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

Governmentality, Participation and the promise of Empowerment: a case study of WaterAid's Community WASH Management (CWM) programmes in Nigeria

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Declaration of Original Authorship

I confirm that this is my own work and the use of all material from other sources has been properly and fully acknowledged.

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Governmentality, Participation and the promise of Empowerment: a case study of WaterAid's Community WASH Management (CWM) programmes in Nigeria

Abstract

With the advent of the participatory development era, Community Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) management (CWM) has been lauded as a viable way of ensuring the sustainability of development projects through the participation of communities in the provision of WASH services. CWM is in theory a programme of empowerment which in keeping with liberal rationalities of government seeks to promote the active participation of beneficiaries in WASH management (Dean, 2010).

There is a growing number of literature that studies participation through the analytical lens of governmentality reflecting a need to look at the micro-physics of power as manifested in the processes of governing participation in specific contexts. However, a large number of these studies are Eurocentric. Drawing from extant scholarship on the governmentality of participation, the thesis examines the extent to which the strategies, procedures and technologies adopted by WaterAid in promoting Community WASH Management (CWM) are based on advanced liberal programmes of empowerment which aim to shape the conduct of aid recipients to create active subjects of participation towards neoliberal objectives. This study examines the rationality as well as the governmental technologies deployed by WaterAid in eliciting local participation and empowerment in two of its CWM projects in Nigeria. The case study projects are the Sustainable Total Sanitation Project (STS) partly funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation and the HSBC Water Programme (HWP) funded by the HSBC Bank. The expected combined coverage of the two projects are about six states, twenty two local governments, 105 communities and 800,000 rural inhabitants.

The study employed a realist governmentality approach by combining a text based analysis with a grounded ethnographic research of governmental practices (Rosol, 2014). Participant interview, key informant and focused group discussions was used to collect data for the study.

The thesis found that WaterAid is influenced unintentionally by a neoliberal governance regime which looks to shift responsibility away from states, looks to actors independent of the state to provide services normally associated with the state, such as the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure, and also to attempt to get village residents to bear some

of these responsibilities. The governmentality of participation and empowerment in Nigeria represents less of state's governing from a distance but more of a unique case of INGOs attempting to govern through the state. WaterAid is attempting to enact WASH governance through the state. But as the empirical data shows, this just doesn't really happen, there is no teleological unfolding of neoliberal governmentality, because the WASH units within the LGAs do not manage fully to capture or control government-related functions and capacities related to provision of WASH services. Empowerment is not happening in the way that WaterAid would envisage. Neither are local people becoming subjects in processes of neoliberal governmentality.

While the thesis describes the various frustrations with doing development through the state detailed in the absence of resources, the limited capacity of LGA staff, their complacency and poor attitude to work, the inability of state institutions to make funds available for WASH services and the failure of LGAs and communities to provide counterpart funds, INGOs are still no substitute for a state with both capacity and resources. Under resourced NGOS like WaterAid in combination with very rural poorly resourced villages with rural dwellers riddled with various socioeconomic challenges cannot afford to build the kind of WASH infrastructure that the Nigerian government finds itself unable to build. Despite the challenges of implementing partnership with the state, such partnerships still remain the only way to have a larger impact in the provision of WASH infrastructure in Nigeria. This entails a shift from donor project structures to working within state systems (Mosse, 2005).

This thesis shows that governmentality has expanded purchase when it comes to understanding the behaviours and strategies of NGO actors like WaterAid. It is also a valuable resource for understanding the relationship between states and non-state actors and for studying multi actor networks. The complexities, predicaments and contestations associated with real life situations are however not taken into account by studies of NGOs and governmentality. Scholars of governmentality working on NGOs need to be giving more nuanced accounts of the conditions required for processes and power relations entailed by governmentality to get a purchase in the ways people come to organise their lives, and the internalised norms on which they base such organisation. Governmentality theory can add considerable value to the study of CWM and other policies related to WASH as demonstrated in this study. To provide more nuanced accounts, it should be combined with other analytical approaches like institutionalism and constructivism (Merlingen, 2011).

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It's a great privilege to finally come to the end of four years of hard work. I consider the opportunity to do doctoral research at the University of Reading a great privilege. I am grateful to God for such a rare privilege. I am indebted to many people who have supported me during the period of my research.

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Table of Contents

Table of Contents

List of Abbreviations

ADB	African Development Bank
ADB RWS	African Development Bank Rural Water Supply
APC	All Progress Congress
BMGF	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation
CAP	Community Action Programmes
CBD-NGO	Community Based Development Non-Governmental Organization
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CLTS	Community Led Total sanitation
CSO	Civil Society Organisations
CWM	Community Water Management
CWP	Community Water Project
EC	European Commission
DOA	Document of Action
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
FMAARD RWSS	Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development Rural Water Supply Scheme
FMWR	Federal Ministry of Water Resources
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus/ acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
HSBC	the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited
HWP	HSBC Water Project
IFS	Institute of Fiscal Studies
INGO	International Non-Governmental Organisation
JDPI	Justice Development and Peace Initiative
JICA	Japanese International Corporation Agency
KI	Key Informant
LDP	Local Development Plan
LGA	Local Government Area
LGA WSS	Local Government Area Water Supply Scheme
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
NDHS	National Demographic Household Survey
NEWSAN	Network for Civil Society Organisations
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NPC	National Population Commission
OD	Open Defecation
ODF	Open Defecation Free
NEWSAN	Network for Civil Society Organisations
NTGS	National Task Group on Sanitation
NWRI	National Water Research Institute

PDP	People's Democratic Party
PPA	Project Partnership Agreement
RBDA	River Basin Development Authority
RUWASSA	Rural Water Supply Sanitation Agency
RWSS	Rural Water Supply and Sanitation
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
STF	Special Task Force
STS	Sustainable Total Sanitation
UNICEF	United Nations International Children Education Fund
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States
USD	United States Dollars
VHP	Volunteer Hygiene Promoter
VLOM	Village Level Operations and Maintenance
WANG	Water Aid in Nigeria.
WASH	Water Sanitation and Hygiene
WATSAN	Water Sanitation Agency
WASHCOMS	Water Sanitation and Hygiene Committee
WCA	Water Consumers Association
WSS	Water Supply and Sanitation
WSP	Water Supply Programme
WSSSRP	Water Supply and Sanitation Sector Reform Programme

List of figures

List of tables

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.0 Background

Although accurate figures are difficult to obtain, it is estimated that about 109 million people in Nigeria, representing about 40 percent of the country's population, lack access to improved sanitation facilities, while 66 million inhabitants do not have access to safe water services (Osita et al., 2014). While decent progress has been made in improving access to drinking water in Nigeria, especially in the context of the recently concluded millennium development goals (MDG), achieving access to sanitation, especially in rural areas, remains elusive (Rose and Jakubowski, 2016). The resulting human impact of poor access to improved water and sanitation have included high prevalence of disease, with 13 percent of children under the age of five years dying from diarrheal diseases annually (WaterAid, 2016). There is also a high proportion of undernutrition, violence, and insecurity especially for women and children that are related to the absence of water and sanitation facilities (WaterAid, 2010). The economic cost of poor water and sanitation services is also quite high. It is projected that the economic cost of poor sanitation and hygiene services in Nigerian is about £1.8 million pounds annually. This amount is equivalent to roughly 1.3% of Nigeria's annual gross domestic product (UNICEF, 2015).

Community Water Sanitation and Hygiene Management or Community WASH Management (CMM) for short, has emerged as a key method in the search for sustainable approaches to the provision of access to water and sanitation services especially in developing countries such as Nigeria (Lammerick and Bolt, 2002; Margerum and Robinson, 2015; Schnegg and Bollig, 2016;Whaley and Cleaver,2017). CWM is denoted as a programme of empowerment which seeks to promote the active participation of project beneficiaries (Kyessi, 2005). CWM gained popularity in the 1980s which is referred to as the international decade for drinking water and sanitation. This period was also characterized by a proliferation of International Non-Governmental Organisations seeking to deliver services through communities and local indigenous organisations (Wamuchiru, 2017).

One of such prominent NGOS is WaterAid which defines CWM as:

'…the situation where everyone (women, men, and children) in a geographical location participates in the planning, decision-making process and have control over the management of their water supply,

sanitation and hygiene services. Technical and sustained support is provided by government structures and external agencies' (WATERAID, Community engagement strategy, 2014: 5).

It is evident from the above definition that CWM is anchored on the principle of 'participatory development' which itself has become the new 'buzz or hurrah Word' (Leal, 2010:89), in international development.

One of the fundamental principles of participatory development is the building of partnerships between relevant governments and INGOs (Sharma, 2015). On this frame, INGOs work with private and public institutions to formulate and pursue strategies to encourage participation of the beneficiaries of any given developmental project (Trinborg, 2007). In seeking to promote bottom-up planning and consequently inclusion, participatory development has many aims. First, participatory development seeks to promote local community empowerment (Kapoor, 2005). Empowerment here means the pooling of resources to achieve collective strength and countervailing power. It also means the enhancement of manual and technical skills, planning and managerial competence and analytical and reflective abilities of people (Tsang, 2009; Kapoor, 2005). Second, participatory development seeks to ensure ownership of development programmes (Ndabaga et al., 2015; Marcus, 2007). In seeking ownership, the initiative in establishing the project activities is taken by the people. Third and lastly, there is a wide, if contested assumption that stakeholder participation will help enhance the sustainability of development projects (Kasemir et al., 2003; Kleemeier, 2000; Gleitsmann, et al., 2007).

The need for engaging local actors in the development process is born out of the presumed failure of the top-down approach to development (Chambers, 1997; Chambers, 2008; Kamruzzaman, 2013). A popular belief is that participation by the poor and marginalized would lead to the greater achievement of development goals and agendas (Ribot, 2011). Participatory development thus implies discarding centralized decision-making processes and the embrace, instead of a more inclusive and 'bottom up' politics (Kapoor, 2005).

In CWM, INGOs work with local governments and communities often in rural villages to manage their water supply as well as to build and manage individual and institutional latrines for example in schools, parks, markets and other public places. The approach is often such that on the one hand, communities are encouraged to see access to water sanitation and hygiene services (WASH) as a human right the provision of which they (communities) should demand from government, and, on the other hand, to work in partnership with governments to enable them (governments) to response to the demand for WASH services by communities.

WaterAid is one of the most prominent INGOs working to provide WASH services in Nigeria. Starting from 1995 when the organization executed its first project in Etche, a rural village in Rivers State – an oil-rich southern state in Nigeria – the organization has steadily grown its presence in Nigeria. Currently, WaterAid has ongoing or completed projects in over 30 local governments and 700 villages in Nigeria. WaterAid repeatedly affirms that it is firmly committed to local empowerment as well as government and community participation service in the implementation its programmes. The organization stresses that in addition to providing services, one of its primary objectives, both globally and in Nigeria, is to influence what it calls 'duty bearers' to respond to the need to provide water and sanitation services. This is, as stated, more or less a rights-based approach to programming where communities are cast as having rights to clean water and decent sanitation while governments are portrayed as having the obligation to provide these services to the citizens (Glieck, 1996; Scanlon and Nemes, 2004; Singh, 2015) WaterAid supports communities to call for their right to WASH services. It also seeks to help service providers meet communities' demands for service affordably and sustainably (WaterAid, 2015).

In order to achieve its stated objectives, WaterAid makes clear that its main focus is working directly with communities and the lowest level of government institutions possible (local governments) to minimise the potential negative impact of national politics and bureaucracy. WaterAid justifies it's approach by pointing out that poor access to water and sanitation services in Nigeria is strongly linked to poor governance of water and sanitation (WaterAid, 2015) arising from the failure of the state to deliver services within the sector. In taking this approach, WaterAid represents a host of INGOs in Nigeria that are increasingly looking to bypass national governments to emphasise greater and direct partnerships with local organisations.

Interestingly, the United Nations recently in September 2015, as a follow-up to the Millennium Development Goals ratified 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) with 169 targets. The sixth goal of the SDG is dedicated to ensuring the availability and sustainable management of water and sanitation services globally (UN Water, 2015). In seeking to deliver Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) services, target 6.a and 6.b of the SDGs address the need to aim for international cooperation, capacity building and the strengthening of the participation of local communities in water and sanitation management on the principle of community-based management (CBM).

However, while there might be a sense of inevitability that addressing the appalling state of WASH services in developing countries such as Nigeria, and meeting the Sustainable Development Goal 6 more broadly require, at least in the short to medium term, the active role by INGOs working with local communities, it is crucial to hold the strategies and techniques deployed by these international actors in achieving their stated objectives in poor countries up for scrutiny. Furthermore, it is important to explore what such strategies and tactics entail for the changing roles and power relations between the state, the communities and the INGOs. Accordingly, the aim of this thesis to explore the strategies and techniques adopted by WaterAid for eliciting participation and empowerment in community.

1.1 Questioning the Promise of Empowerment through Participation

Despite its status as 'the new orthodoxy' (Leal,2010:89) in international development, several literatures from the governmentality perspective have raised the alarm that the growing promise of participation and empowerment may well represent forms of advanced liberal tools and strategies of governance aimed at controlling communities and depoliticizing the process of social change(Babu, 2009).Cooke and Kothari (2001) is famous for popularizing the concern that International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) and the state may be using participation as a means through which investments and policies can be implemented with the least resistance making participation the 'human software' in development. It has been argued that INGOs sometimes in the name of participation steer stakeholders towards support for predetermined goals by forging tactical alliances, blocking dissent and avoiding scope for conflict (Few et al., 2007).

Even with the purest intention, close observers have regularly noted that attempts to implement participatory processes are often complicated by real-world realities and sharp political conflicts which make participation and empowerment unable to deliver on their promises (Cohen et al., 2011; White 2011; Kapoor 2005).One such key aspect of the 'real world realities' is the fact that the ideologies, rationalities, strategies and outcomes of authentic participation may be at odds with those of existing bureaucracies, social institutions, structures and vested interests (White,2011). Hence, if participation is to mean more than a façade of good intentions, it is vital to isolate and effectively explore the range of developmental technologies, tools and strategies deployed by INGOs in participatory development and how these interact with existing structural and political dynamics to either facilitate or stifle the lofty promises of participation and empowerment.

1.2 Aims and Objectives

Drawing from the theoretical lens of governmentality, this study aims to contribute to the understanding of the strategies and techniques deployed by WaterAid for eliciting local participation and empowerment in the context of CWM programmes in Nigeria. Examining what happens as a result of 'neoliberal governmentality from a distance is beyond the scope of this thesis. This thesis instead focus on examining incipient efforts to bring about neoliberal governmentality as stated in the policy and strategies of WaterAid.

To be clear, the objective is not to evaluate the direct project impact of WaterAid's intervention in providing WASH services through the case study projects. Rather the emphasis is on the exploration of the rationality for empowerment and the strategies and tactics employed to promote community WASH management in the study area. The particular focus is on use of (i) decentralized institutions, (ii) capacity building and, (iii) technologies of knowledge as governmental strategies designed to render communities governable and to shape, guide, or affect the conduct of relevant government stakeholders.

1.3 Research Questions

The central research question addressed in the thesis is: To what extent are the strategies, procedures and technologies adopted by WaterAid in promoting Community WASH management (CWM) based on advanced liberal programmes of empowerment which aim to shape the conduct of aid recipients to create active subjects of participation towards neoliberal objectives? Related, the research addresses as sub-questions :(i) what are the strategies, procedures and technologies adopted by WaterAid in promoting local participation and empowerment in the context of Community WASH Management in Nigeria and how are these enacted? (ii) The effectiveness of these strategies? (iii) Their implications on existing administration structures and power relations between INGOs, governments, and the local communities; and (iv) their border implications for the long-term sustainability of projects.

The research questions are addressed by analysing, from a governmentality perspective, two flagship WaterAid projects in Nigeria targeting 22 local governments, 105 communities and about 800,000 rural dwellers. The one is the Sustainable Total Sanitation (STS) project which is implemented with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation in a partnership agreement with a combination of state and non-state actors. The total funding for the project is $6,628,162, for the duration of 48 months. The STS project ended in 2016.The other is the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC) Water Programme (HWP).

The HSBC Water Programme is a partnership between HSBC Bank, Earth Watch, WaterAid and the World Wildlife Fund. It is geared towards providing and protecting water sources, informing and educating communities, enabling people to prosper and driving economic development across the world. The HWP in Nigeria is a five-year project which started in 2012 and ended in 2016.

While recognizing the various types and forms of participation, this research will limit itself to the study and examination of participation within the direct relationships between beneficiary communities, the state, and INGOs.

