; Camras, 2011). By the mid-1990s only minor local trades remained in Kosovo. Ironically, this same informal economy allowed the Kosovo Albanians to weather Yugoslavia's economic crisis during the 1990s and the collapse of Yugoslav banks far better than Serbia or the Kosovo Serbs (Zaum & Knaus, 2013).

5.11 A Political Economy View

Noting political economy includes "the relations between formal and informal political and economic structures" (Berdal & Zaum, 2013:5), and occurs "within its historical and structural context" (Collinson, 2003; Youngman, 2000:3), political economy is therefore an outcome "of the social relations, particularly the power relations that mutually constitute the production, distribution and consumption of resources ..." (Mosco, 2009:2). Thus, the social, political and economic condition of Kosovo can be studied through a political economy of development lens, already identified by Zaum & Knaus (2013) as a missing perspective to understand Kosovo's economic environment. This section will focus on three interrelated economic factors: persistent deficit of Federal investment in Kosovo; structural discrimination; and, economic isolation, especially in the decade preceding the Kosovo War in 1999.

5.11.1 Insufficient Federal Investment

Federal investment in Yugoslavia may be further divided into three broad areas, 1) industry, 2) agriculture and 3) human resources, and their analysis reveals where many investment decisions had substantial contradictory outcomes.

The first, insufficient investment in less developed Republics, was a decision compelled by Yugoslavia's post war conditions in 1945; scarce reconstruction monies were invested first in the industrialized Republics to generate working capital and begin its national development toward full communism. The presence of functional infrastructure and a skilled workforce also made investment in the more developed Republics less of a risk. Yet as described earlier, heavy industry is not only costly, but has a very substantial lag time between equipment purchase and income generation. While economically prudent, the conditions of less developed Republics including Kosovo only continued to worsen. Years without investment unintentionally starved them of the basic resources to re/build, and already possessing fewer resources and opportunity for income generation, widened the already substantial development gap. Particularly in Kosovo where there was little investment until the late 1960's, more than 20 years after the end of the Second World War, the resources necessary to close that gap had become unobtainable. Moreover, as industry and enterprise eventually established in the less developed Republics were rarely economically viable, the more developed Republics came to view investment in the less developed Republics as wasteful and at the expense of their own economies, and thus began to openly consider separation from Yugoslavia. Yet the rigid Soviet model did not provide for less ambitious enterprises than heavy industry, such as the small consumer goods which had to be imported, nor the establishment of transportation infrastructure to facilitate commerce. These, if engaged earlier and in a wider area, would likely have generated local income and help to reduce the extreme economic differences between the Republics.

Secondly, insufficient Federal investment in agriculture: Yugoslav-wide land collectivization added additional uncertainty to farmers whose farms, homes and equipment were damaged, compounded by the fact that, at the war's end in late spring, farmers would have lost not only their autumn wheat and oat sowing, but the spring planting of maize and vegetables as well (Rashid & Cheng-Hopkins, 1999). Moreover, farms in the less developed Republics were already at the subsistence level, and only emergency foreign aid of food and seeds prevented widespread starvation. In addition, collectivized agriculture gave priority of agricultural equipment, and imported seed and fertilizer inputs to cooperative and collective farms, most of them in the more developed Republics. This was both to improve their yields, and discourage private farms through ensuring scarcity and high input costs. Moreover, despite land collectivization having been officially discontinued in 1953, private farmers were unable to purchase motorized farm equipment, such as tractors until 1957. For agriculturally dependent Kosovo, such policies directly undermined its development.

Thirdly, even under the best of conditions, the official use of a single common language is highly political in nature. Serbia contained two substantial non-Slavic language populations, Albanian in Kosovo and Hungarian in Vojvodina, and both minority groups were heavily pressured, then directed by law, to forgo their native language and exclusively adopt the Serbian language (Committee, 1993). As languages often represent culture, and national or ethnic identity, suppression and denial of one's native language is typically perceived as the stripping of one's own identity (Jansen, 2012), thus such language requirements tend to meet significant resistance (Judah, 2008). Yet Yugoslavia's language accommodation also had significant drawbacks. Public education was provided in minority languages through primary school until approximately 15 years of age (Curtis, 1992:114) while secondary and university education was only provided in Serbian, which immediately limited all minority's access to higher education and subsequent employment opportunities.

Ironically, access to better employment opportunities was further reduced when Tito allowed use of the Albanian language through the university level in 1967¹⁴³, as this allowed Kosovo Albanians to become more insular, and at the same time more easily marginalized by Kosovo Serbs and Serbia. As Yugoslavia began to establish additional industry in Kosovo, the management were most often Serbs who possessed both better education and vocational skills (Palairret, 1992). Moreover, as further opportunities for advanced and technical education continued to be provided through State and civil employment, Kosovo Serbs, rather than Kosovo Albanians, tended to be chosen (Woodward, 1995). Therefore, as a larger number of Kosovo Serbs were employed in Kosovo's industry and government overall, Kosovo Albanians were increasingly left behind, both impairing development, and contributing to animosity between ethnic groups.

5.11.2 Structural Discrimination

Use of the Albanian language similarly contributed to structural discrimination of Kosovo Albanians. Nationalist tendencies were especially pronounced in the Republic of Serbia (Curtis, 1992:203), and Kosovo Albanian pressure to use the Albanian language perpetuated Serb fear of Albanian irredentism. Moreover, the provisions and freedoms granted by the 1974 constitution to the two Autonomous Provinces were well known to be largely intended to reduce Serbia's dominance (ibid). Together they increased Serbia's insecurity, and coupled with Kosovo's still-low skill and literacy level, made the exclusion and ensuing discrimination of Kosovo Albanians appear to be reasonable.

¹⁴³ Teachers and textbooks were brought in from Albania, which used the Tosk dialect of Albania, rather than the Gheg dialect of Kosovo, making instruction difficult, but also inspired national identity as an Albanian, rather than a Yugoslav. Taught university subjects were typically in the liberal arts, hence not suited for industry. In addition, Albania's education system was less advanced than Yugoslavia's, thus Kosovo's education was a lower quality overall (Curtis, 1992:88).

Yet as the Kosovo Albanians' literacy and skills improved, their participation in government activities and political awareness also increased. These in turn, gave rise to additional demands for equity from Serbia, then for recognition as a republic.

Emboldened by its growing nationalism under Slobodan Milošević, Serbia revoked the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina, and sacked Kosovo Albanians from public employment soon afterward. He used the subsequent violent protests in Kosovo as pretext for the establishment martial law in Kosovo in 1989, including heavily enforced curfews and travel restrictions.

5.12 Kosovo's Economic Isolation and Arrival of KFOR

Kosovo had already been sidelined by the more developed republics, with its difficult terrain, poor roadways, and an under-skilled populace. Hence, when Kosovo Albanians were dismissed from their civil and state positions, and the most viable industries were either dismantled and moved to Serbia, or its equipment sold, and the buildings shuttered, Kosovo returned to economic invisibility. With the loss of its largest income sources, Kosovo Albanians turned again to working abroad; to family, and to the ubiquitous informal economy; small retail trade, cafés, and subsistence agriculture. But the constricted, apartheid environment had also promoted corruption; the smuggling and organized crime networks which developed extended beyond the end of the Kosovo War in June 1999, especially in the absence of better economic alternatives. The arrival of Kosovo Forces, KFOR, in June 1999 was therefore an opportunity to replace this environment with new economic opportunities, and strongly suggests Kosovo Albanians were particularly open to the establishment of military bases and their prospect for change.

Chapter 6: Camp Bondsteel Case Study

6.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the two United States' bases in Kosovo, Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel, in two sections. It opens with a brief history of the region and the municipalities of Gjilan and Ferizaj, followed by a description of the functions and activities of the US KFOR bases, both established after the 1999 Kosovo War. A discussion of the effects of the establishment of the military bases, including hiring local employees, purchasing and community leader relations completes Section One.

Section Two contains a closer examination and analysis of the social, political and economic changes attributed to the military base, with an emphasis on the economic impact of very high salaries and purchase of millions of dollars of construction material on these two base communities. The Section concludes with a summary of effects, finding the military base significantly increased local prosperity, but did not catalyze sustainable growth.

6.1 Section 1: Establishing US Camps

The US KFOR was staged at the borders of Albania and Macedonia on 12 June 1999 waiting authorization to enter Kosovo and move into the Multinational Brigade-East (MNB-E) area of responsibility (Interview 8). The initial 1,800-Soldier US KFOR contingent convoyed to two geographically separate locations. The majority went to a small Yugoslav Army (JA) artillery training base located in Gjilan, renamed Camp Monteith, which would temporarily house the US, NATO and NATO-partner headquarters and logistic forces. A much smaller group of military engineers and Corp of Engineers civilians traveled approximately 20 miles southwest to a 900-acre field near the town of Ferizaj¹⁴⁴, the site of the yet to-be-built Camp Bondsteel (Interview 73; McClure, 2000; Security, 2000; Wentz, 2002), which would become the MNB-E

¹⁴⁴ The Serb-language name for this Municipality and town is Uroševac. The conventionally recognized Albanian-language name 'Ferizaj' is used throughout this thesis and this Chapter for simplicity.

headquarters. The US contributed approximately 7,000 military personnel and was joined by Greece, Poland, Romania, Russia and Ukraine for a combined total of 17,000 troops by the end of December 1999 (Security, 2000). Map 6.1 shows the general location of the two US camps.



Map 6.1. Location of Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel

6.2 Establishing Camp Monteith

Prior to the Kosovo War, the Gjilan Municipality numbered approximately 119,000 residents; its ethnic profile was 79 percent Kosovo Albanians, 16 percent Kosovo Serbs, and 5 percent of all other minorities (OSCE 2005). The same-named City of Gjilan was Kosovo’s fourth largest. Camp Monteith was located at the north-eastern edge of Gjilan’s city center and business district; it had been an artillery training camp for the 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade and 243rd Mechanized

Brigade, containing barracks, ranges and a small airstrip.¹⁴⁵ Although only the storage and maintenance areas were bomb-damaged during the war, most buildings required substantial renovation as most of the buildings had been intentionally vandalized by retreating Serb forces, then looted for usable materials by the community, particularly for metal pipes, plumbing fixtures, wire to sell for salvage or reuse elsewhere (GlobalSecurity.org, 2000; McClure, 2000). Photo 6.1 shows the condition of a storage and maintenance facility destroyed by bombing during the Kosovo War. It is unlikely any sizeable number of local civilians worked on the base prior to the war due to the availability of conscripts for general labor (also, Prizren interview 62).



Photo: R. McClure, *Engineering in Europe*.

Photo 6.1 Destroyed maintenance building, Camp Monteith

Camp Monteith operated as a staging area for US MNB-E forces, supporting approximately 2,000 Marines, Army infantry and demining personnel, known as “sappers”; US Navy engineers and Navy “SeaBees”¹⁴⁶, German military engineers, and liaisons from the Greek, Polish, Russian, Ukrainian forces. Camp Monteith also housed the US logistic services firm, Brown and Root

¹⁴⁵ Statements made by an interviewee that the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, had used the Camp briefly could not be verified

¹⁴⁶ Sea-Bee is an adaptation of the US Navy abbreviation ‘CB’ for Construction Battalion (<https://www.navy.com/careers/engineering-applied-science/civil-engineering>)

Contractors (B&R) (Interview 8; McClure, 2000). While military forces had made a small number of hires and purchases in the first weeks, B&R subsequently hired all local workers, and contracted for the majority of construction services and materiel for both Camp Monteith and Bondsteel (ibid). The perception that the military had performed these activities is likely due to the nearly identical uniforms worn by the US military, US civilians and contractors; to the local residents, all uniformed personnel represented KFOR (Interviews 8, 73).

Prior to construction's start, military engineers, sappers and B&R contractors demined acres of surrounding fields and roadways. Within the Camp's grounds proper, "engineers set up seven kilometers of fencing; constructed self-sufficient electrical, water and waste treatment facilities; built 75 South East Asia huts (SEA-huts)¹⁴⁷ for offices and accommodation, and an indoor dining facility by 1 October 1999, just over 90 days since the construction start of 1 July 1999", (GlobalSecurity.org, 2000; McClure, 2000).

Photo 6.2 below show the construction of Camp Monteith from 1 July 1999 to 15 October 1999.



Camp Monteith, 1 July 1999



Camp Monteith, 15 October 1999

(Photos: GlobalSecurity.org. [Http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-monteith.htm](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/facility/camp-monteith.htm))

¹⁴⁷ South East Asia, SEA-huts, were developed for Viet Nam. Typically, SEA-huts are gable roofed single-story buildings designed to be quickly built with dimension lumber and plywood sheathing, and able to be modified for nearly any use.

6.2.1 Recruiting and hiring local residents

Expatriate Kosovo Albanians from the US, and translators from Albania accompanied KFOR into Kosovo (Interview 84). Aside from a small number of additional translators¹⁴⁸, few local residents were hired during the three or four-week pre-construction phase of Camp Monteith. None of those interviewed in Gjilan had knowledge of how these first employees were informed of the jobs, and most speculated some combination of outreach and word of mouth was used¹⁴⁹ (Interviews 8, 73, 84). Nevertheless, within 30 days approximately 7,000 local residents and 1,000 expatriates were employed to build Camp Monteith, together with, according to McClure, “German engineers, US Army engineers, SeaBees and B&R contractors operated 24-hours a day to meet their 1 October deadline until Camp Monteith was close to completion” (McClure, 2000:5).

With up to 7,000 local residents employed to build Camp Monteith at salaries of 1,000 to 2,000 USD per month for at least 12 months, the re/construction of Camp Monteith was a source of unprecedented economic opportunity for the residents of Gjilan. A conservative estimate of 1,000 USD per month for 1,000 employees¹⁵⁰ adds 1 million USD to Gjilan Municipality’s economy each month, and an infusion of approximately 12 million USD into the Gjilan Municipality per year. Interviews find base employees primarily used their salaries to support family members, and repair or improve their homes¹⁵¹. Additional interpreters, cleaners, dining facility and maintenance workers, and mechanics would likely have been hired at similar rates

¹⁴⁸ At least some of these first hires were Serb language speakers. (Interview 7)

¹⁴⁹ Favoritism, or gatekeeping, by expatriate Kosovo Albanians did occur initially, but the wide casting into the community substantially reduced its effect (Interview 8, 84).

¹⁵⁰ 1000 Gjilan residents is used for simplicity. However, it is likely there would also have been a small proportion of base employees that originated from outside of the Gjilan Municipality.

¹⁵¹ In several cases, young adult children built their own houses and moved out of their parents’ home, a significant break from patriarchal tradition.

to support Camp operations in late August and September in preparation for the October deadline.

These high salaries are likely to have contributed to localized price increases, particularly for fresh food and meat following the conclusion of the World Food Program blanket food distribution (FAO, 2000)¹⁵². Although Kosovo saw an annual inflation rate of 11.3 percent in 2001, it had fallen to 4 percent in 2003 (Provisional Institutions of Self Government, 2003); Kosovo's average annual inflation rate for the entire study period was 3.4 percent (Kosovo Agency for Statistics, 2017). Gjilan may have experienced some localized inflation in the earliest years, but the localized rate appeared to have also decreased with that of Kosovo until Kosovo unilaterally converted its currency from the Deutschmark to the euro in 2002, then the annual inflation rate was contained in Kosovo's average.

Tyrbedari (2006) in her research of euroization outside of the Euro zone, affirms international community demands for housing, food and other goods and services had significantly contributed to localized price rises and inflation throughout Kosovo, as is noted in the post-conflict literature (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007). However, such increases were also temporary, as the inflation decreases when the new levels of demand are satisfied (Carnahan, et al., 2005). Regardless of its' accuracy, Gjilan interviewees widely believed prices increased during the change from the Deutschmark to the Euro¹⁵³ in 2002 (Interviews 26, 73; also, Tyrbedari, 2006) rather than due to the presence of KFOR, international organizations or other outside factors. Ulaj (2015) also found transportation costs rose nearly 60 percent in 2007, a world-wide outcome of the global oil-related events surrounding the 2008 and 2011 price

¹⁵² While this free food was essential for the first year after the war, anecdotes by farmers stated the concurrent "dumping" of food products into Kosovo by its neighbors drastically reduced their profits. For example, farmers could not raise chickens in Kosovo for the price of frozen chickens shipped in from Macedonia (Interview 37, also Beilock, 2005).

¹⁵³ The official bank conversion rate for Deutschmark (DM) to Euro (€) conversion in 2002 was 1.9551 DM to 1€, which had the perceived effect of doubling the cost of goods and services for the purchaser.

spikes (Ulaj, et al., 2015), which was likely to be a larger contributor to the overall increases in food and consumer goods throughout Kosovo than the international community. Hence, from 2003 until the end of the study period, 2012¹⁵⁴, Gjilan's inflation rate was included in Kosovo's overall; Kosovo's rate was the same or below the rate of its neighbors, between 2 and 3 percent (Central Intelligence Agency Factbook, 2017), even accounting for the significant spikes in Kosovo's overall inflation: 26 percent in 2008, and 19 percent in 2011 (Kosovo Agency of Statistics, 2017)¹⁵⁵ that had resulted from external economic conditions.

6.2.2 Local purchasing

Food, fuel, supplies and building materials for military use were prepositioned¹⁵⁶ in Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro and trucked in by military or B&R convoys (Interviews 8, 84; also, GlobalSecurity.org, 2000). According to the US military, civilian personnel, and local residents with personal knowledge, shops and businesses were not open in Gjilan¹⁵⁷ at the conclusion of the war in June 1999, and very few opened until weeks or months afterward (Interviews 23, 24, 25, 26, 34). Most Gjilan residents had moved to live with family in safer areas, or had left Kosovo completely as refugees (ibid). Those residents that remained in the area had survived by smuggling, or trading for food that had been smuggled in from outside Kosovo, sold from the back of automobiles (Interviews 23, 24, 25, 26, 34, 73). By October 1999 retail shops that sold hardware and spare parts, plastic household goods, and consumables (cigarettes, drinks, and packaged food and snacks) were open regularly. The first significant businesses to reopen in Gjilan were two small petrol stations, both in late October or early November 1999 (Interview 8, 73). See Photo 6.3.

¹⁵⁴ This average includes inflation spikes in 2008 and 2012 which are due to global events.

¹⁵⁵ Consumer Price Index CPI figures are available from 2007 forward (Statistics, 2017).

¹⁵⁶ All MNB lead nations did this; informal conversation with US Air Force logistics officer based in Tirana in April 1999.

¹⁵⁷ Most recall KLA took over buildings and many homes; when shops opened, the KLA extorted money, food and supplies from the owners.




Photo 6.3 Gjilan retail, October 1999

Photo: McClure (2000)

It is important to state here that *only* mounted patrols and a very small number of KFOR personnel such as deminers, civilian logisticians and engineers had the opportunity to leave the base (Interviews 8, 72, 73, 84), in part because arson and armed fighting had still not ended. Opportunities were further limited to daylight working hours¹⁵⁸ except the 24-hour patrols, and by the Kosovo-wide curfew imposed by KFOR from 10:00 pm until 4:00 am. This significantly limited the number of base personnel able to purchase merchandise from the local businesses that began to emerge. In addition, only bagged foods and non-alcoholic bottled drinks were permitted to be consumed. Restaurants were 'off limits' to prevent food borne illnesses; Soldiers were directed to eat solely in base dining facilities or consume pre-packaged food such as Meals, Ready to Eat, MREs, while on patrol. Therefore, the expected price spikes and shortages typically associated with a rapid influx of wealthy outsiders consuming local food¹⁵⁹, fuel, housing, and transportation (Ammitzboll & Tychsen, 2007) did not materialize in Gjilan specifically because of KFOR.

¹⁵⁸ Both military and civilian personnel required advance approval for travel off base. These requirements were still in effect for military during the research period in 2014.

¹⁵⁹ Due to the extreme number of refugees and two lost growing seasons, the World Food Program conducted a 'food blanket' and provided food aid to nearly 100 percent of Kosovo residents for approximately one year, where after it continued based on need (FAO, 2000). An unintended consequence was Kosovo's own agriculture sector could not compete with the wide availability of free food.

While small amounts of gravel and rock had been initially purchased from local quarries, most building materials for Camp Monteith originated from outside of Kosovo for several months (Interviews 8, 25, 73), especially gravel and concrete from Skopje, Macedonia to fill the demand for an average of 4000 cubic meters/day (Interviews 8, 25, 73; McClure, 2000).¹⁶⁰ To reduce transportation costs, KFOR engineers at Camp Monteith located the former managers of the shuttered socially owned gravel company 'Glama' for gravel and crushed stone (McClure, 2000:15). KFOR repaired its equipment and resumed quarrying operations (McClure, 2000:15; Mertens, 1999), and Glama became the primary gravel materials supplier for KFOR¹⁶¹ by the end of 1999.

Few business owners were willing to be interviewed concerning their previous or current work with KFOR. One agreed, a Gjilan-based gravel and construction material company, through a referral provided by a US civilian¹⁶² that worked in facility management on Camp Bondsteel. This company had started as a family owned wood cutting company, and it had specifically redirected its business to take advantage of the new ring road construction¹⁶³. His daughter, the company accountant and co-owner of the family business described the company origins:

"My father cut and sold wood before the war. In September or October [1999] my father borrowed money from family to buy a *kombi* (a type of passenger van) and became a transportation company to shuttle Camp Monteith employees living in remote villages to and from the Camp until late Spring 2000. During the winter, he got the rights to a small unworked quarry, and started a construction material business specifically to provide materials to KFOR for roads. He went directly to KFOR to inform them of the business and they used him right away.

¹⁶⁰ Interview 73 noted the Macedonian government resisted losing KFOR business, which had significantly improved its own economy.

¹⁶¹ Glama had been poorly maintained in the decade before the war. KFOR purchased existing stocks of stone and gravel; repaired and restored quarrying equipment and managed quarry explosives (McClure, 2000:15). Glama was contacted, but not willing to be interviewed during the field visits.

¹⁶² Interview 8; this individual had been a military police Soldier in 1999, but returned to Kosovo as a US civilian in 2004. He gave one interview because he was among the first to arrive and wanted to provide his experience. He confirmed few US or Kosovo civilians will agree to be interviewed due to fear of loss of KFOR's business or employment. See also Chapter 3.

¹⁶³ The ring road was requested by the Gjilan Municipality. KFOR agreed to build the ring road to improve patrol movement and to reduce congestion made worse by convoys and heavy construction traffic that had negatively affected Gjilan's City center. The new road also improved commerce on the north side of the city and facilitated the return of Kosovo Serb refugees and IDPs.

The company started with 20 people and we employed up to 300 people at the peak in 2005. One of the most important things Camp Bondsteel did for us was to pay every week in cash so we could meet the payroll and other obligations. The demand for road materials is much less now, but our company continues to operate with a regular workforce of 150 to 180 people. We work mostly for the Gjilan Municipality today, but KFOR was the reason for our success” (Interview 26).

This interview and several other informal conversations suggest KFOR bought gravel from a small number of local companies for road repair and re/construction, and the construction was performed in conjunction with the Gjilan municipality, which similarly hired local workers. This material is in addition to KFOR’s materials purchases from Glama for its own use in camp construction.

The economic contribution of the construction material business to Gjilan is substantial. Based strictly upon the aforementioned daily demand of 4000 cubic meters of gravel, and an estimate of 11 USD¹⁶⁴ per tonne, over 63,300 USD was purchased through the Gjilan economy for materials per day. More significantly, the local salaries for the 200-300 quarry employees create a purchasing value of 1,000-1500 USD daily¹⁶⁵, which combined, contributed nearly 2 million USD per month for this project alone. Therefore, while the US KFOR made very few direct local purchases, the purchasing volume created a large economic contribution to the Gjilan Municipality and its communities between 1999 and 2005.

6.2.3 Community Relations

Interviews with US personnel, Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb residents, and officials in Gjilan, find the US KFOR based at Camp Monteith generally had had positive relations with the local community and the Gjilan-based civilian international organizations from the bases’ initial establishment through hand-over to the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) in 2005. Interviews with first hand observers especially point to the close collaboration between KFOR Military Police

¹⁶⁴ Kosovo retail for crushed stone. Estimate based on *Cost Benefit Analysis in Kosmac Limestone Deposit, Republic of Kosovo, 2013*. [https://www.insikapub.com/Vol-01/No-03/23IJBAS\(1\)\(3\).pdf](https://www.insikapub.com/Vol-01/No-03/23IJBAS(1)(3).pdf)

¹⁶⁵ Estimate based on monthly salary of 150 USD for 200 and 300 employees.

patrols and United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to oversee and protect returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees of all ethnicities (Interviews 8, 23, 29, 72; Morris, 1999), and of KFOR patrols assisting UNHCR efforts to shelter and meet the physical needs of all the local population by sharing security information (Etchemendy, 2010:15). Similar cooperation with KFOR was noted between UNMIK and Kosovo Police, who attended many of the same anti-crime meetings (Interview 8, 27, 28). The refurbished Camp Monteith was turned over to the KPC in the mid-summer of 2005, and all US military activities were relocated to Camp Bondsteel.

6.3 Establishing Camp Bondsteel

The 900-acre site for Camp Bondsteel is located in the Ferizaj Municipality, approximately 20 miles southwest of Camp Monteith. Ferizaj was a trade city prior to the Ottomans, with one of the more ethnically diverse communities. It was slowly industrialized after the Second World War; its primary industries included agriculture, forestry and wood processing; metal processing, and transportation (Cardno, 2015; Etemi, 2005). Although the Ferizaj Municipality had sustained relatively little war damage to its urban infrastructure, homes and farms were damaged by ethnically motivated arson and destruction from mid-1998 through the end of the war in June 1999 (OSCE, 2003) and much of its industry has been dismantled and buildings shuttered. The estimated ethnic profile of the Ferizaj Municipality¹⁶⁶ before the war was 82 percent Kosovo Albanians, 9.4 percent of Kosovo Serbs, and 8.5 percent combined of all other minorities. The City was slightly more homogeneous, with 90 percent Kosovo Albanian, 6.5 percent of Kosovo Serb, and 3.5 percent combined of all other minorities (ibid).

Despite its unusually large size, Camp Bondsteel was designed as a temporary facility (Global Security, 2000; McClure, 2000); its size was the response to wider regional security concerns

¹⁶⁶ Ferizaj City is the seat of the Ferizaj Municipality. The percentage given of Kosovo Serbs in Ferizaj City specifically reflects the Serb proportion of city's population; the majority of Kosovo Serbs live in mono-ethnic villages in the Ferizaj Municipality.

and their corresponding physical operational requirements. First, NATO forces were still conducting Chapter VII peacekeeping in Bosnia-Herzegovina in June 1999 under Stabilization Forces, SFOR, which had been established by UNSCR 1088 in 1996, as relations were still tense between the Federation (Bosniacs and Bosnian Croats), and the Republika Srpska, (Bosnian Serbs) (SFOR, 2007). Secondly, the influx and expense of hundreds of thousands of refugees from Kosovo into Albania and Macedonia were feared to further destabilize and spread violence into these also-poor countries that were contending with their own political challenges (International, 1999; Suhrke, et al., 2000). Finally, Serbia's President Milošević's continued intransigence and hostility toward Kosovo and NATO undermined confidence of any long term regional stability (SFOR, 2007; Human Rights Watch, 2001). Thus, a substantial regional self-sufficient military base became a practical answer to be able to respond to security related events within these unsettled conditions.

Camp Bondsteel's semi-permanent structures were the result of the recently experienced expense, danger and overall substandard performance¹⁶⁷ of the canvas tents used in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the Balkan winters (McClure, 2000:2). Canvas tents proved largely inadequate for long-term use as work or sleep areas; most of the tents had to be reinforced with wooden frames, floors and interior plywood walls within the first year for adequate wind resistance and insulation, over which the canvas fabric covering had to be continually repaired or replaced. Thus, the wood frame buildings and additional semi-permanent metal structures, such as those used for aircraft hangars, storage and maintenance, were ultimately more practical and cost effective (ibid) in addition to providing more comfortable working and living conditions.

¹⁶⁷ The canvas tents with plywood walls and floors were a constant health and fire hazard, especially as sleeping and office tents were heated in the winter with diesel space heaters, or electric heaters powered by large diesel-fueled generators. Tents were impossible to cool in the summer, difficult to heat and leaked during and after heavy rains or snow (McClure, 2000:2; author's personal experience).

Prior to KFOR's arrival in June 1999, the US Army Corps of Engineers (COE)¹⁶⁸ had researched aerial photographs and maps that were used in earlier business relations with the former Yugoslavia¹⁶⁹ (Curtis, 1992:144; McClure, 2000). Camp Bondsteel's location was selected through the evaluation of these aerial photographs and terrain modeling of several potential sites suitable for the MNB-E base construction (Interviews 8, 73, 84; McClure, 2000), a regular practice for site selection (Anderson, et al., 2014). The senior civil engineer on site in June 1999, stated Camp Bondsteel's present location was a sound design and a practical military choice (Interview 73),

“This location was one of few sites large enough to contain all the necessary facilities to support up to 5,000 troops and an airfield. It also contained relatively few buildings that would need to be removed or relocated.

The site had good access to two major roads: the north-south highway leading to Pristina, Kosovo's capital city, and Skopje, the capital of Macedonia, and the east-west road that connects Ferizaj and Gjilan. Finally, the sites' elevation allowed unrestricted views of the surrounding landscape for nearly 360 degrees.” (Interview 73)

Once on the ground, the COE visited landowners and neighbors adjacent to the property, and later worked with the Ferizaj Municipality to locate remaining landowners and arrange for their compensation (Interview 18, 65, 73) per US Army and COE policy (Army, 1958; McClure, 2000:9). Due to the short construction schedule, some individual parcels of land within the site were taken before each owner could be notified, but all property owners were eventually found (Interviews 65, 73; McClure, 2000:9). Annual lease payments were based on the market value of the property before the war, an accepted real estate valuation method (Army, 1958), and were believed to be fair by the land owners (Interviews 18, 65, 73). Photo 6.4 below shows the construction of Camp Bondsteel from 15 June 1999 to 15 October 1999.