1.4 Governmentality, Participation, and Empowerment

Governmentality scholars trace the idea of participatory development to neoliberalism with its emphasis on minimal state, increased market role in service provisioning and the notion of doing development through public-private partnerships (Trinborg, 2007).Participation, therefore, entails a need to do away with 'big government' and to discard centralised decision-making process in the politics of resource distribution and welfare provisioning (Kapoor, 2005).

Dean (2010:83) describes programmes of empowerment as contemporary liberal rationalities of government that endeavour to operationalize the self-governing capacities of the governed in the pursuit of governmental objectives. The concept of empowerment draws upon the participatory aspects of democratic traditions and preserves while radicalizing, the stress on autonomy and self-determination found in many variants of liberalism (ibid: 83). On this frame, the poor and the beneficiaries are constituted as active participants in their 'own development' with state welfare priorities and responsibilities shifted to citizens, NGOs and the private sector (Ilcan and Lacey 2006).Governmentality scholars have linked the rise of advanced neoliberalism and the decentralized state with the proliferation of various non-state agencies or actors performing various functions which in the past was deemed the central role of the welfare or social state (Lacey and Ilcan, 2006; Okereke et al., 2009).

Governmentality literature notes the many difficulties, and unintended consequences implicated in the roll back of the state and the use of private organizations or market to provide services to marginalised groups in developed countries(Rose, 2000; Dean, 2010).There is, for example, a recognition that at the heart of the discourse of participatory development and of empowerment is the exercise of different lineaments of power and the (re) organization of

society into forms and functions that seek to enhance the welfare of the population and individual liberty without eroding the ability of the state to exercise socio-political control (Sending and Neumann, 2006:656).Strategies of participation can then entail transfer and the shrinking role of the state within an advanced liberal technology of government within which new actors 'doing state' seek to constitute responsible citizens categorized in communities to take or play an active part in performing the role of the traditional state (Rose, 2000; Dean, 2010).

1.5 Perceived Gaps and Justification for the Study

Participation in natural resource management has been a topic of wide and varied studies. Several studies have examined the political economy of participation using the WASH sector as a case study (Das 2014; Kyamusugulwa 2015; Eyben, 2006, Williams 2004). However, while political economy analysis of participatory development processes makes important contributions in showing the inequalities perpetrated through the world's capitalist system, they perform less well in tracing the micro-processes through which power is enacted (Okereke et al., 2009). Hence, there is less evidence of how participation attempts to create spaces for change in discourses and practices through collective empowerment (Das, 2014).

While there is great value in analysing the design features of local community water management and the degree and nature of stakeholder benefit (Boelens et al, 2015; Marcus, 2007), unless we properly understand the particular tactics and governmental technologies used by donor communities to promote participatory approaches and seek to empower communities, it will be hard to pinpoint their role and influence and how power is exercised within the process (Trinborg, 1997).

There is a growing number of literature that studies participation through the analytical lens of governmentality reflecting a need to look at the micro-physics of power as manifested in the processes of governing in specific contexts. However, an overwhelming number of these studies are Eurocentric, and the few but increasing number devoted to developing countries are mostly focused on the sub-continent of Asia. For example Babu (2007) have argued that prominent public- private initiatives aimed at increasing community participation in drinking water management in Kerala, India, involves remote governmental technologies of the state to promote localism and active citizenship which ultimately marginalizes negotiation and resistance. Howe et al (2013) have demonstrated how the governmental technology of vulnerability assessments and scoping diagrams are used to identify, prioritize and manage the

perception of risk in the context of climate change induced community water management systems. The use role of community participation in water governance in Kenya has been studied (Mathenge, et al., 2014).

So far, there is no literature, to the best of my knowledge, which has studied community water management in Nigeria from the governmentality perspective. Rather the focus has been on the process of implementation with emphasis on outcome more or less from a technical, instrumental or problem-solving intellectual tradition (Ajayi et al., 2003; Nwankwoala, 2011; Rose and Jakubowski, 2016). The result is that the specific strategies adopted by the INGOs as well as the relations of power that underpin these programmes and prevailing strategies are mostly ignored.

At the same time, while decentralization, capacity building and the technologies of knowledge have been identified in various governmentality literature as specific governmental strategies in various international development projects, a large number of these analyses are theoretical in nature and not grounded in detailed empirical work. For example, Lohmeyer (2017) examined the complex dynamics between neoliberal social policy and the NGOs that implement them. He argues that an analysis neoliberal social policy ought to consider the interference and overlap between the subjectification effects of these policies and those produced by the NGOs who implement these policies. Similarly, Haque (2017) used a governmentality framework to trace the evolution and emergence of the ideal neoliberal subject in current federal newcomer language training policies. Eade (2007) have forcefully argued that while capacity building was originally rooted in the political left and focused on empowerment, much of the concept has now been co-opted and adopted by organisations pursuing a neoliberal agenda of privatisation, good governance and "pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps" attitude. This thesis will seek to add to the existing pool of literature on the governmentality of participation and empowerment with its unique feature being the focus on CWM in Nigeria and the deployment of a detailed empirical case study based on institutional ethnographic research.

The structure of the Nigerian society and its inherent traditional orientation and political economy may offer a new perspective and context and enable contributions to the governmentality literature. The specific case study organization under examination provides a good lens for this study because of the unique power dynamics between the INGOs, the state and project beneficiaries.

Hence the Foucauldian focus on a micro-physics of power allows one to closely examine power relationships which is inherent and shapes participatory development.

Governmentality theory is a tool for studying networked governance beyond the state. Scholars in governmentality study the co-option and administration of people in terms of the heterogeneous intellectual and technical conditions(Merlingen,2011).We adopt a governmentality theoretical approach as it is known for illuminating relations between state and non-state actors(Edge and Eyles,2015).In taking a governmentality approach, it is suggested that authority is constituted in and through the process of governing as 'different actors, interests, ideas and materials are variously included and excluded in order to shape participation as a governable problem (Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012; Trinborg 2007).The use of governmentality as an analytical lens further allows one to examine how participation is achieved in the context of the reconfiguration of authority and blurring of the state and non-state boundaries in the process of delivery donor support and service delivery. This analytical perspective allows us to disaggregate various patterns of participation by looking at different practices and procedures through which it is performed and in which forms and modes of governance (Bulkeley and Schroeder, 2012).

1.6 Methodology

The study employs a case study qualitative approach. The main case study organisation is WaterAid Nigeria. The specific projects are the Sustainable Total Sanitation project (STS) – a large programme part-funded by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the HSBC Water programme(HWP) funded by the HSBC Bank. The case study projects were selected on the basis of their projected significance (in terms of scope and reach) and crucially because of their avowed commitment to CWM as a strategy for governing WASH in Communities. Data was collected for the study using a combination of documentary analysis, key informant interviews and focused group discussions and participant observation. Key informant interviews and focused group discussions were conducted with local government staff, WASH INGO staff, WASH experts, LGA WASH units and members of beneficiary communities. Strategy documents, reports and literature on WASH from the Case study organisations was analysed to understand the underlying discourses, rationality, and strategies. Data collected was analysed both manually and with the use of NVIVO.

1.7 Contribution

Drawing from the theoretical lens of governmentality and with a focus on decentralization, capacity building and technologies of knowledge, this thesis explored the strategies and techniques used by WaterAid to elicit local participation and empowerment in the context of CWM in Nigeria. The thesis examines the extent to which the strategies, procedures and technologies adopted by WaterAid in promoting Community WASH Management (CWM) are based on advanced liberal programmes of empowerment which aim to shape the conduct of aid recipients to create active subjects of participation towards neoliberal objectives. The thesis is an implicit critique of governmentality as applied to NGOs working in development in sub-Saharan Africa. The thesis also describes how governmentality has been advanced by other scholars since Foucault. It goes further to describes how the logic of governmentality provides a relevant tool for studying community participation.

The thesis represents an original contribution to the literature in a number of important ways. First, there is a limited amount of work that have analysed CWM in Nigeria from a governmentality perspective. Second, the thesis is thus an important empirical undertaking given the institutional ethnographic work involved and the highly influential nature of Nigeria as the biggest economy and the most populous country in Africa. The study contributes to the growing body of literature that detail the motives, reason, actions and agendas of INGOs as they seek to promote participatory engagement especially within the context of WASH in rural Nigeria.

The thesis found that WaterAid is influenced unintentionally by a neoliberal governance regime which looks to shift responsibility away from states, looks to actors independent of the state to provide services normally associated with the state, such as the operation and maintenance of water infrastructure, and also to attempt to get village residents to bear some of these responsibilities.

A crucial contribution to the governmentality literature made by this thesis is the discovery that the governmentality of participation and empowerment in Nigeria represents less of state's governing from a distance but more of a unique case of INGOs attempting to govern through the state. WaterAid is attempting to enact WASH governance through the state. This is evidenced by the creation of WASH units at LGA level through which project activities are implemented and the formation of WASHCOMs in project communities. But as the empirical data shows, this just doesn't really happen, there is no teleological unfolding of neoliberal

governmentality, because the WASH units within the LGAs do not manage fully to capture or control government-related functions and capacities related to water provision, communities can't afford to build latrines, don't fully buy into the need to eliminate open defecation. Empowerment is not happening in the way that WaterAid would envisage – and as they do admit, off the record, themselves – but not because local people are becoming subjects in processes of neoliberal governmentality.

While the thesis describes the various frustrations with doing development through the state detailed in the absence of resources, the limited capacity of LGA staff, their complacency and poor attitude to work, the inability of state institutions to make funds available for WASH services and the failure of LGAs and communities to provide counterpart funds, INGOs are still no substitute for a state with both capacity and resources. As the empirical findings in chapters five and six show, under resourced NGOS like WaterAid in combination with very rural poorly resourced villages with rural dwellers riddled with various socioeconomic challenges cannot afford to build the kind of WASH infrastructure that the Nigerian government finds itself unable to build. Despite the challenges of implementing partnership with the state, such partnerships still remain the only way to have a larger impact in the provision of WASH infrastructure in Nigeria. This entails a shift from donor project structures to working within state systems (Mosse, 2005).

This thesis shows that governmentality has expanded purchase when it comes to understanding the behaviours and strategies of NGO actors like WaterAid. It is also a valuable resource for understanding the relationship between states and non-state actors and for studying multi actor networks. The complexities, predicaments and contestations associated with real life situations are however not taken into account by studies of NGOs and governmentality. Scholars of governmentality working on NGOs need to be giving more nuanced accounts of the conditions required for processes and power relations entailed by governmentality to get a purchase in the ways people come to organise their lives, and the internalised norms on which they base such organisation. Governmentality theory can add considerable value to the study of CWM and other policies related to WASH as demonstrated in this study. To provide more nuanced accounts, it should be combined with other analytical approaches like institutionalism and constructivism (Merlingen, 2011).

1.8 Structure of Thesis

The rest of the thesis develops as follows:

Chapter two presents a background of the research. The chapter provides a description of the Nigerian national state and the governance structure of Nigeria to give a description of the political setting of the CWM interventions by WaterAid. Further, the chapter discusses the current state of water and sanitation in Nigeria and the challenge of making WASH services available. The regulatory policies governing WASH and the various institutional arrangements for WASH are examined. The chapter also introduces the concept of community WASH management (CWM), and community-led total sanitation (CLTS).

Chapter three provides the theoretical and conceptual framework for the study. This chapter examines the concept of participatory development from the governmentality perspective and how it is applied within the community development literature. It also examines debates surrounding the rationality for the employment of participation as a form of governance. The chapter goes on to explore the concept of the state in participatory development under an advanced liberal technology of government and concludes by exploring the relationship between various concepts of power, participatory development, and empowerment.

Chapter four describes the methodology employed to achieve the research objectives as previously set out in relevant section above. The chapter outlines the rationale for selecting a qualitative case study approach and the specific case study projects. It also explains the data collection methodology and analysis. Finally, it discusses the ethical challenges of conducting the study

Chapters five and six are the empirical chapters where the findings of the exploration of the strategies deployed by WaterAid in eliciting local participation and empowerment are presented and analysed. Chapter 5 presents the steps taken by WaterAid to enlist local governments and beneficiary communities before proceeding to analyse decentralisation as a governmentality strategy and technology of governance. Chapter six continues with a focus on the strategy of capacity building, training and the technologies of knowledge.

Chapter seven is the discussion chapter. Here the emphasis is placed on the effectiveness of these strategies and techniques of governance and the implications for changing power relations between INGOS, communities, and government. The discussion chapter also considers the broader implications of the extant participation and empowerment strategies in creating dependencies and on ownership and the long-term sustainability of WASH projects.

This chapter has presented the background to the thesis and the central argument that will guide discussion of the rest of the thesis. The chapter further outlined the objectives and research questions that will guide investigation. The chapter concludes with a summary of methodology for the study and an outline of the thesis.

Chapter 2: The Governance of WASH in Nigeria

2.0 Introduction

This chapter presents the contextual background to the research. The chapter begins with a description of the Nigerian national state and the governance structure of Nigeria. The chapter goes on to discuss the current state of water and sanitation in Nigeria and the challenge of making WASH services available. The regulatory policies governing WASH and the various institutional arrangements for WASH are examined. The chapter concludes with discussions on the concept of community WASH management (CWM) and community led total sanitation (CLTS).

2.1 Nigeria's Governance Structure

Nigeria is a federal republic, located in Western Africa. It shares boundaries with Cameroon and the Chad Republic in the East, the Benin Republic in the West and the Gulf of Guinea in the South (Alabi, 2009). Nigeria has the highest population in Africa, of over 160 million people, as of the last census which was held in 1991. The current projected population of Nigeria is 186,447,091(ibid.).

Nigeria operates a federal system of government with federal, state and Local Governments Areas (LGA). Nigeria has 36 states and 774 LGAs (Nyewusira and Kennet, 2012).Figure 2.1 shows the map of Nigeria. The thirty-six states are managed by state governors who serve for a term of four years (ibid). Each local government area is administered by a Local Government Council made up of a chairman who is the chief executive officer and other elected members who are referred to as councillors (Ogunna, 1996).



Figure 2.1: Map of Nigeria showing the 36 states (Source: IFS, 2012)

2.2 The Role of LGAs in WASH Service Delivery in Nigeria

For most international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) implementing WASH related projects in Nigeria, the unit of intervention is at the LGA level. This is primarily because of the nature of WASH programmes which is often targeted at rural communities (WaterAid, 2004). The LGAs are under the control of state governments from which they receive their monthly statutory allocations. Each LGA is subdivided into political wards. Each LGA is responsible for implementing WASH programmes although the bulk of the high-level design are done by the national and state governments (Nwankwoala, 2011). The current 1999 constitution invests the LGAs with several functions, including economic and welfare provisioning function (Okeke, 2014). In addition to the collection of taxes and fees, each LGA in Nigeria is responsible for building and managing latrines at schools, markets, and other public spaces. LGAs also have the role of licensing bicycles, canoes, wheelbarrows, carts and

other instruments with which water is collected by both individuals and local water vendors (Goni, 2006).

Another major tax the LGA administers is tenement rates on houses and buildings. Furthermore, LGAs are responsible for the construction and maintenance of local roads, streets, drains, parks and other open spaces. They are also responsible for the provision and maintenance of local public transport services, and the establishment and maintenance of cemeteries, burial grounds, and homes for the destitute(Abbas,2012;Abbas,2011).Their specific responsibilities for sanitation and hygiene are building public conveniences, drains, and maintenance of the refuse disposal system (Ajayi et al., 2003). The LGAs also regulate shops, kiosks, restaurants, and other places where food is sold to the public. The Constitution is, however, silent on the role LGAs are expected to play in terms of maintaining household sanitation (Nwankwoala, 2011).

2.3 The Traditional System of Government in Nigeria

Nigeria was under British colonial rule from 1900 to 1960, when it gained independence. Since gaining independence from British colonial rule, Nigeria has had four constitutional reviews. Based on the number of constitutions produced or developed, Nigeria is currently in her fourth republic and is using the fourth constitution which was developed in 1999 (Abubakar, 2016). One of the controversial and recurring subjects in Nigeria's different constitutional review and drafting exercises has been about the role the traditional system should play in governance. The 1979 constitution did not assign any role to traditional rulers in local government but rather stated that the traditional rulers should have advisory and ceremonial functions (Miles, 1993). Traditional rulers were far from being content with the advisory/ceremonial role assigned to them by the constitution (Goni, 2006). The degree of prominence in local decision making that traditional rulers could be given by the democratically elected local government councils, as guaranteed by the constitution, was the subject of debates during the Nigerian second republic from 1979 to 1983 (Graf,1986).

A later version of the constitution, the 1989 constitution, outlines the functions of the traditional councils at the local government level, while clearly stating that the traditional system does not hold any executive, legislative or judicial powers (ibid). One interesting aspect of the 1999 constitution is that it is completely silent about the role of traditional rulers in the governance

in Nigeria. Despite this clear structural arrangement, the traditional system continues to play a role beyond the advisory role assigned to it in the Constitution. Scholars have noted that in most modern African states, traditional systems of governance prove to be a force at various levels of the polity (Whitaker Jr., 2015).

There are several schools of thought in the literature concerning the relevance of the traditional rulers and institutions to the development and transformation of Nigeria. Ogunna (1996) perceive traditional rulers as playing very important roles in rural development in Nigeria. This is attributable to the close association between traditional rulers and inhabitants of rural communities. Other scholars, such as Ajulor, 2013, consider traditional rulers as custodians of local traditions which may sometimes be averse to modernisation. On this frame, the traditional system of government is perceived as a hindrance to development and transformation in Africa. Despite differences in opinion about whether their role in development is positive or more of a hindrance, what is undebatable is that traditional rulers serve as a point of entry and custodians for community-based projects, and are therefore vital to their success. Nevertheless, the lack of clarity about their constitutional role leaves many questions about their legitimacy, accountability and duties in development projects unanswered. In the next section, the state of water and sanitation in Nigeria is discussed, including its relevance to rural areas, decision making, and closeness to the people.

2.4 The State of Water and Sanitation in Nigeria

In Nigeria, about 109 million people lack access to improved sanitation facilities, while 66 million people lack access to improved water facilities (Osita et al., 2014). The 2013 Nigeria Demographic and Health Survey (NDHS) provides a breakdown of access to WASH services for rural and urban areas. The survey reports that 40% of rural households do not use toilets, compared to only 16% of urban households (IFS, 2014). In terms of access to improved water facilities, the survey reports that 76% of urban households in Nigeria have access to improved water facilities while 49% of rural households have access to improved water facilities[1].This demonstrates a disparity between access to WASH services in urban and rural areas. Akpabio and Udofia (2016) attribute this inequality in the provision of WASH services to the colonial legacy of segregated spatial planning. Segregated spatial planning during the colonial era led to the emergence of ‘dualistic partial structures’ (ibid: 3). These segregated settlements into

[1] Improved water facilities refer to water from sources such as reticulated hand dug wells, hand pump boreholes, motorised boreholes and urban water schemes.

urban and rural settlements depending on socio-economic factors and the availability of public service infrastructure, like WASH infrastructure.

This thesis focuses on the provision of WASH services to rural communities in Nigeria, which at present is unequal compared to urban settlements. While significant progress has been made towards achieving the recently concluded millennium development goal (MDG) of improving access to drinking water in Nigeria, achieving access to sanitation, especially in rural areas, remains elusive (Rose and Jakubowski, 2016). Fig 1 shows the toilet facilities used in Albarshi Primary School located in one of the case study communities in Jigawa state, Nigeria. The picture illustrates the poor condition of sanitation facilities in Nigeria.

Figure 2.2: Latrine in Albarshi primary school, Kaugama LGA

The human impact of poor access to WASH services has long been recognised in literature (Altaf, 1993; Tumwine et al. 2005). Empirical evidence shows that the availability of improved WASH services reduces the incidence of water-borne diseases (Adeyeye, 2011). Each year, 124,400 children under five years old die in Nigeria due to diarrhoeal diseases, representing 13% of the under five deaths (Osita et al.,2014). Poor access to WASH services also contributes to other diseases including respiratory infection, under-nutrition and some neglected tropical diseases (Ademiluyi and Odugbesan, 2008). In addition to the health benefits derived from improved access to WASH services, there are other wider social benefits of having improved access to sanitation. Gender scholars note the impact of poor WASH services on women and children. Several studies on the gender dimensions of WASH show that women and girls are saddled with the responsibility of fetching water and caring for sick people. They are also at most risk from violence and insecurity associated with a lack of sanitation facilities (Engel and Susilo, 2014).

2.4.1 Water and Sanitation Policies in Nigeria

Nigeria has over the years developed many water supply and sanitation policies to meet the challenge of providing water and sanitation services (Akpabio and Udofia, 2016). Table 2.1, below, shows the various water and sanitation policies developed in Nigeria from the colonial era to 2007. Efforts to improve water supply and sanitation services in Nigeria started during the colonial era (Ajayi et al., 2003; Akpabio and Udofia, 2016). During colonial times, the policy focus was on prevention of water pollution, and aimed at improving public health. This led to the Waterworks Act of 1915 and the Public Health act of 1917(Akpabio and Udofia, 2016).The early beneficiaries of this colonial attempt to improve water supply were mostly cities in South East and South West Nigeria, including Lagos, Calabar, Kano, Ibadan, Abeokuta, ijebu-Ode and Enugu (ibid).

Table 2.1: Selected water and sanitation policies in Nigeria (Source: adapted from Akpabio and Udofia, 2016)

Policy Title	Year	Key Provision
Waterworks Act	1915	Keeps water from being polluted by harmful matter
Minerals Act	1917	Vests the head of state with power to make regulations for the prevention of pollution of any water course
Public Health Act	1917	Prohibits the fouling of water and vitiation of the atmosphere by harmful human activities
River Basin Development Decree/Act	1976 1987 2004	Ensures a Nigerian programme for comprehensive and integrated water resources development
National Policy on Environment	1989	Focuses on water quality regulation and standard as well as pollution control
Water Resources Decree/Act	1993 2004	Puts Nigeria's water resources exclusively in the control of the Federal Government of Nigeria
Nigeria Federal Constitution	1999	Guarantees the right of access of every citizen to water
National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Policy	2000	Focuses specifically on rural water and sanitation through community participation (programme targets were to increase water coverage from 43% to 80% by 2010 and 100% by 2015.Sanitation coverage was to be increased from 32% to 60% by 2010 and 90% by 2015)
National Water Resources Management Policy	2003	Recognises water as an economic good, opts for integrated and demand driven services
National Water and Sanitation Policy	2004	Operates strictly in line with the demand-driven approach of the National Water Resources Policy
National Environmental Sanitation Policy	2005	Touches on a range of issues including solid waste, medical waste, excreta waste, sewage management, food sanitation and hygiene, sanitation in public places, adequate potable water supply, urban drainage management and hygiene education
National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy	2007	Attempts to address water and sanitation issues in clearly defined spatial units (urban areas, small towns and rural areas), placed high priority on the development of safe and adequate water supply and sanitation services as a key instrument for fighting poverty and accelerating socio-economic development
National Development Plan	2007	Targets subsidies for water and sanitation facilities planned for the poor, as one element of the seven-point development agenda of the Yar'Adua administration
Nigerian Standard for Drinking Water Quality	2007	Protects public health

After independence, successive governments have tried to widen access to water services to rural communities under various poverty alleviation and rural development programmes (Abubakar, 2016).

Nwankwoala, (2011) has noted that many of Nigeria's water and sanitation policies and programmes were influenced by international declarations. Prominent among these policies is the framework of the International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation decade from 1981 to 1990. Policies have however, seen poor implementation over successive years. This can be attributed to the poor implementation of WASH policies, to duplication of WASH institutions and the poor prioritising of WASH by governments (ibid). Ajulor (2013) heaps the blame on poor implementation on rampant corruption and weak leadership. Many scholars have noted that despite occasional noises, rural communities in Nigeria (which are the focus of this thesis), were not given any serious consideration in national water policies until the late 1970s (Belch et al., 2006; Akpabio and Udofia, 2016). Since the 1970s, rural water supply has received a lot of attention from various government though this is mostly at the rhetorical level.

The Nigeria's National Water Supply and Sanitation Policy was approved in 2000 and sets a target of 100% of the population of Nigeria having access to safe water by 2011. A further policy developed in 2004 to strengthen the focus on sanitation set a sanitation coverage target of 65% by 2010 and 100% by 2025. To date, neither of these water and sanitation targets have been met (Ademiluyi and Odugbesan, 2008). Table 2.2 shows the targets set for achieving total sanitation in Nigeria from 2007 to 2025.The target for the year 2015 was not achieved, as less than 60% of the Nigerian population had access to sanitation services.

Table 2.2: Sanitation targets for Nigeria 2007-2025 (Source: WaterAid, 2007)

Year	Target
2007	Improve coverage of sanitation to 60% of the population
2010	Extend sanitation coverage to 65% of the population
2015	Extend sanitation coverage to 80% of the population
2020	Extend sanitation coverage to 90% of the population
2025	Achieve and sustain 100% sanitation coverage

One striking fact is that neither the National Water Policy of 2000, which focused on the water sector, nor the 2004 supplementary document which was drafted to expand the scope to

sanitation and hygiene has been ratified. Moreover, it's instructive that neither document contains significant sections on implementation.

The lack of ratification has been linked to the lack of responsibility for ownership of the policy (Abubakar, 2016, 2011). Despite the fact that the 2000 document has not been ratified, it is recognised by donor agencies in Nigeria and forms the bedrock of policy decisions by international donor agencies.

The policy stemmed from the need to address the challenges related to improving water supply and sanitation in Nigeria through systematic development of the water and sanitation sector of the Nigerian economy. The water policy document outlined the 'policy objective' of the water and sanitation policy as:

> 'The centre piece of Nigeria's water supply and sanitation policy, shall be the provision of sufficient potable water and adequate sanitation to all Nigerians in an affordable and sustainable way through participatory investment by the three tiers of government, the private sector and the beneficiary' (FMWR,2004:12).

The policy offered sustainability and the participatory investment of the three tiers of government – federal, state and local – as the way in which WASH services could be made available.

The main objective of the policy was to increase service coverage of WASH services across Nigeria in an affordable way. The policy sought to increase national capacity in the operation and management of water supply and sanitation services. These objectives were expected to be achieved through effective monitoring of the performance of the sector, enacting backing legislation, regulation and standard setting for the sector, and an overall reform of the WASH sector to attain international standards.

> 'The policy advocates an integrated, bottom-up and demand driven management approach for Nigerian water resources, as well as the establishment of a sound national water resources law, and regulations for its implementation' (FMWR, 2004:12).

The policy estimated that an average of 25 billion naira (equivalent to 400 million USD) would be required annually to address the water and sanitation gap in the country. The policy divided responsibility and sources of funding into capital investment, operating costs and maintenance costs.

2.4.2 Responsibility for delivering water and sanitation services in Nigeria

The National Water and Sanitation Policy (2004) sets out responsibility for the provision of WASH services as being shared across the three tiers of government, Federal, State and Local. In setting out the roles of the three tiers of government, the draft national water policy states:

> 'In view of the magnitude of this amount [needed to provide water and sanitation services in Nigeria] and the fact that the provision of adequate water supply to the population is the most important ingredient of any human and economic development, it is expected that the three tiers of government shall accord the attainment of this objective the highest ranking in priority through allocating adequate and reasonable funds to enable raising the urban and rural coverage for water supply to a national average of 60 percent from the present 40%'(FMWR, 2004:3).

There are various legislative provisions, at federal and state level, mandating and authorising the three tiers of government to provide WASH services to the population. Decree 101, which became effective in 1993, vested 'rights and control of water in the federal government' (FMWR 2004:9). The Federal Ministry of Water Resources (FMWR) has primary responsibility for policy advice and formulation, data collection, monitoring and coordination at a national level. The FMWR is also responsible for mobilising funds at national and international level. They provide support, coordinate and regulate the efforts of other tiers of government, the private sector and the community water supply and sanitation committees, in the fulfilment of their responsibilities.

There are two main institutions operating at the federal level. Figure 2.3 shows the framework for the National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme. The figure shows that a combination of state and non-state actors deliver sanitation services in Nigeria. These include the River Basin Development Authorities (RBDAs) and the National Water Resources Institute (NWRI). The RBDAs are backed by the 1986 RBDA Act. There are 11 RBDAs in Nigeria, responsible for the establishment and supply of bulk water. They control Nigeria's water reservoirs and are responsible for the sale of water to farmers for irrigation purposes. The NWRI is a knowledge producing parastatal organisation under the FMWR. It was established based on Act No.3 in 1985. Based on this enabling act, the NWRI is responsible for the



Figure 2.3: Framework for the National Rural Water Supply and Sanitation Programme in Nigeria (Source: adapted from Nwankwoala, 2011)

Promotion and development of training programmes in water resource management, and has a mandate of advising the government on water resource training needs and priorities.

According to the draft National Water Policy, state governments, mainly through the state water boards and rural water supply and sanitation agencies, are responsible for supplying potable water to those dwelling in the respective states. Activities for the supply of public water include the 'establishment, operation, quality control and maintenance of water supply schemes' (National Water policy, 2000: 10). The state water agencies are expected to provide information on all water supply activities to the FMWR, including water supply sources, water quality and volume of water pumped (ibid:13). State governments are responsible for providing technical support to LGAs in the fulfilment of their responsibilities.

The Nigerian draft National Water Policy places the responsibility for providing water to rural areas on the LGAs. 'Local governments shall be responsible for establishment, operation and

maintenance of rural water supply schemes, in conjunction with the benefiting communities. This shall be through the establishment of a unit that shall be technically equipped, adequately funded and manned (National Water policy, 2000:10). 'The LGA is expected to make records of its operational activities available to the state supervising agency' (ibid: 14). A main strategy for achieving the policy objectives of the National Water and Sanitation Policy is the privatisation of water supply and waste water services. This greater private participation is in order to mobilise resources which allow lasting development of the water supply sector. The privatisation of water supply services is, however, to be carried out with 'adequate protection of the poor' (ibid: 7).The interests of consumers and service providers are to be protected through the creation of laws to govern the participation of the private sector (Ibid.).

The policy sets out the importance of ensuring the participation of non-state actors which include the private sector (commercial banks and consultants), NGOs and communities in the WASH sector. The policy states the major role of NGOs as that of providing technical expertise and additional finance.

> 'The private sector (operators, commercial banks, and consultants), communities, as well as NGOs have a critical role to play in the planning, design, financing, implementation and operation of water supply and sanitation systems. Their potential for additional finance and technical expertise should be tapped' (FMWR, 2004:9).

The policy does not provide any further details of how the participation of the private sector would take place. It does however set out a role for the private sector (made up of operators, commercial banks and consultants). The private sector is expected to play a leading role in the operation and maintenance of water facilities, instead of the government being responsible for construction and maintenance of WASH facilities (FMWR, 2004).

To ensure that the private sector takes responsibility for maintaining WASH facilities, the government would train local private tradesmen to be able to maintain rural water supply facilities. Similarly, for small town water supply, operations and maintenance would be funded through private operators (ibid.). In addition to the financing responsibility of the three tiers of government and the community, the policy states the need to supplement the available national resources with 'external grant assistance' (National Water Policy, 2000:12), in the form of loans and grant assistance channelled through the Federal Ministry of Water Resources.

The only aspect of the year 2000 policy that mentions NGOs specifically is with respect to the funding of peri-urban water schemes. Peri-urban areas are urban slums the urban poor live. The

policy does not make a distinction between national and international NGOs, but states that where federal and state governments have provided basic water supply facilities in peri-urban areas, NGOs will be expected to 'mobilise the benefitting communities in providing distribution networks and collecting water fees for operation and maintenance of the systems' (National Water Policy, 2000:12).

2.4.3 The Challenges of Providing Access to Water and Sanitation Services in Nigeria

A number of studies have highlighted the factors responsible for the poor delivery of WASH services in Nigeria. According to Olajuyigbe (2016), the WASH sector is underfunded in terms of capital requirements. He claims further that the WASH sector is not given sufficient priority, compared to other sectors such as education and health, despite its importance and relevance to the sustenance of other sectors. U-Dominic et al., (2014) attribute the failure of the government to invest money in the water and sanitation sector to competing demand from other sectors. Where the government do invest money in WASH services, the focus is on providing physical infrastructure such as hand pumps, boreholes and irrigation schemes. Little money is committed to building the capacity of personnel, community mobilisation or the promotion of hygiene (Alabi, 2009).This is referred to as the 'software' component of WASH (U-Dominic, 2014:5). Closely related to the lack of investment in the WASH sector is the improper use of funds budgeted for the provision of WASH services. WaterAid (2015) reports empirically that most funds allocated to the sector are underutilised.