¹⁶⁸ The US Army Corps of Engineers is a US federal civilian, not a military, civil engineering organization.

¹⁶⁹ The US had partnered with Yugoslavia for agricultural improvements such as for wheat and sugar beets, thus had aerial photographs.



Photo: McClure, 2000

Camp Bondsteel, 15 June 1999



Photo: Task Force Falcon Public Affairs Office

Camp Bondsteel, 15 October 1999

Photo 6.4 Camp Bondsteel construction

6.3.1 Recruiting and hiring local residents

The construction of Camps Monteith and Bondsteel was concurrent. Announcement of opportunities to work on Camp Bondsteel was initially made by radio messages and posters, but was more quickly spread by word of mouth; interested residents could go directly to the main gate to apply for a position (Interview 8, 11, 13, 14). Brown and Root (B&R) similarly hired all local workers. To meet the 1 November 1999 deadline,¹⁷⁰ several thousand local men were trained in construction skills and plumbing and electrical trades (McClure, 2000). See Photo 6.5.

Most local laborers had to be trained to do tasks assigned to them, such as drywalling




Photo 6.5 Local workers on Camp Bondsteel, September 1999 (McClure (2000))

¹⁷⁰ The 1 November deadline was set to have all personnel housed in semi-permanent buildings before winter began, a lesson learned in Bosnia when military and civilian personnel lived and worked in canvas tents for over a year.

At the completion of their training, the new workers, military engineers and B&R managers, were formed into teams to build the SEA-huts¹⁷¹ and other base structures (ibid). A similar recruiting process was used to hire and train workers for the dining facility, laundry, cleaning and light maintenance. Base construction continued 24 hours a day, seven days a week, stopping only for equipment maintenance breaks, for over 90 days. At its height, some 7,000 workers had been hired and were working on Camps Bondsteel and Monteith (McClure, 2000; Interview 73). Men and women were likely to have been hired at the same rates, but were also hired into typical gender-stratified positions. Women and gender roles are discussed in Section Two of this chapter.

Official KFOR and B&R information concerning local worker salaries is absent. Anecdotally, however, early salaries ranged from a high of 5,000 USD per month (Oye, 2010) for skilled professionals to a more typical 1,000 USD per month for dining facility, maintenance and laundry workers, at a time when most local salaries were barely 200 Deutschmarks (Héthy, 2000:14)¹⁷². Using only the lowest salaries of 1,000 USD/month for a low estimate of 5,000 workers, the Ferizaj Municipality would have realized 5,000,000 USD per month through work at Camp Bondsteel. Like Gjilan, Ferizaj's inflation was included in Kosovo's annual 11.3 percent rate and had dropped to a similar 4 percent inflation rate in 2003 (Kosovo Agency for Statistics, 2017).

6.3.2 Local Purchasing

Although the Ferizaj Municipality was less damaged than Gjilan, it was also far more rural.

Interviewees stated no businesses were open at their arrival, or had opened for many weeks

¹⁷¹ SEA-huts are simple wood buildings designed for temporary use. Developed for Viet Nam, SEA is an abbreviation for South East Asia.

¹⁷² Per informal conversation: According to an US Air Force logistics officer working in Albania in 1999, the high salaries were based on Western European hiring salaries, and had not yet been adjusted to the local level. See also <http://prishtinainsight.com/kosovars-follow-money-warzones-mag/>

(Interviews 8, 73, 84). As the community businesses reopened, and new construction services and material companies were established in October and November, B&R and the US military engineers visited and invited local companies to bid for work on Camp Bondsteel, particularly for the precast concrete sections used for SEAHut footers (Interview 73). The co-owner of one of the first construction and materials company hired for Camp Bondsteel describes his visit:

“My three brothers and I were working in Switzerland, waiting to be able to return. When we learned that NATO was going to bomb Serbia, we knew the time had come and we left [for Kosovo]. We combined our savings, about 200,000 DM, and bought this property to start our construction business because we wanted to rebuild Kosovo.

Each of us has his own area of responsibility: mine is business development. One brother manages the materials yard, another the fleet of vehicles and the fourth has project management. KFOR came to us because we specialize in earthwork and horizontal construction – excavation; roads, bridges and other heavy operations. Our company employed between 200 and 300 at the peak, today we’re about half that. We continue to do some road repairs on Camp Bondsteel, but the (Ferizaj) Municipality is now the largest customer (Interview 9).”

Contracts with KFOR appeared to have had negative as well as positive effects. Working for KFOR was a source of prestige, and inferred both a high level of competence, and financial capability, as companies were required to meet US Federal Acquisitions Regulation¹⁷³ requirements for insurance and bonding. In addition, a contract with KFOR would be expected to be at higher value than with a local client, thereby generating a higher income for the company. At the same time, a large contract with KFOR would also have likely taken these contractors and their subcontractors¹⁷⁴ ‘off the market’ for use by the local community, thereby setting conditions for an artificial scarcity and subsequent higher costs for products and services. Several business owners also acknowledged their success had increased expectations for employment and other favors by family, friends and the community, and therefore found it better to maintain a very low public profile (Interview 9, 20).

¹⁷³ The Federal Acquisition Regulations, FAR, requires contractors and vendors to be bonded to guarantee project completion. This requirement is rarely substantially relaxed in post-conflict environments.

¹⁷⁴ Contractors and vendors were not obligated to pay their employees or subcontractors at higher than local rates. Thus, local companies contracted by B&R should not be assumed to have paid high salaries to their employees or subcontractors (McKenna, 2002:16).

6.3.3 Community relations

The academic and gray literature often states local elites and community leaders attempt to represent “their people” to the military forces in order to increase their personal influence and status in the community, (Cheng, 2013:11; Pugh, 2001:350) a point also specifically made in the 1999 OSCE Verification Missions report (OSCE, 1999). However, the Mayor of Ferizaj and other officials in Ferizaj did not appear to have more than a thin relationship with KFOR’s leaders. (Interviews 52, 56, 58, 69, 70, 71; also, Etchemendy, 2010:15). Both senior community and military leaders interviewed mention little more than attending the monthly formal luncheon meetings on Camp Bondsteel with the US KFOR commander to discuss topics of common interest, such as infrastructure repairs and local security. Also absent in literature concerning Kosovo are the frequent informal meetings between civil-military personnel, mid-level community officials and technical staff regarding the details of these same issues; military patrols, and the daily interaction with the community by the Liaison Monitoring Teams (Etchemendy, 2010:15). The LMTs are discussed more fully in Chapter 10.

6.4 Base Operations Summary

This study of the military bases established by the US KFOR in Gjilan and Ferizaj reveals physically self-contained systems for base administration and sustainment operations; a substantial demand upon the local community for employment at very high salaries; a low level of local purchasing to establish and maintain the base (with the exception of stone and gravel), and very low level of interaction with political and business leaders. These are balanced by a significant interaction at the mid-and low-levels of both Municipal employees and military personnel.

Table 6.1 compares the initial hypothesis with the results of these characteristics observed in the field:

	Hiring	Purchasing	Community Relations
Hypothesis	Direct hires in large numbers at high salaries	Inflated prices emerge due to IC demand for scarce housing, food, fuel; become too high for local incomes	Local leaders attempt to influence military forces for own benefit; may infer return to violence
US KFOR	Centralized hires: very large numbers; over 7,000, at very high salaries, \$1,000-\$5,000/month for ~ five years.	Centralized purchasing. Low demand for local resources. Very high volume of construction materials for ~ 10 years.	Infrequent, mostly formal relations with local leaders. Frequent informal relations with military personnel

Table 6.1: Comparison of hypothesis expectations and field observations.

The variance between the initial hypotheses, which were based on academic and organizational literature, and the findings from the field research, suggest both the early material self-sufficiency to establish the base and the limited personal freedom of KFOR military personnel substantially reduced many of the anticipated negative characteristics to establish these camps. Intentional or not, their actions were aligned with best practice recommendations to reduce peacekeeper crime and unprofessional behavior that were found in the United Nations' investigation of the economic impact of their peacekeeping operations (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Carnahan, et al., 2006).

6.5 Political, Social and Economic effect of Camp Bondsteel 2000 – 2012

This section of the Ferizaj case study is founded on the central research question, *“How do the everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict environments affect the post-war political economy and what are the implications for peacebuilding?”* Among the criticism of international and non-governmental organizations are the “widespread societal and economic changes in the community caused by the employment of community residents for their daily organizational operations” (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; also, Carnahan, 2005; Sciarra, 2008). This sub-section specifically examines the social, political and economic changes in Ferizaj, including the communities' perception of employment on the base, and how those

employed by KFOR saw themselves. These areas are further considered by gender to identify changes in cultural and social standing, and vulnerability and exploitation (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004; Sciarra, 2008), finding general agreement with feminist literature. The base's long term economic effects are primarily examined as new business development.

6.5.1 Political Effects

Like most Municipalities, Ferizaj's municipal and city government offices were taken over by former KLA members directly after the war (Cheng, 2013:72; International Crisis Group, 2000:i), who both established an unofficial provisional government and often challenged the authority of understaffed UNMIK. The hero-status of the KLA, coupled with an intense sense of justified privilege after years of exclusion, made the removal and eviction of former KLA members from these offices particularly destabilizing (ibid). Consequently, the KLA remained in place, closely monitored until elections, whereby most were voted out for their violence and poor performance (KIPRED, 2006). According to KIPRED, elections held in Ferizaj from 2000-2004 were also highly influenced by central party offices of the *Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës* (Democratic League of Kosovo), LDK, and later the *Partia Demokratike e Kosovës* (Democratic Party of Kosovo), PDK in Pristina (KIPRED, 2006; Morina, 2011). Moreover KIPRED stresses, there is "tremendous pressure on the [local] parties to respond to the international community rather than its voters [as] their greater vulnerability is to the former," which has subsequently led to both a decreased confidence and legitimacy of local governments, and a parallel increased reliance on informal local community leaders (KIPRED, 2006:28). Such loss of confidence in Kosovo institutions ultimately undermined the work of UNMIK and governance organizations, such as the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG), the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX), and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and therefore, long-term Kosovar political and economic development (ibid).

Thus, while the academic and grey literature provides ample evidence of malign actor's attempt to build relations with military forces to benefit themselves, (Cheng, 2013:70; Münch,2013), it is the PISG, UNMIK and EULEX that have a direct impact of the on local leaders' present and future activities in Kosovo. Accordingly, local leaders' do not gain substantially from an alliance with KFOR, nor gain leverage in favor of their political party, so have little incentive to approach KFOR. Hence, a distant and formal relationship has resulted between the KFOR's leaders and those of the local communities. In addition, KFOR¹⁷⁵ and especially the United States military, attempt to take a firm apolitical stance in an effort to circumvent political no-win situations, thus avoiding unintentional support for 'the wrong' individual or organization. This in turn, has generally allowed KFOR to appear unbiased and more trustworthy than UNMIK and other organizations which actively engage in Kosovo's political affairs. This positive reputation further encourages KFOR not to deviate from this hands-off approach with local community leaders.

A very small number of former US KFOR employees were found have developed careers in local and federal politics, less than five of the thousands of Kosovars hired, therefore, KFOR was unlikely to have major influence through its former employees (Interviews 13, 80).

At the same time, the UNDP report *Kosovo Mosaic 2012* found an exceptionally high satisfaction and confidence level with the Ferizaj Municipality leadership (UNDP & USAID, 2012: 35). Given that the Ferizaj Municipality's personal income is one of the highest in Kosovo (KOSME, 2014:1), and higher degree of paid property taxes, point of sale taxes, and permitting fees, this satisfaction in community leadership is likely an indirect result of the overall greater prosperity afforded by the high base wages. Thus, the base had widespread indirect and unintentional effects on the politics of local community, though chiefly as a large employment center, rather than a political actor.

¹⁷⁵ Although the NATO countries at the international level have openly displayed their preferences for Kosovo's candidates and parties, the military forces on the ground attempt to act as impartially as possible.

6.5.2 Social Effects

A common criticism of the military, and international and non-governmental organizations are the changes in acceptable behavior and attitudes caused by the employment of local residents (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, 2005; Sciarra, 2008). Nevertheless, interviews and informal conversations¹⁷⁶ with community members were unwaveringly positive concerning Camp Bondsteel and with those that had worked on the base. Nearly all had personal knowledge, or substantial second-degree knowledge through family members, close friends or neighbors, that presently work or had worked on the base. Base employment was a source of respect and pride. Individuals were not only familiar with both the very-high salaries paid by Camp Bondsteel¹⁷⁷, but also approved of the high salaries “because the money was spent in Ferizaj” and therefore, “the whole community benefitted” (Interviews 19, 31, 32, 40-43, 64). This community-benefit perspective was most pronounced concerning friends and family of the considerable number of Ferizaj residents that had worked at Camp Bondsteel and were later recruited by Brown & Root for truck driver, mechanic, carpenters, food service and maintenance positions in Iraq and Afghanistan. Up to 8,000 Kosovar’s worked in these positions between 2001 – 2011; over 2,100 Kosovars worked for Brown & Root in Afghanistan during 2011 alone (GAP, 2011), a substantial number of them originating from Ferizaj (Halili & Fazliu, 2015).

For individuals, working on Camp Bondsteel, the job was not solely a source of income, but of status and pride. A former Camp Bondsteel warehouseman¹⁷⁸ recalled during an informal conversation:

¹⁷⁶ Conversations other than interviews, including informal talk while waiting in queues; taxi/parking lot attendants; business, service and wait staff, and with professional administrative staff.

¹⁷⁷ Salaries for unskilled workers in June 1999 were 1,500-1,200 USD per month; by May 2014 salaries were 500-700 USD per month.

¹⁷⁸ Continued employment required English language skills. English classes were provided, but this employee had declined.

“When I worked on Camp Bondsteel people looked up to me; I was someone.
Now I am nobody.”

This sentiment of status was consistent with all interviewees who had worked on a KFOR base, regardless of the duration and position held (Interviews 9, 10, 20, 48, 50, 53, 55, 57).

Respondents also stated their prior employment on base was a significant advantage when seeking new employment or business in their community (*ibid*). Although many residents did continue to seek additional employment with B&R and similar logistics contractors¹⁷⁹, few base employees sought employment with other international non-governmental organizations. Most were thought to remain in their community using their new skills in carpentry, groundworks and other trades (Interviews 19, 73), in contrast to criticism found in international organization literature (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; also, Carnahan, 2005; Sciarra, 2008).

Translators, with their more marketable expertise to the international community, were the exception, and actively sought employment with these organizations when their contracts with KFOR were complete (Interviews 13, 38, 73). Very few highly skilled Kosovar professionals were hired to work on base; none were known to be working on base outside of their career field¹⁸⁰.

However, the reputation of those who had been fired from their job with KFOR was badly damaged. These former employees were generally unable to find work locally despite their employment on the base, and instead joined a family business, become self-employed, left the municipality or migrated out of Kosovo entirely (Interviews 11, 38, 73).

¹⁷⁹ Dyn-Corps and Fluor also held contracts for these services in Afghanistan, Iraq and Central African Republic, and similarly recruited former Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel worker to fill positions at salaries from 4000-6000 USD/month (Plesch, 2015).

¹⁸⁰ Author’s personal knowledge of two local high-skill professionals, an architect and a civil engineer.

6.5.3 Employment and Influence on Women

The experiences of women working on Camp Bondsteel were more complex. Women who had worked on base described similar increased pride and self-respect (Interviews 11, 30, 64, 78). At the same time, many older male family members, typically those living abroad, openly disapproved of their employment (Interviews 11, 30, 31, 32, 64, 78, 85). Economic need for the woman's income generally overruled such disapproval (ibid), but some women were exploited¹⁸¹ by their families and personally gained little benefit from their salary (Interviews 78, 85).

In addition, women and the families of women working on the base were often subject to community disapproval. Accusations such as "indecent, shameful wives and disgraceful mothers working with strange men" and "terrible women leaving their children (with other family members)" were common, especially if the woman had accepted a position in Afghanistan or Iraq (Interviews 31, 32, 64, 78, 85). Unmarried women that worked on base were usually considered to be less desirable for marriage, or simply unmarriageable (ibid). None of the women interviewed had personal knowledge of women that had left their jobs due to family or social pressure, but individually assumed there would have been some. These women also stated the negative attitude toward women working on base decreased significantly with the increase of women employed, and the continued presence of the military base (Interviews 11, 64, 78, 84). Congruent with feminist literature, women tended to be hired into traditional gender appropriate positions¹⁸², mainly cleaning, kitchen, laundry and retail.

¹⁸¹ An example is a woman's salary would be controlled or given to her husband or father for distribution to family members.

¹⁸² Kosovar women remain primary caretakers of the family, thus women might accept less responsible positions to accommodate their family responsibilities, rather than have been denied them. This condition was already common for working women in Yugoslavia, including Kosovo, prior to the establishment of Camp Bondsteel.

Men and women in similar positions appeared to have been paid at the same rate, but far fewer women than men were managers (ibid).

In some cases, the women's job on base challenged acceptable gender roles. As example, women in Kosovo rarely work where alcohol is served, and coffee shops in Kosovo typically serve alcoholic beverages. Thus, a woman working in a Camp Bondsteel coffee shop described her experience:

"I used to work at the jewelry counter at the PX¹⁸³, but that closed, and I was transferred to work at one of the coffee shops. At first, everyone, even my best friends, were against me working in a coffee shop on the camp. I couldn't tell some of my family where I worked. But we only have coffee and hot chocolate and cold drinks – no alcohol. The military and everyone is respectful and there was another girl working there already, so eventually it was OK. Even my parents got used to it. Now it's nothing and about half of us that work in the Bondsteel coffee shops are women" (Interview 11).

The women interviewed stated they did not personally experience harassment or gender discrimination by military personnel or contractors¹⁸⁴ nor did they have knowledge of others that had. However, the number of women interviewed was small, thus while the statements may be individually accurate, they cannot be considered completely representative.

Nevertheless, women's groups, both local civil society and international organization leaders, stated the military base has been an overall positive influence for women:

"The base hires many women; they earn their own money and are more respected by their families. Military women are also good role models (for the community) because everyone can see women in charge of men and doing a good job (Interview 29).

"The KFOR soldiers have shown a lot of support for us and our work [for women]. They have helped us by repairing and painting our (domestic abuse) shelters; by providing us with all kinds of donations¹⁸⁵ and they spend time with the children¹⁸⁶. The community

¹⁸³ Post Exchange, PX, the non-food retail store typically found on US and other military bases.

¹⁸⁴ Rather, it was more typical for Kosovo Albanian men to be rude, or act and speak inappropriately toward Kosovar women working on base.

¹⁸⁵ KFOR soldiers often 'adopted' a local school or charity during their four-month to one-year deployment and made minor building repairs, and distributed clothing, school supplies, toiletries and toys donated by their families and friends 'back home.'

¹⁸⁶ Typically sports: soccer/football and basketball or English language lessons.

knows this. They also tell us what they see during their patrols, so we can help the most vulnerable children and women.” (Interview 30).

A women business owner interviewed likewise believed military women are good role models;

“It is good to see military women in our community; they behave well and set a good example. However, it is more important that the improved security has made it possible for our women to come ‘out of the house’ and enjoy the rights we already had (during communism.) The young girls today are so happy to go out for a coffee, but in those times, we could do anything.” (Interview 26)

Male political leaders in Ferizaj and Gjilan stated they were unsure whether the military base had made a specific difference for women, but agree they have been more open to hiring women since its establishment:

“I am not sure it is because of KFOR, but now, if I have two candidates for the same job, I will take the woman. Women are more loyal; they work hard, and they don’t become corrupt like men” (Interview 19)

“My wife does not work but I want good opportunities for my daughters. I had never thought of this before, but I do believe we need to have the women out in our society.” (Interview 34)

Other interviewees also expressed the end of the “Serb oppression” or “Serb occupation” was the most significant factor that made it safe for women to work and move freely. (Interviews 26, 50, 53, 62).

Yet, despite the economic benefit and an increasing acceptability of women working outside the home, just 10.5 percent of women in the Ferizaj Municipality were employed outside of the home in the Ferizaj Municipality between 2000-2012, lower than the Kosovo average of 12.4% (UNDP & USAID, 2012). This is likely to be the result that fewer ‘feminine industries,’ such as textiles had been established in Ferizaj during its industrialization period, thus 10.5 percent may be on par, or higher than past figures. Nevertheless, these examples suggest that Camp Bondsteel provides exposure and acceptability of non-traditional opportunities for women, and appears to have had an overall positive influence on women and men.

6.5.4 Economic Effects

The Municipality of Ferizaj was industrialized later than Gjakova and Prizren; its same-named central city only developed in the late 1900's and "more closely resembles a large village than an urban space despite its location at the crossroads of primary east-west and north-south roadways" (Warrander & Knaus, 2010)¹⁸⁷. Like Gjakova, many of Ferizaj's SOEs were agriculturally based including meat and leather processing; forestry, and wood furniture and wood building material manufacturing. According to the European Stability Initiative (2003), 22 of Ferizaj's SOEs have been privatized, however, they continue to employ far fewer workers than they had in the past (Asanaj, 2009; European Stability Initiative, 2003). As in other municipalities, it is small businesses, mostly sole proprietorships, that have replaced SOEs as the primary sources of income in Ferizaj (UNDP & USAID, 2012).

Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel were built at the same time and under the same US KFOR leadership and conditions, hence the majority of economic changes in the Gjilan and Ferizaj Municipalities are similar. Additionally, many of Camp Monteith's workers transferred¹⁸⁸ to Camp Bondsteel upon Monteith's handover to the KPC. Therefore, this subsection includes Gjilan in its assessment, and examines construction services, construction trades, and retail trade, which represent the sectors most often identified in post-conflict literature (Cerra & Saxena, 2007). Transportation and Hotels and Restaurants are not analyzed: KFOR's improvements to transportation was specific to military freedom of movement, and KFOR personnel had had negligible use of hotels or restaurants during the research period.

¹⁸⁷Warrander & Knaus (2010) state this effect is primarily due to the influx of residents of small rural towns relocating to Ferizaj for employment on Camp Bondsteel.

¹⁸⁸ The transfer of Camp Monteith to the KPC was well known in advance. Locally hired workers required English language skills, in addition to their individual skills, to be transferred to Camp Bondsteel. Language lessons were provided, however, not all personnel participated or were able to take advantage of them.

Table 6.2 provides a view of Ferizaj and Gjilan business starts by population size in comparison to Kosovo’s average, showing business starts in both Gjilan and Ferizaj are higher than the Kosovo average.

Municipality (Kosovo average)	Business Starts per 1000 residents¹⁸⁹	Business Entry Rate	Business Exit Rate
Ferizaj	101	14.2%	6.0%
Gjilan	91	12.2%	5.4%
Kosovo	76	13.6%	6.5%

Table 6.2 Business Starts by Registration as of 2013

Data source: KOSME, 2014

Noting the low employment of the former SOEs in Ferizaj and Gjilan, Camps Bondsteel and Monteith employed over 7,000 workers for camp construction, from July 1999 until Camp Monteith closed in 2005. Camp Bondsteel continued to employ nearly the same number in combination with its own employees and additional workers recruited by KBR for employment in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Table 6.3 provides sources of income for the Ferizaj and Gjilan municipalities.

Municipality	Work / Employed	Supported by Others in Kosovo*	All Other Sources of Income
Ferizaj	28.1%	45.6%	26.3%
Gjilan	27.7%	47.1%	25.2%
Prizren	29.1%	45.7%	25.2%
Kosovo	28.9%	44.2%	26.9%

Table 6.3 Sources of individual income. Dependents; supported by others includes children, and 65 years and older. All other sources of income include pensions and remittances from abroad. Source: KOSME (2013).

¹⁸⁹ Based upon the 2011 Census

The figures in Table 6.4 likewise show the employment rates of the three municipalities are low, but constant. Gjilan’s percent of workers outside of employment is lower, likely due to the higher average age of workers, (KOSME, 2014) ¹⁹⁰. Table 6.4 provides a comparison of economically active population, as of 2013

Municipality	Percent Employed	Percent Unemployed	Percent Outside*of the Employment Market	Average Wages 2004
Ferizaj	26.1	43.7	30.2	208€
Gjilan	26.4	45.6	28.0	Not available
Prizren	25.4	43.4	31.2	199€
Kosovo	24.7	44.8	30.5	209€

Table 6.4 Percent of population employed, unemployed and outside the employment market. *Includes children below 15 years, elderly over 65, and infirm. Data source: KOSME (2013), Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2005).

Therefore, noting Tables 6.3 and 6.4, Camp’s Monteith and Bondsteel appear to have contributed very little to their local economies. This assessment is based on three factors that may be directly attributed to the military base: first, despite the high number of local residents employed on bases or by B&R, these numbers are still low in proportion to the municipality population; second, with the exception of basic construction materials, there was a very low volume of building materials, food, fuel or other materials purchased for use by the Camps¹⁹¹, and third, a low level of consumption in local café’s, restaurants or shops by military personnel due to health concerns and restrictions in movement off the base.

6.6 Municipal Profile

Using the Kosovo Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Programme (KOSME) categories, Figure 6.1 provides an overview of the five primary business sectors, indicating retail trade was

¹⁹⁰ Youth, persons under 19 years old and typically dependents, comprise 36.9 percent of Gjilan’s population, while youth comprises 39.2 percent of Ferizaj’s population (KOSME, 2014)

¹⁹¹ Based upon usual construction practices. Contractors purchase building materials according to the construction schedule.

most active, followed by transportation and hotel/restaurant business starts. The spike in business starts in 2003 is the result of a successful Kosovo-wide business registration campaign (Interview 83; also, Tax Administration of Kosovo, 2014)




Figure 6.1: Business starts of NACE primary sectors, 2000-2012. Data source: Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry; Kosovo Agency of Statistics

As noted in the first section of this chapter, over 7,000 individuals worked on Camp Monteith and Bondsteel at its peak and at rates much higher than the local salaries until mid-2005. Up to 5,000 individuals continued to be employed on Camp Bondsteel through the 12-year study period. Although the compact size of Kosovo would allow workers to commute, poor roadways limited that number, hence, the majority of employees lived and spent their salary in the Ferizaj or Gjilan Municipalities, especially for home repair and construction.

Ferizaj’s business starts from 2000-2003 were typical of post-conflict reconstruction (Cerra & Saxena, 2007), showing a dramatic rise in small businesses in response to individual initiative and donor spending, a trend that occurred throughout Kosovo. However, such rises are also

fragile “because post-conflict countries often do not have sufficient economic and human resources necessary to self-stabilize when shocks occur” (ibid, 15) and consequently close. This was seen in Ferizaj where the number of construction business starts *decreased* by 50 percent, from 15 starts in 2005 to eight starts in 2006. However, this pronounced drop in business starts was consistent across business sectors and municipalities, indicating exogenous factors, likely the emerging effects of the global economic slowdown of 2007-2008, were the primary drivers. Particularly in Ferizaj and Gjilan, these outside factors are likely to have had a greater influence on businesses than the transfer of this base to the KPC, and transfer of Gjilan employees to Camp Bondsteel.

The 2005 handover of Camp Monteith to the KPC completed the employment contract for many construction workers. Statements from interviews and informal conversations noted several former employees had opened businesses of their own (Interviews 14, 16, 19, 25, 73). As most workers learned a construction *trade*, such as roofing, plumbing and electrical works, rather than for construction *services*, the management of construction operations, the increase in business starts for construction trades was expected to be perceptibly higher than for construction services, particularly as would-be construction companies may have postponed their starts in order to earn a high income while employed at Camp Monteith. Surprisingly, the expected increase in construction-related businesses in Gjilan did not occur, although business starts with 2-4 employees is higher in Gjilan than Ferizaj. While Cerra & Saxena (2007) find econometrically that new business starts taper off and tend not return to their high post-conflict levels, construction business starts in Ferizaj exceeded Gjilan’s soon after the transfer of Camp Monteith to the KPC, therefore, construction businesses may have indeed “followed the money” to Ferizaj.

Figure 6.2 provides a view of Ferizaj and Gjilan’s construction business starts.




Figure 6.2 Construction business starts 2000-2012. Data source: Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry

Ferizaj and Gjilan retail businesses start figures appear to better fit Cerra & Saxena’s model; retail business starts stabilized well below their post-conflict level. See Figure 6.3, retail business starts.




Figure 6.3 Retail business starts 2000-2012. Data source: Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry

6.7 Camp Bondsteel Analysis and Summary

This study using KOSME, online Kosovo Municipality data and publications; Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry list of business registration statistics, and field interviews, find the establishment of Camps Monteith and Bondsteel have had an overall low to low-moderate positive effect on their communities in the political, social and economic areas of interest. This assessment contrasts with much of the academic post-conflict literature which points to increases in malign political activities; dramatic price increases for basic housing, fuel and foodstuffs, and a rise in criminal activities, particularly prostitution and trafficking, that can be directly attributed to the military bases.

Reasons for their absence appear threefold: First, the close governance and law enforcement oversight of UNMIK and the trustee-like relationship with the Provisional Institutions of Self Government (PISG) enabled KFOR to concentrate on its security responsibilities and remain relatively separate from political activity. In addition, KFOR military leaders individually refrained from any appearance of political interest, while civilian contractors were responsible for local employment and purchasing. Thus, community elites had little reason, or reasonable access, to actively influence KFOR's military leaders to benefit themselves as had occurred in Afghanistan, Somalia and other post-conflict environments.