A second reason for the poor state of the WASH sector is poor policy and the institutional environment. The country has a draft National Water and Sanitation Policy as earlier discussed, but its implementation has been slow and adherence to the policy limited (Akpabio and Udofia, 2016). The policy is still in draft form 16 years after it was developed and has not been passed into law. Many states in Nigeria are yet to adopt the National Water Policy. While areas like water supply have clear institutional frameworks, other WASH areas like sanitation and hygiene are not the direct responsibility of any agency (Nwankwoala, 2011; WaterAid 2015).

The third reason is the poor coordination of donor activities. There are several donor organisations in Nigeria working in the WASH sector without proper coordination of their interventions. This has led to duplication of interventions, competition for the limited human resources available and a consequent waste of resources and funds (Akpabio and Udofia, 2016). The National Planning Commission (NPC) is responsible for admitting international

development agencies into the country for various development assistance projects. The NPC regulates INGO operations in Nigeria. The NPC, in carrying out this function, is guided by the 2008 Official Development Assistance Policy. The Official Development Assistance Policy was developed as a response to the challenges of coordinating donor funds in Nigeria. The policy identified the 'inadequate involvement of Nigerians, high cost of technical assistance, donor-driven approach to aid delivery, proliferation of aid agencies, uneven spread of donors' activities, institutional weaknesses, inadequate coordination and problems of counterpart funding', as major challenges that characterised the sector (Official Development Assistance Policy, 2008:3).

The fourth challenge facing the water and sanitation sector in Nigeria, which relates to the objectives of this thesis, is the lack of sustainability of WASH infrastructure. Several pieces of literatures document the reasons for the lack of sustainability in the Nigerian WASH sector. Ademiluyi and Odugbesan (2008) say that vandalism of WASH facilities in communities has been reported as a major factor hampering the sustainability of WASH services. Lack of sustainability is also attributed to the absence of community management systems which is closely related to the lack of ownership of facilities (Marcus, 2007).

A fifth factor responsible for the poor state of WASH at local government level in Nigeria is the lack of representation by elected officials at LGA level. The LGA system of governance has elected councillors from various communities within the LGA serving as the legislative arm of government, vested with the responsibility of representing communities. The representation is, however, weak (WaterAid, 2015). A 2009 internal evaluation of WaterAid activities in Nigeria showed that a lack of autonomy, budget limitations and poor capacity were the main factors limiting the performance of LGAs in the WASH sector.

2.5 The Concept of Community WASH Management (CWM)

Literature on WASH attributes the inability to achieve and sustain WASH services to the failure of community participation (Nwankwoala, 2011). Olajuyigbe (2016:92) defines community management as a 'conceptual framework within which the improvement in rural water supply is achieved by involving the community concerned in the whole process. This model enables people to take control of the operation and administration of their own rural water supply (RWS) system completely and indefinitely'.

Community WASH management is a vehicle through which community participation can be achieved (Troeger et al., 2015; Terry et al., 2015).CWM originated in the 1980s which is

referred to as the International Decade for Drinking Water and Sanitation (IFS, 2012).This decade was characterised by a proliferation of NGO programmes that bypassed state structures and focussed instead on delivering WASH services through community and grassroots organisations (U-Dominic, 2014).During this period, responsibility for operations and maintenance of WASH facilities was placed in the hands of communities or project recipients (ibid.).

Nwankwoala's (2011) study of localising strategies for achieving rural water and sanitation in Nigeria, highlighted the key features of community management as legal ownership and control of services by communities, the ability of communities to make decisions on the kind of services required and where such services should be sited, and a contribution of cash between 5 and 10% of the total cost of facilities. Other necessary features include setting up a committee that is responsible for managing the WASH facility, accepting responsibility for all aspects of operations and maintenance of the WASH facility and willingness to undertake self-help action to ensure the effective management of the WASH facility. Thus, community WASH management is about communities participating in all aspects of the provision of WASH services.

In Nigeria, the concept of community WASH management has received lots of attention from INGOs implementing WASH services. In 2013, a manual published by UNICEF entitled 'The expanded guideline for Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Committee (WASHCOM) formation and training on community WASH management', attempted is to unify the various approaches to community WASH management in Nigeria. The document sets out guidelines for implementing WASH programmes in communities in Nigeria. This document forms the basis for the analysis of CWM in this thesis. The primary vehicle through which WASH programmes are implemented at community level in Nigeria is through the Water Sanitation and Hygiene Committees (WASHCOMs) (UNICEF, 2016:17).

There are several benefits to the practice of CWM as documented in literature. The central benefit is the sustainability of WASH services provided to the community. Ademiluyi and Odugbesan (2008) suggest that sustainability cannot be realised in WASH without community participation. Similarly, Nwankwoala (2011) asserts that WASH should be managed at the lowest level in order to take local conditions into account. This can guarantee sustainability of WASH services.

CWM is based on the principles of empowerment, efficiency and sustainability (Lockwood, 2004). It offers a lens through which the key concepts of participation, empowerment, decentralisation and responsibility, which form the key focus of this thesis, can be examined. In the next section, the concept of community led total sanitation (CLTS), an approach to achieving total sanitation in rural communities based on the principle of CWM, is discussed.

2.5.1 The Community Led Total Sanitation (CLTS) Approach to Community WASH Management

There are many approaches to implementing sanitation projects in the developing world. The main approach used by INGOs for programmes aimed at promoting the uptake of sanitation in the developing world is CLTS (Sah and Negussie, 2009). CLTS started in Bangladesh in 2000, when it was introduced by Kamal Kar, a development consultant working with NGOs. Over the years, CLTS has been adopted as the method of choice for promoting sanitation in rural communities in the developing world by local NGOs, INGOs and governments (Engel and Susilo, 2014). CLTS is rooted in the principles of participatory development and behaviour change (Bardosh, 2015).

CLTS is an approach to promoting sanitation that encourages self-examination of existing defecation patterns and threats. Community self-analysis is expected to promote local solutions to reduce, and eventually eliminate, the practice of open defecation (OD), thereby becoming open defecation free (ODF) (Engel and Susilo, 2014).

In a CLTS process, trained facilitators encourage communities to carry out their own appraisal and analysis of community sanitation. This is intended to show members of community how the practice of open defecation means they are likely to be ingesting one another's faeces (Bardosh, 2015). This is referred to as the 'triggering' process. The resulting disgust and desire for self-respect induces them to stop OD and build latrines without infrastructural incentives from government or INGOs. CLTS doesn't prescribe standards or designs for improved sanitation but leave these to local improvisation (ibid.).Figure 2.4 shows a summary of the CLTS implementation process. CLTS also does not emphasise latrine construction, but focuses on encouraging communities and individuals to understand the health risks of open defecation. Disgust and shame are used as 'triggers' to promote response and action from individuals and the community at large (IFS, 2014).



Figure 2.4: The CLTS Process (Shayamal, Kashem and Rafi, 2008) ***Source: Adeyeye, 2011***

In Nigeria, CLTS was piloted between 2004 and 2007.The first organisations that were involved in piloting CLTS in Nigeria were a combination of state and non-state actors. The state actors were the state and local governments, while the non-state actors included UNICEF, WaterAid and the National Task Group on Sanitation (NTGS) (UNICEF, 2016). CLTS is currently implemented in all 36 states of Nigeria and the Federal Capital Territory. Led by

UNICEF Nigeria, a stakeholder team comprising of CLTS practitioners, have produced a manual to train the trainers, which aims to standardise and guide the implementation of CLTS in Nigeria. The manual emphasises that communities are at the centre of the CLTS approach:

> 'CLTS focuses on the behavioural change needed to ensure real and sustainable improvements-investing in community mobilisation instead of hardware, and shifting the focus from latrine construction for individual households to the creation of 'open defecation-free' communities. By raising awareness that as long as even a minority continues to defecate in the open everyone is at risk of disease, CLTS triggers the community's desire for change, propels them into action and encourages innovation, mutual support and appropriate local solutions, thus leading to greater ownership and sustainability' (UNICEF, 2016:2).

CLTS implementation in Nigeria is hampered by a lack of sustainability, particularly related to behaviour change. There is always a tendency for households to revert to open defecation, making communities unable to maintain their ODF status. Many households slip back to open defecation once latrines fill and require replacement or emptying (Chambers, 2009; WaterAid, 2009).There is also the challenge of accessing vulnerable households and minority groups (Adeyeye, 2011). Literature has criticised the concept of CLTS for issues related to the quality of latrine construction, the potential for contamination of soil and water due to inadequately designed CLTS approaches, and shaming those who continue to defecate in the open (IFS, 2012; Adeyeye,2011). Reports from a monitoring exercise conducted by the National Task Group on Sanitation NTGS indicate a large number of unsatisfactory results and outputs from implementing the CLTS approach in Nigeria. Over 1,500 communities are reported to have been triggered, but less than 500 are ODF (WaterAid, 2009).Despite these challenges, CLTS remains the method of choice for INGO intervention in rural sanitation.

2.6 Conclusion

This chapter positions community WASH management within the context of the governance of WASH in Nigeria. The Nigerian national state is responsible for the delivery of WASH services. The national government has decentralised delivery and is working to deliver WASH services through various centres at national, state and local government level. This is based on the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria which divides responsibility between the three tiers of government. The failure of the State to deliver WASH services has however led to the activity of many INGOs in the sector. In addition to directly implementing WASH

projects, INGOs are also responsible for encouraging and promoting government activity and investment in the sector. WaterAid which is used as a case study for this thesis is an INGOs working in the WASH sector in Nigeria.

In keeping with the principles of participatory development, INGOs use community WASH management as their main strategy for delivery of WASH services. The rationale for the use of CWM is related to the overall sustainability of WASH services. The next chapter discusses how power is exercised within neo-liberalism using Foucault's notion of governmentality. Foucault's analysis of power requires a shift in concentration from the centre and national institutions such as the state. This is not because it enables the powerless to speak and be heard, but because those macro spheres of authority are not necessarily the only focal points of power. This, as I further explain, makes it apt for analysis of CWM (Kothari, 2001).

Chapter 3: Participation as a Technology of Governance

3.0 Introduction

This chapter examines the concept of participatory development and empowerment from the governmentality perspective with a specific focus on community development literature. It also examines debates surrounding the rationality for the employment of participation as a form of governance. The chapter goes on to explore the concept of the state in participatory development under an advanced liberal technology of government and concludes by exploring the relationship between various concepts of power and participatory development.

3.1 The Meaning of Participation

Much literature on participation sees the term 'participation' as ambiguous and lacking conceptual clarity (Bayley and French, 2007; Cohen et al., 2011; White, 2011). Participation exhibits a 'process product ambiguity'; it refers to a process on one hand and the outcome of that process on the other (Dieko and Benno, 1982; White, 2011). The normative definition of participation conceptualises it as a process that brings together diverse stakeholders to define critical issues and develop common goals and objectives. A key assumption is that participation leads to an increase in representation which creates empowerment, benefits for all and poverty reduction (Gillespie, 2012).

The theorising of participatory approaches to means/ends classification distinguishes between efficiency arguments (participation as a tool for achieving better project outcomes) and equity and empowerment arguments (participation as a process that enhances the capacity of individuals to improve or change their lives) (Cleaver, 2001).Claims for participation as a means focus on the ability of participation to deliver more effective development because of its potential ability to lead to better project execution. Participation as an end in itself however, focuses on participation delivering empowerment by giving project recipients control over the development process. It also focuses on transforming consciousness leading recipients to challenge the causes of their underdevelopment (Cooke, 2011).

For Arnstein (1966:216), participation is about the redistribution of power. Referring to citizen participation, she defines participation as the redistribution of power that enables the 'have not' citizens, 'presently excluded from the political and economic processes, to be deliberately included in the future by getting involved in decision making' (Arnstein 1966:216). This definition categorises the citizens in a society into two broad homogeneous categories of

'haves' and 'have nots', and emphasises the redistribution of power between the two categories. It seems however to place the responsibility for redistributing power in the hands of the regulating authority. Similarly, Galjart (1981 cited by Servaes, 1984) in studying participation within organisations, emphasises participation as the forms of upward exertions of power by subordinates in organisations as are perceived to be legitimate by themselves and their superiors. Galjart (ibid.) emphasises the upward exertion of power supporting the previous definition by Arnstein. The exertion of power should, however, be legitimate for both the subordinates and their superiors. Similarly, Dieko and Berno (1982) define what they called 'real participation' as the means through which a target group takes part in decision making, directly or indirectly, in all aspects of project implementation. Their use of the word 'real' in qualifying participation, presupposes a fake or unreal participation which is not identified in the definition. Taking part in decision making is expected to enable project beneficiaries to exercise voice, which leads to the redistribution of power and control of resources (White, 2011).

Ghai (1982), in defining participation, emphasises 'an organised effort' in which those 'previously excluded' from control over resources increase control. His definition limits participation to a formal and organised process involving a group or formal group action against a formal regulatory institution. It does not seem to accommodate individual action or informal institutions. It does however, add questions of exclusion to the debate on participation.

Advocates of participation as a process, refer to activities that enable recipients or beneficiaries of a scheme, project or initiative to take part in implementations (Dieko and Benno, 1982). These activities could be planning processes, or could occur at or within the planning stage of the project (White, 2011). Similarly, the World Bank (1994 cited by Cleaver, 2001) defines participation as a process through which stakeholders' influence and share control over development initiatives, decisions and resources that affect their lives. The definition from the World Bank introduces the word 'stakeholders' into the participation discourse. Kamruzzaman (2013) observes that this definition ignores inequalities which affects the ability of some stakeholders and conceals the hierarchical and hegemonic relationships among stakeholders. Cohen and Uphoff (2011), in defining community participation as a process, perceives participation as a measure of how much is being done by the people for themselves, with a view to taking control over their own lives and environment in a self-reliant effort. This definition leans towards self-action and the empowerment of the most disadvantaged people.

Participation here is seen as a measure of how much self-initiative individuals are able to exert as opposed to external help. It does not however, describe the nature of empowerment.

These definitions of participation described in the preceding paragraphs place redistributing power (or increasing control) through an organised process, at the heart of many descriptions of the term. This is to be achieved through more involvement in decision making. The definitions also seem to advocate more involvement of beneficiaries, which brands 'more participation' as desirable. Beneficiaries are framed as homogeneously 'disadvantaged' and needing a change in the balance of power. This change is to be provided by 'change agents'. Project beneficiaries and organised groups are expected, under these definitions, to play an active part (become active citizens in Foucauldian terms) in taking control of already established initiatives or projects. Following Foucault, the discourse of participation may be viewed less as a singular coherent set of ideas or prescriptions, than a configuration of strategies and practices on constantly shifting ground. They may be at one time oppositional and at another conducive to the interventions of particular kinds of agents, whether states or supra-national institutions (Cornwall, 2001).

3.2 Typologies of Participation

Cohen et al. (2011) argue that asking what participation is maybe the wrong question, since it implies that participation is a single phenomenon. They instead advocate a focus on accommodating specific but multiple activities and outcomes, under the broad term participation, that can be meaningfully understood. This section discusses various typologies of participation. The typologies describe a series of activities that fall within the term participation, and this examination allows for a better description of participation.

3.2.1 Levels of public Participation (Sherry Arnstein, 1969)

Sherry Arnstein (1969) was perhaps the first to propose a model of the various types or levels of public participation. Her model is based on the town planning processes in America.



Figure 3.1: A ladder of citizen participation: Source: Arnstein, 1969

Arnstein's model, also called the ladder of citizen participation, consists of levels of participation based on the level of citizen power. Her emphasis is on disadvantaged citizens whom she refers to as the 'have nots' (Arnstein 1969:216). The ladder from the bottom upwards shows increasing levels of citizen power. The bottom rungs of the ladder are (1) manipulation and (2) therapy. These two rungs describe what she refers to as 'non-participation', sometimes disguised as 'genuine participation'. The central objective behind these rungs is to enable power holders or regulating authorities to push their objectives, which she refers to as 'educating' or 'curing' people. The lower rungs of the ladder represent degrees of non-participation in as much as they represent ways that service users might be influenced by service providers to affect change, to fit a required mould or to conform to the status quo. These levels are considered manipulative (McKay and Garratt, 2013).

Rungs (3) informing and (4) consultation, are levels of 'tokenism', that allow the have-nots to hear and to have a voice. When they are proffered by power holders as the total extent of participation, citizens may indeed hear and be heard, but under these conditions they lack the power to insure that their views are heeded by the powerful. When participation is restricted to these levels, there is no follow-through, no 'muscle', hence no assurance of changing the status

quo. Rung (5) placation, is simply a higher level tokenism, because the ground rules allow the have-nots to advice, but the power holders retain the right to decide (Arnstein, 1969).Further up the ladder are levels of citizen power with increasing degrees of decision-making. Level (6) partnership, enables them to negotiate and engage in trade-offs with traditional power holders. At the topmost rungs, (7) delegated power and (8) citizen control, have-not citizens obtain the majority of decision-making seats, or full managerial power (ibid.).