Secondly the social ills usually associated with military and peacekeeper bases, such as prostitution and trafficking, drug use and organized crime, appear to have been significantly mitigated by the US KFOR's strict policies against alcohol, and measures to greatly limit the ability of Soldiers and US civilians to leave the military base. As a result, very few instances of unprofessional behavior were described, and no instances of prostitution or trafficking, drug use or involvement with crime were noted, despite almost 100 field interviews and conversations, including conversations with military intelligence, law enforcement and representatives of local and international women rights and women's health organizations.

For the community residents, working on the military bases was overwhelmingly a source of pride and higher personal social status. The role of women employed on the military base was consistent with feminist literature, particularly that women were hired mostly for line positions in cleaning, laundry, retail and food services, though both men and women were reported to be paid the same salary, and have had the same opportunities for advancement. Yet, the women interviewed also consistently stated they enjoyed an increase in self-respect by earning their own money, which generally mitigated the family and community reproach for working with “strange men” and criticism for “leaving their children” to go to work. Strong disapproval of women working on base had almost entirely subsided at the time of the interviews in 2014.

Thirdly, in contrast with a wide range of post-conflict examples, the economic effects of the bases did not include the usual emergence of a balloon economy caused by peacekeepers’ demand for scarce resources. The military forces self-housed, and food and fuel were imported for Camps Monteith and Bondsteel’s needs. Localized inflation for housing and food peaked at 11.3 percent annually in the cities of Ferizaj and Gjilan in 2001, but inflation overall appeared to be contained to the urbanized area of the Municipalities. In addition, KFOR engineers refurbished a local quarry that had been idle for over a decade and used that quarry for most of its construction materials, and therefore did not compete with businesses in the Gjilan or Ferizaj Municipalities or its residents for those resources. Finally, as KFOR repaired or built roadways and bridges it needed for patrolling, these also directly benefited the mobility and commerce of both municipalities.

While military base salaries were substantially higher than those of other international and civilian organizations, many community members stated those earnings were mostly spent inside the community, and therefore “everyone benefitted.” Per capita, business starts for construction services, trades and retail business were higher in Ferizaj than the Kosovo average; Gjilan’s businesses starts were somewhat lower, but the business sizes in Gjilan were larger

than the Kosovo average,¹⁹² which is a better indicator of economic confidence and stability. Particularly in Ferizaj, the dormant textile and furniture industries appear to have been revived to meet the demand for home furnishings (Cardno, 2015), albeit a much lower level, in addition to the emergence of new building product importers and manufacturers. Further research is necessary to determine what percentage of these newly locally manufactured products remained in Ferizaj as local consumption as a result of base-related income. Nevertheless, their operations clearly supported local employment and reconstruction.

Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel have significantly contributed to the prosperity of both the Municipality of Gjilan and Ferizaj. However, the military bases' political and social effects were relatively minor, and the economic effects were mostly concentrated within the general urban area within those municipalities, rather than the wider region. Ultimately, the self-contained nature of the bases structurally limits the military base to act as largely as an employment center, rather than a catalyst for sustainable business and industry.

¹⁹² Gjilan contained a larger percentage of businesses with 2-4 employees in comparison to Ferizaj, which contained more sole-proprietorships.

Chapter 7: Camp Prizren Case Study

7.0 Introduction

The Camp Prizren case study is comprised of two sections. The first section describes the functions and activities of the German KFOR base, Camp Prizren, established after the 1999 Kosovo War. It opens with a brief history of the region and the city, and a discussion of the establishment of the military base, including hiring local employees, purchasing and community leader relations. The second section contains an examination of the subsequent social, political and economic changes attributed to the military base.

7.1 Prizren Background

Germany was the lead nation for MNB-South (MNB-S) headquartered in the multi-ethnic city of Prizren. Germany contributed approximately 8,500 military personnel, and was joined by Austria, The Netherlands, Russia, Switzerland and Turkey for a total of 17,000 troops in MNB-S by the end of 1999 (Global Security, 2013).

Prizren is one of the oldest cities in Kosovo; it had been a major trade city for centuries before becoming the regional administrative center of the Ottoman Empire in the mid-15th century¹⁹³. It remained the political and cultural center until 1947, when Pristina became the political capital of Kosovo. Prizren had been occupied by German Forces from 1943 through 1944 when Kosovo and Albania were occupied by the Axis Powers.

Prior to the Kosovo War in 1999, the Municipality of Prizren's population was approximately 221,000¹⁹⁴ residents, comprised of the City of Prizren and 74 surrounding villages. Its ethnic profile was approximately 77 percent Kosovo Albanian, 16 percent Kosovo Bosniac, 5 percent Kosovo Turk, 1 percent Kosovo Roma and less than one percent Kosovo Serb and other

¹⁹³ Curtis (2000) states 1459 – 1829.

¹⁹⁴ A 2001 UN estimate based on the 1991 Yugoslav census, and natural growth.

nationalities. After the war, many of the non-Kosovo Albanian residents moved¹⁹⁵ to villages with a majority of their own population outside of the municipality, increasing the Kosovo Albanian majority in the Municipality to 82 percent (OSCE, 2013). Nevertheless, the Municipality and City of Prizren remain among the most ethnically diverse in Kosovo, with Albanian, Bosnian, Serbian and Turkish all recognized as official languages.

The Prizren Municipality had contained approximately 40 state industries prior to the war, mostly for basic construction materials, textiles and agricultural processing, such as fruit products, tanneries and pharmaceuticals, and had employed some 15,000 residents (Saunik & Buzhala, 2002). These industries, like the majority of others in Kosovo, were largely inefficient and unprofitable (Palairret, 1992). Many had been stripped of usable assets during deindustrialization in the 1990s (European Stability Initiative, 2002:7), and again for salvage after the war in 1999 (Interviews 35, 62, 73). Prizren was very well known as a regional tourist and shopping destination. The cities' economy was supported by over a thousand sole proprietorships and family enterprises, especially for silver filigree work, leather items, and traditional wedding-related goods (Warrander & Knaus, 2010). Unlike the surrounding Municipality, which saw very heavy fighting during the war, the City of Prizren¹⁹⁶ itself was mostly undamaged, and instead sustained extensive ethnically motivated intimidation, arson and revenge property destruction immediately after the war (Cocozzelli, 2009).

¹⁹⁵ Several villages became near mono-ethnic after the war, such as Mamushë, a majority Kosovo Turk village. In 2008 under the Ahtisaari Plan to improve self-governance, Mamushë among others became Municipalities following Kosovo's declaration of independence.

¹⁹⁶ The Municipality and City share the same name, however when Prizren is used, it refers to the Municipality. The City of Prizren will be so stated.

7.2 Establishing Camp Prizren

Before the war, Prizren had been the headquarters of the 549th Motorized Infantry Brigade. The subordinate units of this nearly 14,000-strong brigade¹⁹⁷ were stationed throughout southern Kosovo (Humanitarian Law Center, 2013). Its three motorized infantry battalions, and its anti-aircraft battalion were located in Gjakova, while its two artillery batteries, a howitzer battalion and 31 tanks were distributed throughout the countryside in teams near key towns and terrain (OSCE, 2003). The brigade headquarters, located directly outside of the Prizren city boundary, contained the command staff and headquarters facilities. The headquarters building also housed the brigade's logistic unit, with maintenance and storage facilities; a security unit, and housing for an estimated 1,000 personnel on site (Humanitarian Law Center, 2013).

The headquarters' base had been moderately damaged during the 1999 NATO bombing. Local residents interviewed that had lived in Prizren during this time, both of whom were interpreters for the German KFOR, hired in 1999 and 2000, stated,

“The bomb damage was concentrated to the motor pools, artillery [park] and the ammunition/storage buildings. However, the Serbs vandalized the headquarters buildings, barracks and living quarters before they left. They even stripped out the plumbing fixtures and electrical wire” (Interviews 35, 62).¹⁹⁸

Despite the damage sustained by the compound during the bombing and the withdrawing Serb forces, MNB-S selected the former Yugoslav Army camp as its headquarters in June 1999.

The first German KFOR contingent, the 12th Panzer Brigade, crossed the Albanian border into Kosovo on June 12, 1999; MNB-South was officially established on 13 June when the 12th Panzer Brigade entered the city and occupied Camp Prizren (McGrath, 2006:53; Interviews 35, 62, 73).

In accordance with the Military Technical Agreement, (MTA) and Security Council Resolution

¹⁹⁷ According to the Center for International Law dossier against the commanding officers of the 549th. This total is likely to include JA reserves, the 'Pristina Corps' and the "hundreds of volunteers from various countries including Russia and Ukraine" (Center, 2013:7; also, OSCE, 2003)

¹⁹⁸ Some looting by Prizren residents may also have taken place, but due to the relatively brief time between JA withdrawal and KFOR arrival, the amount of opportunity theft was likely to be low.

1244 (SCR 1244), the Serb forces concurrently began their withdrawal from Kosovo.

Eyewitnesses interviewed state “JA and other Serb forces vandalized and burned or destroyed personal and public property as they left¹⁹⁹” (Independent International Commission on Kosovo, 2000:309; Interviews 35, 53, 62; also, OSCE, 2003). Photo 7.1 shows the MBR-S headquarters, “The Blue Residence” upon arrival of the German forces in June 1999.



Photo 7.1 Prizren Kaserne June 1999 “Blue Residence.” Photo: Patrick Theutone

German communication teams arrived first and secured the small, mostly undamaged radio sites just outside the city (Interview 75). Over 4,200 soldiers formed the first tranche²⁰⁰ of the MNB-South KFOR security mission (Bundeswehr, 2014; Global Security, 2000; Theutone, 2000), followed by an additional 4,300 a few weeks later. Military personnel were temporarily housed in a nearby hotel and in abandoned industrial buildings of the SOE *Elán*, a preformed concrete materials manufacturer, and of SOE *Progres*, a synthetic industrial fiber manufacturer (Saunik & Buzhala, 2002)²⁰¹.

¹⁹⁹ These may be conflated with actions taken by Kosovo Serb civilians who followed the withdrawing JNA forces.

²⁰⁰ Tranche is often used in NATO operations to refer to a portion of the designated troops and equipment that are deployed to support a larger multi-phase operation.

²⁰¹ The use of the hotel and SOEs was noted by UNHCR in its 2002 Municipality Development report, further details are absent.

7.2.1 Administrative Procedures

The German armed forces administrative and sustainment systems are highly self-contained, requiring little support by civilian workers. These limited both the number of opportunities, and type of positions that would be available to the local population. However, civilians had not been known to have been employed on the JA base prior to the arrival of the German KFOR (Interviews 35, 62). As noted earlier regarding Camp Monteith, civilian employment would have been unlikely in the past due to the availability of conscripts, thus there would have been a fairly low expectation for local employment opportunities on the German base.

Nearly all of Camp Prizren's administrative and sustainment functions were performed by German military personnel, including base security. This practice is typical of NATO militaries but in contrast with most international organizations (Carnahan, et al., 2006), which generally employ a substantial number of local civilians for security. For those services which the German forces did not obtain internally, administrative guidelines allowed individual departments to recruit and hire personnel from the community, and purchase directly with local businesses for supplies and services as needed (Interview 75). In addition, the German headquarters' central logistics section coordinated for extensive common-need services such as health care and laundry; printing and publishing; vehicle maintenance and repair to local firms on behalf of the base (Interviews 35, 50, 51, 53, 62, 75).

7.2.2 Recruiting and Hiring Local Residents

While the initial German contingent of over 4,000 MNB-S soldiers included a company of military engineers, primarily builders, specifically to rehabilitate the camp, a small number of local workers were also hired. A longtime base employee provides his observations:

“The German engineers were the project managers, and the German soldiers did most of the physical labor. Between 150-200 local people were hired in the first two months for unskilled construction work and cleaning. Although recruiting was officially through posters and radio messages, the information was mostly spread by word of mouth. The primary qualification was to have some German or English language ability.

Most people left when the construction was finished. A few people stayed on for maintenance, or to be cleaners and dining facility workers. Jobs were generally filled in the usual male and female roles: men went to construction and facilities maintenance jobs and the women worked in the kitchen as cooks and cleaners. More men than women were in the management jobs. A few women were hired later for the small souvenir shops, or as cooks and servers in the base cantinas. Men and women were paid the same rates, from 600-800 euro/month for the same positions, and probably would have had the same opportunities for any advancement²⁰².

Most of the people that stayed were interpreters, because Prizren [Municipality] has four official languages: Albanian, Bosnian, Serbian and Turkish. Both men and women interpreters work with the military patrols and the LMTs to visit the communities and attend meetings. Interpreters also work at [Camp Prizren's] security gates, but only the military performs base security.²⁰³ Right now (2014) there are probably less than 80 local people working on Camp Prizren" (Interview 62).

Overall, the number of local residents employed during the reconstruction phase or for daily operations was low. However, such a low number of Prizren residents employed on the German KFOR base is a frequently recommended 'best practice,' based on the recognition of negative externalities, (e.g. wage inflation and bubble economy), and the "brain drain" effect from local businesses and government that base employment, with its far higher salaries, can have on the local community (Anderson, et al., 2014; Carnahan, et al., 2005). Hence, the small number of residents initially employed on base – barely 200 out of a population of over 220,000, and up to another 200 employed in the additional lodging and barracks located within Prizren – clearly meant employment with KFOR is unlikely to have contributed to an unsustainable balloon economy as the result of the much higher wages.

Non-governmental and international organizations tend to rely more heavily on local labor and likewise pay higher than prevailing wages, often creating new tensions over who has access to these incomes (Ammitzball & Tychsen, 2007; Anderson, 2000; Carnahan, et al., 2006; Sciarra, 2008). However, while the number of such organizations in Prizren was not small, between 30

²⁰² Advancement opportunities were few, generally limited to shift leaders or similar "first among peers" positions.

²⁰³ Military controlled base access not only improves base security, but also reduces opportunity for local civilians to act as gatekeepers and hold undue influence against others. This gatekeeping had occurred for a brief time at Camp Bondsteel by Kosovo Albanian expatriates who had become US citizens and were hired by B&R as hiring supervisors (interview 78, and informal conversations with US Air Force logisticians.)

and 40, the number of both expatriate and local hires with their higher salaries were low, typically ten or fewer (Cocozzelli, 2009; Integration, 2012), and therefore would similarly not have contributed to inflationary effects.

7.2.3 Local Purchasing

The buildings and camp grounds of the former 549th Motorized Infantry Brigade headquarters were not badly damaged by the war. Hence, when the MNB-South Task Force entered and occupied the compound, the construction materials that had been pre-placed in Macedonia and Albania, including cement, plaster and gravel, were sufficient to begin initial building repairs by the military engineers (Interview 78). Similarly, within the City of Prizren, and despite the vandalism by retreating Serb forces, there was relatively minor damage to the physical structure of the office buildings and shops (Interviews 35, 62), thus many local businesses were able to open shortly after the major fighting ceased (ibid). The local purchase of construction-related goods by KFOR was therefore necessarily limited, as it largely focused on restoring and upgrading the existing infrastructure in the camp, and other facilities it used, rather than constructing a new facility. As a result, KFOR would not have created competition for these resources and inflated their prices above the reach of the local population. Moreover, only small amounts of new and replacement items were purchased locally.

Interviews and informal conversations strongly suggest the German military forces visited Prizren's businesses primarily to get a sense of the local economic conditions and become familiar with this civil environment, and secondarily to locate sources for future purchases or to add to the local economy. First, it was German military personnel that initiated the majority of the early business relationships in Prizren²⁰⁴ (Interview 35), and second, purchases tended to be limited in type and at a single location particularly if multiple options were possible. Two of the

²⁰⁴ This is not surprising, as it is unlikely the present Kosovo Albanian community would have had economic relations with the JA base.

business owners interviewed stated nearly all local businesses were visited individually by German KFOR officers, as theirs had been, and that the visits were believed to be specifically intended to establish a wide range of vendor relationships (Interviews 48, 57, also 35).

The first vendor, the owner of a produce company, described his visit:

“A German KFOR officer visited my father’s company in summer 1999, to look at [inspect] his store and, because it was clean, he contracted for one item, potatoes, which we soon started to deliver to the camp on a regular basis.”

At that time, foodstuffs, particularly fresh produce and meats, were trucked in from Germany and other European countries, therefore the German KFOR’s choice to buy only potatoes locally was practical for three reasons. First, although potatoes are relatively inexpensive, they are bulky and heavy, which adds to their overall cost when transporting them, and if transported from one’s home country, it is also at the expense of military unique equipment and supplies. Secondly, potatoes are not highly perishable, thus local vendors could acquire sufficient quantities of this vegetable from a variety of sources with little loss to spoilage. Finally, potatoes are cooked before consuming, and variations in quality could be masked by preparation. In the case of this vendor, the single item contract continued for almost 10 years. This company was eventually awarded the contract to provide all fresh produce for Camp Prizren in 2010 (Interview 57).

The second business, a large hardware and tool retailer, was located on the main roadway some five kilometers from Camp Prizren. It carried construction safety equipment and offered a wide selection of hand tools by German manufacturers such as *Bosch and Stihl* as well as lower priced, less well-known regional brands. The owner of this local hardware store described his experience:

“A German KFOR officer came to our store in the summer [of 1999] to see what we had to offer. In the beginning, KFOR bought exclusively from our company because they [Germans] buy good-quality tools and use safety equipment, such as vests and hard hats, which only our company in Prizren carried at the time (Interview 48).”

Versions of these visits by German KFOR to buy a single type of item were stated anecdotally by several others in Prizren. For the community, such single-item contracts were a means of income when legitimate employment opportunities were still low, moreover, many small contracts may have reduced the likelihood of local firms vying for exclusive business arrangements with the base at the expense of the community. These instances strongly suggest German KFOR leaders had an appreciation of both the positive and the negative potential economic effects that intervening military forces' spending could have on the local community.

7.2.4 Contracting for Services

The German forces, rather than members of the community, typically initiated business relationships. More specifically, the German KFOR contracted for its common-use services,²⁰⁵ including laundry, printing and vehicle maintenance. Only the laundry services business was found to have opened specifically to support the German Camp, and its owner directly solicited its business.

Camp Prizren's laundry is washed by a single laundry firm approximately four kilometers from the main gate of the Camp. According to the company owner and manager:

"This laundry was started in summer of 1999 specifically to service Camp Prizren. The German KFOR had first visited us when my family reopened the small quarry and construction materials company we had had prior to the war. We still have it, but it's completely separate, with separate management.

"When I saw a lot of small companies opening up to sell the same materials we had, I decided to open the laundry specifically to fill this niche for KFOR, because I knew there was no competition. I went to their gate and told them (KFOR) about our business and we got this contract right away. We still have the exclusive laundry contract with Camp Prizren, and it's our main customer. We now also offer 'sterile laundry' service for hospitals and clinics. The laundry employs 11 local women, and one man, who is a (distant) relative." (Interviews 50, 51).

²⁰⁵ Health care for the military was also contracted, but through an international, not local, health care provider.

A second contracted service is printing and desktop publishing, provided by a local, family owned and managed publisher with a retail print shop. The owner of the shop describes his experience:

“This print shop is the storefront for our large printing concern offsite²⁰⁶. The German KFOR came to us to print a large number of color programs for them and we were able to complete their order in 24 hours. Since then we have designed and printed all of Camp Prizren’s paper products, including calendars, camp publications/newspapers, diaries, gift books and special event brochures.

Our core business is textbook publishing. However, the (regular) work contracted by Camp Prizren allowed us to invest in modern equipment and continue to be competitive with the smaller printers and [low-overhead] desktop publishers, maintaining employment for up to 15 skilled workers (Interview 53).

The third contracted service, vehicle maintenance, is best described as a partnership between KFOR and local business. Here German KFOR mechanics and technicians provide comprehensive training to locally hired employees for the servicing, maintenance and repair of the military-unique vehicles used by the German KFOR²⁰⁷ at Camp Prizren. KFOR also provides all oversight of these local employees and maintenance operations. Due to the Camps’ security restrictions, the vehicle maintenance operations were off-limits to visitors and its employees did not participate in research, and hence, further details of its operations are not available. However, it can be expected that the on the job training for the maintenance of a wide range of gasoline and diesel-powered vehicles directly contributes to Prizren through the establishment and employment in logistics companies, repair garages and industry using similarly fueled equipment, such as electrical generators.

As noted concerning base employment and local purchasing, the relatively small amount of spending by the German KFOR is also in keeping with UN best practices (Carnahan, et al., 2005) and prevents the formation of an unsustainable “balloon economy” created by the

²⁰⁶ This print shop provided small retail services to the public, such as copying, invitations and promotional materials.

²⁰⁷ Other national MNB-S contingents, such as the Swiss Company, SWISSCOY, performed their own maintenance and services.

international community, described by Ammitzbol & Tychsen (2007). However, both Carnahan and Natsios remind that this low-level spending does little to energize the local economy at a time when it is needed most (Carnahan, et al., 2006; Natsios, 2009: 65). Nevertheless, the businesses interviewed in Prizren believed the German military purchasing system was “fair and reasonable” (Interview 48, 50, 57), and that the “purchase of one or two items from each business probably kept [vendor] corruption to a minimum” because no one company could get the advantage over another (ibid).

7.2.5 Community relations

The post-conflict academic and grey literature often states that local community leaders and elites will attempt to represent their community and ingratiate themselves with the military forces to develop and extend their personal influence and position in the community; to extract rents from international aid, or threaten to return to violence (Cheng, 2013:70; Münch, 2013; Zaalberg, 2006). These negative relationships appeared not to have occurred in the establishment of Camp Prizren. Indeed, the local officials interviewed in Prizren, most of whom are appointed to their positions through their political parties rather than directly elected, were consistently positive in their opinion of KFOR, but indifferent to actively influencing KFOR’s leaders (Interviews 52, 56, 58, 69, 70, 71). This suggests the political leader’s party, UNMIK or other political organizations, held more influence or opportunity for personal or professional advancement than KFOR. In addition, the informal relationship between local leaders and the Liaison Monitoring Teams, who were established in late 2004 after the Kosovo-wide riots, supplied an avenue to directly reach out to KFOR at a community level that was absent in the past. This new relationship may have replaced any previous interest in attempting to influence military leaders.

7.3 Base Operations Summary

The military base established by the German KFOR in Prizren demonstrates a highly self-contained system for base administration and sustainment operations. There was relatively little demand upon the local community in terms of employment and purchasing to establish the base, and a low level of interaction with political and business leaders within the community. Indeed, relations between the military leaders and the community leaders were much more formal and far less frequent than anticipated.

Table 7.1 provides a comparison of these three characteristics observed concerning Camp Prizren with expected results of the initial hypothesis:

	Hiring	Purchasing	Community Relations
Hypothesis	Direct hires in large numbers at high salaries	Inflated prices emerge due to IC demand for scarce housing, food, fuel; become too high for local incomes	Local leaders attempt to influence military forces for own benefit; may infer return to violence
German KFOR	Direct hires in small numbers; high salaries ~ 600-800€/month.	Low demand for local resources. Direct purchase of single-item or a small amount of consumables. Contracted directly for military-unique needs	Infrequent, mostly formal relations with local leaders. Frequent informal relations with military personnel.

Table 7.1. Comparison of hypothesis expectations and field observations.

The variance between the initial hypotheses, which was based on current academic and organizational literature, and the findings from the field research, as described in Table 7.1, suggest both the early self-sufficiency to restore the former JA base and the limited personal freedom of KFOR military personnel substantially reduced the many of the anticipated negative

characteristics of establishing and maintaining the Camp. Strategies such as a low number of local hires and limited local purchasing are generally aligned with the best practice recommendations found in the United Nations' investigation of the economic impact of their own peacekeeping operations (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Carnahan, et al., 2006:51). As a result, the initial hypotheses were reexamined to discern reasons for the variation in the expected and realized findings.

7.4 Political, Social and Economic effect of Camp Prizren 2000 – 2012

Among the chief criticisms of the arrival of international and non-governmental organizations, including military peacekeeping forces, are the widespread societal and social changes in the community. These are typically caused by the employment of local residents at disproportionate and unsustainably high salaries; emergence of a 'balloon economy, and involvement in illicit activities (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; Carnahan, et al; 2005; Sciarra, 2008). When the arrival of international organizations is examined through base closure literature, the factors that most clearly demonstrate the influence of a military base are the relationship between the base leaders and local elites; shifts in acceptable and unacceptable social behavior, and changes in local economy. This sub-section therefore, examines the social, political and economic changes in the city of Prizren, including the communities' perception of employment on the base to answer the central research question, "*How do the everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict environments affect the post-war political economy and what are the implications for peacebuilding?*" These areas are further considered by gender to identify changes in cultural and social standing, and vulnerability and exploitation (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Enloe, 2000; Higate & Henry, 2004; Sciarra, 2008), finding general agreement with critical and feminist literature.

7.4.1 Political Effects

Since the Ottoman era when Prizren served as its seat in the Balkans, Prizren has been influential in Kosovo politics, and many of Kosovo's senior leaders have roots in the Municipality. Yet, the relations between Prizren's municipal leaders, and leaders of the German KFOR appeared to be limited, and mostly formal. This contrasts with many post-conflict studies demonstrating local leaders attempt to secure favorable relations for themselves and their people. In Prizren specifically, these relations may be the outcome of the early encounters between the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA, and German KFOR.

Prizren was among the first cities to be claimed by the KLA in June 1999. Hours after UNSCR 1244 and the MTA were adopted, members of the KLA returned from their hiding places in the mountains and entered Prizren, taking over the Municipal buildings, including the police station (Human Rights Watch, 1999) before the arrival of KFOR (Daltveit, 2007:90). The withdrawal of the JA and other Serb forces had left a law enforcement vacuum that was quickly filled with self-appointed – often armed and criminal – former KLA members (Janssens, 2015:100). Therefore, while Prizren City was relatively undamaged during the war, ethnically motivated retribution killing and destruction erupted and rapidly spread through the Kosovo Serb neighborhoods and Roma enclaves, often initiated by the hugely popular KLA. The German KFOR which had only arrived within the previous 24-hour period, was neither trained and positioned²⁰⁸, nor adequately manned to effectively²⁰⁹ respond to the spontaneous outbreak of civil violence. Even if they had been so trained and ready, the hero-status of the KLA would have likely caused the local residents to turn against KFOR²⁰⁹. Consequently, KFOR “appeared to watch helplessly as Kosovo Serbs, Roma and moderate Kosovo Albanian’s were terrorized and killed, and their property burned or destroyed” (Human Rights Watch, 1999), undermining the

²⁰⁸ While the German KFOR, the 12th Panzer Brigade, was well trained for their conventional wartime-tasks, law enforcement functions including civil disturbance and organized crime, are well outside of a typical tank brigade's combat training (Janssens, 2015:107; Wilson, 2006:154).

²⁰⁹ KFOR feared wider regional destabilization. A wide complaint was KFOR was far more concerned with the safety of its own forces than the population it was sent to protect.

communities' confidence in both KFOR's willingness to protect it, and its sense of its real ability to do so (ibid).

According to Kifner, the KLA was physically removed from the Prizren police station by KFOR and CIVPOL, the UNMIK police (Kifner, 1999) but the KLA members that had occupied the municipal buildings would remain in place until the results of the elections in October 2000, whereby candidates of the Democratic League of Kosovo, LDK, (Research Directorate, 2003) were elected, and most former KLA were replaced. Yet in that fifteen-month interim before removal from office, the "KLA provisional government" was able to operate and conduct criminal activities with virtually no interference by either UNMIK or KFOR (Cheng, 2013:72; Janssens, 2015:103). Unsurprisingly organized crime flourished and KFOR's early reputation and credibility were further compromised. Therefore, the KLA's ability to operate almost entirely outside of UNMIK framework as the *de facto* government for over a year 'under the nose of KFOR' suggests strongly that KFOR would not have been viewed as an influential powerbroker worth courting by Prizren's community leaders.

KFOR, however, was an early and strong reconstruction partner with the Municipality, particularly with the Municipal urban planners. From 2000 onwards, German and Turkish KFOR provided engineering assistance as well as assisted with contracts established in collaboration with non-governmental and aid organizations for the repair of roads, bridges and waste management and historic buildings (Cidiroglu, 2005; Saunik & Buzhala, 2002). Details are rare, yet small, local road repairs involving KFOR funds and equipment appear to have been coordinated and contracted directly with local leaders, some local labor and possibly contractors²¹⁰ (Cidiroglu, 2005). KFOR and the Municipality also worked together in the

²¹⁰ *The KFOR Chronicle*, KFOR's own publication, describe several occasions where the local government or residents participated in the site selection of a football pitch or community clean-up in preparation for road and bridge repairs.

administration of several multi-year, multimillion euro reconstruction contracts (Saunik & Buzhala, 2002). However, subsequent major reconstruction and infrastructure development contracts were coordinated by prime donors, such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (ERBD) directly with Kosovo's central government (EBRD, 2017), and would have used international design-build engineering firms. KFOR and Camp Prizren is unlikely to have had any role in these projects²¹¹.

7.4.2 Social Effects

Prizren experienced the same mass ousting of its teachers and other state employees by Milošević's policies in 1989 that had occurred throughout Kosovo, and even with its history as an intellectual center, education in Prizren had stagnated in the absence of resources. Given that the German KFOR had hired very few workers to support Camp Prizren, and had hired even fewer skilled workers, it is unlikely that Prizren's best educated would have left their positions for low-skill or unskilled jobs. Therefore, Camp Prizren is unlikely to have had a substantial "brain drain" effect on the community.

Referrals made by the two KFOR interpreters for additional individuals to be interviewed declined their invitations. Nevertheless, anecdotally the KFOR base was considered a good place to work; employees were treated well and earned good salaries, but little else was known. This is not unexpected considering the far smaller number of local residents that would have been hired in proportion to the size of the municipality. It may also suggest base employees believed they were not at liberty to discuss their employment with the base, or they may not enjoy the same level of prestige as base employees do in Ferizaj. While Prizren retailers, vendors and local company owners interviewed were generally open and positive

There is no mention of either local contractors or paid labor. Nevertheless, the Municipality was likely to have hired contractors as a result of its larger projects with KFOR, and at local prevailing wages.

²¹¹ If involved at all, the Municipality and local contractors would have had a very minor role, unlike the collaboration with KFOR, which actively engaged the local community

about their sales to KFOR, the sale of only one or two items meant having KFOR's business did not make a significant difference in their business, or in the community's perception of their business (Interviews 48, 50, 57, also 35, 62). Nonetheless, several businesses expressed a request for the interviews to remain discrete to prevent stirring ill feelings in the business community who may believe their sales were higher than they actually were (Interviews 50, 57).

7.4.3 Influence on Women

Prior to 1989 nearly half of the able women in Prizren worked full time outside their home. Yet, in the two decades afterward, only nine percent of adult women in Prizren did so (UNDP & USAID, 2012), and Prizren's level of female employment was the lowest of the three municipalities studied. However well prior to the study period, in addition to retail, women generally worked "behind the counter" in bakeries, lunch counters and similar positions. Given the long restriction from eating and drinking locally produced food and drink, KFOR military personnel and the base generally, are likely to have had little lasting effect on the role of women in the city, noting further Camp Prizren's hiring practices reflected typical male/female gender roles for cleaning, cooking and retail work. This contrasts with the military forces' participation in prostitution.

7.4.4 Peacekeeper Prostitution in Prizren

There is a substantial body of literature concerning prostitution and peacekeepers (Interviews 29, 39, 78; also, Amnesty International, 2004; Autesserre, 2014:214; Enloe, 2014; Carnahan, 2005; Ingimundarson, 2003; Mendelson, 2005; Inspector General, 2003; Stefanova, 2005:48). Particularly in Kosovo, according to UN Women, prostitution in Kosovo had been uncommon prior to the war²¹², the result of the closed, conservative culture and years of extreme lack of freedom of movement for Kosovo Albanians (Sadaj, 2010:3). Both of these changed with the

²¹² Uncommon, but not unknown. Prostitution was mostly conducted in private homes through personal networks.

Kosovo war. As the Kosovo Albanian and Macedonian borders opened and most restrictions on travel were lifted, the post-war lack of law enforcement facilitated organized crime. Hence by July 1999, Kosovo had become both a destination and source of women trafficked for prostitution intended to service the UN and KFOR peacekeepers and the over 300 non-governmental organizations that had arrived by then (Amnesty International, 2004:1; Godec, 2010:12; Sadikaj, 2010:3). Moreover, in a break from the past, Albanian men began to regularly visit prostitutes, whereby “only 10 to 30 percent of brothel clients are international” (Andreas, 2008) a percentage which had become typical in the Balkans (ibid), and henceforth Kosovo’s prostitution was sustained²¹³ by local residents, rather than KFORs’ demand. Prizren contained more brothels than any other municipality (Stefanova, 2005:48); Amnesty International and the International Organization for Migration specifically highlight that the German KFOR, for whom prostitution is legal at home, was among the most permissive concerning the patronization of prostitutes. NATO established a KFOR-wide “Zero Tolerance” policy on human trafficking and its related activities including soliciting prostitutes in 2004 (Mendelson, 2005:5).

Interviews conducted in Prizren with the KFOR interpreters, local business owners, municipal officials, and numerous informal conversations found negative responses by the interviewees concerning prostitution; none expressed knowledge of KFOR personnel patronizing prostitutes in Prizren. Yet as KFOR is well regarded, and prostitution is a particularly taboo subject, such admitted knowledge of prostitution may have social repercussion. Therefore, while “no personal knowledge of KFOR and prostitution” may have been reported truthfully by those interviewed, the literature describing its presence and subsequent shift in cultural acceptability by key post-conflict feminist authors is substantial (Enloe, 2014; Godec, 2010:12; Mendelson, 2005; Mertus, 1996) and merits attention, although not to the extent typically assigned to

²¹³ Stefanova (2005) states internationals paid much higher rates so their business more profitable despite the lower number.

military forces. Concerning social effects therefore, the military forces of Camp Prizren appear to have promulgated unfavorable social outcomes within the Prizren Municipality, particularly for women, and offered no observable positive offsetting opportunities such as higher education, training or employment.

7.4.5 Economic Effects

As the former Balkan seat of the Ottoman empire, Prizren had sufficient political influence and civil infrastructure to be among the first municipalities in Kosovo to be industrialized in the mid-1960's (Morina, 2011:57). Prizren's early industries were unprocessed building materials, pharmaceuticals textiles, and agricultural processing, particularly fruit products, tanneries and tobacco. These eventually replaced most of Prizren's traditional trading professions (Saunik & Buzhala, 2002:13).

Prizren has since successfully privatized and reopened a small number of SOEs, but the number of their employees are still a fraction of the pre-war number. Privately owned trade oriented micro-enterprises, typically having less than ten employees, and most often sole proprietorships, have largely replaced the high-employment manufacturing SOEs (KOSME, 2014).

Table 7.2 provides Prizren sources of income.

Municipality	Work / Employed	Supported by Others in Kosovo	All Other Sources of Income
Ferizaj	28.1%	45.6%	26.3%
Gjakova	25.6%	48.6%	25.8%
Prizren	29.1%	45.7%	25.2%
Kosovo	28.9%	44.2%	26.9%

Table 7.2 Sources of individual income. Supported by others includes children and those 65 years and older. All other sources of income include pensions and remittances from abroad. Source: KOSME (2013).

The figures in Table 7.3 below similarly found the employment rates of all three municipalities are low, however, wages in the Prizren Municipality are the lowest, a condition that Cocozzelli (2009) attributes to the urbanization caused by the tremendous influx of rural residents that resettled in the City of Prizren after the Kosovo War (Cocozzelli, 2009:151).

Municipality	Percent Employed	Percent Unemployed	Percent Outside*of the Employment Market	Average Wages 2004
Ferizaj	26.1	43.7	30.2	208€
Gjakova	22.6	48.8	28.6	213€
Prizren	25.4	43.4	31.2	199€
Kosovo	24.7	44.8	30.5	209€

Table 7.3 Percent of population employed, unemployed and outside the employment market as of 2013. *Includes children below 15 years, elderly over 65, and infirm. Data source: KOSME (2013), Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2005).

Therefore, noting Tables 7.2 and 7.3, Camp Prizren appears to have contributed very little to Prizren's economy. This assessment is based on three factors that may be directly attributed to the military base: first, the very small number of Prizren residents employed in Camp Prizren in proportion to the Municipality population; second, the low volume of building materials, food, fuel or other materials purchased for use by the Camp²¹⁴, and third, a low level of consumption in local café's, restaurants or shops by military personnel due to health concerns and restrictions in movement off the base.

The Camp has uniquely contributed to Prizren in other ways, however. In addition to KFOR's usual re/construction of roads and bridges necessary for its patrolling within its area of

²¹⁴ Based upon usual construction practices. Contractors purchase building materials according to the construction schedule.

responsibility, the German KFOR also makes an annual payment to the municipality²¹⁵ for its water/waste treatment services. Moreover, German KFOR engineers have actively worked with donors and investors to reestablish Prizren’s water purification and waste management facilities (UNDP & USAID, 2012), which will likewise improve services for Camp Prizren. Moreover, the German KFOR CIMIC initiated funding for an agricultural training center (Asanaj, 2003: 105) in support of the recently privatized SOE ‘Progres – Export’ in 2003. These are in addition to the aforementioned vehicle mechanics’ training to repair and maintain the German KFORs’ own vehicles, which benefits both KFOR and Prizren’s corporate knowledge of large equipment.

7.5 Municipal Profile

According to the Kosovo Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Program, KOSME, Prizren is ‘average’ for active businesses, although exits are slightly higher. See Table 7.4.

Municipality	Business Starts/ 1000 residents²¹⁶	Business Entry Rate	Business Exit Rate
Ferizaj	101	14.2%	6.0%
Gjakova	91	11.0%	3.9%
Prizren	75	11.0%	7.8%
Kosovo	76	13.6%	6.5%

Table 7.4 Business performance, 2000-2012. Data source: KOSME (2013).

To examine post-conflict business activity, Figure 7.1 provides an overview of the five primary post-conflict business sectors, showing retail trade was consistently the most active throughout

²¹⁵ Approximately 210,000 €/year.

²¹⁶ Based upon the 2011 Census

the study period, likely the source of the higher business exit rate, followed by transportation and hotel/restaurant business starts.

The large spike in business starts in 2003, especially for retail sales, is the result of a successful Kosovo-wide business registration campaign.




Figure 7.1 Overview of the five primary economic sectors.

Figure 7.2 below, demonstrates business registrations do not show the usual pattern of a rapid rise in the number of construction services and associated trades businesses that tend to emerge after conflict to benefit from the flood of donor funding and humanitarian aid (Cerra & Saxena, 2007).

This likely reflects that Prizren’s overall housing and municipal infrastructure were not overly-damaged, and therefore few construction and construction trade businesses would be established to meet a rise in demand for those services. Moreover, the relatively whole infrastructure would have allowed retail trade businesses to recommence with minimal delay, indicated by consistently strong retail. This contrasts with the manufacturing sector, seen in Figure 7.3, which would have already been low due to deindustrialization before the War, and

only made worse by theft, vandalism, and a shortage of the human and physical resources necessary to resume operations.




Figure 7.2, Comparison of Prizren’s business starts in the ten Kosovo economic sectors

7.6 Camp Prizren Analysis

A study of Kosovo’s official federal and Municipality publications and websites, academic and grey literature and field visits, finds the early political and social practices of the KFOR base in Prizren were described negatively. This is chiefly due to KFOR’s inability to adequately respond to the immediate ethnic violence and criminality in the Prizren Municipality, and for the rise and permanence of prostitution. However, these negative opinions appear to have been mitigated. Both in terms of wider community investment, such as the repair of roads and bridges; the establishment of a new municipal water purification/waste treatment facility; providing technical expertise to newly privatized enterprises, and through the military specific practice of purchasing a small number of items from a wide range of vendors. In addition, despite limited

detail, KFOR's use of several SOE buildings for almost three years was likely to have resulted in substantial improvements to those buildings, thus increasing their value and usefulness when they were returned to the municipality.

The establishment of the Liaison Monitoring Teams in late 2004, discussed more thoroughly in Chapter 10, and relaxation of restrictions for KFOR personnel to consume food and non-alcoholic drinks off base a few years later, would have generated additional local income without causing the typical spike in unsustainable businesses often described in post-conflict literature. Thus, this overall assessment contrasts with much of the academic post-conflict literature which asserts dramatic increases in malign political activities and unsustainable new businesses that service the international community.

Three strong trends come to mind. First politically, KFOR's risk aversion is well known, including its preference for limited and formal contact in order to be perceived as well outside of Kosovo politics. Particularly in Prizren, where the KLA controlled government offices for over a year, this had resulted in only negligible effort by local leaders to attempt to influence military leaders to benefit themselves as had occurred in Afghanistan, Somalia and other post-conflict interventions because there was little need to do so. However, the *psychological* presence of the base may have denied malign actors and criminals a sense of complete freedom, especially after the establishment of the community-based Liaison Monitoring Teams in 2004. Based on field interviews and anecdotes from visits to Prizren in 2014 and 2016, KFOR is firmly believed to be a trusted source of stability and security despite its' early failures.

Secondly, Camp Prizren's investment in social development appears to have been minimal. While social development is not a military responsibility, 'actions speak louder than words.' The small number of locally hired workers did not contribute to the loss of the best educated to work with the military forces, yet it also reduced opportunities for social interaction with Camp Prizren's personnel. In addition, the long-restricted ability to eat in restaurants and café's

limited opportunities to have a positive influence, particularly as an offset to participation in prostitution. Nevertheless, KFOR's involvement and investment in the restoration of several historical buildings was a well-known meaningful and enduring contribution to the City of Prizren's culture.

The third factor, economics, generally appeared to have primarily given support to the aforementioned social factors. Notwithstanding the blurring of the work usually accomplished by the international and humanitarian communities, KFOR's investment in the Prizren municipality (water/ waste) and agriculture (vineyards) as well as the road network it used for patrols, directly contributed to Prizren's long term growth, and are far more lasting than local employment and purchasing alone. Based on these observations, Camp Prizren has had a low but net positive influence on the Municipality of Prizren.

Chapter 8 Municipality of Gjakova Case Study

8.0 Introduction

The Municipality of Gjakova provides a basis for comparison of the political, social and economic effects military bases established after conflict have on local communities. Gjakova, which does not contain a military base, is compared with Ferizaj and Prizren which both contain a military base established within 24 hours of the end of the Kosovo War in June 1999. This chapter is comprised of two sections; Section 1 opens with a short background of the Municipality and region, including an examination of the political, social and economic characteristics of Gjakova. Section 2 provides a comparison of Gjakova and the municipalities containing a military base. The case study concludes with an analysis of field research results, finding Gjakova was largely unaffected politically or socially by the absence of a military base. However, economically, Gjakova presents a structurally more mature and sustainable environment than either Ferizaj or Prizren, indicating the military bases have primarily increased local prosperity in their municipalities, rather than stimulated enduring business development.

8.1 Gjakova Background

Prior to the Kosovo War in 1999, the Municipality²¹⁷ of Gjakova's population was the third largest in the Kosovo Province, with approximately 132,000²¹⁸ residents within the City and 91 villages (Human Rights Watch, 1999). According to the OSCE Municipality Communities Report, Gjakova's ethnic profile was 92.7 percent Kosovo Albanian, 5.4 percent Kosovo Egyptian, and 0.9 percent other nationalities including Bosniac, Roma, Kosovo Serb and Kosovo Turk (OSCE, 2010) .

²¹⁷ Gjakova refers to the municipality of Gjakova. References to the City of Gjakova are specifically noted.

²¹⁸ OSCE (1999), Human Rights Watch (1999) and UNHCR figures; UNDP states 145,000 based on 1991, the last census, and natural growth. Gjakova's population dropped to ~ 95,000 by 2014.

The same-named City of Gjakova is the seat of the Municipality, and the city alone accounted for some 95,000 residents²¹⁹. Gjakova is one of the oldest trade cities in Kosovo, predating Prizren and the Ottoman Empire. It was also long considered to be an important cultural and intellectual center (Vishaj, 2017:268), and had established an active tourism trade supporting hundreds of small traditional crafts' businesses, generally sole proprietorships and small family enterprises (ibid, 269). The City of Gjakova has long been politically active and has been the home or birthplace of influential political figures, and recently, former KLA leaders (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011).

The Municipality of Gjakova was industrialized in the mid-1960s, early in comparison to most of the former Yugoslavia era's investments in Kosovo, and remained a major industrial center until 1988 when the first wave of Kosovo Albanians were sacked from their employment in government and industry in 1989. Investment in agriculture was initiated first in Gjakova under the initial Yugoslav Five Year Plan, which took advantage of its flat, fertile farmland. Local farmers and factory workers later benefitted from the establishment of large food processing factories, which manufactured for domestic use rather than export. A small agriculture airport, located just outside the city, was used extensively until it was closed and abandoned in the 1990's²²⁰, likely the result of deindustrialization and transfer of Gjakova's industrial assets to Serbia during international sanctions.

Gjakova had also benefitted from substantial textiles manufacturing, metals processing, and commercial transportation and storage (ECOI, 2008) enterprises. Its proximity to the Albanian

²¹⁹ Unless specifically discussing the City, Gjakova henceforth refers to the Municipality.

²²⁰ The Gjakova airport was not used or damaged during the war. It was restored and used by the Italian KFOR for troops and supplies until it was turned over to the Republic of Kosovo in 2013. The Ministry of Trade and Industry operated the airport for passengers for only two years before transferring to the Ministry of Economic Development in January 2016. The airport ceased operations in 2016 to concentrate investment in Kosovo's commercial aviation in Pristina (Gjakovës, 2016; interview 84).

border, just eight kilometers to the west, likewise made the Municipality especially advantageous for the nearly 40 State-owned export industries, including chemical ores, and construction materials (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011). This extensive trade network and proximity to the border also made the municipality an ideal location for smuggling and organized crime. Hence the porous Kosovo - Albanian border region became a convenient haven for the KLA as it conducted its guerilla hit-and-run operations against the Yugoslav Army, JA (OSCE, 1999, Human Rights Watch, 2001). Damage to Gjakova's State industries was mostly the result of bombing and fighting during the war. However, the JA intentionally destroyed and vandalized hundreds of small, privately-owned family businesses, especially in the oldest Ottoman-era section of Gjakova City (OSCE, 1999, Interview 84).

8.2 Local Yugoslav Bases

Prior to the 1999 War, Gjakova had contained two JA military bases that were under the command of the 549th Motorized Infantry Brigade headquartered in Prizren: the 53rd Border Guard Battalion²²¹ and the 311th Air Defense Regiment. A principal JA defensive tactic during the war was the dispersion of individual air defense teams away from the base to prevent their discovery. Hence, air defense artillery pieces, tanks and other large military equipment were regularly moved and hidden in houses and barns to avoid detection, which destroyed the building in the process (Human Rights Watch, 1999:63). Gjakova's villages and countryside were also deliberately damaged by Serb forces in retaliation for NATO bombing. Thus, coupled with months of aerial bombardment and heavy tactical fighting between the KLA, JA and para-military forces, Gjakova had become one of the most damaged municipalities in Kosovo by the end of the war (Human Rights Watch, 2001).

²²¹ The border with Albania was historically contentious; KLA was especially active in the Gjakova Municipality and along the Kosovo-Albania border (HRW, 2001).

8.2.1 KFOR in Gjakova

The Gjakova Municipality is located within the area of operations of the KFOR Multinational Brigade Southwest, MNB-SW, led by the Italian 132nd “Ariete” Armored Brigade (McGrath, 2006:53) which is headquartered in the predominantly Kosovo Albanian city of Peja, approximately 35 kilometers (21 miles) northwest of the City of Gjakova. The Italian KFOR arrived in Peja on 14 June 1999 (NATO, 1999); Italy contributed approximately 2,300 military personnel, and was joined by Bulgaria, Finland, Portugal, Spain and later, Russia (Mockaitis, 2004:9; OSCE, 2003:49), for a combined total of 5,200 troops by the end of December 1999 (OSCE, 2003:48; Security, 2000). Italy also contributed 250 Italian carabinieri units, a military police force with civil law enforcement authority who are specially trained in riot control, and the *Guardia di Finanza*, a dedicated military police force responsible for border control, counter-trafficking, and currency fraud. These together formed the Multinational Specialized Unit, or MSU, and was headquartered in Pristina (Bedin, 2001). See Map 8.1²²².



Map 8.1 Locations of Gjakova and Peja in MNB-SW

²²² The Serb spelling for Peja is Pec; the Serb spelling for Gjakova is Djakoviča

Both the Municipality and City of Gjakova were included in the regular MNB-SW patrolling schedule upon arrival of the Task Force in June 1999, and KFOR military police and carabinieri provided additional support to Municipal law enforcement. However, as the Italian KFOR was the smallest NATO task force in Kosovo, and it was unable to maintain a large or continuous presence in the Municipality.

Gjakova was well known in Kosovo as a cultural, intellectual and political center, (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011), and had contained an active and powerful branch of the League of Communists of Kosovo. The municipality has long benefited from the large number of civil servants from Gjakova that worked in senior Party positions in Pristina, several of which would favor Gjakova over other municipalities, particularly Mr. Mahmut Bakalli, who served as the president of the League of Communists of Kosovo for ten years, 1971-1981, (Morina, 2011:20; Warrander & Knaus, 2010) during Yugoslavia's greatest period of investment in Kosovo (Morina, 2011:21). Senior government officials, including the Kosovo president Ms. Atifete Jahjaga, continue to originate from this municipality. Nevertheless, while a substantial number of senior officials and political leaders now in Pristina may have originated in Gjakova, in practice this group would have little contact with the military KFOR Task Forces. Instead, these leaders would coordinate directly with their peers in civilian international organizations, and in conjunction with them, senior military leaders and representatives of KFOR Headquarters.

8.3 Basis for Comparison

Gjakova was among the most economically and socially developed Kosovo municipalities²²³ under the former Yugoslavia. It is a useful comparison to Prizren with regard to its similarly well-established history of trade, culture and history; a correspondingly robust tourism industry

²²³ Municipalities to the west of the Kosovar Mountains were already more developed through better agricultural land and ancient trade routes, hence, the first to receive Yugoslav investment.

and traditional craft businesses, as well as a comparably high level of industrial investment during the former Yugoslavia. Gjakova is likewise comparable to the Municipality of Ferizaj with relation to population size, 131,700 to Ferizaj's 127,333 (OSCE, 1999:657) and its substantial agricultural industry.

8.3.1 Kosovo's Road Network

Although relatively close, Gjakova is not expected to have contributed a significant number of workers for Camp Prizren or Camp Bondsteel due to Kosovo's overall poor road infrastructure. As Pettifer (2002) notes, Kosovo's roadways were primarily built to support Yugoslav industries' ability to transport raw materials and semi-processed components out of Kosovo to be processed elsewhere, and the roads remained in this configuration after the war (ibid). Kosovo's road network was primarily designed in a hub-and-spoke pattern, with secondary paved roads leading from the resource area to the municipalities' industrial periphery. Gjakova was located on a secondary paved road connecting it 'out' to Albania and Pristina; roadways did not connect eastward, or in toward either Prizren or Ferizaj. While all primary roads, and the few secondary/regional roads built by Kosovo's central government were well constructed and paved, by 1999 many were cracked, pot holed and had delaminated.²²⁴ Local-level road construction and maintenance had been the responsibility of the municipalities and villages, and these roads were usually built to the minimum standards (World Bank, 2009:6). Likewise, minor municipal and farm roads were not paved, but comprised of hard-packed gravel. Indeed, the World Bank affirms Kosovo's roads, predominantly built in the 1960s and 1970s, were not damaged by the war in 1999 but had already deteriorated through lack of maintenance in the two decades after Tito's death (World Bank, 2009:6; Meyer, 2000).

²²⁴ Paved roads are built in successive layers of compacted rock and gravel with a protective asphalt topping. Degradation is caused by flooding or breaks in the road surface causing one or more layers to break down and begin a progression of structural failures in and between the layers causing the road to fracture and crumble, especially in cold climates.

As a result, the overall number of roads was not only small, most were poorly constructed and all were undermaintained (Pettifer, 2002), hence were in very poor condition after the war (World Bank, 2009:6). Road quality worsened after the war by increased traffic, particularly from returning refugees and expatriates, and the heavy military and aid-carrying vehicles (Meyer, 2000). As a result, seeming short distances would be exaggerated by too-few and poorly maintained roadways (World Bank, 2009:6). Noting Gjakova was not on a primary road, and Gjakova and Ferizaj were not connected by either primary or secondary roads, the long travel time caused by travelling minor and broken roadways was likely to have prevented any meaningful number of workers from Gjakova to have traveled to Ferizaj for employment at Camp Bondsteel²²⁵ unless able to stay with friends or family (Interview 73). Therefore, Gjakova's isolating circumstance and distance from Ferizaj and Prizren make it a suitable municipality and community for comparison. See Map 8.2, primary and major secondary paved roadways.



Map 8.2. Map courtesy of Independent Commission of Mines and Minerals (2017)

²²⁵ The distance from the Municipality of Gjakova to Prizren was just 36 km, 21 miles; the distance to the Ferizaj Municipality was 88km, or 53 miles

8.4 Municipality Factors for Evaluation

Governments at every level are composed of interconnected local political, social and economic factors. Examined through both the post-conflict and base closure literature, the factors that most clearly demonstrate the influence of a military base are the relationship between the base leaders and local elites; shifts in acceptable and unacceptable social behavior, and changes in community economics, including employment levels, business starts and increased local-level economic development. Therefore, the municipalities containing military bases, Ferizaj and Prizren, are compared to Gjakova in these areas, and changes in these factors are assumed to be the most pronounced for the base having the greatest contact and interaction with its community.

Thus, the Municipality of Ferizaj containing Camp Bondsteel, which had employed thousands of local residents at very high salaries and had locally purchased millions of dollars' worth of materiel, should exhibit the greatest variation from Municipality of Gjakova which does not host a military base, did not provide materials for purchase nor supply a significant number of base employees.

8.4.1 Political Factors

As discussed in Chapter 4, the failure to address the status of Kosovo, or to offer any remedy to the Serb violence against Kosovo Albanians at the 1995 Dayton Accords, undermined the cautious passive resistance movement. It also gave credence for violence against the Serbs by the previously unknown group calling themselves the Kosovo Liberation Army, KLA. This group was initially comprised of small, independent clan and village groups, predominantly from Kosovo's south and western municipalities,

including Gjakova. Kosovo's western border became the KLA's "operational zone" where the short distance to Albania and the mountainous terrain allowed training and movement to be relatively unnoticed (Morina, 2011:58). After the war, the KLA's western region commander Ramush Haradinaj, established the political party *Aleanca për Ardhmërinë e Kosovës*, Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (AAK) as his entrée to national politics (ibid: 44)

Upon the announcement of withdrawal of Serb forces per the Military Technical Agreement, Gjakova's Municipal offices, which had been vacated during the fighting, were filled and controlled by local KLA fighters, KLA supporters and organized crime elements - just hours after UNSCR 1244 was adopted (Interviews 77, 86; Daltweit, 2007:84; Human Rights Watch, 1999:24; Taylor, 2002:72). The KLA's intimidation and hardline domination of the Municipality which had overwhelmingly favored former KLA members, was soon felt to be illegitimate and caused resentment by the municipal population (Human Rights Watch, 1999:50; Taylor, 2002:72). Yet, by mid-2000, many of the former KLA members joined the nascent AAK, which by then had established itself as the majority political party in Gjakova and the western Kosovo municipalities²²⁶ (Morina, 2011:58; Skendaj, 2014), displaced the ubiquitous, but passive Democratic League of Kosovo, (LDK).

While the Gjakova municipality did not contain a KFOR military base, it did contain a unit of the temporarily formed para-military emergency services organization *Trupat e Mbrojtjes së Kosovës*, (TMK), chiefly comprised of now-unemployed former KLA. The TMK was officially disbanded a few months later with completion of the KLA's demilitarization, and was

²²⁶ Peja, Decan and Junik (Morina, 2011:63)

immediately formed into the Kosovo Protection Corps, (KPC)²²⁷. The KPC was developed jointly by UNMIK and KFOR, where KFOR helped develop daily administrative operations and provided professional training per its UNSCR 1244 tasking (Cockell, 2003:125; Haussler, 2008:63). Yet, while military personnel from the Italian military base would have had regular interaction with both the community and KPC, actual contact time was short²²⁸, and the relatively low rank of both the KPC members in training and KFOR trainers themselves allowed little opportunity for the development of significant working relations between the military leaders and Gjakova's community leaders to develop.

Despite KFOR leaders having had little direct political dealing with local community leaders concerning the KPC, KFOR did have some indirect influence through the interactions of daily patrols. More substantial relations developed in 2005 through regular visits by the Liaison Monitoring Teams, where community information and local concerns were habitually shared and exchanged with the local government (Svensson, 2008). Nevertheless, the usual attempts by community leaders to influence military leadership that are found in base closure, as well as much post-conflict literature, was minimal in Gjakova (Cheng, 2013; Dardia et al.,1996:1; Zaalberg, 2006). This thin overall interaction between KFOR and the community indicate the military bases' influence on the political activity in the Gjakova Municipality was likely to be low, and in the absence of corresponding social and economic influences through employment or purchasing, its influence would have been less than that which was found in the Municipalities of Ferizaj and Prizren.

²²⁷ Created through agreement of then political minister of the KLA, Hashim Thaçi and Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR). UNMIK retained overall responsibility for the TMK and KPC.

²²⁸ While each contributing nation had its own policy, early KFOR units generally rotated out of Kosovo on a four to six-month schedule.

8.4.2 Social Factors: Women in Gjakova

Among the chief social factors in post-conflict literature directly attributed to the presence of military bases are changes in locally acceptable behavior and attitudes toward women and sex/gender-based exploitation, especially prostitution.

Gjakova had had a long tradition of regional trade and hundreds of small handicraft shops, and it is assumed that women would have had some part in these activities, and therefore had participated in the local economy. In addition, Gjakova's early industrialization is likely to have brought women into the industrial labor force as well (Wolchik, 2016). Indeed, by 1976 nearly half of the able women in Yugoslavia were working outside the home²²⁹ (Damachi & Seibel, 1982). Women tended to be channeled toward the more "feminine" industries of textile manufacturing and food processing²³⁰ (Bonfiglioli, 2013; Woodward, 1995:316) among the first industries established in the Gjakova Municipality. By the early 1980s, women comprised over 70 percent of those employed in these industries (Bonfiglioli, 2013; Bonfiglioli, 2015; Woodward, 1995).

Nevertheless, while women were working away from the home in increasing numbers in Yugoslavia overall, the number of women employed full time outside the home in Kosovo in 1987 achieved just 20 percent of the workforce (Curtis, 1992:100). This figure dropped immediately with the ousting of Kosovo Albanians from industry and civil service by Milošević's policies and was reinforced by a return to the traditional protection of women (Sadikaj, 2009). By 2012, women employed outside the home in Gjakova had fallen to ten percent (UNDP & USAID, 2012). At the same time, Gjakova contains a disproportionate number of widows and female heads of family due to the especially heavy fighting in the municipality. Thus, especially

²²⁹ It is important to note that not all women that worked specifically wanted to work, rather 'work' was national duty.