Arnstein recognises certain limitations of her model. Firstly, the ladder depicts powerless and powerful citizens in order to highlight the fundamental divisions between them. In reality, neither the have-nots nor the power holders are homogeneous. Each group encompasses a host of divergent points, competing vested interests and splintered sub groups. Arnstein states that her justification for using such simplistic abstractions is that in most cases the have-nots really do perceive the powerful as a monolithic 'system', and power holders actually do view the have-nots as a sea of 'those people', with little comprehension of the class and caste differences among them.

Secondly, Arnstein observes that her typology does not include an analysis of the most significant roadblocks to achieving genuine levels of participation. These roadblocks may lie on the side of the power holders and also on the side of the have nots. On the power holders' side, they include issues like resistance to power redistribution. On the have-nots' side, they include inadequacies of the poor community's political socioeconomic infrastructure and knowledge-base. Lastly, the eight separate rungs on the ladder may not exist in the real world. There might be many more rungs with fewer distinctions among them, or some of the characteristics used to illustrate each of the eight types might be applicable to other rungs (Arnstein, 1969). Arnstein, in referring to haves and have nots, conceptualises power as being 'zero sum', and transferable from one level to another.

McKay and Garratt (2013), in discussing this typology of participation, note that Arnstein's ladder shows a form of disciplinary power. While information is provided to project beneficiaries, mechanisms may be put in place to define what counts as participation. Disciplinary power works through the administrative rule set to provide boundaries, expectations and limits for project beneficiaries. This may allow power to function automatically (ibid).

3.2.2 Combining Different Typologies of Participation

Table 3.1: Typologies of Participation:Green et al,2003

Increasing levels of Involvement

Community					Risk Management	Company
Amstein (1969)	Dorcey et. al (1994)	Wilcox (1994)	Pretty & Shah (1997)	UNDP (1997)	Fischoff (1998)	
Citizen Control	Ongoing Involvement	Supporting	Self Mobilisation	Self Management	All of below	Decisional
				Partnership	All we have to do is make them partners	
Delegated Power	Seek Consensus		Interactive participation			
		Acting together		Risk-sharing	All we have to do is treat them nice	
Partnership	Test ideas, seek advice		Functional participation			Consultative
Placation	Define issues			Decision making	All we have to do is show them it's a good deal for them	
		Deciding together				
Consultation	Consult on reactions		Participation by consultation	Consensus building	All we have to do is show them that they've accepted similar rules in the post	
Informing	Gather info perspectives	Consultation	Participation by information giving			Informative
				Consultation	All we have to do is explain what we mean by the number	
Therapy	Educate	Information	Passive participation	Information	All we have to do is tell them the number	
Manipulation	Inform			Manipulation	All we have to do is get the number right	

Green and Hunton-clarke (2003) summarise typologies of participation by compiling models from several authors. The table above depicts various levels of participation, with the arrow depicting increasing levels of participation. The base level has various names in the respective models, but can be summarised as a manipulative form of participation, which Fischoff (1998) as cited in Green and Hunton-clarke (2003) calls 'getting the numbers right'. The summary classifies the phases of participation into informative, consultative and decisional phases. The highest level of participation for all the typologies supports self-action or initiative and self-management by project recipients.

All the typologies of participation seem to have a level, where participants, stakeholders or project recipients are involved in decision making and two-way communication is taking place, as the desired or ultimate goal in a participatory process. This raises a pertinent question: Would participation be said to have occurred if it stops at the initial level of typologies or if the process does not eventually lead to stakeholders taking part in the decision making process?

There are different models and typologies of participation that have been designed in literature, following Arnstein. Most of these typologies have been developed with a nuanced or limited concept of power. Few studies have examined typologies in the light of other understandings of power.

A recurring problem with the models described above from a facouldian perspective is that they make the uptake of help and support a conditional element of effective partnership. Such partnerships may be based on administrative rules. The rules provide a basis for which normalising judgements are made (McKay and Garratt, 2013). Any deviation from such a norm is considered unacceptable. This may limit the ability of project beneficiaries to take initiative, and questions the ability of project beneficiaries to attain the highest level of involvement or self-management.

3.3 Benefits of Participation

The literature on participation identifies several reasons why participation should be embedded in development and planning (Cornwall, 2011). First is a general consideration of the effect of participation, to assess what arrangements most likely contribute to human happiness and the 'good life'. This was made by Aristotle in his analysis of the Greek city. In his view, participation in the affairs of the state as a citizen is essential to the development and fulfilment of the human personality. Aristotle's view of participation is linked to political participation

which, during his lifetime, involved voting, holding office, attending public meetings, paying taxes and defending the state (Cohen et al., 2011). Ghai,(1988), thinking along the same lines as Aristotle, emphasise the need for democratic order in society where an individual makes justified choices himself, in such a way that his own interests, as well as the interests of his group, are equally served.

Reed (2008) categorises arguments for the benefits of stakeholder participation in decision making in literature into two broad categories; the normative, which focuses on the benefits for democratic society, citizenship and equity; and the pragmatic argument which focuses on the quality and durability of environmental decisions that are made through engagement with stakeholders. The normative claims for participation focus on the supposed ability of stakeholder participation to promote active citizenship, democratisation and empowerment by reducing the likelihood of marginalisation of the disadvantaged, by giving them a voice. (Chambers 1997; Reed, 2008; Videira et al., 2003). The public trust decisions more if the processes leading to them are perceived to be transparent and holistic, taking conflicting views into account and accounting for a diversity of values.

For pragmatic claims, it is argued that participation enables interventions and technologies to be better adapted to local conditions, thereby enhancing the rate of adoption and diffusion among target groups and increasing the capacity of projects and interventions to meet local needs (Reed, 2008).

Another pragmatic claim for participation is the argument that participation can improve the quality of decisions and the efficiency and effectiveness of investment because it brings more minds to bear on issues (Chambers, 1997). The inputs from stakeholders can also widen and enrich thinking due to having more complete information (Reed 2008; Videira et al., 2003). More debate during participatory processes may lead to greater clarity and allow the decision making process to be visible, structured and auditable, allowing for anticipation of unexpected negative outcomes (Bayley and French, 2008). Participation creates a sense of ownership over processes and outcomes which may lead to long term support and active implementation of decisions (Kamruzzaman, 2013). The role of participatory processes in decision making is becoming more and more important as managers seek to shift towards integrated deliberative decision making processes arising with the broad and inclusive participation of the public and stakeholders (Beierle and Cayford, 2002).It is argued that participation transforms adversarial

relationships and enables stakeholders to work together by establishing common ground and an appreciation of the legitimacy of each other's views (Kamruzzaman, 2013; Reed, 2008).

3.4 Limitations of Participation

The criticisms of participation in the literature are divided into two broad categories, majorly centred on two issues which are connected to interest based politics and relations of social power (Few et al., 2011).The first category focuses on the technical limitations of participatory approaches (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). This is linked to various modes of engagement and the extent to which they constitute active participation (Few et al., 2011; Cleaver, 2001). Most critics focus on participatory rural appraisal, based on the works of Robert Chambers in the late 1970s and 1980s. The thinking here is that participatory methods accounts for the failure of participatory development to deliver on its promises. Within this framework, it is assumed that refining or further perfecting participatory tools leads to the attainment of the goals of participation (Cornwall and Pratt, 2003). Such an approach to participation fails to address issues of power, control and information. It also provides an inadequate framework for developing a critical understanding of the deeper determinants of technical and social change (Mosse, 1994). To effectively understand the limitations of participation, a shift from critiquing the methodologies of participation to a deeper understanding of the conceptual framework and politics of participation is required (Cleaver 2011; Wesselink et al., 2011).

The second category of critics pay attention to the theoretical, political and conceptual limitations of participation mentioned. These critics focus primarily on definitional differences, debates over the objectives of participation (whether it is a means or an end) and the applicability and appropriateness of the techniques and tools used (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

An examination of participation through a governmentality lens, which is the focus of this thesis, raises other criticisms of participation. Critics of participation from a governmentality perspective focus on how the discourses and practice of participation govern the possibility of action within a given project or intervention (Kothari 2001; Nelson and Wright, 1995; Sletto and Nygren, 2016; Blakeley, 2010; McKay and Garrat, 2013; Rosol, 2015). Participatory processes produce a new subject, the 'participant'. The participatory subject is expected to learn to constitute himself as equal to his peers and as part of a collective (Gillepsie, 2012). He is also expected to be a self-policing agent involved and engaged in a rolling process of critical self-analysis (Engel and Susilo, 2014). By participating, people establish that they require intervention and become implicated in normalising the discourses and practices of

participation. Participation's claim to inclusivity may act to exclude and de-legitimise those who refuse to participate (McKay and Garrat, 2013). Through participation people are drawn into becoming compliant subjects of the broader project of modernisation, making empowerment through participation a form of subjugation (Kesby, 2005; Gillepsie, 2012).

Another line of criticism against participation which is aligned to a governmentality perspective is the idea that participation depoliticises development. Firstly, participation homogenises communities, ignoring issues of gender, socio-economic equalities and other wider differences that may exist within communities (Marcus, 2007; Williams, 2004). Secondly, participatory development, emphasises the 'local' as the sight of empowerment (Cohen, 2011). In doing so, participation or participatory development ignores other wider relationships that may affect decisions happening at the local level (Kothari, 2001; Williams, 2004). Transformation in communities is assumed to be achieved when beneficiaries of development projects or 'subjects of development' are accorded participatory roles in each stage of the development intervention (ibid.). The current focus on new forms of participation lies in examining the way poor people exercise voice and good governance (Gaventa, 2002).

3.5 Participatory Development and Neoliberalism

3.5.1 Empowerment as an advanced liberal technology of citizenship

Political relationships that entail empowerment, according to Dean (2010), have many features. Firstly, they are established based on a definite form of expertise which is based on a definite knowledge of the poor and of the means of getting the poor to participate in programmes that offer solutions to their problems. Secondly, such relationships are initiated by one party, in our case the development partner, and the 'poor' are invited to participate within such programmes of empowerment. Inherent to the concept of empowerment is the underlying assumption of self-management or government. Empowerment, according to Cruikshank, (1999) has a political strategy: to act upon others by getting them to act in their own interest.

There are many pragmatic concerns in the literature about how programmes of empowerment are expected to lead to changes in the relationships of power among project beneficiaries, and also between project beneficiaries and project implementers (Eyben et al., 2006). First is the concern that within the operations of development programmes, a lot of emphasis is placed on uncovering power relations among the beneficiaries of the project, but the marginalised

recipients are unable to investigate or explore power relationships inherent to the development process itself (Williams, 2004; Eyben et al., 2006). Exploring this further, Kothari (2001) suggests that participatory development programmes emphasising social inclusion draw previously marginalised individuals and groups into the development process, but do so in ways that bind them more tightly to structures of power that they are then not able to question. Other literature focuses on pragmatic issues that hinder the promise of empowerment from being realised (Eyben et al., 2006). These include the technical nature of certain projects which makes it impossible for beneficiaries to participate (Cornwall, 2002). Much literature has also raised questions about what people are empowered for (Kammruzzaman, 2013; Henkel and Stirrat, 2001). A key argument is that participatory approaches shape individual identities, thereby 'empowering' participants to take part in the modern sector of developing societies. Individuals thus become subjects, instead of becoming empowered (Batiwala, 2010). Another pragmatic issue relates to the absence of conflict in empowerment programmes. Empowerment, if genuine, needs to reflect conflict since it involves changes in power relationships (White, 2011). Critics of the supposed lack of conflict in programmes of empowerment often draw conceptual inspiration from the works of Brazilian educator Paulo Freire. In his book, *'Pedagogy of the oppressed'* published in English in 1970, based on his experience of teaching Brazilian adults to read and write, Freire asserts that there cannot be genuine empowerment without a revolution and also that the oppressed have to assert their own agency and create their own empowerment (Freire, 1970). This implies that 'empowerment' cannot be brought about on behalf of a project recipient. Genuine empowerment can only be initiated and created by the project recipient himself. Another concern reflected in the literature is the motive of participatory development practitioners in promoting empowerment (Kapoor, 2005; Cleaver, 2001). The drive for project efficiency may lead to a trade-off with the goal of empowerment, as projects seek efficiency over the desire to create sustainable change. When this happens, the objective of empowerment becomes mere rhetoric.

3.5.2 International NGOS and the Promise of Empowerment

Programmes of empowerment in Third World countries like Nigeria are implemented by INGOs. A growing amount of literature questions the 'supposed' claims of INGOs to deliver empowerment programmes. Blair (1997) argues that INGOs create institutional arenas in which they behave like market operators, treating their beneficiaries as clients and thereby weakening the 'social contract' between state and citizens. Secondly, there is also a perception of the transnational community of development NGOs as a neo-imperialist project in which

they claim to have a specialist knowledge of how Third World countries should be managed (Hope, 2015). Thirdly, relationships forged with local partners by Northern NGOs are not based on equity and tend to disempower Southern NGOs (Batiwala, 2010). The fourth issue is the dependence of funding on official sources. The fifth is the formal reporting processes which kill downward accountability (Cleaver, 2001).

The desire of organisations for self-preservation challenges the claims of empowerment through participation. The concept of empowerment through participation promotes the idea of organisations putting themselves out of work as they empower communities and local people to take initiatives for themselves (Mohan, 2001). He stated further that the concept of 'working yourself out of work' is contrary to the aims and objectives of government personnel and organisations. The primary objective of a social institution is its own sustenance, perpetuation and expansion. The drive for self-preservation necessitates the continued existence of the larger system of which it is a part, which it serves and from which it benefits. He concludes that while existing structures and interests constitute a substantial impediment to participatory processes, sustainable change can occur only through genuine participation, which the powerful are not willing to grant. What remains is a superficial structuring of programmes supposedly in the name of participation, which do not lead to true empowerment.

Closely related to the idea of self-preservation is the drive for accountability. Accountability to funding agencies by implementing NGOs necessitates that those NGOs keep a close watch on how project funds are disbursed. Many NGOs, in trying to achieve this, set up stringent auditing and reporting mechanisms. The fear that resources entrusted directly to the control of beneficiaries have to be accounted for, makes such organisations limit the transfer of power to project beneficiaries (Mohan, 2001).

Even in cases where NGOs are willing to loosen their control, give voice to, and empower stakeholders, the process may not be as simple as it appears. There may be problems of public apathy, social disincentives to collective action and time costs involved in participation, all of which may limit public motivation to take part (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). Factors such as self-confidence and respect for authority may shape people's readiness to participate. Low levels of participation may also be linked with organisation-stakeholder relations, negative experiences of past programmes, and knowledge or communication gaps (Few et al., 2011).

3.5.3 The Concept of Neoliberalism as a Form of Governmentality

Larner (2000:5) describes neo-liberalism as a term which 'denotes new forms of political-economic governance premised on the extension of market relationships'. Neo-liberalism emphasises market competition and a free market process characterised by deregulation, liberalism, privatisation and state retrenchment (McKee, 2015). 'Markets are understood to be a better way of organising economic activity because they are associated with competition, economic efficiency and choice' (Larner, 2000:5). This is expected to lead to increased economic growth. Under neo-liberalism, social government is reconfigured as a set of markets in services, provision and expertise. Beneficiaries of the services from the various markets are reconfigured as consumers (Dean, 2010), and market rules and values affect all aspects of social life.

There are various versions of neo-liberalism in the literature. Studies on neo-liberalism make a distinction between the terms 'advanced liberalism' and the more general term 'neo-liberalism', which, according to Lacey and Ilcan (2006), allows for consideration of the inter relationships between various reactions to various forms of governance. This allows for a link between liberalism and debates on morality and community. Larner (2000:6) distinguishes between a focus on neo-liberalism as a policy framework or ideology and a focus on neo-liberalism through the lens of governmentality. He argues that understanding neo-liberalism as 'governmentality opens useful avenues for the investigation of the restructuring of welfare state processes'. Neo-liberalism as a form of governmentality seeks to 'govern without governing' (also described as 'governing at a distance' by Rose and Miller (1992)) by creating or promoting active agency in governable subjects (McKee, 2015). The process of creating active agency in citizens is achieved through the creation of responsible citizens, which is linked to morality and community (ibid.).