²³⁰ "Feminized industries" tended to pay less, with fewer opportunities for advancement. Women were also more likely to be laid off during economic constriction and not rehired, therefore losing their health care, housing and social standing.

in comparison to Ferizaj containing a military base with a substantial number of female employees with high wages, women in Gjakova tend to have had far fewer opportunities to earn a self-supporting income (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011:39).

8.4.3 Economic Factors

According to the Municipality of Gjakova, one of every three residents had been employed in Socially Owned Enterprises (SOEs) at their peak in the early 1980's (Kosovar Stability Initiative, 2011:3). Kastrati (2014) notes that since Milošević's policies had terminated the employment of Kosovo Albanians in SOEs and civil service, Gjakova has experienced one of the highest out-migration rates in Kosovo (Kastrati, 2014:19), with its harmful "brain drain." Few of Gjakova's SOEs have since been successfully privatized and reopened to employ any sizable number. The high-employment SOEs have been slowly replaced by private micro-enterprises, which typically have less than ten employees, and are overwhelmingly sole proprietorships (ibid).

Given the thousands of Ferizaj residents employed on Camp Bondsteel, it is remarkable that the percentage of employed residents in Gjakova is similar to the municipalities with that military base and to Kosovo overall. The percentage of dependents, or "persons supported by others" are similarly comparable (KOSME, 2014), and like Kosovo as a whole, this figure is nearly double the combined number of employed and self-employed. See Table 8.1, Sources of Individual Income.

Municipality	Work / Employed	All Other Sources of Income	Dependents - Supported by Others
Ferizaj	28.1%	26.3%	45.6%
Gjakova	25.6%	25.8%	48.6%
Prizren	29.1%	25.2%	45.7%
Kosovo	28.9%	26.9%	44.2%

Table 8.1 Sources of individual income. All other sources of income include Yugoslavia-era and foreign pensions and remittances from abroad. Dependents/Persons supported by others also includes individuals below 15 years and over 65 years old, and the infirm. Source: KOSME (2013).

Gjakova's post-conflict economy presents the usual pattern of rapid growth immediately after conflict's end with its flood of donor funding and humanitarian aid to meet crisis and immediate needs (Cerra & Saxena, 2007), and also restoration of culturally significant buildings. As example, Gjakova received funding to restore its 15th Century Ottoman district to preserve that cultural treasure in 1999 by USAID. Nevertheless, humanitarian aid generally tapers off as urgent needs are met, and tends to decline in the third or fourth year after conflict (Collier, et al., 2008; Demekas, et al., 2001; de Coning, 2008). Further investment in substantive infrastructure re/construction projects often wait until the environment appears to have well stabilized (UNCTAD, 2009:58).

The loss of SOEs in this heavily industrialized municipality, and destruction of the traditional private businesses have been chiefly replaced with new small businesses. This subsection examines business starts in the sectors most often identified in post-conflict literature: construction services and trades, retail trade, transportation and hotel/restaurants for the study period²³¹.

Figure 8.1, below, provides an overview of the five primary sectors.

²³¹ The spike in business starts in 2003/2004 is the result of a successful Kosovo-wide business registration campaign.




Figure 8.1 Gjakova Business Starts. Bars represent number of starts for years 2000-2012. Data source: Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry (2016).

This figure clearly shows retail sales was the most active sector, at least in part a reflection that it had been Gjakova’s primary means of income generation for centuries, in addition to the post-conflict spike. Retail sales is followed by hotel/restaurants and transportation,²³² businesses that are more often associated with tourism. However, given that the Gjakova Municipality and surrounding area were badly damaged by the war, the increase in hotels/restaurants are likely the result of the demand for transition shelter for returnees, and temporary lodging for displaced residents and possibly builders from Albania or Montenegro, as local builders and merchants would have been similarly impacted by the war. Transition lodging may also be inferred by the fairly constant level of hotel/restaurants starts, which indicate more than the clientele of international organizations’ staff alone were using these services (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, et al., 2006). Transportation follows a similar pattern to retail; private individuals register as transportation services – taxis - for hire. It must

²³² Transportation in this period includes privately owned vehicles used as taxis, as well as multi-passenger transporters.

be noted here that the Italian KFOR had also rebuilt portions of the Gjakova's transportation infrastructure as it was within the Task Force area of responsibility, and while primarily intended for KFOR's own use such as for patrolling, the improvements would have benefitted Gjakova's businesses and commerce as well.

8.5 Comparison of Municipalities

In the absence of substantial outside investment, Gjakova is expected to have lower wages and a lower number of business starts^{233 234} including a lower number of businesses in the post-conflict sectors, when compared to the Municipalities with bases. This inference is based on two factors directly attributed to the military base: the first is a high number of residents employed, and secondly higher spending for those who are employed on base, noting monthly salaries²³⁵ averaged over 1,200€ in Ferizaj with Camp Bondsteel, and 600€ in Prizren with Camp Prizren.

The figures in Table 8.2 below finds percent employed in the three municipalities are surprisingly similar, despite the high number of workers in Ferizaj. Gjakova's percentage of employed residents is only slightly lower than either Ferizaj and Prizren, or the Kosovo average. Gjakova's average wages, however, are slightly higher than both Ferizaj and Prizren. This wage differential may be attributed to Gjakova's higher number of business and personal services businesses which tend to pay slightly better than does retail (Harris, 2016), hence the military bases appear to have had negligible overall effect on local wages or employment.

Table 8.2 Comparison of economically active population, 2000-2012

²³³ Business registration serves as a proxy for business starts.

²³⁴ This lower number of business starts would be most pronounced in secondary and tertiary business enterprises.

²³⁵ Particularly at Camp Bondsteel, the very-high salaries of up to \$5,000 USD (4,000€) had decreased to under \$2,000 (1,600€) by 2007/2008.

Municipality	Percent Employed	Percent Unemployed	Average Wages ²³⁶ all sectors
Ferizaj	26.1	43.7	208€
Gjakova	22.6	48.8	213€
Prizren	25.4	43.4	199€
Kosovo	24.7	44.8	209€

Table 8.2 Percent of population employed, unemployed (looking for work). Data source: KOSME (2013), and Kosovo Agency of Statistics (2005).

According to Héthy (2000), Kosovo’s monthly wages in 1999 after the war for government and civil servants “ranged from 150 DM for technical support staff to 600 DM for senior directors, with an average of 270 DM paid to state/civil employees. Teachers received 150 DM; doctors and professors received 360 DM, which was later increased to 1,000 DM, [noting] the UN paid its’ local staff between 940-2,200 DM, and UNDP paid its staff 400 DM.” Monthly wages paid by private businesses ranged from a high of 200 DM for construction-related services, while industries and trade with heavy competition, thus market saturation, paid employees between 50 and 60 DM (Héthy, 2000:14). Salaries for government and civil servants did not increase to accommodate inflation or other raises in costs of living (ibid). Specific details concerning Kosovo’s civil and private wages following the adoption of the euro from the Deutchemark, (DM), in 2002 are not readily available. However, like the interviewees in Ferizaj and Prizren, many in Gjakova believed that the conversion from DM to euro doubled the cost of goods and services for the purchaser, although it is not supported by literature. It is probable that some accommodation in wages for the euro conversion were made in 2002 or 2003, particularly as Kosovo’s annual budget, and subsequent donations and commerce with Western Europe were henceforth based on the euro.

²³⁶ Reliable municipality-level wage rates begin in fiscal year 2003-2004.

While post-conflict economic assessments rightly concentrate on the immediate recovery business sectors; construction services, retail trade, transportation and hotels/restaurants, Gjakova appears to have independently established a higher number of secondary *business services* and tertiary *personal services* business enterprises.²³⁷ These secondary and tertiary services require additional knowledge, training and often licensing prior to establishing the business and are thus more representative of a mature economy. Their presence may indicate a strategic decision to develop them *in the absence* of other options, particularly to increase Gjakova’s appeal for donor and foreign investment – a frequent best practice found in base closure literature (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Carnahan, et al., 2006). See Table 8.3.

Municipality	Business Starts 1000 residents²³⁸	Business Services	Personal Services
Ferizaj	101	7.0%	8.4%
Gjakova	91	7.6%	13.9%
Prizren	75	7.0%	9.7%
Kosovo	76	10.4%²³⁹	9.7%

Table 8.3 Secondary and tertiary business starts, 2000-2012. KOSME (2013); UNDP & USAID, (2012).

While not conclusive, secondary and tertiary businesses may also contribute to stability through clustering and business diversification, and therefore improve the ability for a wider range of businesses to operate successfully, shown by Gjakova’s low business exit rate. See Table 8.4.

²³⁷ Secondary services include banking and insurance, communication, real estate and scientific/technical activities, some administrative services and wholesaling. Tertiary services include accountancy, consulting, law, information technology, recreation, and some government services.

²³⁸ Based upon the 2011 Census

²³⁹ This figure includes Kosovo’s capital city, Pristina, containing a disproportionate number of international organizations and government offices that have an exceptionally high demand for these services.

Municipality	Business Starts/ 1000 residents	Business Entry Rate	Business Exit Rate
Ferizaj	101	14.2%	6.0%
Gjakova	91	11.0%	3.9%
Prizren	75	11.0%	7.8%
Kosovo	76	13.6%	6.5%

Table 8.4 Business performance, 2000-2012. Data source: KOSME (2013).

8.6 Gjakova Analysis and Summary

A study of Kosovo’s official federal and Municipality publications, its website, and a field visit finds more similarities than differences between the Municipality of Gjakova and the Municipalities with bases. The small number of differences tend to point to mostly neutral and localized effects on the political, social and economic areas of interest. This assessment contrasts with much of the academic post-conflict literature which asserts dramatic increases in predominantly malign political activities; unsustainable new businesses that service the international community, and substantial criminal activity, particularly prostitution and trafficking, that can be directly attributed to the military bases.

Reasons appear threefold. First, the absence of a KFOR base in the Gjakova Municipality provides fewer occasions for relations to develop between military and political leaders, particularly given KFOR’s risk aversion and preference for limited and formal contact, and thus to be perceived as well outside of Kosovo politics. Community elites did not actively attempt to influence military leaders to benefit themselves as had occurred in Afghanistan, Somalia and other post-conflict interventions because there was little opportunity or benefit to do so.

Secondly, Gjakova’s centuries-old trade routes were a convenient transit for weapons trafficking and smuggling supplies by the KLA (OSCE, 1999). Although KFOR had included

Gjakova in its regular patrolling schedule since its arrival in June 1999 (Salerno, 2003), poor local roads made travel difficult and the municipalities' long border with Albania and Macedonia made trafficking of arms, drugs and humans very easy to hide. Thus, the social ills usually associated with military and peacekeeper bases; prostitution/human trafficking, drug use and organized crime, were able to emerge in Gjakova without the presence of a military base.

Thirdly, unlike the Ferizaj Municipality, social and economic opportunities for women have either had not increased or regressed. Despite a fairly open past, after the mass employment termination policies of Milošević, Gjakova's residents turned inward for self-support and protection. Men typically became the sole wage earners, while women would be relegated to low pay/no pay caretaker roles that often held a lower social value. In addition, well-founded fears resulting from the increasing harassment of Kosovo Albanians during that time had led to the re-cloistering of women and often a greater acceptance of traditional gender-based restrictions. These habits have only been gradually relinquished since the end of the war. Nevertheless, in the absence of new social and economic opportunities and their influences for both men and women, including those that may be produced by a military base, Gjakova's social and economic development may be disadvantaged in the long term.

At the same time, Gjakova's economy appears to have taken an unexpected direction. At first review Gjakova presents the expected lower number of business starts and a lower employment rate throughout the study period than Ferizaj or Prizren. Gjakova and its industry had been badly damaged in the war. Not only had it lost much of its substantial Yugoslav-era industrialization that had been higher than both Ferizaj or Prizren, it also lost the pre-war capacity created by its historical trade network. Yet Gjakova presents a comparable percentage increase in business starts per capita in the primary post-conflict business sectors, construction services; retail trade, transportation and hotel/restaurant, to those that are seen in Ferizaj and Prizren, and with lower exit rates, Table 8.4.

However, Table 8.3 demonstrates Gjakova has uniquely developed a small, but substantial secondary and tertiary services sector. Businesses in these sectors typically require additional professional training and education, and hence are unlikely to have been simply established by former SOE employees, but may be due to returning expatriates, replacing the 'brain drain' of the prior decades. Similarly, Gjakova may have specifically encouraged such business development to take the place of manufacturing as well as increase Gjakova's appeal to foreign investors and international donors, particularly in the absence of proximate economic opportunities such as a military base. This turn to business and personal services is frequently emphasized as a best practice to recover from base closure, hence Gjakova may ultimately develop into a more sustainable political, social and economic environment.

Therefore, based on these observations of the Municipality of Gjakova and a comparison with the Municipalities of Ferizaj and Prizren, the KFOR military bases appear to have had negligible effect overall on the political, social and economic factors of their local communities.

Chapter 9: Analysis of Case Study Municipalities

9.0 Introduction

This chapter presents an analysis of the influences that military bases have on their local communities in the contemporary post-conflict environment. While a substantial range of academics and practitioners have detailed the ways peacekeeping forces and their bases place a heavy political, social and economic strain on the residents and community in post-conflict environments (Ammitzbøll & Dons Tychen, 2007; Autesserre, 2014; Carnahan, et al., 2005; Duffield 2011; Enloe 2000; Sciarra 2008; Toft 2010), a similar examination of the influences of military bases established in this environment is nearly absent. Drawing from a livelihoods approach to political economy analysis, this chapter examines the effects of military bases from the local communities' own perspective, the meso and micro levels, which Collinson (2003) notes "reveals the totality of the economic, political, social and cultural factors that affect people's lives" (Collinson 2003:4).

The chapter is comprised of two sections and built upon the characteristics and interrelated effects of military bases. The first describes the Political and Social effects of the base, focusing on the relationships between the community, community leaders and military leaders. It is followed by an examination of the perceptions of base employees, vendors, business owners and community members, and their individual experiences with the military bases. A closer view of the bases' influence upon women and their usual gender roles, and a discussion of base related crime is provided. An introduction to Kosovo-unique Liaison Monitoring Teams completes this section.

The second section concentrates on the bases' economic effects. It further analyzes the economy at the meso and micro (local) level, finding many of the anticipated effects are far

less robust than predicted, concluding the military bases have a limited effect on the communities.

9.1 Section 1: Intra-Community Dynamics in Case Study Municipalities

Among the many criticisms of both military bases are their extensive *intra-community* effects, generally negative outcomes of external influences that have modified locally acceptable attitudes, behavior and activity. These effects range from crime and the entrenchment of local opportunist actors; introduction of Western values concerning women, including women in the military; its contrast with the traditional roles of women in a patriarchal society; and, inflation and emergence of a peacekeeper-based economy. A close review of the academic and grey literature finds three broad areas where peacekeeper practices directly affect the local community: through local employment, local purchasing, and community relations. Military base closure studies similarly assess these areas and their effects on the community.

Base closure studies also examine the factors common to successful and unsuccessful transitions to a fully civilian economy, identifying four consistent factors: the proportion of community residents that work or provide services for the base; the bases' proximity to an urban area; the technical expertise of those employed on base, and the quality of relations between community leaders and the military base. These were examined with the field research, and evaluated within the three broad characteristics of a community, its political, social and economic roles.

In this chapter, *Political*, refers to relations between the community and the military leaders; *Social* refers to the attitudes and actions of the military personnel toward the community, and those of the community toward the military and between community members. *Economic* includes both local employment and purchasing and the secondary/tertiary effects of that employment and purchasing. These three factors are used as a framework to examine the

effects of the practices on the community by the base established by the German KFOR in the Municipality of Prizren, and the United States' KFOR in the Municipality of Ferizaj. The results are subsequently compared to the Municipality of Gjakova which does not contain a base, to determine whether, and in what ways, the base affects the local political economy. This Section therefore examines the social, political and economic intra-dynamics of the base communities.

9.2 Political Effects

The immediate post-conflict environment often finds vacated civil government offices have been filled by victorious military forces, organized crime, and warlords (Cheng, 2013; Münch, 2013). As Berdal (2009) and Cheng (2013) note, in the absence of the rule of law and a credible, capable government, criminalized war and conflict economies are quick to emerge to exploit the power vacuum, and in the absence of capable institutions, these conflict economies are likely to continue when conflict ends, becoming entrenched and permanent (Berdal, 2009; Cheng, 2013; also, Pugh, 2004). Such an appropriation of authority had occurred throughout Kosovo; members of the KLA and their supporters quickly occupied municipal government offices, including those municipalities containing KFOR bases. In part due the KLA's wide popularity²⁴⁰, these former KLA members and political supporters remained in those positions until the outcome of the 2000 elections, when many were voted out and replaced by members of newly established political parties.

As a military organization, KFOR strives to remain as apolitical as possible. Especially in a post-conflict environment, military leaders will tend to remain firmly outside local politics, intending to give little incentive for local leaders to establish [malign] relations with them. Hence, the commander and military leaders representing both Camp Bondsteel and Camp Prizren typically had only infrequent and formal interaction with the community leaders. Typically, this absence

²⁴⁰ Also, the slow deployment of UNMIK and its law enforcement organization, CIVPOL.

of interaction is offset through the relations between municipal-level civil servants and the non-US CIMIC or US Civil Affairs personnel. In Kosovo, these are joined by the NATO Liaison Monitoring Team (LMTs)²⁴¹, directed to gather, share and distribute news and information (Interviews 23, 25, 58, 60, 73; Svensson, 2008), yet may also establish a proxy political relationship for the military. Hence, whether it is intentional or not, by doing so military leaders and their forces ultimately give tacit approval to the status quo through their activities, or failure to act, hardly a neutral position.

Field interviews with members of International and non-governmental organizations; Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb residents and government officials, regularly stated that KFOR has had generally positive relations and cooperation with the local civil society and international civilian organizations since 1999. Interviews especially describe the early collaboration between KFOR Military Police patrols and United Nations Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) to oversee and protect returning internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees (Interviews 8, 3, 29, 72; Morris, 1999:16; UNMIK, 1999:6), as well as supporting their efforts to shelter and meet the physical needs of the local population by providing information regarding the hard-to-access very small and very remote villages on the patrol routes (Etchemendy, 2010:9). Similar descriptions of cooperation were expressed by UNMIK and Kosovo Police, who attended many of the same coordination meetings (Interviews 8, 27, 28, UNMIK, 1999:6).

9.3 Social Effects

A common claim against peacekeeping forces are their “influences which cause widespread societal changes when large numbers of the community are employed to their operations on their base” (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277; Carnahan, 2005; Sciarra, 2008). These range from a ‘brain drain’ from the community by competition between the international

²⁴¹ The activities of CIMIC, Civil Affairs and LMTs are examined more fully in Chapter 10.

community and local government for skilled workers (Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006; Sciarra, 2008); gender-based trafficking and insult to traditional gender roles (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007:277); and unsustainable entrepreneurship that “specifically caters to the tastes of foreigners” (ibid). At the individual level however, the most common changes are shifts in acceptable and unacceptable social behavior concerning personal status, effects on the role of women and peacekeeper-related crime.

9.3.1 Personal Status

For years working at a KFOR base was a not only a source of income, it was also a source of special status²⁴² and pride²⁴³, a sentiment consistent with all interviewees that had worked on a KFOR base, including businesses, (Interviews 9, 10, 20, 48, 50, 53, 55, 57), although businesses generally did not publicize their relationship. Prior employment on the base tended to be an advantage when seeking new employment in their community (ibid). Few, however, were known to have sought employment with other international organizations as is often stated in post-conflict literature (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, et al., 2006; Jennings & Bøås, 2015). This is likely due to the low demand for the skills developed on the base, typically a construction trade, food service or cleaning. Translators, with their more marketable expertise to the international community, were the exception (Interviews 13, 19, 38, 73). However, those who had been fired were often unable to find employment despite their experience on a KFOR base, and would seek employment with family, become self-employed, relocate to another location, or migrate out of Kosovo (Interviews 11, 73, 78, 84).

²⁴² Interviews and informal conversations with local employees of international and non-governmental organization did not express this sense of status and pride.

²⁴³ By the second research visit in 2016, working on a military base was no longer a significant source of social prestige.

9.3.2 Influence on Women

The experiences of women were more complex. While women who had worked on base also described increased pride and self-respect (Interviews 11, 64, 84), they, and other women they knew, had often heard disapproving comments from their family, typically from male family members living outside Kosovo, (Interviews 11, 64, 77, 78, 84, 85). Although economic need for the woman's income generally overruled such disapproval, that noncompliance was an affront to the patriarchal tradition and occasionally a source of family friction (ibid). Some women, however, were expressly exploited by their families for their high salaries, pressured to give their income to the male family members, and did not benefit from it (Interviews 77, 78, 85).

Community disapproval of a woman working on base could also extend to the spouse and children, with accusations of "shameful wives and disgraceful mothers working on the base with strange men" (Interviews 30, 31, 32, 64, 77, 85.) The disparagement for unmarried women was punitive; she became undesirable as a wife or simply unmarriageable, although interviewees stated these views have subsided with the increase of the number of women employed and continued presence of the bases (Interviews 11, 64, 77, 84).

In some cases, a job transfer on base or promotion challenged local gender roles. Women seldom worked 'in front of the counter'²⁴⁴ and very rarely worked where alcohol was served. As coffee shops typically serve alcohol in Kosovo, a woman that had been transferred from a retail jewelry counter to work in a coffee shop hid her new job from her family for months, although no alcohol was sold there, in fear of their disapproval. More consistent with feminist literature were anecdotes and insinuations of prostitution, 'friendly laundry ladies,' the details of which

²⁴⁴ Women who worked outside the home was not an issue, it was *where*. Women already worked in point of sale services such as retail, bakeries and fast foods, 'behind the counter.' Serving coffee with its closer contact to male customers, is considered 'in front of the counter,' comparatively risqué.

were unverifiable²⁴⁵, and a small number of romances, mostly between male Soldiers and their female translators.

Woman's rights and health organizations, including Kosovar civil society, Kosovar-led international organization leaders, and women business owners, stated the military base has been good for women overall. First because women working on base eventually gain community respect for their contributions to the family, and secondly, because military women [especially as leaders] have been good role models to demonstrate professional relationship with men. Several male political leaders had made similar statements concerning their positive opinions, in addition to their greater willingness to hire women, and support for increased opportunities for women to work and "be a part of society."

9.3.3 Military Peacekeeper Crime

A frequent theme in academic and grey literature concerning military bases is the increased level of crime; black marketing, labor exploitation and prostitution that are directly attributable to the presence of those international and military forces (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Carnahan, et al., 2006:21; Enloe, 2014:126; Martin, 2005; Mendelson, 2005; Sadikaj, 2010:2; Stern, 2015). Moreover, these organizations have acknowledged they have often failed to hold offenders accountable when the crimes were discovered (Carnahan, et al., 2005; Martin, 2005; Mendelson, 2005), undermining their organizations' credibility and further damaging the community it was sent to help (ibid).

²⁴⁵ On the US base, mostly women received and returned bagged laundry, and were professionally friendly as they often saw the same individuals on a regular basis. This led to speculation by some military personnel they were available for prostitution. Claims of such attempts were not verified; however, military personnel that spent an inordinate of time at the laundry or other base venues could be reprimanded for harassment. Relationships and romances between the military and local workers were very strongly discouraged to avoid negative impressions of KFOR through violation of traditional customs. Moreover, the time needed for marriage visas was often much longer than a Soldier would have in Kosovo, resulting in broken engagements and irreparable damage to the fiancée's reputation (Author's experience, 2009).

Although such activity is well documented in the Balkans, such as the *Arizona Market* in Bosnia-Herzegovina²⁴⁶, and elsewhere in post-conflict literature, these malign activities did not appear to have emerged in Kosovo *expressly due to the military bases*²⁴⁷ per the field interviews. Nearly 100 percent²⁴⁸ of the interviews²⁴⁹ conducted in Kosovo contained questions concerning the informal economy, to include black marketing and smuggling; human trafficking, prostitution and sex-crimes; inappropriate conduct, such as theft, drunkenness and rude/culturally offensive behavior²⁵⁰ after the arrival of military forces. Several interviewees acknowledged that there had been offenses and crimes committed by military personnel in the early years, but none of those interviewed stated they had more recent knowledge of KFOR's involvement in illegal activity including prostitution (Interviews 23, 27, 28, 29, 30, 44, 73, 84). Human Rights Watch had closely chronicled human rights violations in Kosovo since 1998, and cites Kosovo had become a thruway and destination for prostitution in the late 1990s, (Human Rights Watch, 2001; Amnesty International, 2004; also Interviews 29, 30, 84), but it did not 'take hold' as it had in Bosnia (Mendelson, 2005; Interviews 29, 30, 84).

Prostitution had secretly existed in Kosovo within clandestine "Public Houses," however, very few KFOR personnel would have had knowledge of them (Interview 84), and fewer would have had the means to visit due to the base restrictions on travel. Far more common was rudeness

²⁴⁶ Named after the roadway in northern Bosnia-Herzegovina on which it is located, NATO "Route Arizona" near the city of Brčko. Arizona Market was encouraged and protected by US Stabilization Forces (SFOR) to promote positive inter-ethnic relations by creating a protected area for private commerce, generally farm products and household items. Its good intentions were quashed by its usurpation by organized crime, especially human trafficking for prostitution. Arizona Market was eventually 'cleaned up' and regulated, but the crime network has remained (Haynes, 2010).

²⁴⁷ This is not to state that it was not present, as Mendelson, Martin and Human Rights Watch provide substantial evidence of its occurrence. Rather, the field research did not find the same clear and direct connections often stated in literature.

²⁴⁸ Several individuals were interviewed for their background knowledge of NATO operations outside of Kosovo.

²⁴⁹ The interview sample included local police, Kosovo government officials at the municipality level; senior international organization officials, German and US military - including military intelligence, and civilian personnel that had been posted on a base in Kosovo during in the research period; youth and women's rights and domestic protections groups and international civil society, a Municipal ombudsman for minority communities, and the senior KFOR cultural advisor.

²⁵⁰ Inappropriate behavior includes, but not limited to overly-loud talking, disrespectful attitudes and mannerisms; sexually suggestive gestures to local girls and women; harassing animals; unnecessarily blocking roads and aggressive driving through villages.

and gratuitous roughness with men, and inappropriate touching of women by military personnel during security searches, particularly in the months immediately after the war's end. The rape and murder of a 12-year old Kosovo Albanian girl by a member of the US KFOR in 2000 led to that Soldier receiving a jail sentence for life, in addition to multiple career ending reprimands for several others, and an aggressive pre-deployment rules of behavior training program for all NATO forces to be rotated into Kosovo, all of which were made public.

Therefore, while some negative responses may have been the effect of nervousness, strong social taboo or discomfort concerning prostitution, the absence is more likely to have been the result of the highly restrictive procedures for leaving the military base²⁵¹. Such restrictions are listed among the UN best practices (Carnahan, et al., 2006). Hence, KFOR appeared to have mitigated much of the usual destructive activity and behavior historically found in military base communities, as the majority of reported incidents in literature are 2005 and earlier. Table 9.1 provides a snapshot of expected findings.

	Hiring	Purchasing	Community Relations
Hypothesis	Direct hires in large numbers at high salaries	Inflated prices emerge due to high demand for scarce housing, food, fuel; all become too high for local incomes	Local leaders/elites attempt to influence military forces for own benefit; may infer return to violence
Camp Bondsteel: US KFOR	Contractor hires in very high numbers; very high salaries ~ \$1,000-5,000/month.	Low demand for local resources. High volume purchase of material through US government through civilians.	Infrequent, mostly formal relations with local leaders. Frequent informal relations with patrols, LMTs
Camp Prizren: German KFOR	Direct hires in small numbers; high salaries ~ 600-800€/month.	Low demand for local resources. Purchased single items or small amounts. Contracted for military services.	Infrequent, mostly formal relations with local leaders. Frequent informal relations with patrols, LMTs

Table 9.1. Comparison of hypothesis expectations and field observations.

²⁵¹ Military forces and civilians were typically confined to the base unless leaving was a necessary part of the job, e.g. patrolling, and then in multi-vehicle convoys and in military uniform. Military forces posted on the two bases of this research were either restricted to consuming alcohol on base during prescribed hours (Germany) or restricted from alcohol consumption completely (United States).

9.4 Section 2: Economic Effects

A period of rapid economic growth after the end of conflict is well documented, (Cerra & Saxena, 2007; David, et al., 2011; Dobbins, et al., 2007; Ohiorhenuan & Stewart, 2008). While the early practices of establishing the military bases did not result in the anticipated balloon economy and extreme inflation, the majority of the effects on the community were undeniably economic.²⁵² Indeed, Lynch (1970), in reference to measuring the employment effect of small regional economies in base closure communities, states:

“... the increase in [base activity] leads to an increase in local employment; that such an increase in employment directly leads to an increase in community income, which as spent, induces a derived and calculable increase in localized income.”²⁵³ (Lynch, 1970:263)

More simply, the overall positive or negative economic effect on a community is an outcome of the number of local employees employed and their spending, in proportion to the size of the community (Cowan, 2012; Dardia, et al., 1996; Lynch, 1970; Sharp, 1990).

This section, *economics*, examines interrelated economic activity-relationships: the primary, direct economic relationships, such as individual salaries and purchases; the most typical secondary and supporting economic relationships formed by within-community purchasing; and, the projected tertiary economic effects on the communities as a whole. These activity-relationships describe a simple economic model where a business activities' distance from the primary base-individual relationship is increasingly more complex and incurs more risk to those that precede it, thus revealing a communities' tendency toward economic maturity and stability.

²⁵² Per both empirical and published data from the Kosovo Small and Medium Enterprise Promotion Program, KOSME, the Kosovo Ministry of Trade and Industry; individual Municipalities and the United States Agency for International Development, USAID

²⁵³ Lynch, (1970:263), referring to the multiplier effect of changes in local/base economy and subsequent changes in the community.

9.4.1 Direct Economic Relationships

The post-conflict literature rightly highlights the antagonism felt by community members who had not benefitted from high-salaried work with international organizations (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Gauster & Maruszczak, 2006; Sciarra, 2006), or profited by their considerable purchasing power.²⁵⁴ This resentment, however, appeared to be mostly absent in the communities surrounding KFOR bases. The US bases Camp Monteith and Camp Bondsteel together hired unprecedented thousands of individuals to work on the bases at very high salaries for several years²⁵⁵, drawing mostly from the Gjilan and Ferizaj Municipalities. Yet, with the exception of concrete blocks purchased for building SEA-hut foundations in the first year, and the very substantial gravel and crushed stone purchases for nearly 10 years,²⁵⁶ these bases actually bought very little from the community overall.

The German base, Camp Prizren had hired a only a small number of individuals from the much larger Prizren Municipality to work on the base, and at a comparatively modest salary²⁵⁷. Camp Prizren personnel made numerous small and regular purchases for a variety of consumable items, and had locally contracted for base printing, vehicle maintenance and laundry services in their entirety. Economic opportunity therefore, was not specifically confined to a small number of industries or elites, (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007) but was distributed within multiple sectors of the community. Hence, the anticipated concentration of economic resources by a small number of persons or businesses do not appear to have emerged in these two municipalities.

²⁵⁴ Carnahan observed where local businesses catered to UN fieldworker preferences, approximately 20 percent of a fieldworkers' money spent would remain in the community (Carnahan, et al., 2006:3).

²⁵⁵ As high as 5,000 USD per month in 1999 for nearly 12 months. Salaries stabilized at 1,200-1,500 USD per month, for several years, at a time when most salaries in the community were 50-300 USD per month. Base salaries in 2014 were 600-800 USD per month.

²⁵⁶ While thousands of tonnes of quarry material representing millions of dollars is not insignificant, it is a single economic sector with a fairly low linkage to other economic sectors, thus contributes little the local economy overall.

²⁵⁷ Salaries at Camp Prizren ranged from an initial high of approximately 1,200 USD to the present (2014) 400-600 USD per month.

9.4.2 Individual Soldier Spending

While almost 20,000 US KFOR and partner nation Soldiers, and hundreds more US contractors were deployed to Gjilan and Ferizaj, and some 17,000 German and partner nation KFOR soldiers²⁵⁸ were deployed to Prizren, individual soldiers and contractors spent little money in the local community, the result of KFOR-wide and Camp Bondsteel and Camp Prizren travel restrictions.²⁵⁹ Particularly as arson and armed fighting continued well into 2000, with the exception of patrols and select military activities, very few KFOR soldiers were permitted to travel outside of the base, which significantly reduced soldier purchasing opportunities. These spending opportunities were further limited to the daylight operating hours as directed by the Kosovo-wide curfew imposed by KFOR to reduce crime and vandalism.

Soldiers on patrol or travelling between duty locations were generally permitted to buy personal consumables, such as cigarettes, bagged snacks and bottled non-alcoholic beverages; clothing,²⁶⁰ jewelry or souvenir items such as ashtrays and small electronics (Interviews 8, 35, 62, 73). However, KFOR soldiers were restricted to eating pre-packaged meals or at the base dining facilities and canteens (Interview 62, 73) for nearly a decade, and remained limited thereafter. Such everyday practices such as meeting at local cafés, eating meals at local restaurants or drinking at bars, were not allowed to prevent soldiers from acquiring food borne illnesses. Thus, the price spikes typically associated with a rapid influx of wealthy outsiders consuming local housing, food, fuel or other goods and services, and thereby inflating prices or causing shortages (Ammitzball & Tyksen, 2007) did not appear to materialize in Gjilan, Ferizaj and Prizren because of the KFOR personnel. Rather, community members in these

²⁵⁸ Soldiers from Austria, Netherlands and Turkey and were also posted in Prizren, and operated under the same restriction.

²⁵⁹ Restrictions to leave the base was relaxed following the establishment of the Liaison Monitoring Teams in late 2004.

²⁶⁰ This was minimal mostly gift items, such as for children; civilian clothing was not permitted to be worn by military personnel on KFOR bases.

municipalities consistently believed that the rise in local prices was caused by the transition from the Deutschmark to the Euro in 2002, not as the result of KFOR or “internationals” (Interviews 35, 62, 73, 78; also, Tyrbedari, 2006:9²⁶¹).

9.4.3 Secondary Economic Relationships

The salary of a single base employee typically supported seven to nine adult family members and several children, all of whom would have lived in a family home of four to six rooms (Interviews 73, 85). Given many homes had been damaged by war or vandalized, the majority of base employees invested a large part of their salaries on home repair, home expansion or on new construction (ibid), often purchasing from the numerous new retail businesses selling imported building supplies, paints, lighting and sanitary fixtures that had opened to meet demand. This construction also appeared to have energized, or coincided with, the restart of several of the pre-war textile, wood furniture and cabinetry businesses [in Ferizaj] (Cardno, 2015; Daniel, 2003), and manufacturing of new construction products’ such as roof tiles and preformed concrete supplies; metal specialties used in tile and brick work, and glass products such as windows and doors [in Prizren] (ibid). Likewise, the increase in discretionary income would likely have also increased the establishment and use of convenience services, such as restaurants and taxis, automobiles and non-essential retail consumables.

Thus, the effect of purchasing by local base employees would be expected to have facilitated starts for complementary business servicing enterprises, such as importers and suppliers, that have specifically formed to support business or industry. These carry a somewhat higher degree of risk; business to business enterprises are dependant upon a comparatively small range of potential clients for larger, but more infrequent purchases (Harvard Business Review, 1978). As the military bases made few purchases from local businesses, the business to business growth

²⁶¹ The bank conversion rate for Deutschemark (DM) to Euro (€) conversion in 2002 was 1.9551 DM to 1€, which appeared to double the cost of goods and services for the purchaser. Although not supported, this “doubled cost” was widely believed throughout Kosovo.

in the base community would chiefly reflect local demand. Thus, an increase in number and variety of business services and business to business enterprises would indicate a more sustainable local economy.

9.4.4 Tertiary benefits to the community

In addition to increased non-base related employment, the wider community also benefits through revived industry, and payment of personal income, property and point of sale taxes, which fund improvements to municipal infrastructure and services. Business registration and tax enforcement also reduce the informal economy and limit opportunities for criminal activity and corruption (Ferizaj Municipal Tax Authority, 2016). Figure 9.1 provides a graphic the expected direct and indirect economic impact of a military base.




Figure 9.1 Anticipated Model of Base Economy

9.5 Evaluation Considerations and Significant findings

Given the observations made by Lynch (1970) concerning base employment and purchasing, the following assumptions were made:

- The Municipality of Ferizaj, a 2000 estimated population of 140,000, containing US base Camp Bondsteel, which had employed thousands of local residents at high salaries, and had made a high volume, but low absolute number of purchases, will show a high number of business starts across sectors
- The Municipality of Prizren, a 2001 estimated population of 221,000, containing the German base Camp Prizren, which had hired few local workers and contracted for many small quantities of goods and services, will show a low level of business starts across sectors
- The Municipality of Gjakova, a 1999 estimated population of 132,000, without a military base was expected to have a very low level of business starts across sectors

The availability of historic municipality-level data for pre-Kosovo War is limited, primarily due to Kosovo's incorporation into Serbia's overall data as a province²⁶². Nevertheless, the Kosovo Business Registration Agency, and the Kosovo Small and Medium Business Enterprises (KOSME) Programme provides comprehensive longitudinal data²⁶³ of private businesses operating in Kosovo between 2000 and 2013.²⁶⁴

Figure 9.2 displays the total number of business starts for the three municipalities.

²⁶² Kosovo specific economic data was compiled, but often destroyed or relocated to Serbia (Interviews 24, 25, 58, 60, 67)

²⁶³ KOSME's compilation of OSCE reports collected from 2000 forward, and KOSME's own surveys from 2010-2013.

²⁶⁴ The 2003-2004 spike in business starts reflects a successful Kosovo-wide business registration program.




Figure 9.2 Business starts 2000 - 2012

The graph of business starts by municipality finds the high number of starts in 2000, which fall to a much lower point only a few years later in 2002, is congruent with Cerra & Saxana's (2007) research regarding post-conflict economic recovery and rapid local growth (Cerra & Saxena, 2007; also, David, et al., 2011:6). It also supports Serneels & Verpoorten (2012) conclusions that after the rapid expansion, the number of businesses contract, and that ultimately, economies will approach, but rarely to return to, their pre or post conflict highs. In addition, the number of businesses tend to stabilize, and barring further conflict or other external factors²⁶⁵, the economy tends to henceforth function below its pre-war levels (ibid). Acknowledging the spike seen in 2003 which reflects a successful Kosovo-wide business registration campaign, the profile of business starts for the three municipalities appear to follow the same trendline. Noting that Prizren shows the highest number of business starts, both proportionally and in real numbers,

²⁶⁵ Such as the global economic slowdown of 2007 - 2008.

rather than Ferizaj as expected, it suggests that Prizren's already robust business environment is likely to have played a greater part in new business establishment, which appears more consistent with base closure literature concerning base proximity to an urban center (Cowan, 2012; Dardia, et al., 1996) than the proportion of base employees and their expenditure in the community (Lynch, 1970).

9.6 Municipal Profiles

When the primary post-conflict business sectors are disaggregated into the five primary post-conflict economic recovery sectors, and graphed as a percentage of the municipal economy, the profiles are again similar across the three municipalities. Surprisingly, overall construction business starts are low, mostly under 25 starts per year. As individual post-conflict repairs are generally cash-based, the low level of construction business starts in Prizren and Gjakova may indicate limited income, or a general tradition of self/family-repair. However, the low level of construction business starts in Ferizaj, despite a very high number of base workers with high incomes, may stem from an economic preference to work on base for a high salary for as long as possible, rather than take on risk and open a business, hence construction businesses may have been *suppressed* by the base. Thus, the overall number of construction business starts is unexpectedly low especially considering the widespread destruction in Gjakova; vandalism in Prizren, and new affluence in Ferizaj.

The disproportionately high level of retail starts in Prizren is likely to reflect its long tradition in regional trade; Gjakova presents a similar trend at a far lower level. Given Ferizaj does not have this tradition of trade, its elevated level of retail business starts, which is coupled with high transportation and hotel/restaurants starts, appears to support that these activities are mostly related to income generated by the base. This specific combination is common and well described in peacekeeping literature (Ammitzbøell & Dons Tychen, 2007; Carnahan, et al., 2006). However, the predominance of trade overall may also reveal systemic economic

weakness, as trade can also become “subsistence employment” in the absence of other opportunities (Denfeld, 2013:28). See Figures 9.3 – 9.5 below.




Figure 9.3 Municipality of Ferizaj business starts, 2000 - 2012 (Camp Bondsteel)




Figure 9.4 Municipality of Prizren business starts,²⁶⁶ 2000 - 2012 (Camp Prizren)

²⁶⁶ Note the Y-axis for the Municipality of Prizren is 800 units, rather than 400 units for Municipalities of Ferizaj and 300 for Gjakova.




Figure 9.5 Municipality of Gjakova business starts, 2000 - 2012 (no base)

To further examine the municipalities overall economic sectors' growth, and whether the base and its activities had a meaningful effect on the local economy as a whole, the Municipalities of Ferizaj, Prizren and Gjakova, and for Kosovo overall are disaggregated and compared by ten key NACE economic sector areas²⁶⁷: construction, wholesale/retail trade; hotels/restaurants; transportation; manufacturing²⁶⁸; personal services; human health; business services; energy/water supply and education. These profiles below again indicate trade alone is nearly half of all new enterprise.

See Figure 9.6.

²⁶⁷ Based on 2008 NACE Code, "Statistical Classification of Economic Activities in the European Community"

²⁶⁸ Although manufacturing appears strong, this mostly represents construction materials for domestic sale/use, as described earlier.




Figure 9.6 Ten Primary Economic Sectors

9.7 Analysis and Summary

These disaggregated graphs demonstrate trade, which is likely to be primarily consumption due to the absence of any significant balancing sectors such as manufacturing (especially for export), or business and personal services, ultimately reveals economic weakness across Kosovo including the municipalities of Ferizaj and Prizren. This conclusion is twofold. Trade, especially retail trade, requires few skills and has a low barrier to entry. Trade operates on a simple principle of selling merchandise at a price higher than that it was purchased in order to result in profit and therefore income. However, in the absence of adding further value through processing, that margin is small, hence profit often remains low (Denfeld, 2013). Particularly in the post-conflict environment, this merchandise is likely to be seasonal food, packaged consumables and small household goods, which not only tend to have low profit margins²⁶⁹, but the ease of business duplication can saturate the market with the same products and result in

²⁶⁹ Smuggling, particularly of tobacco and alcohol is an exception; profit margins greatly improve by avoiding tariffs.

losses. Even when the merchandise 'advances' to more durable goods, the simple retail structure remains. Transportation and most restaurants offer similar low startup costs. In contrast, construction requires additional specialized skills and tools, while manufacturing requires not only skills, but also suitable equipment, resources and infrastructure.

Although business registration aids tax accountability, most small businesses continue to operate informally and without sufficient management experience or investment to expand (Gilbert & Singh, 2005). Hence, such small enterprises generally fail to grow or add new jobs beyond one's family (Denfeld, 2013), and have little protection from external market fluctuation (Ndlovu, 2014). Secondly, as trade represents approximately 50 percent of all businesses, and over 80 percent of businesses operate as sole proprietorships (KOSME, 2014), the ability to earn sufficient profit to invest, grow and hire employees, such as those noted in the expected secondary effects in Figure 9.1, becomes much more difficult.

It must be restated here that military organizations have little proficiency, and even less dictate to intentionally participate in developing the economy of their local communities. Nevertheless, the establishment and day-to-day practices of operating the base have an effect on them. The Municipality profiles of Ferizaj, Prizren and Gjakova present small, but telling variations.

- The Ferizaj Municipality which contains Camp Bondsteel was expected to show a markedly high number of business starts for all of the five primary post-conflict reconstruction sectors: construction services, construction trades, retail trade, transportation and hotels/ restaurants. It does not. Rather, Camp Bondsteel which provided substantial training and experience for local residents in construction trades for several years, and the payment of very high salaries paid to thousands of employees for over a decade, appears to have had mainly increased Ferizaj's prosperity and consumption. The high levels of trade, and fairly consistent level of transportation and hotels/restaurants suggest Camp Bondsteel had not significantly catalyzed growth in

more 'mature' service business sectors as would have been anticipated after 12 years in the community. The same general pattern is seen in the 10-economic sector graph where manufacturing, and services are also minimal. Thus, Camp Bondsteel's economic benefits to the Ferizaj Municipality is low and relatively superficial, and does not support the expected strong economy, regardless of the high local income.

- Prizren also displays a disproportionate level of trade business starts in the five post-conflict reconstruction sectors and in the 10-economic sector graph, though it is more likely to be related to Prizren's its long history of trade than an extraordinary post-conflict surge. This is concluded because trade is paired with hotels/restaurants, the proportion of which is nearly 50 percent higher than Ferizaj, and close to 100 percent higher than Gjakova per year since 2000. Moreover, there is a virtually identical number of new construction services and construction trade business starts as in Ferizaj and Gjakova. Hence, Prizren is most likely returning to its primary pre-war economy, trade and tourism, which the local military base would have had little influence, and therefore supports Camp Prizren's overall low economic effect on the Prizren Municipality.
- Gjakova, without a military base, shows the expected lower number of business starts in all five post-conflict sectors, giving an initial impression that the absence of the base has had a negative effect on its economy. However, further examination of the 10-economic sector graph shows Gjakova has developed larger secondary and tertiary services sectors than are seen in either Ferizaj or Prizren. As businesses in these sectors tend to require additional professional training and education, they may be due to returning expatriates, replacing the 'brain drain' of the prior decades. However, Gjakova may have specifically encouraged such business development to replace lost manufacturing as well as to increase Gjakova's appeal to investors, specifically because of the absence of proximate economic opportunities such as a military base. This turn

to business and personal services is a frequently emphasized as the best practice to recover from local base closure. Thus, while the low number of post-conflict business starts predicted in the Gjakova Municipality is supported by the data, Gjakova in fact demonstrates a more mature and stable economy, hence the KFOR military bases appear to have had at best a very minor effect overall on the political, social and economic factors of this community.

The chapter therefore concludes that the crime, including black marketing, labor exploitation and prostitution which are directly attributable to humanitarian and military forces, can be greatly mitigated by careful procedures and increased personnel accountability. Likewise, localized inflation and a balloon economy can be reduced by adhering to appropriate lessons-learned and best practices, such as those published by the United Nations. Significantly, the high salaries paid by military organizations tend to increase local prosperity rather than catalyze and sustain local business development, and therefore base communities require the same developmental investment as those communities without bases. This research strongly suggests that well-coordinated relations between military and civilian peacekeepers and the community may indirectly support peace building initiatives. Nevertheless, noting the main influence of military bases on the community is the relationship between military and community leaders, and observing the limited, formal relations noted in the base communities, Chapter 10 analyzes the role of military LMTs, particularly whether they have served as a proxy for military leaders to influence community relations, and if so, in what ways and with what effects.

Chapter 10: The Liaison Monitoring Teams

10.0 Introduction

This Chapter introduces the military Liaison Monitoring Teams, (LMTs), small groups of military personnel that have worked throughout Kosovo at the community level since early 2005. The LMT structure, and ways of community engagement are unique to Kosovo. The Chapter argues that while UNMIK and other international organizations have formal political and economic influence over local politics, KFOR, through the LMTs have had a substantial but chiefly unintended, informal influence.

The LMTs were established in response to an eruption of riots that had started near the majority Kosovo-Serb municipality of Mitrovića and rapidly spread across Kosovo in March 2004. The riots were a surprise to the international community, including KFOR. KFOR realized that, five years into its mission, it lacked both an understanding of local community dynamics and an appropriate means to quickly and flexibly respond. Since early 2005 LMTs have served as KFOR's "eyes and ears" and a means to detect and address potential areas of conflict as they emerge, especially ethnically-based tensions, rather than when they have escalated into a potentially violent crisis. Moreover, LMTs have facilitated information sharing between the military base, the local government and the populace, as well as various international and non-governmental organizations located within its Brigade area of responsibility.

For KFOR, the activities of the LMTs have been a significant contributor to everyday security in Kosovo for both KFOR and the populace. Yet paradoxically, LMTs may also have facilitated a dependency upon KFOR which could ultimately degrade Kosovo's longer-term stability as they have become a mechanism through which relationships between communities and local authorities are mediated. The chapter concludes with a reflection of the relationships and

activities performed by the military through the LMTs and their consequent influence on the local community.

10.1 LMT's Relation to the Wider Argument

While LMTs have been a ubiquitous part of KFOR's "Safe and Secure Environment" (SASE) strategy since early 2005 and continue to be a core part of KFOR's everyday activities, comprehensive study of the role and activities of NATO Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMTs) is nearly absent in academia (Janssens, 2015; Svensson, 2008). This void is surprising, considering their widespread use in Kosovo for over a decade, and the similar Liaison and Observation Teams, LOTs²⁷⁰, active in Bosnia-Herzegovina several years prior to the establishment of the LMTs in Kosovo (Gstrein, 2007; Janssens, 2015). Instead, first-person anecdotes, typically written by military personnel in personal web logs (blogs); in military public affairs stories in soldier journals, and in press releases for hometown newspapers²⁷¹ are the most commonly found materials relative to them. Their content is largely positive and self-congratulatory, often relating their contributions to the improvement in the living conditions of Kosovars in their assigned area (Reyes, 2005; Wade, 2009²⁷²). Limited non-anecdotal discussion of LMTs were also found in NATO, and gray literature, often as good news stories or "lessons learned," that were embedded among other improvements in local situational awareness, and for smoothing community relations in support of the KFOR mission (Cook, 2008; Janssens, 2015). The most substantial academic examination was limited to a handful of Master's Degree theses concerning civil-military liaison officers generally (Chalmers, 2001), and KFOR LMTs specifically

²⁷⁰ Although outwardly similar to LMTs, Liaison and Observation Teams (LOTs) in Bosnia-Herzegovina closely supported intelligence collection and were focused on threats to the military mission. Likewise, the engagement operations of the community-based Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) Houses found in Banja Luka (UK Sector) and Mostar (French Sector). LMTs expressly do not collect intelligence.

²⁷¹ A 2005 article in the New York Amsterdam News highlights the New York National Guard LMTs meeting with Kosovo Serb shepherds in support of a USAID program to increase Kosovo's wool production and market in the Balkans.

²⁷² See "One Team ... Once Goal" by 69th Public Affairs Detachment for a description of KFOR LMTs in the MNB-E area of responsibility: <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/37629>.

(Svensson, 2008); a critical review of post-conflict policing (Janssens, 2015) and an assessment of German armed forces' civil-military operations (Voget, 2008). Hence, an examination of LMTs, which have operated throughout Kosovo since 2005 may be a key factor to explain and understand the absence of relations between KFOR's military leaders and community elites as described in post-conflict literature, and address whether LMTs act as proxies for military leaders.

10.2 Environmental Factors

The field interviews and informal conversations conducted during the in-Kosovo research periods, 2014 and 2016, consistently found leaders at the municipal level, including the mayor of Ferizaj; the mayors' offices in Ferizaj, Gjilan, Gjakova and Prizren as well a representative of the informal (parallel) government of the majority Kosovo-Serb village of Strpče²⁷³ to have had very little contact with KFOR commanders or senior staff (Interviews 19, 25, 58, 60, 73, 86, 89). Instead, most of these leaders noted occasional visits by KFOR patrols; frequent office visits by civil affairs or CIMIC soldiers, and especially the daily presence of LMTs in their communities. The Mayor of Ferizaj also described attendance at the monthly mayor's luncheon on Camp Bondsteel and invitations to various special KFOR events (Interview 19). However, these focused and formal visits were chiefly the extent of their relations with KFORs senior leaders.

An investigation into probable circumstantial factors to explain the absence of the military leader's relations in the community that are otherwise described in academic literature produced two interrelated primary reasons: first, the nature of the Kosovo War, and second, the terms of KFOR's responsibilities. These are reinforced by the Kosovo Albanian popular support for the KLA, and KFOR's overall risk aversion, which left little political reason or space

²⁷³ While KFOR did not formally recognize the unelected Kosovo Serb parallel governments, it had actively attempted to maintain a positive relationship informally through interaction and visits by civil affairs or CIMIC personnel, (and later by LMTs) and enhanced security by specially posted KFOR forces near minority enclaves and religious/cultural sites.

for the residents of Kosovo and KFOR to interact. These interrelated factors are addressed below:

A significant factor why Kosovo Albanian and Kosovo Serb leaders did not actively attempt to influence KFOR may be understood by a brief re-examination of Kosovo's history.

10.2.1 Nature of the Kosovo War

The first factor is the nature of the Kosovo War. Since the inception of Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians have generally had a low level of autonomy. However, between 1974 and 1988, Kosovo had enjoyed an unprecedented level of federal economic investment, and Kosovo Albanians gained substantial social and political freedoms. These freedoms were revoked in the decade prior to the outbreak of war in 1999, and Kosovo Albanians began to live under growing social, political and economic oppression in an apartheid-like system.

The loss of rights and freedoms, coupled with Milošević's provocative nationalist and violent anti-Kosovo Albanian agenda, built a deep distrust between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. Prior to these conditions, many Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs had not only lived near each other but had often played together as children and worked with each other as adults. In this light, the ensuing violence which Parent names "*neighbor on neighbor killing*" (Parent, 2012:26), was an especially personal betrayal and therefore formed more deeply entrenched animosities (Eckstein, 1965). With increasingly eroding political and social conditions, and their blanket ousting from public employment in 1990, Kosovo Albanians established a parallel government to provide themselves with basic government services, including health care, education and economic support for the most vulnerable, building upon the traditional clan/family networks and the parallel government structure that had been developed under Tito during Kosovo's industrialization in the late 1960s and 70s²⁷⁴. It is these

²⁷⁴ See Chapter 5, Section 5.4.

clan and family networks, and later, the parallel government, that the KLA relied upon for support to fight against the JA. Hence, at the conclusion of the war, KLA military leaders established themselves as rightful political leaders and representatives²⁷⁵ of a Kosovo Albanian-led republic to UNMIK, OSCE and the wider political community.

This contrasts with the conditions of the Kosovo Serbs, who had long enjoyed superior social and economic status, and had had significant political and economic support from Serbia despite their minority numbers. The conditions of UNSCR 1244 ending the Kosovo War in 1999 not only deprived Kosovo Serbs of much of their political support from Serbia, which became a pariah for its decades of “ethnic cleansing” under Milošević, (Hosmer, 2001) it had also caused a humiliating status reversal that stripped away their higher social and economic standing, of which KFOR was clearly a significant part. Consequently, Kosovo Serbs formed their own parallel government that was increasingly insular and often refused to reconcile with Kosovo’s new Kosovo Albanian-led government. Thus, it is very unlikely either Kosovo Albanian or Kosovo Serb leaders would have attempted to ingratiate themselves with the military base or seek alliance with KFOR. This is only reinforced by KFOR’s own risk-aversion and its military security-oriented tasking and mandate.

10.2.2 KFOR Responsibilities under UNSCR and The Military Technical Agreement

The adoption of UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 in June 1999 and The Military Technical Agreement (MTA) directed KFOR to “Establish a secure environment and ensure public safety and order,” colloquially to create a “Safe and Secure Environment” (Force, 1999;

²⁷⁵ Torjesen (2013) describes ‘wartime cooperation for safety against an enemy threat may lead to new social organizations where some segments or individuals benefit at the expense of others.

United Nations, 1999)²⁷⁶. More simply, KFOR's task was to provide physical security for other organizations²⁷⁷ to operate and remain outside of political activity.

Under UNSCR 1244 UNMIK was responsible to "enable a provisional civil government, under the direction of the Special Representative to the Secretary General (SRSG), to coordinate and oversee the political and economic restoration of Kosovo"²⁷⁸ (UNMIK, 2017). Foremost among UNMIK's responsibilities was to perform basic civilian administrative functions and promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government. Thus, while KFOR was likely to have been more visible in many communities than UNMIK or other organizations, KFOR's lack of mandate²⁷⁹ to take the lead in these areas would have them redirect residents to other, more appropriate, organizations.

10.2.3 Popularity of the Kosovo Liberation Army

As described in earlier chapters, the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) enjoyed enormous popular support – more aptly described as hero status. Yet the KLA was often at odds with KFOR and the international community concerning ethnically motivated destruction and revenge killing that continued for nearly a year after the end of the war (Coelho, 2008; Human Rights Watch, 1999; Janssens, 2015:100); for their occupation of important government offices (Cheng, 2013:72; International Crisis Group, 2000:i; Morina, 2011; Narten, 2009:271), and the establishment of its own strident and self-serving "provisional government" (Human Rights Watch, 1999:50; Kifner, 1999; Taylor, 2002:72). Nevertheless, the KLA's continued high popularity with Kosovo Albanians deemed wholesale removal of the KLA from the government offices to be too destabilizing (Narten, 2009:260), thus they were "co-opted and monitored" until the local and

²⁷⁶ See Chapter 5, Section 5 for complete discussion of KFORs tasking per the MTA.

²⁷⁷ Chapter VII, Article 39 states, "The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security"

²⁷⁸ Coelho notes that while the SRSG recommended that international organizations coordinate with each other, there was no requirement to do so. Hence, they often acted independently, and their activities were both contradictory and less effective (Coelho, 2008:177).

²⁷⁹ Also, likely to be absent with KFOR were sufficient technical capability and supporting resources to assist.

Kosovo-wide elections were held in 2000, and many were voted out (International Crisis Group, 2000:i; KIPRED, 2006). Under these circumstances, and particularly as seen in Prizren with KFOR's failure to protect Kosovo Serbs, moderate Kosovo Albanians and Roma (Chapter 8), KFOR would not have appeared to be the resource and powerbroker worth courting often described in post-conflict literature.

10.2.4 Demands for Stability and the Climate of Risk Aversion

Zaum & Knaus (2013) assert when international organizations concentrate their efforts on stability and the prevention of renewed violence after conflict ends at the expense of substantial institutional and social change, these practices undermine the credibility and legitimacy of their organizations at home and in the field (Zaum & Knaus, 2013:234, also Narten, 2009). Moreover, the international communities' refusal to confront antagonistic individuals and organizations not only cements their behavior into a new and counterproductive normal, it also tends to redirect future reconstruction funds into security and security-related activities to contain them instead (Zaum & Knaus, 2013:236).

Duffield has often pointed to the "risk avoiding temperament" of military organizations, which he states are "by nature stability and security oriented" (Duffield, 2011; also, Call & Cousens, 2007:12). Mockaitis (2004) is especially critical of KFOR's climate of risk aversion and its over-emphasis on force protection under which it attempts to establish its mandated "safe and secure environment" (Mockaitis, 2004:33). Although Etchemendy (2010) is more positive, he too, notes that KFOR's interaction with the community was shallow, and has concentrated on its own popularity to the exclusion of proactive initiatives to address local issues and concerns (Etchemendy, 2010:28). Yet this risk avoiding mindset promotes "bunkerization", a tendency to become insular and avoid the civilian population. As a result, military forces were increasingly likely to continue to miss opportunities to have any meaningful positive influence on their local

community (Duffield, 2011), a condition that specifically led to the Kosovo-wide riots in 2004 and establishment of the LMTs.