Another major concern amongst scholars of neo-liberalism is the role of the state, under a system in which 'the discipline of the market' permeates all aspects of social life. Under neo-liberalism, the welfare role of the nation state is redirected from a bureaucratic centre, and distributed to agencies, organisations, individuals and citizen groups (Lacey and Ilcan, 2006; Rose, 2000). There are divergent views as to what becomes of the authority of the national state under this arrangement; it may 'govern at a distance' or there may be a loss in governmentality or authority of the state.

One traditional role of the state is to reduce the cost of social risk (Dean, 2010). Under an advanced liberal regime, risk and responsibility are conferred on the beneficiaries of governmental programmes, as they take greater responsibility for their circumstances, characterised by modes of subjection **(**where individuals as responsible subjects are expected to take greater responsibility for social and economic problems) (Ilcan and Lacey, 2006). This additional responsibility creates certain expectations as to how individuals should conduct themselves (Ilcan and Lacey, 2006).

3.5.4 Conceptualising the state within a programme of empowerment under advanced liberalism

Under advanced liberalism, a new image of the state emerges. The state becomes an enabling or facilitating body, relieved of its powers and obligations to know, plan, calculate and control from the centre (Rose and Miller, 1992). The state is no longer required to answer all society's needs, instead individuals, organisations and localities are expected to take some part of the responsibility (ibid.). This argument makes a distinction between a national state and civil society (Curtis, 2015). Civil society in this case is a plurality of groups, organisations and individuals, and 'becomes a resource for the state and a means by which citizens can be governed through their active agency and encouraged to take responsibility for their own life outcomes and those of their fellow community members' (ibid.).

Other scholars, such as Bulkeley and Schroeder (2012), argue that the ascendance of non-state actors in shaping and carrying out global governance functions is not an instance of transfer of power from the state to non-state actors, or a matter of changing sources or institutional locus of authority, but rather it is an expression of a change in governmentality whereby the ostensibly non-state actors become integral to the project of governing global issues. Under this arrangement political power is exercised through a shifting alliance between authorities to govern diverse aspects of social life and individual conduct (Rose and Miller, 1992), and power is exercised through citizens becoming capable of bearing regulated freedom (Rose and Miller, 1992).

The absence of a central government creates a new task for the modern national government which is 'governing without governing society'. This involves securing the 'institutions and mechanisms' for social and economic government by ensuring that they operate in a form consistent with the objectives of government (Dean 2010; Sending and Neurman 2006). Dean

(2010) argues that two technologies of government are used to achieve this new role. The first is the technology of agency which seeks to enhance our capacity for participation, agreement and action, by allowing the flow of information from the bottom and the flow of durable identities, agencies and wills. The second is the 'technology of performance', which makes these capacities calculable and comparable, enabling us to exercise our capacities for performance as different types of people and aggregates by making indirect regulation and surveillance possible (ibid). He asserts that these two technologies make possible a strategy which puts into play our moral conduct and political conduct for governmental purposes. (ibid). Government, in this sense, involves 'government at a distance' characterised by 'a process that involves both the encapsulation of conditions and activities in many locales in inscribed forms which permit their transmission to centres of calculation and the framing of the needs and desires of individuals in ways which lead them to strive to obtain the objectives sought by authorities' (Curtis, 1995; Rose and Miller, 1992).

In summary, we can say that the new roles citizens have under the process of responsibilisation have given birth to, or re-echoed, the constant calls for empowerment and participation born out of a desire to replace 'big society with small communities of responsible citizens. The state is constituted by a promise: we will assist you to practice your freedom, as long as you practice it our way' (Dean, 2010).

3.5.5 Conceptualising community as a 'technology of government' under advanced liberalism

The view of community in participatory development literature is one in which community is conceptualised as a natural social entity characterised by solidaristic, homogeneous relationships, which can be assumed and channelled in simple organisational forms (Cleaver, 2001; Mosse, 2001; Sharpe, 1998; Cohen, 1993; Msukwa and Taylor, 2011). This concept of community emphasises geographical boundaries in defining communities, thereby assuming a permanent static structure. In studying community, literatures attempt to answer questions regarding the nature of consensus under participatory development. Viewing communities as homogeneous entities suppresses differences and tensions by ignoring class, gender, inequality, power relations and other differences within such defined communities. In most of the literature on participation, community participation is framed in terms of the rights and responsibilities of groups whose rights have not been recognised (Semmerville and Kendell, 2008).

Under advanced liberalism, an increasing body of literature has emerged that seeks to understand the role of 'community' within a national government that seeks to 'govern at a distance' or govern 'beyond the state' (see Dean, 2010; Ilcan and Lacey, 2006; Rose, 2000). Such literature is concerned with the ways in which community as a 'technology of government' is used to shape, normalise and instrumentalise the conduct of others in order to achieve desired objectives. This process is referred to as responsibilisation (Summerville and Kendell, 2008). The literature argues that community participation, even though regarded generally as positive, is implemented in such a way that governing takes place through regulated choices made by actors in the context of commitments to family (ibid.). Behaviour is thus governed through ethics as we seek to fulfil the common good. If we consider community as a technology of government, behaviour is governed through the realm of ethics, 'whereby individuals are ethically obliged to act for the benefit of their group to become masters of their own collective destinies by becoming ethical citizens of their community.

Community is therefore an advanced liberal rationality of government (a site of government)' (ibid.). Community is a form of governmentality that is used to collectivise and organise subjects. Responsibility is not understood as an obligation to the state but as an obligation to those for whom an individual care for, including one's community (ibid.). Community is thus an affective and ethical field, binding its elements into durable relations (Rose, 2000).

This conceptualisation views community as a political project concerned with assembling a constituency, forming links and marking boundaries. It is a site of government. It is also the site of a political project, because it is an attempt to stabilise and normalise particular sets of relations and practices and establish relatively continuous regimes of authority (Dean, 2010). Conceptualising community as a site of government or a political site differs from the concept of community as 'communitarianism', which sees community in terms of a 'natural community of belonging' (Ilcan and Lacey, 2006).

With this thinking, individuals within communities or groups are no longer members of a social or political community coincident with the nation state. They have instead been enjoined to think of themselves as self-managing individuals and communities, enterprising persons and active citizens, and members of a whole range of 'intermediate groups'. Above all, communities can be targeted and objectified as subjects of governmental interventions (Dean, 2010). The targeted community, empowered through technologies of agency, enters into

partnership (in the form of contracts) with professionals, bureaucrats and service providers, in which they are encouraged to manage themselves (ibid.).A growing body of research has focused on how community is mobilised for self-governance, the response of individuals within such targeted communities to contractualised community engagements and the obligations citizens feel in response to efforts to make them good responsible citizens (McKee,2015).

Rosol (2015) argues that, while contractualised agreements aimed at creating responsible citizens can lead to transformation in communities, they can also serve to exclude citizens that deviate from established norms and rules of engagement under the contractual obligations. Such citizens are considered to have failed to become part of what Rose (2000) calls the 'moral community'. Community is increasingly seen as a 'terrain of government between the state, the market and the individual with a moralising emphasis on responsible conduct' (McKee, 2015). Notions of local empowerment and engagement, capacity building and local knowledge are seen as strategies that create moral subjectivity of responsible self-help and self-reliance (Ilcan and Lacey, 2006).Community groups have however shown themselves to be capable of manipulating prevailing discourses to their advantage thereby creating new outcomes which may contradict idealised notions of development communities(Taylor,2007).

3.6 Power and Participatory Development

Power is central to participation and affects attempts at participation in various ways. This is particularly relevant when taking the definition of participation as an end, which brings to light questions of empowerment. The concern of scholars studying power in participatory development regards those who have and those that do not have power (the assumption being that some hold power while others do not). A transfer of power is necessary to even up the power divide. Portrayed this way, power is conceptualised as zero sum, where one party has power and the other party wants power (Kapoor, 2004).The next section examines two theories of power. The classical theory as postulated by Lukes (2005) and power from a governmentality perspective, based on the work of Michael Foucault. The two theories form the basis for the analysis of power within this thesis.

3.6.1 The classical theory of power

The classical theory of power is summarised in the assertion that 'A has power over B'. This can be said to mean 'A's behaviour causes B's behaviour'. The central implication of this thinking is that power is conceived as the decisive factor that makes the power subordinate act

the way s/he does and that s/he would have acted differently had s/he not been subjected to the exercise of power (Borch, 2005).This concept of power known as the pluralist approach to power. It dwells on the study of specific outcomes in order to determine who actually prevails in community decision making (Lukes, 2005). It emphasises the study of observable behaviour, the central task of which is decision making. Hence power can be analysed only after a careful examination of a series of concrete decisions (ibid.). Identifying who prevails in decision-making is seen as the best way to determine which individuals and groups have more power in social life. Power is analysed in terms of capacity to affect outcomes (ibid.).

The classical theory of power assumes that decisions about 'issues' involve actual and observable conflict. Conflict is assumed to be crucial in providing an experimental test of power attributions without which the exercise of power fails to show up (ibid.). The conflict in this context is between preferences, so that a conflict of interest is equivalent to a conflict of policy preferences (ibid.). This type of power, according to Luke, is a one dimensional concept of power.

3.6.2 Limitations of the classical theory of power

Many authors have written on the limitations of classical thinking on power. Luhman (1969 cited by Borch, 2005) is critical of what he calls a causal framework of power. Firstly, an examination of the causes of power does not tell us where power originates. Secondly, and closely linked to causal explanations, every effect has an infinite number of causes just as every cause produces an infinite number of effects (ibid.). Another question is whether one can envisage the exercise of power as being decisive in the subordinate's actual actions. Is it possible, causally, to preclude the subordinate acting the way s/he did under all circumstances or, at least, that there were no reasons for his/her action other than the exercise of power? Finally, the classical theory of power implies a conception of time in which the future is seen as a fixed projection of the past with limited alternatives (ibid.). This is particularly apparent regarding the subordinate, whose future actions are presumed to be pre-determinable before power is exercised. However, when focusing on the present, the causal thinking of classical power theory must be abandoned, since 'actual entities in the contemporary universe are causally independent of each other' (Borch, 2005).

Additionally, Borch, 2005) criticises the classical theory of imaging power as a substance that can be possessed. A simple reference to the possession of power, where power is transferred

from one person to another and from one situation to another, altogether conceals the systemic conditions of such a modality of power. Furthermore, it assumes that the exercise of power is a zero-sum game where, for example, increasing bureaucratic power can take place only with a corresponding loss of parliamentary power. Borch (2005) questions this assumption and argues that an adequate theory of power must be able to take into account the fact that power often increases in one place without leading to a parallel loss elsewhere. Organisational power increases simultaneously among both superiors and subordinates when their internal relations intensify (Borch, 2005).

Similar to Borch, Lukes (2005) in his book *'Power, a radical view'* criticises the classical theory of power, saying that it is a mistake to define power as 'A exercises power over B when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests' (ibid.). According to Lukes, power is a capacity not the exercise of that capacity, since it may never be, and never need be, exercised. He states that one can be powerful by satisfying and advancing the interests of others. Bachrach and Baratz (1970 cited by Lukes, 2005) criticise the classical notion of power for not taking into account the fact that power may be, and often is, exercised by confining the scope of decision making to relatively safe issues (ibid.:22), suggesting that a two dimensional concept of power is necessary to accommodate this shortcoming. This two dimensional concept of power takes into account both decision and non-decision making. Non decision making in this sense is the 'means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are voiced, or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision making arena' (ibid.).

3.6.3 Two Dimensional View of Power

The two-dimensional view of power involves a qualified critique of the behavioural focus of the classical theory of power. It allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are prevented from being taken on political issues over which there is an observable conflict of interests, embodied in express policy preferences and sub political grievances (Lukes, 2005). Lukes qualifies a 'key issue' as meaning 'one that involves a genuine challenge to the resources of power or authority of those who currently dominate the process by which policy outputs in the system are determined' (ibid: 23).The two dimensional view incorporates the question of control over the agenda of politics and the ways in which potential issues are kept out of the political process (ibid.).

There are several criticisms of the two dimensional concept of power as postulated by Lukes (2005). The concept is still committed to the study of actual behaviour, or 'behaviourism', and gives a misleading picture of the ways in which individuals, groups and institutions succeed in excluding potential issues from the political process (ibid.). Factors other than the conscious will of the individual can serve to enforce or maintain the bias of the system (ibid.). For example, the socially structured and culturally patterned behaviour of groups and practices of institutions may serve to maintain the bias of the system. The power to control the agenda of politics and exclude potential issues cannot be adequately analysed unless it is seen as a function of collective forces and social arrangements (ibid.).

Lukes, citing Bachrach and Baratz (1970), also observes that the two dimensional view of power associates power with actual observable conflict. Manipulation and authority, which are conceived as agreement based upon reason, may not involve conflict. Another limitation is the assumption that power is only exercised in situations of conflict. Power can be exercised through influencing, shaping and determining wants. It is a supreme exercise of power for compliance to be secured by controlling thoughts and desires. This can occur without conflict (Lukes, 2005). The two dimensional view of power maintains that non decision making power only exists where there are grievances which are denied entry into the political process as issues. If people feel no grievances, then they have no interests that are harmed by the use of power. It is however 'the exercise of power to prevent people from having grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they accept their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or imagine no alternatives to it, or because they see it as a natural and unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and beneficial. To assume that the absence of grievances equals genuine consensus is simply to rule out the possibility of false or manipulated consensus by definitional fiat' (Lukes, 2005).

3.7 Power as government

The work of Foucault on power marked a radical departure from previous work (Gaventa, 2003). Foucault sought to paint a micro-physical picture of power through his evolving research. He tried to analyse power in terms of its capillary forms of existence, concerning himself with the 'point where power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and inserts itself into their very action and attitude, their discourses learning process and everyday life' (Lukes 2005). He devoted a lot of attention to power relationships, how

power relationships are organised, which forms they take and the techniques they depend on (ibid.).

Initially, in '*Discipline and Punish*', Foucault (1975) introduces his analysis of power as discipline. This thinking focuses on the exercise of power over and through the individual, the body and its forces and capacities (Foucault, 1977). As Dean (2010) explains, 'the object of disciplinary power is the regulation and ordering of the numbers of people within a territory' (Dean, 2010). Conceptualising power as discipline stresses the productive, creative, and positive aspects of power as opposed to the conception of power as repressive, prohibitive or exclusionary (Gaventa, 2003). Foucault later conceptualised power as a continuation of war by other means.

Soon after introducing power as 'discipline', in 1982 Foucault introduced the concept of 'bio-power' which is partly a political anatomy of the body and partly a regulation of the population, or bio-politics. This led him to recognise the need for a more general analysis of power. This conceptual development ended with the notion of government (Borch, 2009), culminating in his work on governmentality, which he delivered in a lecture at the Collège de France in February 1978. In the next section, the thesis examines the concept of the national state, and sovereignty as a form of power.

3.7.1 The National State and Sovereignty

Traditional accounts of government view 'government' as the 'coercive apparatus of the state' (Okereke et al., 2009:67). The state here is conceptualised by Dean (2010:16) as a 'sovereign body that claims a monopoly of independent territorial power and means of violence, that inheres in but lies behind the apparatuses or institutions of organised and formal political authority and that is separate from the rulers and the ruled'. Government under the welfare state, is understood as 'an activity undertaken by the national welfare state acting as a unified body upon and in defence of a unitary domain, society. The purposes of this government are conceived as enframing society within mechanisms of security by which the state cares for the welfare of the population from the cradle to the grave' (ibid: 16).

A central focus of Foucault's work on power refutes the notion of an area controlled by a certain kind of power, that he calls the 'juridico-political schema' (Rose, 2006:45). The juridico-political schema is established through the historical development of the monarchy and its

institutions (Borch, 2009). Monarchy or royal power is characterised by an exercise of 'sovereignty' as a form of rule, meaning the exercise of 'ultimate authority over a territory and the subjects who inhabited that territory' (Dean, 2010). The major instruments of the exercise of sovereign power are the 'instruments of laws, decrees and regulations backed up by coercive sanctions ultimately grounded in the right of death of the sovereign' (ibid.).

In exercising authority over specific territories and subjects, sovereignty works and functions as a 'form of rule over things' (ibid). It functions as an exercise of deduction and seeks to impose a technology of subtraction of things over the subject it rules (ibid.).