Thus, while KFOR would have been welcome and seen by many to halt the fighting and reverse the apartheid conditions and ethnic cleansing, these interrelated factors strongly suggest that KFOR was unlikely to be viewed as a significant resource for material and financial benefit, or for political gain.

10.3 The 2004 Kosovo Riots

Ironically, the international community, including KFOR, had falsely believed ethnic tensions had substantially eased and relations had normalized, (Lemay-Hebert, 2009). By late 2003 KFOR had already reduced its forces from nearly 50,000 to 17,500; ended its community patrols and civil-military projects, and had initiated plans to withdraw additional military forces later in 2004 (Cook, 2008; Marley, 2016; Parliamentary, 2004). The unexpected riots in March 2004 were the result of a cascade of unnoticed events that led to increasingly violent actions, reactions and responses that were ultimately based on the still unsettled tensions between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs, and especially by continued postponement of Kosovo's bid for independence (Weller, 2009).

Precipitating these riots was an incident in early March 2004, when an 18-year old Kosovo Serb man was killed in a drive-by shooting²⁸⁰ in the Kosovo Serb majority town of Çaglavicë near Pristina. The following week, three Kosovo Albanian boys drowned in the Ibar River in the majority Kosovo Serb village of Zubin Potok, near the city of Mitrovica (OSCE & UMNİK, 2005) as snow melt made the river run dangerously high and fast. A surviving fourth boy could only give enough detail of the incident to create more conjecture. In the end, the story told was the boys were cruelly forced into the swollen river by Kosovo Serb men with dogs in revenge for the

²⁸⁰ The assailants against the 18-year-old Kosovo Serb were not found, nor their ethnicity confirmed.

drive-by shooting. This story rapidly spread throughout Kosovo; in less than 24-hours, the first anti-Serb riot by ethnic Albanians occurred near the city of Mitrovica.

Riots and increasing violence soon spread to other Kosovo Serb areas and enclaves and lasted almost three days. When the violence subsided, there had been 34 separate riots with over 50,000 participants, leaving 19 dead, 954 injured, and 4,100 displaced. The violence destroyed hundreds of homes, and numerous monasteries and other culturally significant sites (Kovacevic, 2008; OSCE & UNMIK, 2005; Svensson, 2008).

10.4 Establishment of Liaison Monitoring Teams

This 'surprise' was deemed to be the result of three interconnected issues that substantially overlooked growing civil frustrations: first, a climate of risk aversion on the part of the military leaders (Mockaitis, 2004); second, an over-focus on military security to prevent a return to armed fighting (Brocades Zahlberg, 2006); and, third, a general failure to recognize the growing hostilities and unresolved social tensions between Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs since the official end of the war in June 1999 (Daltweit, 200; Etchemendy, 2010). Most disturbing for the international community was that UNMIK's civil police force, CIVPOL, had initiated and had had significant success with comprehensive community policing by the Kosovo Police Services since 2003 as a means to build community confidence, but the program was dissolved within the year due to lack of funding (Janssens, 2015).

Thus, to "fill the information gap" (Marley, 2016:226) and prevent such a surprise from reoccurring in the future, small teams of four to seven trained military personnel were formed to regularly circulate throughout each of the Multinational sectors "to take the pulse of the people of Kosovo" (Etchemendy, 2010:6; Janssens, 2015:232; Marley, 2016:226). These teams differed from the military patrolling already underway which was performed by well armed combat soldiers and military police personnel in full protective gear whose interactions with the

community were focused on security: weapons trafficking interdiction, removal/deterrence of illegal roadblocks, and border violation prevention. As a result, the less obvious social nuances and inter-community issues were mostly unseen. Therefore, to reduce this aggressive military motif, the LMTs would not carry weapons, nor wear helmets or protective vests as did the patrols; they were instead to become the less intimidating 'the eyes and ears' of the Multinational Brigade commander, serving as a bridge between the military forces and the local community to identify and solve potentially volatile issues early, and thereby prevent a repeat of the March 2004 violence (Svensson, 2008; Wade, 2009).

As NATO stated:

... At the local level, KFOR Liaison Monitoring Team's goal is to liaise closely with local administrations, community leaders and relevant individuals and organizations through regular meetings and also increase the local confidence. ... LMTs are a tool dedicated to operate in addition to Intel assets as a force multiplier²⁸¹. (Voget, 2008: 165)

Thus, the LMT's purpose and activities significantly differed, yet complemented, those of both CIVPOL's civilian law enforcement and KFOR's military patrols security activities deployed throughout Kosovo.

10.4.1 Historical Precedent for LMTs

While the LOT's that operated in Bosnia-Herzegovina had provided a useful template (Gstrein, 2007), the community-based concept underlying LMTs was derived from community law enforcement practices, particularly *The Koper Concept*, (Koper, 1995; Lum & Koper, 2011) where the presence of non-threatening authority was regularly found to re/build trust and cooperation between local government and the community (Koper, 1995). Police officers would

²⁸¹The Liaison and Observation Teams, LOTs, already in use in Bosnia-Herzegovina, had a pronounced intelligence role, unlike the LMTs.

regularly ‘walk their beat’ to know and be known by the local populace, as well as to become attuned to their conditions and circumstances (Janssens, 2015; Koper, 1995). Koper had found random, informal meetings of up to 15 minutes between the police and residents at key ‘hot spots’ consistently reduced criminal activity and calls for police assistance in that area (ibid). Importantly, this technique not only deterred crime in those ‘hot spots,’ it did not cause an increase in crime elsewhere²⁸², which substantially improved the community’s confidence in police and local government (Koper, 1995).

Counterinsurgency doctrine increasingly adopted the same technique for its operations; use of this technique helped identify and address grievances²⁸³ upon which terrorist, criminal or civil unrest fed (Dixon, 2016; Lum & Koper, 2011; Petraeus, 2006). Known colloquially as ‘*winning hearts and minds*,’ this approach could turn a hostile, or at best suspicious, population into a more cooperative one. Cooperation in turn produced information concerning the actions and whereabouts of criminals and insurgents, which led to more focused and effective use of force or other action against them. Moreover, improved intelligence reduced unintended civilian casualties (Petraeus, 2006) which had reinforced anti-military stereotypes and tended to inflame public opinion against the military. The use of the Koper Concept in counterinsurgency is clearly “limited in direct application, as local improvements in the quality of life are easier to grant than political solutions” (ibid:3-12). Nevertheless, the employment of LMTs in this community focused role provided KFOR with improved insight and forewarning of potentially destabilizing grievances as well as provided the community with an outlet for their concerns.

10.4.2 Composition of the LMTS

Since early 2005, each of the Multinational Brigades contained a LMT Section comprised of multiple LMT-teams and a small administrative unit; a total of 40 LMT teams were established

²⁸² The military colloquially refer to this phenomenon as “whack-a-mole.”

²⁸³ Such as access to water, land use, health care, education, and opportunities for employment.

and worked throughout Kosovo within months of the program's inception (Cook, 2008; NATO, 2004). The size of the Task Forces' LMT Section and teams varied slightly, from four to seven soldiers, based in part on the size and ethnic makeup of the community, but also upon the number of personnel available, and overall capabilities of the nation contributing to the staffing. National composition of LMTs also varied. The team members assigned from one of the lead nations such as the US and Germany, or a strong NATO nation such as Turkey, were typically four to seven members of the same nationality²⁸⁴, both male and female, and joined by one or more interpreters. When limited numbers of personnel were assigned by the smaller contributing nations, such as Poland and Ukraine, they were generally combined with other nations to produce a team large enough to cover their areas of responsibility. Task Force commanders selected the location of the LMT offices to best address the unique conditions of their Brigade area of responsibility. Hence, while most teams lived inside the military base and commuted to an office from which they made their daily rounds, typically provided by the Municipality, other teams lived and worked from a "LMT house" established within the community²⁸⁵. The role, location and activities of LMTs were widely advertised in local media by KFOR messaging²⁸⁶ in multiple languages, and their presence, function and office hours were well known throughout Kosovo.

10.5 Selection and Training of LMTs

Specific details of the selection and training of the Liaison Monitoring Team are nearly absent, and all LMT personnel were either unable and unwilling to be interviewed.²⁸⁷ This sub-section is

²⁸⁴ LMTs from Austria and Switzerland, both non-NATO nations, operated under the administration of Camp Prizren as single nationalities.

²⁸⁵ Camp Prizren operated several LMT houses due to national caveat preferences, e.g. non-NATO members Austria and Switzerland, operated CIMIC/LMT houses. Camp Bondsteel operated a LMT house in an area of interest, the Kosovo Serb enclave Strpče. The LMT interpreters lived elsewhere and typically commuted daily from their homes.

²⁸⁶ Messaging includes billboards, radio and television public information spots, as well as signs in municipal buildings and hand distributed flyers by the LMTs themselves.

²⁸⁷ See Chapter 2 for discussion of declined interviews by KFOR.

therefore primarily based on archived press releases found on the NATO website; human interest stories in the KFOR magazine *KFOR Chronicles*, informal conversations with former LMTs, interpreters, and the author's own experiences.

LMTs have been operating in the Balkans for over a decade, yet the selection process and the training are not specifically described in NATO doctrine²⁸⁸. Instead, this activity is an extracted component of Civil Military Cooperation, CIMIC, which is defined as: "The coordination and cooperation, in support of the mission, between the NATO Commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as international, national and non-governmental organizations and agencies" (Paul, 2009:31). The primary means of establishing coordination and cooperation is through *civil military liaison*. Kosovo's Liaison Monitoring Teams are ... [to] "establish and maintain liaison with civil actors at appropriate levels, facilitating cooperation, harmonisation, information sharing, concerted or integrated planning and conduct of operations" (ibid). More simply, Kosovo's LMTs have 'interaction with civil actors' as their sole function.

10.5.1 Non-United States LMTs

Since their establishment in late 2004 the majority of LMTs from Germany, France, Italy, the UK, and their partnering countries, have been trained per NATO CIMIC-based doctrine. NATO officers and enlisted personnel are both full time military and military reservists. They are mostly seasoned junior and mid-level officers and senior enlisted staff who demonstrate personal maturity, 'good people skills' and an ability to work in stressful situations²⁸⁹. Team members typically attend NATO accredited or based CIMIC courses, often the Liaison Officer

²⁸⁸ United States' Civil Affairs doctrine, which more narrowly focused on tactical to operational level activity in support of US military operations, is used by all branches of US services, particularly the US Army and US Marine Corps.

²⁸⁹ CIMIC personnel tend to be older than their peers; LMTs in their 30's and late 40's is not unusual. Personal and professional maturity is part of CIMIC training and evaluated in the exercises.

course conducted through the CIMIC Center of Excellence in The Hague, Netherlands²⁹⁰. This course incorporates CIMIC doctrine, lectures by visiting experts in the field, and small group work, leading to a comprehensive scenario-based exercise incorporating the lesson material.

According to Janssens (2015), the initial LMT training course was just a week in length; it has since been expanded to two, with additional instruction on interviewing and personal relations skills. LMTs also receive a short orientation to their area of responsibility upon arrival to their assignment in Kosovo, followed by up to two weeks of accompanying and supervised replacement²⁹¹ of the departing LMTs. A small number of NATO partners may also participate in alternate training with the US LMTs in Hohenfels, Germany. In general, these LMTs they believe their liaison work is important and adds to Kosovo's stability.

10.5.2 United States' LMTs

From the time the LMTs were established in late 2004 through late 2014, US doctrine did not include a dedicated liaison element comparable to the CIMIC Liaison Officer. LMT training materials were developed by military trainers and civilian contractors. Training reflected components of CIMIC, US civil affairs as well as military police skills but were not specifically based upon any of these doctrines. Pre-deployment training included a series of short lectures followed by 'situational training exercises' or STXs, to practice their skills in simulated benign and contentious environments. They were similarly evaluated for personal maturity, people skills and the ability to work in demanding situations. The initial classroom training took place first in the US, with skill reinforcing STX training events conducted in Germany where the LMTs participated in a final comprehensive scenario-based exercise that have occasionally included a small number of non-US LMTs²⁹². Upon arrival to their assigned units, US LMTs would receive

²⁹⁰ This course is most frequently offered in Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia.

²⁹¹ Referred to left seat/right seat training, the incumbent trains his/her replacement on a one-to-one basis for two weeks, switching the lead role for the second week.

²⁹² Military forces' rotations vary in duration, thus not all US rotations would include training with non-US LMTs, typically Partnership for Peace or NATO candidates, such as Romania and Ukraine.

the same short orientation to their area of responsibility followed by up to two weeks of combined on the ground familiarization, then the replacement, of the departing LMTs.

By 2004, the US had redirected much of its active duty forces to Afghanistan and Iraq, thus only a very small number of the initial LMTs would have been regulars; by mid-2005 the US LMTs have consistently been military reservists²⁹³, with full-time non-military professions²⁹⁴. Unlike the CIMIC liaison officers, LMT personnel from the US are unlikely to have had prior exposure to civil liaison. Moreover, despite their recognized stabilizing presence and proven value as a source of timely information, US LMTs are not highly regarded by US commands. The majority of US LMTs tend to be junior officers and enlisted Soldiers whose skill sets are not specifically relevant to the Kosovo mission, such as cooks, drivers and mechanics; those who are otherwise “excess personnel” or who are brought in from other units to fill the mandated number of personnel prescribed for the Task Force LMT section. US LMTs tended to be unexceptional during the early weeks or even months of their Kosovo tour, though they improve quickly through continued experience and positive relations with the community. Ultimately, as US deployments tend to be up to a year, much longer than other nations, the eventual quality and capability of the LMTs are similar.

Military organizations tend to be risk averse in general, however, the differences in the selection processes and training reveal divergent national outlooks concerning opportunity for conflict. The US places far greater emphasis on *response to violence*, hence there is a greater emphasis on preparing to respond to potential civil unrest, than the soft skills to prevent that unrest. In contrast, the CIMIC influenced conflict *mitigation* orientation of the non-US Task Forces tends to place a greater emphasis on negotiations and preventing civil unrest in the first

²⁹³ Specifically, The National Guard, representing one of the 50 US states and Puerto Rico.

²⁹⁴ The civilian professions of these military reservists vary widely. However, the military reservists often have more in common with the local community and therefore tend to have better understanding of civilian issues and concerns.

place (Mockaitis, 2004). As a result, the US KFOR is likely to limit its understanding of the actions and conditions that contribute to violence and may unintentionally weaken the stability it seeks to maintain.

10.6 LMT Responsibilities and Activities

The LMTs have three core responsibilities: to monitor the local economic, social and religious conditions; to facilitate military and civilian communication in their communities; and to cooperate with the international, governmental and non-governmental organizations in their assigned area. LMTs visit their communities on a daily basis. They meet openly and informally in public places including markets and cafes; with shepherds and farmers in their fields; in local government offices and at schools and sporting events. LMTs ask standardized open-ended questions and a small number of additional questions relevant to that community, particularly regarding ethnic and religious concerns (Wade, 2009). LMTs listen to the resident's daily problems, interests and fears, and share what they had observed and learned - without analysis - as written reports to the LMT leader, and with local community officials and non-governmental organizations that have the appropriate responsibility, authority or ability to act²⁹⁵. The KFOR military chain of command may also identify additional topics of interest for inquiry, but these are strictly kept to a minimum to prevent an impression of intelligence collecting by the community, or an create an attitude of intelligence gathering by the LMTs themselves.

10.7 The LMT reporting process

The LMT information flow and coordination is detached from that of the usual military chain of command. This separation from command and intelligence channels was intentionally established to reinforce the community focus of the LMT and to help soften relationships with

²⁹⁵ Primarily, but not exclusively, OSCE, UNMIK and UNHCR in addition to community ombudsmen.

non-governmental and civilian organizations that prefer not to work with military forces²⁹⁶. The process described below is the official report flow from the individual LMTs to the Commander of KFOR (COMKFOR)²⁹⁷.

- 1) LMTs hold informal conversations with community residents. LMTs may also attend local events in addition to the regular community visits, based on local news, significant future or past events (e.g. elections); in response to patrol reports, or follow up to an earlier LMT report. LMTs also meet informally with local officials and members of non-governmental organizations, such as Office of Security and Cooperation in Europe, (OSCE) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to share their observations and community issues; to follow up on local projects, or to share military activities. LMTs record their conversations anonymously using a simple factual format of “who/what/where/when/why/how;” the resulting reports are submitted to the Regional LMT without further analysis.
- 2) The Regional LMT (RLMT) is the section of the Task Force responsible for a specific MNB/MNTF region. The RLMT consolidates the individual LMT reports into a single report and submits it to the MNB/MNTF operations section, and the LMT Coordination Center (LMTCC).
- 3) a. The MNB/MNTF operations staff adds the RLMT report to the daily consolidated regional update to KFOR operations and distributes the report internally to other staff sections for their use and situational awareness.

b. The LMTCC receives the MNB/MNTF LMT reports, and scans them for any obvious errors or trends, and shares their insights with KFOR Operations. However, the primary function of the LMTCC is to receive and collate reports and to train and support the RLMTs; the LMTCC does not task subordinate RLMTs, nor it is tasked by KFOR.
- 4) KFOR Operations’ staff analyze the collated LMT reports in context of intelligence, Civil-Military and other MNB/MNTF reports and the wider political environment, to produce a briefing and information book for KFOR Headquarters and the KFOR Commander (COMKFOR).

²⁹⁶ While it is clear LMTs are military personnel, the absence of weapons and protective wear softens the heavy-handed perception.

²⁹⁷ Informal conversation with LMT Section leaders, noting variations were permitted on a case by case basis. Neither Camp Bondsteel nor Camp Prizren were known to vary from this structure.

- 5) KFOR Headquarters and COMKFOR use the information book to comprehend the present social, political and economic situation and as a guide to develop KFOR plans and operations.
- 6) Requests for clarification and additional information follow a similar, reverse track.

The diagram below details this general flow of LMT information to KFOR Headquarters:




Figure 10.1 Adapted from Svensson, 2008

10.7.1 LMT Reporting in Practice

In parallel to the formal KFOR information reporting process, LMT share their observations with military personnel and civilian organizations that are appropriate to address the concerns of the community. Examples from Camp Bondsteel²⁹⁸ LMTs illustrate this relationship:

Strpče Primary School Repair

In late 2008, Ukrainian LMTs submitted their daily reports containing the conversations they had had with Kosovo Serb parents concerning a remote primary school that would have to close during the winter as a result of an insufficient annual allotment of wood for heating. Due to its location in a closely monitored area of interest, the LMTs also informed the Ukrainian CIMIC officer, who presented the winter closing of the primary school at a regularly scheduled Civil Military Operations (CMO) coordination meeting for consideration as a potential 'project'²⁹⁹.

Although KFOR, and especially the US military, does not provide heating fuels or have reconstruction funding resources, the school met the conditions for a NATO Quick Impact Project (QIP), which provides up to 5,000 euros for local assistance projects that support civil-military NATO goals and objectives. The school was approved for further study; the Ukrainian LMT and CIMIC officers, and US civil military operations officer arranged for a meeting at the primary school with local officials from the Kosovo Serb Ministry of Education representing the local Serb shadow government, while US civil affairs personnel informed the official elected Kosovo Albanian mayor of the future meeting for the proposed school project. The Albanian mayor agreed to the project and there was no further coordination with this office³⁰⁰.

The assessment meeting determined that like most buildings in the area, the condition of the school was due to deferred maintenance, rather than war damage. School officials identified and prioritized the numerous deficiencies with the school building to

²⁹⁸ The Camp Bondsteel example in the author's own in October/November 2008.

²⁹⁹ A catch-all descriptor of any activity with a tangible outcome; intangible activities were similarly called 'missions.'

³⁰⁰ In the predominantly Kosovo Serb village of Strpče, the Kosovo Albanian was mayor in name only, voted in by Kosovo Albanians when the Kosovo Serbs boycotted an election. The mayor was mostly ignored by the Kosovo Serb constituency who 'retained' their former ethnic Serb mayor. That local government also received direct financial support from Serbia.

be repaired, and eventually agreed to new chimney/roof flashing, and the replacement and insulation of the woodstove exhaust pipes in the classrooms, all of which could be funded by QIP. Additional funds to repair smaller deficiencies, such as replacing broken window glass and sealing the woodstoves, would be provided by the local Ministry of Education. Classroom painting and minor repairs would be donated by the parents. When some parents objected that the selected roofer was Kosovo Albanian, the local official for the Ministry of Education personally advocated for the contractor³⁰¹, and as a result, the school remained open through the 2008/2009 winter.

The Kosovo Serb enclave of Strpče was considered a bellwether community for promoting renewed violence. Thus, the positive outcome of the school repairs was viewed as a major step to warm the aloof relationship KFOR had had with the community which had long believed KFOR favored Kosovo Albanians over Kosovo Serbs. Subsequently, as the KFOR and LMTs had “proven” themselves to this important Kosovo Serb enclave, it prompted better relations with other Serb communities, and eventually led to information sharing concerning criminal activity near the Kosovo-Macedonia border³⁰² and it reinforced KFOR’s overarching tenet of providing a “safe and secure environment” for all of Kosovo.

10.8 LMTs and Dependency

The grey and academic literature have appropriately raised a range of concerns regarding the use and activities of military personnel in humanitarian and development roles, (Anderson, 2000; Dixon, 2016; Etchemendy, 2010; Pugh, 2001), especially concerning the blurring of lines between military and civilian aid organizations (Collinson, 2012; Jackson & Haysom, 2013) for over two decades. Among the chief concerns were military short-termism; insufficient training of (military) personnel, particularly in their ability to recognize and appropriately resolve conflict (Dixon, 2016), anticipate secondary consequences (Anderson, 2000:25), and their over-

³⁰¹ Although ethnic balance was not a specified goal of QIP projects, the “wrong ethnicity” was not sufficient reason to refuse a contractor, and insistence to do so was known to cancel NATO/QIP projects and redirect that funding elsewhere.

³⁰² Such as cigarette and alcohol smuggling, which are civil law enforcement responsibilities, and cross border tree cutting, which is both a civil and military infraction.

orientation on potential threats (Duffield, 2011) thereby missing positive outcomes and opportunities for collaboration.

These allegations have merit from the non-military and development organization perspective, at the same time, they should be further examined within this unique post-conflict context.

LMTs were widely and openly known by the community as part of a larger military organization and as being specifically directed to improve relations and understanding in their communities on behalf of the military. LMTs also regularly shared their observations with international and local humanitarian organizations³⁰³, and had provided them with current information on local concerns and feedback on their own programs³⁰⁴. Most importantly, LMTs do not compete with humanitarian organizations, nor do their activities prevent these organizations from conducting their own research or activities.

More substantial criticism includes the military being seen as provider of humanitarian aid, such as the early heavy involvement in winterization activities and the aforementioned school repairs. Such projects can foster an aid dependency (Campbell, et al., 2011), therefore weakening confidence in local governance over the long term (ibid). Nevertheless, while KFOR may continue to occasionally fund road and bridge repairs, usually between 5,000-10,000 USD, in order to continue its military patrolling and ability to receive materials and supplies, the distinctly provider-like activities that KFOR had performed with UNHCR and other organizations had effectively ceased by 2005.

At the same time, local projects that stem from the good intentions of KFOR soldiers of nearly all of the contributing nations, coupled with the professional skills of many military reservists can both raise expectations (Etchemendy, 2010), and exacerbate impressions of favoritism

³⁰³ Organizations include Caritas; FINCA, Liria, Mother Theresa Society, UNCHR, USAID

³⁰⁴ While LMTs and other military personnel regularly liaise with the local government, humanitarian organizations and the local population in support of the military mission, these are intended to be limited in scope and duration; military personnel are neither intended nor trained to take on such political responsibilities.

when ‘projects’ appear to benefit one group over another³⁰⁵, or damage community relations when community projects are left incomplete because the initiating military forces rotated out, and the new units failed to continue them³⁰⁶. In addition, as Narten (2009) claims, there is a tendency to overlook the importance of ‘training the trainers/training the managers’ from the earliest days, and therefore fail to build genuine local capability (Narten, 2009:259). Thus, the assertions of fostering dependency and impeding local capacity seem to have merit, as several signs of such dependency appear to have emerged and may have become the norm. These assertions are examined below.

10.8.1 Community Dependency on LMTs

The residents and government officials interviewed in Ferizaj, Prizren and Gjakova regularly expressed their positive opinion of the KFOR LMTs. The interviews generally revealed two lines of belief, the first is KFOR’s reputation as an “honest broker,” likely formed and reinforced by LMTs’ openly engaging in conversations with all members of the community, and by doing so, are believed by the population to be an important check to prevent a return to violence. As many interviewees offered, “we trust KFOR to protect us from ourselves” and “we need KFOR (to stay) to protect (Kosovo) Albanians and (Kosovo) Serbs from each other” (Interviews 25, 39, 31, 31, 33, 34, 64, 73).

The second is related to the first: since the LMTs regularly visit remote villages and ethnically homogeneous enclaves, they are well known and have knowledge, ease of access and entrée into these communities that the local government may not. Consequently, local governments have come to rely on LMTs for community information, “we couldn’t do our job without them” (Interviews 25, 34).

³⁰⁵ The technical and economic support by the German KFOR to the new owner of a privatizing vineyard is an example.

³⁰⁶ Author’s experience to complete a primary school left unfinished for several years in the same Kosovo Serb area.

This presents an untenable condition for four reasons. First, the LMTs themselves are an artificial construct. Highly resource intensive, few communities have means to establish such a robust non-military equivalent of LMTs to regularly seek and provide information to the government on behalf of small communities³⁰⁷. Second, intentionally or not, the resources that could be dedicated toward positive community outreach can be directed elsewhere without penalty. This allows community leaders and civil servants to continue to under-support remote and minority communities, which may subsequently reinforce an inequitable status quo; it can also fail to note emerging local issues and concerns that are invisible to outsiders, and therefore contribute to future conflict. Third, the presence of the LMTs allow community members to relinquish taking part in community affairs or holding their local leaders accountable, even to the limited degree they had through informal neighborhood councils. Instead, residents are able to take their individual concerns and grievances directly to the LMTs who bring them to the attention of KFOR, the local government and non-governmental organizations anonymously. Local governments may likewise depend upon LMTs to deliver official information to the populace in remote or contentious areas. In both cases, LMTs unavoidably represent the authority of KFOR, and therefore contribute its weight to whatever the information they deliver.

Fourth, and most critically, this shuttle diplomacy solidifies the status quo rather than invites change, even as it infers – or even confirms - that Kosovo is not yet safe and capable of solving its own problems. In this regard, as Donais (2012) contends, such top-driven activities that are often introduced by strong outsiders directly inhibit governance strategies that are based on local culture and social context, and instead, local leaders acquiesce to the outsiders' demands for cooperation (Donais, 2012:7). As a result, sustainable solutions to everyday disagreements are not created and 'owned', but only last until the outsiders have departed (ibid:5). Thus, the

³⁰⁷ This is not to minimize the work of civil servants and the community ombudsmen located in the Municipalities. However, these offices are not designed or staffed for extensive outreach and travel.

LMTs can easily and unintentionally impair the development of the necessary trust that the local government can and will serve, sustain and protect all members of the community equitably³⁰⁸.

10.9 Critique and Paradox of LMTs

Kartas openly challenges such 'positive' community interaction by the LMTs as depoliticizing the local government (Kartas, 2007:2). His argument returns to the power and interests [of the West] inherent in military forces, where Pugh likewise states, where "the local government and community are forced to comply with an outside ideal of good governance, they are therefore deprived of space to deliberate about their own political organization" (Kartas, 2007:2; Pugh, 2001; also, Donais, 2012; Narten, 2009:257), and they must conform, particularly if future assistance is conditioned (Koeberle, et al., 2005; Marley, 2016). Similarly, Jabri contends such 'intervention' by outsiders not only denies communities their struggle to develop their own solutions, but may also re/impose policies that led to the conflict in the first place (Jabri, 2016). Consequently, the array of coordination activities performed by the LMTs, outsiders and representatives of the military, though outwardly positive, may unintentionally delay emergence of appropriate civilian actors (Donais, 2012:7; Pugh, 2001), and ultimately serve to undermine local problem solving capability and long term stability, (ibid) by preventing locally owned solutions.

10.9.1 Wither the LMTs?

The LMTs have three core responsibilities: to monitor the local economic, social and religious conditions; to facilitate military and civilian communication in their communities; and to cooperate with the international, governmental and non-governmental organizations in their

³⁰⁸ Etchemendy (2010) provides supporting case studies.

assigned area. To this end, the LMTs have been a success. Since their inception in response to the riots in 2004, and despite a continued reduction of military forces operating in Kosovo, KFOR and the LMTs continue to be perceived as fair minded and trustworthy by Kosovo Albanians, Kosovo Serbs and the minority communities (see Section 10.10). Where Eckstein and Parent note internal wars “tend to scar deeply and prevent the formation of consensus indefinitely” (Eckstein, 1965:134; Parent, 2012:28), LMTs appear to support Darby & MacGinty who state rebuilding trust after civil wars often benefit from the effort of third parties (Darby & MacGinty, 2008). Noting that even at the time of this research in 2014 and 2016, the informal community forums have not substantially reemerged, LMTs therefore, may provide the first step to start that conversation.

Nevertheless, as Narten, (2009) warns “when, as the result of any ill-delivered external assistance, the level of dependency increases, this dependency can develop into a ‘structural quality’, becoming self-perpetuating and resistant to easy solution” (Narten, 2009: 258). In this regard, both the military and civilian peace operations community have recognized that the long-term interlocutor activity of the LMTs serving as this bridge does not belong to the military. The query therefore, is not simply wither the LMTs, but who or what will take their place, and when. Yet the overarching question to be answered here is ‘*are the LMTs a proxy for KFOR’s military leaders,*’ particularly as a prevalence of post-conflict literature found military leaders are often solicited by local elites for personal benefit in that difficult environment. Particularly in Kosovo, that answer is no, and for three principal reasons.

First, the stated role of the LMTs which were only fully operational in early 2005, was to serve as the “eyes and ears of the commander” at the local level within the Task Force commander’s area of responsibility. This listening role was made well known throughout Kosovo. As the LMTs were established more than five years after the arrival of KFOR, the local military and community leaders would have already formed their relationships and the LMTs would have

been unlikely to replace them. Secondly, a substantial military chain of command was already in existence for the military leaders to meet with local leaders on behalf of the commander at the community level: The Multi-National Brigade commanders' subordinate battalion and company commanders. These subordinate commanders inherently possessed coercive power and an authority to act on under the auspices of their KFOR commander, which the LMTs do not. Third, in accordance with the Military Technical Agreement, KFOR's mandate is security: 'to establish a safe and secure environment.' Thus, military leaders would likely have quickly redirected politically motivated overtures to civilian organizations, particularly given KFOR's considerable risk averse orientation.

10.10 Chapter Summary

This chapter has described the purpose, role and activities of the Kosovo Forces Liaison Monitoring Teams, KFOR LMTs, and provided an analysis of those roles and activities in the community. Post-conflict literature provides a substantial number of examples where local leaders and community elites ingratiated themselves with the military in pursuit of their own benefit. In contrast, field research found the military base in the study areas to have had little official contact with their local leaders, and instead, there has been significant and continual informal contact through patrols, CIMIC and Civil Affairs personnel, and especially LMTs. This chapter sought to answer whether the LMTs have had a political, social and economic influence on their local communities, and more importantly, whether the LMTs serve as political proxies for their military leaders.

Analysis finds that the Kosovo Forces' LMTs, established in late 2004 and operating throughout Kosovo since early 2005, with a clear mission to 'keep a finger on the pulse of the community, are specifically intended to observe and mitigate emerging animosity between groups to prevent KFOR from being surprised by violence as it had been in March 2004. The LMTs 'walk

their beat' and provided a reassuring presence in their assigned communities. LMTs actively and openly meet with local leaders, government officials, members of the community including minority populations, and representatives of local and international organizations to share observations and concerns. Thus, as LMTs performed their duties to support KFOR's mandate to maintain a safe and secure environment, they often acted as a go-between to the community and its government, lending KFOR's weight to both recipients, thereby also unintentionally reinforcing Kosovo's political status quo. Nevertheless, while LMTS are military personnel, and clearly represent the military base and KFOR more generally, the LMTS do not appear to have had a substantial political, social and economic influence on their communities. Moreover, as LMTS possess neither an express nor implied authority in their observer role, they do not serve as a proxy for their military base leaders.

Chapter 11: Thesis Conclusion and Recommendations for Further Research

11.0 Introduction

The objective of this thesis was to examine the effects military bases established after conflict have on their surrounding communities. There is a rich body of literature concerning peace operations, especially since the end of the Cold War, and a growing examination of the effects of international organizations on the communities within post-conflict environments is underway. Yet, a systematic examination concerning the effects of military bases established in post-conflict and peacekeeping environments is nearly absent.

The research first considered three major premises that are directly related to the establishment of a military base drawn from the peace operations literature: that the base is an employer and consumer; that the base is a catalyst for economic growth; and, the base is a political actor. The findings of initial field research with regard to the impact of military bases in Kosovo varied significantly from the assertions of much of the existing peace operations literature. Moreover, these findings also varied between the individual communities where the bases were established, and therefore required further investigation concerning the unique political, social and economic activities and procedures of the military bases. These additional characteristics proved useful for identifying how the daily activities of bases influence the communities' political economy. Therefore, this research begins to fill a significant gap in knowledge of the impact post-conflict state- and peacebuilding practices, contributing especially to the understanding of everyday practices, the importance of which has been increasingly highlighted in critical peace and state building literature.

11.1 Objectives

This research sought to answer, "How do the everyday practices of military bases established in post-conflict environments affect the local political economy, and what are the implications for

peacebuilding?" Hence, this thesis set out to substantiate three hypotheses: (1) *There will be a positive shock of employment and business opportunities, but also a crowding by expatriates which limit benefit to the local community;* (2) *Shortages and inflation will be temporary; high wages will stimulate local secondary and tertiary enterprise and industry;* (3) *Local elites will solicit and leverage relationships with military to reinforce power/leadership positions in the community.* To accomplish this, a concentrated schedule of desk research was conducted, followed by two field visits to Kosovo. The desk research revealed an underlying perception by humanitarian organizations that military base operations were essentially homogeneous, and their influences were primarily negative on the local community; that the degree of their damaging effects varied only by the size of the military forces on the ground (De Torrenté, 2006; Duffield, 2011; Enloe, 2000, Fishstein & Wilder, 2012; Jackson & Haysom, 2013; Mendelson, 2005). This perception sensitized this researcher to become especially vigilant concerning potential practioner blindness. This researcher was not only a current member of the military, but had also served in Kosovo at one of the camps in the study for over a year, and was therefore more likely to unintentionally project a favorable personal bias.

Following the literature review, the research focus was narrowed to three suitable communities for fieldwork. The selection of those communities was based on comparable size of deployed military forces; the size and pre-war development level of the base community, and the relative physical isolation from other newly established bases and each other. As noted above, the fieldwork responses varied substantially from the literature, and the bases demonstrated significant differences in their operating procedures.

See Table 11.1, Hypothesis/Field Results Crosswalk, below, for initial fieldwork responses.

Hypothesis/Field Results Crosswalk		
Hypothesis	Expected response	Received response
<p>Hypothesis 1:</p> <p>The military base is an employer and primary consumer of local goods and services.</p> <p><i>There will be a positive shock of employment and business opportunities, but also a crowding by expatriates which limit benefit to the local community.</i></p>	<p>High but select number of local residents hired; high number of expatriate and extra-local persons and businesses crowd out local residents for jobs and contracts.</p> <p>High demand and consumption of re/construction resources by military.</p>	<p>US Base: Contractors hire high numbers of local residents at high pay to work on base; most building materials, supplies and equipment imported from outside Kosovo. Very few local expatriates.</p> <p>German Base: Self-sufficient. Few local residents hired, but high pay. Limited services are contracted. Most businesses hired by the German KFOR by “walking door to door.”</p>
<p>Hypothesis 2:</p> <p>The military base is a catalyst for price and wage inflation; secondary economic activities and effects.</p> <p><i>Shortages and inflation will be temporary; high wages will stimulate local secondary and tertiary enterprise and industry to support military base and personnel.</i></p> <p><i>Military damaged infrastructure limits reconstruction progress.</i></p>	<p>High inflation and ‘balloon economy;’ shortage of basic goods and real estate; Increased local crime, especially drugs and prostitution.</p> <p>Military damage to local infrastructure impedes local reconstruction and commerce.</p>	<p>Military not dependent upon local goods, services or real estate; no shortages.</p> <p>Little military-related crime due to curfew, no-alcohol policy, and limited movement off base.</p> <p>Much infrastructure was poorly built, ill maintained; most damage due to war and Serb withdrawal.</p> <p>New businesses support the community; not military.</p> <p>Military rebuilt significant local infrastructure for own use and to develop goodwill.</p>
<p>Hypothesis 3:</p> <p>The military base is a political agent.</p> <p><i>Local elites will solicit and leverage relationships with</i></p>	<p>Local elites and leaders solicit relationships with military base to benefit self or political interests.</p> <p>Corruption, “gatekeepers” and elite involvement in local</p>	<p>Relations between local elites/ leaders and military base is formal and infrequent; local elites have no input to base hiring or purchasing.</p>

<i>military to reinforce power/ leadership positions in the community.</i>	hiring and business operations; local examples and complaints of unfair practices and/or discrimination.	Military personnel assigned in Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMTs) provide “eyes and ears” for both the military base and local government/civil servants.
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Table 11.1 Hypothesis/Field Results Crosswalk

11.2.1 Findings

There were several unexpected findings and significant variance with the post-conflict literature:

- Hypothesis 1, that the base is a major local employer is only partially supported. With exception of the initial military forces arriving in June 1999, the ‘military’ did not hire a high number of civilians from the local community. Instead, both the German and US military forces hired very few local residents, mostly as interpreters. The German KFOR ultimately hired fewer than 500 community residents to work at the main base or one of the multiple locations where German Soldiers were temporarily lodged throughout Prizren. This contrasts with the US KFOR, where several thousand residents from Gjilan and Ferizaj were hired exclusively through the US-based logistics contractor Brown and Root (B&R) to work on the US bases, where nearly every able-bodied adult that applied for work on the base between July and November 1999 was hired and trained on a range of construction trades, foodservice and maintenance skills, or for a variety of housekeeping and service positions. Hence, the anticipated local ‘gatekeeper’ did not emerge in this initial period as expected. Potential employees at Camp Bondsteel would later apply for positions through a centralized internet-based system, adding a new insulating layer between the hiring manager and eventual workplace, and thereby reducing opportunity for influence by current base employees. Camp Bondsteel remains the largest employer in the Ferizaj Municipality to the present day, and its presence has become commonplace. The gradual but significant reductions of base staff and salaries have also made employment at Camp

Bondsteel a less secure and less economically advantageous source of employment, although still a favored and desirable opportunity.

- Hypothesis 2, the base as a catalyst for wage and price inflation and stimulus for business enterprise is only partially supported. The disproportionately high military wages and subsequent increase in personal spending by local employees was congruent with the literature³⁰⁹, especially in the early years. However, the number of personnel employed have steadily decreased since 2005 and dropped again to 2008 to less than half of their original number and at approximately a third of the initial salaries.³¹⁰ At the same time, neither the substantial inflation nor a distinct balloon economy that was expected to accompany the high wages appear to have developed as result of the military base. These are likely to have been mitigated by the advance positioning of supplies and construction materials outside of Kosovo by both the US and German KFOR, so local purchasing of reconstruction materials did not occur; the very limited off-base travel which soldiers could engage in, and enduring restrictions which prohibited military personnel from eating or drinking in local restaurants, thus few opportunities for soldier spending, resulting in few resource demands on the local economy.

Local industry appears to have made only minor advances. Ferizaj, and Prizren to a lesser extent, realized the reopening of several small private and former socially-owned manufacturers of building products, particularly for windows, doors and textiles. However, they reopened at a far lower capacity and with far fewer employees. Although many have remained open until the present day, it is primarily at the consumer level, rather than for

³⁰⁹ Individuals employed at the local bases typically supported families of up to nine adults and children (Warrander & Knaus, 2010).

³¹⁰By July 2014, German KFOR base wages were just 10-25% higher than the local wages, approximately 400 Euro per month for retail clerks, to 800 Euro for skilled professionals. Likewise, Camp Bondsteel's 2014 employees numbered approximately 2,000 (Interview 73) with monthly salaries of 600-800 USD, although still almost twice the local wages (Kosovo Agency of Trading Economics, 2017).

export. Thus, while the base did provide stimulus for local industry through salary income, eventual satisfaction of consumer demand is likely to limit further growth. Finally, repairs to civil infrastructure is common for US and German military forces who will build or restore the local civil infrastructure necessary for military operations, such as roads and bridges used for patrolling through the MNB area of responsibility, or to ensure their freedom of movement such as construction of a ring road in the Gjilan Municipality, that was built to bypass the city congestion. These smoothed local commerce, but did not substantially catalyze regional economic development.

The fieldwork likewise found little to support the assertions of enduring crime and other malign effects which could be considered the direct result of peacekeeping forces that is well described in post-conflict literature. This is potentially the result of the KFOR 'zero tolerance policy' established in late 2004 for drugs, prostitution and trafficking among soldiers. However, these topics, especially prostitution, are also relatively taboo in a conservative and patriarchal society such as Kosovo's, thus negative responses may in fact be based on preexisting social mores.

- Hypothesis 3 concerning the relations between local elites and the military base is not supported. Fieldwork found relations between community and military leaders to be formal and infrequent, primarily limited to attendance at the MNB monthly Mayor's Luncheon, or change of command ceremonies for incoming and departing KFOR commanding officers. This is substantially contrary to the post-conflict literature. Instead, local elites appear to have greater interaction with political organizations such as UNMIK, which hold considerably more influence over political and municipal activities than the military base.

The most significant unexpected finding was the relationship of the Liaison Monitoring Teams (LMTs) with the local community. The LMTs are unique to the Balkans; these small teams of

four to seven military personnel are tasked to serve as ‘the eyes and ears of the commander.’ They were initiated after the Kosovo-wide riots in March 2004 to gain an understanding of local political conditions and particularly to serve as an advance warning for potential violence from ethnically based divisions. The LMTs informally interact with all members of the local community on a daily basis to promote and maintain positive relations between the military and community, to liaise between the military and local government and to share information and anticipate sources of friction that could lead to a return to violence. Thus, LMTs are the visible constant presence of KFOR, rather than the military leaders, and they develop an enduring though informal working relationship with community leaders and civil servants, in addition to the casual relationships with local residents and non-governmental organizations. While LMTs do not serve as proxies for their military leaders, LMTs nevertheless project their influence as representatives of the military to both local residents and the local government through their community relations. As a result, the LMTs are more apt to reinforce the military-centric status quo, than project a stable future without KFOR support, and therefore are ultimately likely to weaken wider peacebuilding efforts.

11.3 Analysis of Military Base Operations

The substantial variance from the post-conflict literature required a closer investigation of the base communities, and a comparison with a community without a base. These were examined using a livelihoods view of political economy analysis, through the three broad characteristics of a community, its political, social and economic features³¹¹ to assess the effects of the practices on the community by the base established by the German KFOR in the Municipality of Prizren, and the United States’ KFOR in the Municipality of Ferizaj. The results are subsequently

³¹¹ As defined in Chapter 9, *Political*, refers to relations between the community and the military leaders; *Social* refers to the attitudes and actions of the military personnel toward the community; those of the community toward the military and between community members, and *Economic*, which includes both local employment and purchasing and the secondary/tertiary effects of that employment and purchasing.

compared to the Municipality of Gjakova which does not support a base, to determine whether, and in what way, the base affects the local political economy.

11.3.1 Political Characteristics

The military bases in Ferizaj and Prizren appeared to have had minimal political effect. Table 11.2 demonstrates the political relations for all three municipalities are low and nearly identical: base leaders do not have a significant or influential relationship with their communities, and therefore local elites/ leaders are unlikely to have a significant reciprocal influence or leverage with the military base. The Liaison Monitoring Teams have not performed as a proxy for the military leaders.

11.3.2 Social Characteristics

The bases have a mixed effect on community social characteristics. Camp Bondsteel continues to employ several thousand local residents from Ferizaj, including a considerable number of women, many of whom had had experienced some societal disapproval, but all had also enjoyed higher self-respect. As described in Chapter 6, this has substantially improved the social and economic status of women in Ferizaj. Anecdotally, Camp Prizren, analyzed in Chapter 7, is a good place to work, but it does not appear to evoke the same source of personal pride or status in the community. This is likely due to its much small number of employees employed on the camp. Subsequently, Prizren also employs fewer women and therefore has had little influence on women. Both Camps provide substantial skills training for their employees in select positions that are also useful to establish a business in the community. However, Camp Prizren permitted soldier use of prostitution in Prizren until the implementation of the KFOR-wide zero tolerance policy in late 2004, which allowed trafficking and crime to operate more easily in Prizren.

Gjakova, without a military base, analyzed in Chapter 8, gains no associated benefit. As Gjakova

was badly damaged during the war and contains a high percentage of widows, the absence of employment opportunities for women is especially pronounced.

11.3.3 Economic Characteristics

Overall, the bases have had a mixed economic effect upon their local communities. The high base salaries in Ferizaj appear to have largely increased local prosperity and consumption. Hence, retail has increased, and several former construction/construction-related businesses and industries have reopened to serve the local area. The bases had minimal effect in Prizren and effectively none in Gjakova. However, both Prizren and Gjakova municipalities already had a long history of trade, which was able to benefit from pent-up demand, and therefore able to return to prior economic capability more easily. They also demonstrated more qualities of mature or stable local economies such as business and professional services which are less dependent or influenced by a military base. See Table 11.2 for Community Characteristics Overview.

Community Characteristics Overview			
Municipality	Ferizaj (Chapter 6)	Prizren (Chapter 7)	Gjakova (Chapter 8)
Political Effects	Little military leader interaction with local leaders/elites.	Little military leader interaction with local leaders/elites.	Very little military leader interaction with local leaders/elites.
Social Effects	Local strong positive identity with base employment. Many opportunities for women. Some skills training. Little base-related crime. Positive opinion of LMTs	Local positive opinion of Camp Prizren. Few base employment openings. Some skills training. Supported prostitution until zero tolerance policy. Positive opinion of LMTs.	Minimal; positive opinion of KFOR LMTs.
Economic Effects	High number of local employees with high salaries. Several construction-related industries restarted. Increase in retail transportation and restaurants is typical post-conflict.	Small number of local employees with high salaries. Very strong history of trade. Several industries restarted, mostly construction related. Strongest post-conflict recovery.	No base; very long history of trade. Manufacturing is comparable to Ferizaj and Prizren. Highest number of business/professional services businesses, demonstrates a more stable economy.

Table 11.2 Community Characteristics Overview

11.4 Limitations of the Study

There is one important limitation to this study: the extent to which it is possible to generalize from a solitary case in a particular post-conflict environment that was conducted by NATO military forces that are both comparatively wealthy, and politically and socially 'Western.' This study of Kosovo acknowledges that similar peacekeeping forces, such as those directed by the United Nations, African Union and European Union do not necessarily share these attributes and perspectives, nor would have completed identical training. Nevertheless, this case study analyzed with a livelihood-focused political economy analysis, and framework of the three hypotheses reflecting political, social and economic influences is transferable to other post-conflict environments and produces locally-oriented results.

11.5 Implications of the Study

This study of the Municipalities of Ferizaj, Gjakova and Prizren demonstrates the day-to-day activities to establish military bases have had varying levels of political, social and economic effects, but relatively little influence on their local communities. The fieldwork reveals the US and German bases function under very different base operating procedures and guidelines concerning local purchasing and employment, despite operating under a single unified NATO leadership and United Nations tasking. This finding directly challenges the perception of military base homogeneity found in the literature and requires better knowledge of the procedures and 'habits' of deploying military forces: rules matter more than size.

Military bases contribute primarily to local prosperity and appear to do very little to catalyze substantial economic development. The often-described retail, restaurant and transportation businesses that start immediately after conflict end tend to be subsistence employment, and many fail to prosper. Hence, these results indicate that while military bases can have a positive influence on their community, the communities will require the same international support in

economic development, governance, rule of law and social well-being as communities without bases.

Finally, this research demonstrates the effectiveness of international peacekeeping lessons-learned and operational best practices when they are effectively implemented. Intentionally or not, many of the recommended practices that were published by the United Nations were followed by KFOR and produced generally positive results. Thus, this research strongly suggests that military bases established in post-conflict environments under a deliberate peace operations strategy may substantially reinforce international peacebuilding programs and initiatives.

11.6 Recommendations for further study

This research may facilitate further study in three related areas. The first is further analysis of the short and long-term effects of the Liaison Monitoring Teams, and a comparison of their influence with earlier unarmed community-level teams such as the UN Observers. Such an examination and comparison of the political and social influences of unarmed teams operating in a range of post-conflict mission environments would inform their suitability and appropriate role in peacebuilding. Noting particularly those internal war conditions described by Eckstein and Parent where “internal wars tend to scar deeply and prevent the formation of consensus indefinitely” (Eckstein, 1965:134; Parent, 2012:28), and by Darby & MacGinty who state that rebuilding trust after civil wars often benefits from the presence of third parties, such teams may reinforce positive dialogue.

Second, a focused investigation of the culture of humanitarian and military organizations while on mission, the particularly in what ways the internal cultures of lead and contributing nations influence their operations and relations with their community. Humanitarian and military bases are not homogeneous; their effects and influence on the local political economy are primarily

the result of their internal procedures and practices and their national/corporate culture, thus a focused investigation furthers understanding and best practices in peacebuilding operations.

Third is a study of the gender effects of the social and political empowerment of women as a result of the base, particularly where women had been employed on base as primary wage earners. This study would include a close examination of the enduring influence upon their roles in the family, on traditional mores and their own influence in the local community, including those leading to greater opportunities for culturally-appropriate leadership and conflict resolution.

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Appendix 1: Interview Participants

Interview Number	Interview Location	Date 2014	Type Participant	Business/ Occupation
3	Pristina	7-May	Government Official	Netherlands Ambassador to Kosovo
4			Director, International Organization	
5	Pristina	7-May		United Nations Political Unit
6	Ferizaj	9-May	Ferizaj Business Owner	Restaurant
7	Ferizaj	10-May	Ferizaj Business Owner	Mfg. and set up playground equipment
8	Ferizaj	10-May	Ferizaj Business Owner	Café and Bar
9	Ferizaj	11-May	CBS contractor	US MP Soldier 1999/2000
10	Ferizaj	12-May	Ferizaj Business Owner	Road construction and const. materials
11	Ferizaj	12-May	Ferizaj Business Owner	Construction salvage materials; iron & steel
12	Ferizaj	12-May	Former base employee	Coffee Shop employee
13	Ferizaj	12-May	Ferizaj Business Owner	Small retail business
14	Ferizaj	13-May	CBS Media specialist	Public Affairs Specialist
15	Ferizaj	13-May	Former KBR employee	Food Service employee
16	Ferizaj	13-May	Business Owner	Ferizaj Retail Business
16	Ferizaj	14-May	Ferizaj Municipality	Ferizaj Economic Director

Interview Number	Interview Location	Date 2014	Type Participant	Business/ Occupation
17	Ferizaj	14-May	PX employee	Camp Bondsteel PX department manager
18	Ferizaj	14-May	Ferizaj Business Owner	Owner of land used by US KFOR; runs café and shop, parking lot at Main Gate
19	Ferizaj	15-May	Ferizaj Municipality	Mayor of Ferizaj
20	Ferizaj	19-May	Bakery Owner	Exclusive baker to CBS
21	Ferizaj	19-May	Ferizaj Business Owner	CADI Cleaning Wholesale cleaning products
22	Ferizaj	19-May	Local store employee	Super Viva Grocery store w/restaurant
23	Gjilan	21-May	Gjilan Municipality	Chairman for Communities
24	Gjilan	21-May	Gjilan Civil Society	Pres. Gjilan Chamber of Commerce
25	Gjilan	22-May 27-May	Gjilan Municipality	Office of Economic Development
26	Gjilan	22-May	Business Owner	Co-Owner Beta Commerce Quarry/Gravel
27	Gjilan	26-May	Gjilan Municipality	Gjilan Police Officer for minority Communities
28	Gjilan	26-May	Gjilan Municipality	Gjilan Police Forces/Serb Officer
29	Gjilan	27-May	International Organization	Coordinator, UN Women

Interview Number	Interview Location	Date 2014	Type Participant	Business/ Occupation
30	Gjilan	27-May	Gjilan Municipality	Director, Gjilan Youth
31	Gjilan	27-May	Community member	Member, Gjilan Youth
32	Gjilan	27-May	Community member	Member, Gjilan Youth
33	Gjilan	27-May	Community member	Farmer; sells produce at Serb farm market
34	Gjilan	28-May	Gjilan Municipality	Director, Youth, Culture and Sports
35	Prizren	29-May	Community member	Professor, University of Prizren
36	Prizren	29-May	Prizren Municipality	Director for Economy and Finance
37	Prizren	7-Jun	German KFOR	German KFOR CIMIC Team
38	Lipjan	9-Jun	Former interpreter/ base employee. Son of business owner	Puntori Construction materials
39	Gjilan	9-Jun	Gjilan Municipality	Exec Director, Center for Protection of Women & Children
40	Ferizaj	11-Jun	Former KBR employee	Construction estimator, Loan Officer, Raffisen Bank
41	Ferizaj	11-Jun	Former KBR employee	Not presently employed/ returned from Afghanistan
42	Ferizaj	11-Jun	Former KBR employee	Not presently employed/ returned from Afghanistan

Interview Number	Interview Location	Date 2014	Type Participant	Business/ Occupation
43	Ferizaj	11-Jun	Former KBR employee	Not presently employed/ returned from Afghanistan
44	Ferizaj	12-Jun	US KFOR	Camp Bondsteel, Intel NCO
45	Ferizaj	12-Jun	US KFOR	Camp Bondsteel, CMO
46	Ferizaj	12-Jun	US KFOR	Camp Bondsteel, CMO
47	Ferizaj	12-Jun	US KFOR	Camp Bondsteel, Public Affairs
48	Prizren	13-Jun	Business Owner	Co-owner, Retail hardware
49	Prizren	16-Jun	Prizren Municipality	Prizren Information Center
50	Prizren	16-Jun	Business Owner	Construction materials
51	Prizren	16-Jun	Business Owner Camp Prizren laundry	Laundry
52	Prizren	17-Jun	International Organization	Caritas Kosovo, Head of Mission
53	Prizren	17 Jun	Prizren Business Owner	Printshop for all CPZ paper products
54	Prizren	17 Jun	Camp Prizren Interpreter	*Chance meeting, provided contact information for #62
55	Prizren	17 Jun	Prizren Business Owner	Small electronics shop
56	Prizren	18-Jun	International Organization	Caritas Kosovo, Minority Integration
57	Prizren	18-Jun	Prizren Business owner; Produce vendor to CPZ	Co-owner, Produce Market

Interview Number	Interview Location	Date 2014	Type Participant	Business/ Occupation
58	Prizren	18-Jun	Prizren Municipality	Prizren Econ. Development
59	Gjilan	2-Jul	Director	War Veteran Association Gjilan Civil Society
60	Ferizaj	4-Jul	Mayor	Mayor of Ferizaj
61	Ferizaj	4-Jul	Engineer	Ferizaj Municipal Engineer
62	Prizren	5-Jul	Albanian - German – English Translator	Camp Prizren Employee
63	Gjilan	7-Jul	Director	Local Catholic NGO
64	Ferizaj	7-Jul	Fulltime mother	Former University of Maryland employee
65	Ferizaj	7-Jul	Community member	Local land owner; lessor to CBS
66	Gjilan	8-Jul	Son of business owner	DEA Water and Krystal Hotel employee
67	Ferizaj	8-Jul	Director, Ferizaj Public Library	Ferizaj Municipality
68	Ferizaj	8-Jul	Director Director, Regional Units and	US NGO
69	Pristina	15-Jul	Associations	Kosovo Chamber of Commerce
70	Pristina	15-Jul	Director, Dept. of Administration	Kosovo Chamber of Commerce
71	Pristina	20-Jul	Director IKS	Local Civil Society Organization
72	Pristina	21-Jul	Chief of Mission UNHCR	International Organization
73	Pristina	21-Jul	Translator	Camp Bondsteel employee
74	Ferizaj		Civil Engineer, US Corps of Engineers	Lead Engineer, Camp Bondsteel 1999

Interview Number	Interview Location	Date 2016	Type Participant	Business/ Occupation
75	Oberammergau	27-Mar (2015)	German KFOR	Communications Officer
76	Ferizaj	17-Oct	Employee, Business Association	Alliance of Kosovo Businesses
77	Ferizaj	17-Oct	Employee, Business Association	Alliance of Kosovo Businesses
78	Pristina	17-Oct	Former Camp Bondsteel Cultural Advisor	Senior Advisor to Ministry of Internal Affairs
79	Fushe Kosovë	18-Oct	Ministry of Communities & Returns	Republic of Kosovo
80	Fushe Kosovë	18-Oct	Ministry of Communities & Returns	Republic of Kosovo
81	Prizren	18-Oct	Bank Manager	Regional Bank
82	Prizren	18-Oct	Director of Economy and Finance Manager, Tax Compliance Dept.	Prizren Municipality
83	Ferizaj	19-Oct	Director, Economy & Tourism	Ferizaj Municipality
84	Ferizaj	19-Oct	Director, Economy & Tourism	Ferizaj Municipality
85	Gjakova	21-Oct	Volunteer, Local Civil Society	Gjakova Veterans Association
86	Gjakova	21-Oct	Mayor of Gjakova	Gjakova Municipality
87	Pristina	21-Oct	Executive Director	Kosovar Civil Society Foundation
88	Pristina	24-Oct	International Organization	UNMIK Senior Program Officer for Minorities
89	Pristina	24-Oct	Economics Professor	University of Pristina
90	Pristina	25-Oct	Economics Professor	University of Pristina (cancelled/email only)

Appendix 2: Camp Bondsteel/Camp Prizren Questions

- How was the site for this Camp selected? Why were JA base/other facilities selected?
- Was the labor for construction/repairs made up of military personnel or people from the local area? A combination? Skilled or unskilled?
- Were there construction companies after the war, if so, what was the any system of selection?
- Where did construction companies usually come from (local, Pristina, out of Kosovo)?
- Following the groundworks and rough construction, if the laborers were civilians, where did they go when they were finished?
- Were building materials (quarried gravel, concrete mix, lumber) for the base or local use purchased locally or brought in? What was the vendor selection process?
- Were construction equipment/generators/furnishings purchased locally/in Kosovo, or imported?
- Small businesses often open near a military base to service military and civilians working there - did this also occur near this base? If so, what sort of businesses? Did civilians not working on the base use them?
- It is very common for a rapid increase of outsiders (returnees, neighboring countries, etc.) to arrive at a base construction site to take advantage of economic opportunities. Was this noticed here? If so, did the outsiders compete or displace the local people. What happened?
- It is very common for illicit businesses to spring up in response to the increase in local income, especially after conflict, and the arrival of peacekeepers such as KFOR, NATO and UN. Was an increase in crime, including prostitution and drugs, noticed near the base? How did people find out; who was likely to participate?