Thomas Lemke (cited in Borch, 2009) identifies three main assumptions in the discourse of sovereignty. First, he points to an assertion of possession, in which power is conceptualised as a substance that can be possessed, which implies the idea of power as a zero-sum game. Second, there is an assumption of location, in which power, typically political power, is concentrated in a centre or headquarters, the monarch or the state apparatus, from which it flows (causally and top-down) to the rest of society. Finally, the discourse of sovereignty relies on the contention that power serves purposes of repression. This is particularly apparent in the importance attributed to prohibitions and law, so that power, still according to the juridico-political model, is essentially in opposition to freedom. To exercise power is to limit freedom. The govermentalisation of the state is the broadest condition of the emergence of liberal and social forms of rule for much of the 19th and 20th centuries. It makes possible, certain aspects of the non-liberal rule and authoritarian governmentality of the 20th century (Rose, 2010). Contemporary forms of government like advanced liberalism create a subject 'where choice and autonomy are central to the government of the self' (Rutt, 2010). Government can only operate at a distance with encounters between technologies of domination of others and that of the self (ibid: 56).

3.7.2 The Art of Government

For Foucault, questions regarding the 'art of government' or the 'problematic government' are linked to the 16th century. Before this time, the objective of the exercise of power for a prince, and the politics of the prince, reinforced, strengthened and protected the 'principality'. The principality represents the prince's relationship with what he owns, his territory and his subjects (Foucault, 1978). Questions regarding government were diverse during this time; there was the question of the government of self-dealing with issues surrounding personal conduct; the government of souls and lives; the government of children; and the government of the state by

the prince. How to govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people accept being governed, and how to become the best possible governor, are all issues of the 16th century (Foucault, 1978:202).

The 18th century brought a transition from a regime dominated by structures of sovereignty to one ruled by techniques of government (Foucault, 1978). During this period, the essential art of government became political economy. This is the introduction into political practice of economy, meaning 'the correct way of managing individuals, goods and wealth within the family and also the management of the state' (Dean, 2010). To govern a state in this sense means to 'apply economy, to set up an economy at the level of the entire state, which means exercising towards its inhabitants, and the wealth and behaviour of each and all, a form of surveillance and control as attentive as that of the head of a family over his household and his goods' (Foucault, 1978:207). The art of government is thus an act of 'exercising power in the form and according to the model of economy' (Foucault, 1978:209).

The finality of government resides in the things it manages and in the pursuit of the perfection and intensification of the processes it directs (Rose, 2010). The instrument of this form of government is no longer the 'sword' but a range of multiform tactics. Government is therefore not about imposing laws which is the instrument of sovereign rule, but about 'employing tactics and using laws as tactics to arrange things in such a way that through a certain number of means, ends may be achieved' (Foucault, 1978: 211). 'Ends' in this case could mean the production of wealth or the provision of subsistence for the family. The process of achieving these 'ends' requires the 'disposal' of things. The art of government now becomes 'the disposal of things' (Trinborg, 1997), where 'disposition' refers to 'the strategic arrangement of things and humans and the ordered possibilities of their movement within a particular territory' (Foucault, 1978: 212).

The art of government as the 'disposal of things' is a rule over things (Foucault, 1978: 211) that differs from the deductive exercise of sovereignty, instead, it is a productive rule that makes things and creates outcomes (Dean, 2010; Rutt, 2010). This form of rule seeks to 'increase the means of subsistence, to augment the wealth, strengthen the greatness of the state, to increase the happiness and prosperity of its inhabitants, and to multiply their numbers' (Dean, 2010:128).

The art of government draws out a 'plurality of forms of government' resulting in differing 'practices of government' within the state (Foucault, 1978). Foucault (1978) identifies three types of government; the art of self-government (connected with morality); the art of properly governing a family (connected with economy); and the science of ruling the state, which concerns politics. According to Foucault, 'the art of government is always characterised by the essential continuity of one type with the other, and of a second type with a third. Hence in the art of government, the task is to establish a continuity in an upward and a downward direction' (ibid: 206). He emphasises the need for defining a form of government that can be applied to the state as a whole.

An underlying implication of a plurality of government and a departure from a regime of government dominated by structures of sovereignty to a regime ruled by the techniques of government is a departure from a 'preoccupation with the kingdom as an extension of the royal household and the model of the government of the state based on the government of the family' (Ref). The family now becomes an 'element within the dynamic field of force that is the population' (ibid: 128). The population represents the end of government more than the power of the sovereign; 'the population is the subject of needs, of aspirations and the object in the hands of the government' (Foucault, 1978:217). The family, as part of the population, becomes an 'objective of government rather than the very a priori of government itself' (Dean, 2010:128).

Dean (2010) explores the implication of introducing the concept of 'population' into the concept of governance which presents a point of departure from a conception of power as sovereignty. The first implication is on the 'governed'. The members of a population are 'no longer subjects bound together in a territory who are obliged to submit to their sovereign' (Dean, 2010:127), they have diverse customs, means of subsistence and livelihoods. Secondly, 'a population is defined in relation to matters of life and death, health and illness, propagation and longevity, which can be known by statistical, demographic and epidemiological instruments' (ibid.). A population is also a 'collective entity' with a knowledge that cannot be reduced to the knowledge of a single entity within the population. The new objective of government brings with it a concern for the population (ibid.). The new objective of government regards subjects, and the capacities of living individuals, as members of a population and resources to be fostered and optimised. This is in contrast to the sovereign form

of rule, described as a 'reducing form of rule', aimed at extracting from subjects (ibid.). Foucault sought to go beyond the idea of a 'causal effect' of power (Lukes, 2005:20). His focus turned to understanding how power works through people. Conceptualised as government, power is defined as the 'conduct of conduct' (Foucault, 1978). In the next section, I unpack this concept.

3.7.3 Government as the 'Conduct of Conduct

The art of government described above entails a separation of the sovereign form of rule under a prince, from the governance of the state. This leads to new ways of thinking and conceptualising the state and the government. Under this new rationality, government, in addition to judicial power, discipline and normalization, pays attention to 'techniques of the self to govern oneself', along with normalisation and responsibilities (Sauer, 2015). Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' as a new form of governance in the modern state allows for an understanding of not only how we are governed but also how we govern ourselves in order to govern others (ibid.). It is concerned with the relationship between government and how thought operates within a particular rationality or organised way of going about things (regime of practice). Rationality in this sense is understood to mean any systematic way of reasoning, thinking about, calculating and responding to a problem which draws upon formal bodies of knowledge (Dean, 2010).

As Foucault puts it: 'Governmentality is understood in the broad sense of techniques and procedures for directing human behaviour' (Foucault, 1997:82). Government therefore entails deliberate efforts to shape behaviour based on a particular set of norms in order to achieve certain objectives (Dean, 2010). The central thinking here is that government is concerned with 'not only how we exercise authority over others, or how we govern abstract entities such as states and populations, but also how we govern ourselves' (ibid.). This understanding shifts thinking about rule and authority beyond the apparatus of the national state and allows us to conceptualise the exercise of power beyond the national state.

This draws out Foucault's view of power as decentralised and omnipresent. Thinking of power in this sense has implications for the 'locational' concept of power associated with sovereignty. Foucault asserts that it 'can no longer be assumed that the location of power rests with the

sovereign, but instead one needs to investigate the many technologies and practices, fields of knowledge, fields of visibility and forms of identity that constitute a ruler with certain powers' (Foucault, 1982). This implies that government is not limited to the state but can be exercised at all levels of society, as government of the self, government of the family and government of the state' (ibid.). Government in this sense can be conceptualised as 'any more or less calculated and rational activity, undertaken by a multiplicity of authorities and agencies, employing a variety of techniques and forms of knowledge, that seeks to shape conduct by working through the desires, aspirations, interests and beliefs of various actors, for definite but shifting ends and with a diverse set of relatively unpredictable consequences, effects and outcomes' (Dean, 2010:18). This is the 'conduct of conduct'.

A central pillar of conceptualising government as the 'conduct of conduct is the association of power with freedom. Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free' (Foucault, 1982:221). As Dean (2010:18) explains: 'the notion of government as the conduct of conduct presupposes the primary freedom of those who are governed entailed in the capacities of acting and thinking. It further presupposes this freedom and these capacities on the part of those who govern'.

All practices of government have a goal to be achieved, and this has implications for ethics (Dean, 2010). The process of achieving goals is based on organised practice which presupposes a certain way of producing truth and knowledge, through which human beings act on themselves and others, and hence come to know and understand themselves (Rose et al., 2006). This truth is, however, taken for granted because it is assumed to be common knowledge within a specific domain of practice. The way we think about exercising authority is therefore drawn from the forms of knowledge (expertise, vocabulary, theories, ideas and philosophies) available to us (Dean, 2010). The process of employing certain techniques and technologies of the self to achieve self-improvement through specific forms of knowledge, called the 'action of the self on the self', is an attempt at self-regulation with moral implications, as individuals attempt to make themselves accountable for their actions (ibid.). This assumes the government to be moral, since all governing bodies presume to have specific forms of knowledge of 'what constitutes good, virtuous, appropriate, responsible conduct of individuals and collectives'. Individuals under governments are expected to 'form a moral relationship with themselves so that they are able to monitor and judge their own conduct in relation to moral discourse' (Rutt, 2010).

3.7.4 Subjection versus Subjectification

Foucault's preoccupation with 'subject' concerns the way a human being turns himself into a subject, and how he becomes subject to someone else by control and dependence, tied to his own identity by conscience or self-knowledge (Foucault, 1978). Governmentality, in terms of subject, is the way in which 'subjects could be brought to internalise state control through self-regulation' (Rutt, 2010:53). The freedom of subjects is what makes them governable (ibid: 56).

The aim of government (and the process of governing individuals and people) under governmentality, is not only to organise subjects but also to create subjects. This is the process of subjectivation (Sauer, 2015), in which the individual is subjected under state power, giving the state legitimacy. The same individual, on the other hand, and under the same process of subjecting himself to state rule, emerges as a subject, but in this case a subject with agency in the process of subjection and subjectivation (ibid.). A good example is governing civil servants, which includes both discipline and self-governance through a citizen-citizenship relationship (a customer-client concept created through individualisation, contractualisation and responsibilisation) (ibid.). It depends on the ability of bureaucrats for self-governance and their subjectivation as self-entrepreneurs (ibid.). Liberal acts of government are actionable only on the condition that citizens carry out the purposes of government. The government in this case may not be the state (Cruikshank, 1999). In seeking to understand domination, Foucault identifies three forms of struggle, ethnic, social and religious (Foucault, 1978:331). In struggle against these forms of domination, individuals may struggle against forms of subjection, subjectivity and submission.

3.7.5 Participation as Governance

In her work *'the will to empower: democratic citizens and other subjects',* Cruikshank (1999) describes several attempts by the United States government in the 1960s to implement a programme of empowerment. This Community Action Programme (CAP), initiated during the regime of President Johnson, had the sole objective of making the poor participate through the creation of local power relations embodied in the notion of community between the poor and programme implementers made up of various professionals (ibid.). The aim was for the poor to participate as a unified community, constituted by a programme of empowerment. The overall objective of the programme was to transform the poor into active participatory citizens with the ability to make rational decisions (Ilcan and Lacey, 2006).

A number of recent studies have sought to examine the process of 'governing through participation', but few have focused on Africa. A study by Ilcan and Lacey (2006) examines the governmentality of Oxfam using a fair trade project in Uganda as a case study. The research, influenced by the work of Barbara Cruikshank's (1999) '*Will to empower'*, examines how communities were made the target of governmental strategies, subject to expert authorities, objectified by particular kinds of knowledge and linked to a demand for self-management or empowerment. The authors argue that Oxfam, as an international aid NGO, operates in conflict with the broad aim of empowering project beneficiaries through participation. They conclude that two key policy areas, the emphasis on self-management and empowerment and the pursuit of free trade as a development tool, specifically challenge the ability of Oxfam to act in a capacity that upholds the voices of the poor, and rather than doing so, acts in a capacity that supports advanced liberal initiatives which aim to govern individuals and groups in particular ways (Ilcan and Lacey, 2006).

The central argument of this article is that empowerment of local people does not entail them evading power relations, but rather entails further entrenchment in a particular disciplinary relationship in which the subject needs to establish herself and others. This relationship is built upon the same basic rationality as has been articulated through various macro oriented development interventions envisaged since the Second World War, that the present lives of Third World subjects are, by and large, characterised by a fundamental lack, which can be remedied through a set of calculated and planned interventions (ibid.). In presenting this argument, Ilcan and Lacey (2006) do not consider the strategies of international donor agencies like WaterAid under the premise of a 'rights based approach'.

In his 2014 work, Rosol examines what he calls 'governing through participation' which is a form of governance consisting of leading the conduct of citizens through participatory processes within the context of an urban governance project (Rosol, 2014). He examines Vancouver's participatory planning process known as 'City Plan'. Theoretically guided by a Foucauldian governmentality approach, Rosol shows why a participatory process was chosen in order to overcome obstacles to the further development of the city of Vancouver. He presents City Plan as a 'specific technology of governing through participation', concluding that the techniques rested on two rationalities, a strong belief in communicative and deliberative

planning and a neo-liberal orientation based on responsibilisation. The paper addresses the geographies, and contributes to the methodology, of governmentality.

3.8 Conclusion-Linking Power and Participatory Development

Foucault argues that 'space is fundamental in any exercise of power'. The process in participatory development of making available, claiming and taking up space (invited spaces) needs to be seen as an act of power, but not always about the exercise of power, directly or indirectly, over others (Cornwall, 2004). Participatory approaches, in emphasising the local and in ignoring larger political and economic structures, may not change national power structures (Pappett, 2000). A more sophisticated power analysis is therefore required that examines a holistic structure and the power knowledge discourse. This may provide a better representation of, and engagement with, power, making participation sustainable within participatory development.

As shown in the preceding discussion, the concept of governmentality provides a valuable resource for studying how state power is reproduced in new spaces while allowing for the possibility of 'active subjects' who can shape and influence the act of government (Taylor,2007).Critics of governance theories like governmentality however view such concepts as idealised normative models which implies a sense of community while in most cases ignoring the tensions, messiness and frustrations embedding most forms of governance(ibid.

The next chapter presents the methodology for the thesis. The chapter outlines the rationale for selecting a qualitative case study approach and the specific case study projects. It also explains the data collection methodology and analysis. Finally, it discusses the ethical challenges of conducting the study.

Chapter 4: Methodology

4.0 Introduction

This chapter describes the methodology employed to achieve the research objectives set out in Chapter 1. The chapter outlines the rationale for selecting a case study approach. It also explains the data collection methodology and analysis. Finally, it discusses the ethical challenges of conducting the study**.**

4.1 Epistemology

Before commencing PhD studies at the University of Reading, the researcher worked as a consultant to the two case study organisations. This provided a practitioner's perspective of the project, allowing an in-depth evaluation beyond what would be possible if the researcher had only an external standpoint. Knowledge and contacts acquired from the consultancy experience was useful in designing and conducting the formal interviews and focus groups. The method of reflective practice (Finlay, 2002; Moncrieffe, 2006) was deployed for the triangulation of the data collected through focus group discussions and key informant interviews. Familiarity with some of the research subjects from previous professional relationship made conversation and access to communities easier. It also allowed for observation of internal processes (within communities and case study organizations), which significantly enriched the work. Although previous experience overall proved a very useful asset in conducting the study, it has to be admitted that in a few places the researcher struggled with the challenge of making unwarranted assumptions or deciding where and when to isolate or combine knowledge gathered from past experience working in the sector from knowledge gathered during the period of actual fieldwork for the research. The reflexivity technique of self-critical analysis of situations (Moncrieffe, 2006) offered valuable guidance in dealing with the situation.

That said, it is worth reiterating that researchers inevitably bring their own mind sets and frameworks to inform how they interpret data and work within contexts (Cloke et al., 2000; Bryman, 2015). It is in part for this reason that Bourdieu (1977) emphasises that 'genuine science requires reflexivity, systematic and rigorous self-critical practice' (Cited in Gaventa 2003:14). This is crucial for exposing and tackling the struggles that researchers face in producing real knowledge about given contexts, and the ways in which development actors, with their differing socially constructed dispositions, meditate them, and offer real analysis and

insights for understanding and transforming the situations and negative dispositions that obstruct empowerment.

4.2 Research Design

The research employs a qualitative case study approach to investigate the research questions. The following section describes the process of the selection of case studies, how the data was collected and the methods of analysis used.

4.2.1 Qualitative Case Study Approach

The study uses a qualitative case study research method to investigate the research questions. Barratt et al. (2010:329) define a qualitative case study method as 'empirical research that primarily uses contextually rich data from bounded real-world settings to investigate a focused phenomenon'. A case study research method aims to systematically gather data about an instance, individual or organisation (Bowyer and Glenda, 2012).It is an epistemological position which constitutes knowledge production through the processes and events described in the case study.

Case studies are implemented to gain in-depth knowledge of the subject under study and to learn about the whole evaluation programme. Case studies are evaluation tools that answer 'how' and 'why' questions during an evaluation (Barratt et al, 2010). The components of a case study include documents, interviews, statistical data and field observation (ibid.).Case study design has four central components, a study question, it's unit of analysis, the logic linking the data to the propositions and the criteria for interpreting findings from the study (Yazan, 2015:140).

The use of the case study method of research has however received criticism in the methodology literature. The main criticism is related to a lack of scientific rigour and a lack of clearly defined protocols (Yazan, 2015). Case study approaches are also said to lack a significant sample size which allows for generalisation (Bowyer and Glenda, 2012).Case study research is often descriptive, which critics describe as lacking theoretical contribution (ibid).

The case study approach is used to study the STS and HSBC WASH projects implemented by WaterAid in Nigeria. The selected case study approach is the most suitable for the phenomenon under investigation because it allows for an empirical investigation of the phenomenon of participation and the resulting governance issues arising from a practical investigation. It also

provides an opportunity to use observations from a real life situation to make a contribution to theory.

4.3 The case study organisation and projects

Two case study projects were selected for the purpose of the research study. The projects are the STS project and the HWP project. Both projects are implemented by WaterAid in Nigeria. In this section, the criteria for selecting case study projects is presented. This is followed by a description of WaterAid and the case study projects.

4.3.1 Criteria for selecting case study projects

The central focus of this thesis is how international non-governmental organizations (INGOs) maintain their hegemonic status while seeking to use the notion of community WASH management (CWM) as a strategy to empower communities towards sustainable WASH services. Therefore, in selecting suitable WASH projects for the study, the major criterion was the INGO WASH project should have a clear commitment to implementing WASH projects using the concept of CWM. Another criterion was the willingness of the project implementers to allow the project to be researched. This includes granting interviews, permitting observation and allowing access to research communities. A further criterion for case study selection was the project timeframe. The idea was to focus on WASH projects that were being implemented within the time frame of the research study. The reason is to enable the researcher to observe at first hand the everyday processes and practice of participation and empowerment in the course of project implementation.

The two projects chosen for study (STS and HWP) fulfil the above three criteria. The STS and HWP projects have a clear commitment to CWM as stated in the WaterAid community engagement strategy document (WaterAid, 2015). WaterAid also has a clear statement of its commitment to the empowerment of project beneficiaries and communities through CWM. For example, the STS Inception Report states:

‘Communities need to have capacity to strive for improved services, make choices of water and sanitation service options, implement water supply and sanitation (WSS) activities and to own and manage the water and sanitation facilities constructed. This is an important prerequisite of sustainable Rural Water Supply and Sanitation (RWSS) services and will be employed to foster choice and demand particularly for community led process towards behavioural change’ (IFS, 2014:15)

Similarly, the HWP project in its inception report also professes a commitment to community level implementation and empowerment. The HWP project, according to the inception report, 'intends to adopt strategies that ensure that the most vulnerable community members, such as women, children, the elderly, disabled, those living with HIV/AIDS and where relevant, marginalised ethnic groups, are included in the project' (WaterAid 2016:6). The focus of the projects, the report goes on to say, is 'on the empowerment of beneficiaries through CWM' (WaterAid, 2015: 3).In terms of the second criterion, the researcher contacted and received consent from senior managers of the two projects for the projects to be used for the study. They also assented to allow researcher to join in on their visit and engagement activities with the communities where the projects where being carried out. Both of the projects started in 2012 and due to conclude by the end of 2016.

4.3.2 WaterAid in Nigeria (WANG)

WaterAid is an international non-governmental organisation focused on improving access to water and sanitation and promoting hygiene in the world's poorest communities. Established in 1981, WaterAid works in 27 countries in Africa, South Asia and Latin America, and its membership includes the USA, Australia, Sweden and the United Kingdom. WaterAid International and its members are each governed by a board of trustees who are responsible for ensuring that the plans for programmes and policy influence are consistent with WaterAid's global aims and policies (IFS, 2014). The mission of WaterAid is to 'transform lives by improving access to safe water, hygiene and sanitation in the world's poorest communities' (WaterAid, 2016:13).

WaterAid says it believes that WASH is fundamental to all aspects of human development. The core mantra is that providing WASH services to the poorest and the most vulnerable transforms their lives and increases their quality of life. WaterAid aims to bring about 'a world where everyone everywhere has these essential services by 2030' (WaterAid, 2016:14).

WaterAid began work in Nigeria in 1995.The organisation had its first project in Etche, a village in Rivers State. In 1996, WaterAid commenced a Department for International Development (DFID) funded project in Oju local government area of Benue state. The project focused on water and sanitation. WaterAid has spread its work in Nigeria, currently operating in 30 LGAs across six states.

WaterAid developed its first strategy for Nigeria in 1995 with an initial concentration on delivering water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services to rural communities. By 2006, the

organisation had doubled its focus states from three to six, and increased its implementation partners from two LGAs to 22. In 2006, the second Country Strategy Paper (CSP) was adopted. It was reviewed during the 2007 mid-year review process to include other programme principles such as equity, inclusion, sustainability, modelling, and rights based approaches.

WaterAid repeatedly affirms that it is committed to service delivery to governments and the communities where it implements its programmes. In addition to providing services, a major objective of WaterAid, both globally and in Nigeria, is to influence what it calls 'duty bearers' to respond to the need to provide water and sanitation services. This is more or less a rights based approach to programming where communities are cast as having rights to clean water and decent sanitation while governments are portrayed as having the obligation to provide these services to the citizens. (Glieck, 1996; Scanlon et al., 2004; Singh, 2015) WaterAid supports communities to call for their right to WASH services. It also seeks to help service providers meet communities' demands for service affordably and sustainably (WaterAid, 2015).

WaterAid has a regional office for Western Africa based in Dakar, Senegal. The Country representative, Michael Ojo reports to the Head of Region, Marian Demp. She reports to the Director of Programmes, Grish Menom, based in the United Kingdom. WaterAid is currently implementing two projects in Nigeria, the Sustainable Total Sanitation Project (STS) and the HSBC Water Programme. The next section outlines the nature of these two projects.

4.3.3 The Sustainable Total Sanitation (STS) Project

The Sustainable Total Sanitation Project seeks to improve the effectiveness, efficiency, inclusion and sustainability of all sanitation approaches in three states of Nigeria, namely Jigawa, Ekiti and Enugu states. The lessons learnt are expected to contribute to national and regional good practice in sanitation in Nigeria and Western Africa, and through the learning so generated contribute to wider national and regional good practice (IFS, 2014). The STS project is an action learning project which seeks to derive lessons from sanitation. The action learning approach involves intensive documentation and cross learning. The STS project is implemented in Nigeria with funding from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. It is implemented by WaterAid Nigeria (WANG) in a partnership agreement with a combination of state and non-state actors. Financing for the STS project is provided under a counterpart funding arrangement between the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, WaterAid, the

beneficiary LGAs and communities. The total funding for the project is $6,628,162, for duration of 48 months. The STS project is currently in its third year of implementation (ibid.).

In the context of the poor state of sanitation in Nigeria and the project communities, the STS project has a major objective to achieve and sustain open defecation free (ODF) communities using the total sanitation approach. The project seeks to achieve and sustain ODF, promote good practice and influence path to scale in sustainable sanitation access. The proposal for the project was developed by WaterAid in the United Kingdom. A series of meetings were held in 2012 to develop a road map and finalise proposals for the project. The proposal for the project was developed by Richard Charter who was then the Director of Operations of WaterAid in the United Kingdom, and approved by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. It started in June 2012 and is due to end in June 2016.

The project documents claim that WaterAid understands the need for a national and regional approach that looks beyond service delivery to policy formulation and institutional strengthening at a national and regional scale. Hence, implementation of the STS project is supplemented by a systematic and structured process of partner and stakeholder learning, and a component of formal research which addresses specific, testable research questions or hypotheses. The idea is to use rigorous process of grounded learning and formal research to influence practice and policy more widely in Nigeria and the region (IFS, 2014).

Successful implementation of the project is expected to generate changes in three major areas. The first is the extent to which the progressively improving total sanitation approach achieves sustainable and inclusive outcomes at community and household level. This means the success of the implementation in achieving and sustaining ODF status. The second is the significance, usefulness and success from a process viewpoint which primarily speak to the extent and quality of stakeholder participation but also to promptness and efficiency of the project execution. The third is the extent to which change is brought about in the practices and policies of partner LGAs, other local government and state authorities, and implementing agencies elsewhere in the region (ibid.).

4.3.3.1 Project Beneficiaries

The STS project is implemented in three states, Jigawa, Ekiti and Enugu, at the local government level. A total of 12 LGAs participate in the project from the 3 states. In Jigawa state, the project works in four LGAs, Maigatari, Gumel, Sulei Tankarkar and Kaugama. The LGAs in Enugu are Nkanu East, Igbo-Etiti and Udenu. The 4 LGAs in Ekiti state are Ikole, Moba Ilejemeje and Ekiti South West. The project works with the LGAs through the WASH

units which are responsible for implementing the STS project in communities. The project works with communities through WASHCOM or the Water Consumers Association (WCA), at small town level. WASHCOM or the WCA are responsible for the daily management of WASH activities in communities and small towns.

The direct beneficiaries of the project are villages or communities. The project is projected to reach 500 communities within its span. During the field work, the project worked in 250 communities, and it is expected that 625,000 people will benefit from the project. The project currently reports, as of August 2015, that 68 institutional latrines have been constructed in 34 schools. In Enugu, 18 units of latrines have been completed in 9 schools; in Ekiti, 12 units of latrines have been completed in 6 schools; and Jigawa has the highest number of institutional latrines constructed to date with a total of 38 latrine units constructed in19 schools (WANG, 2015).

4.3.4 The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited (HSBC) Water Programme (HWP)

The HWP is financed by the HSBC. The HSBC Water Programme is a partnership between HSBC Bank, Earth Watch, WaterAid and the World Wildlife Fund. It is geared towards providing and protecting water sources, informing and educating communities, enabling people to prosper and driving economic development across the world. The programme is implemented in six countries.

The HWP in Nigeria is a five-year project implemented by WaterAid. It started in 2012 and is due to end in 2017. It focuses on water and sanitation and how it helps communities to flourish economically. The programme aims to significantly improve access to safe water, sanitation and hygiene for people living in the poorest communities in Nigeria.

One objective of the project is to change the lives of individuals and transform the livelihoods of communities. Another is to provide evidence of how essential water is to all human activity and a fundamental driver of all socio-economic growth. Within the five-year implementation period, the project seeks to provide access to safe water for 173,165 people and improved sanitation and hygiene to 316,280 people in Nigeria.

In order to realise these objectives, the HWP provides financial support to enhance the capacity of the project beneficiaries by implementing integrated WASH education in rural communities. The HWP also strengthens the organisational capacity of WASH institutions through staff recruitment, development of policies and organisational guidelines.

4.3.4.2 Project Beneficiaries

The beneficiary states in Nigeria under the project are Benue, Bauchi and Plateau. The project is being implemented in a total of 10 LGAs within these three states, 4 in Plateau namely Pankshin, Kanke, Langtang North and recently Bokkos; 4 in Bauchi namely Dass, Bogoro, Ningi and Ganjuwa; and 2 LGAs in Benue, Logo and Ado

4.4 Data Collection Methods

As previously stated the research made use of a number of different methods to enhance the collection of qualitative data. These include documentary analysis, interviews, focus group and observation. In the following sections, I first provide brief academic description of these methods before going on to describe what I did in the field.

4.4.1 Documentary and Discourse Analysis

In studying the case study projects and organisations, discourse analysis is used. Discourse is the complex process by which we communicate with each other about particular topics (Gaventa, 2003). Such analysis is necessary if we are to understand the underlying assumptions that shape a particular discourse, its internal rules, how it operates, and how it changes overtime. Discourse is commonly reflected in text, conversation and practical application (ibid.). The knowledge embodied in discourse should not be seen as being representative of universal truth, but rather as an exercise of power (ibid.).

The analysis follows a 'realist governmentality' approach (McKee, 2009; Stenson, 2005), which combines text-based analysis with more grounded ethnographic research of governmental practices (Rosol, 2014). A realist governmentality method 'integrates political economy with an emphasis on politics, governance, and choice in sub-national settings' (Stenson, 2008:10). Using a governmentality analysis, key text is analysed to examine the changing rationalities of liberal rule (Stenson, 2008). In a realist governmentality approach, the role of politics, local culture and shifting rationalities of rule are emphasised (ibid.).

4.4.2 Key Informant Interviews

Interviewing is a core research method used across all social sciences and should be considered a conversation in which one person has the role of a researcher (Reed, 2008). In a semi-structured interview, the researcher is guided by a pre-set interview protocol made up of a set of questions or a simple list of subjects for discussion. The interviewer uses the protocol with flexibly, allowing the interviewee to respond in the order and manner of their choosing (ibid.).

Questions can be asked and answered in or out of sequence. Semi-structured interviewing allows the researcher to ask additional questions that occur to them during the interview but which may not be on the protocol. Semi-structured interviews are most useful where the researcher seeks information regarding a specific, defined phenomenon such as an event or some aspect thereof, and can produce reasonably focused data with significant depth (ibid.).

4.4.3 Focus Group Discussions

A focus group is a planned discussion among a small group of stakeholders facilitated by a skilled moderator. It is designed to obtain information about experiences, preferences and values pertaining to a defined topic, and why these are held, by observing the structured discussion of an interactive group in a permissive, non-threatening environment.(Gibbs,1997) Thus, a focus group can be seen as a combination of a focused interview and a discussion group. They are particularly useful when participants' reasoning behind their views is of interest, and they can reveal the process by which participants develop and influence each other's' ideas and opinions in the course of the discussion (Crew, 2009).When the power differential between the participants and the decision-makers is great enough to discourage frank participation, the focus group provides the security of a peer group. The multiple voices of the participants, as well as the flexibility of the process structure, results in limited researcher control over the focus group process. Sometimes group expression can interfere with individual expression and the results may reflect 'groupthink' (ibid). Table 4.1 provides a summary of actors interviewed and their numbers. FGDs were only held with WASHCOMs.A total of 7 FGDs were held with 11 WASHCOMs.

Table 4.1: Summary of actors interviewed and their numbers.

Actors	Number of Interviews
LGA WASH Staff	9
Natural Leaders	5
CLTS Facilitators	6
Staff of National NGOs	4
Staff of WaterAid	6
WASH Consultants	5
Traditional Rulers	7
	42

4.4.4 Observation

Observation was used for data collection. Observation allows the researcher to have a close and intimate familiarity with the practices of participants in a research study (Kawulich, 2005). Observation involves four major stages. The first stage is establishing rapport with the participants of the research, this is followed by actual observation on the field. During observation, a record is made of observations made. The final stage is the analysis of data gathered (Johnson and Sackett, 1998).Observation has several limitations. A major limitation is that observations from the researcher may be limited by his personal belief (ibid.). This may influence the way he analyses and interprets data. Observation was used in the study to observe CLTS triggering in communities.

4.5 Fieldwork in Project Communities

4.5.1 Timeline for Data Collection

A pilot study was initially conducted in April 2013.The pilot study was necessary to determine the categories of respondents, complete interview guidelines, questionnaires, evaluators' guidelines etc. This informed the development of the final data collection plan as the projects progressed and analysis of the initial data was completed. Fieldwork was conducted in January 2015 to observe CLTS triggering activities and the progress of the project, and to collect further information. Table 4.2 shows the timeline for data collection.

Table 4.2: Timeline for data collection

Phase	Activities	Dates
Pilot	• Attendance at UNICEF participatory tools workshop • Preliminary chart with staff of WaterAid Nigeria	April,2013
	• Observation of CLTS sensitisation meetings • Observation of CLTS triggering meetings • Key informant interviews with LGA staff, traditional rulers and Project beneficiaries • Focused group discussions with WASHCOMs	January 23, 2015 to 13th February 2015
Telephone, Skype and WhatsApp based interviews	• Interviews with LGA Staff • Interviews with WASH Consultants • Interview with staff of National NGOs in Nigeria	February to May 2016

4.5.2 Selection of Project Communities and Interviewees

Purposive sampling ensures that sites and interview participants are relevant to the research questions (Bardosh, 2014).Purposive sampling was used to select respondents for key informant interviews and focused group discussions. Interviews were not conducted with community members in general but with members of WASH institutions created by the Projects. States, LGAs and communities participating in the STS project were used as the sampling frame for the study.3 LGAs per project were randomly selected from a list of all LGAs where the projects were implemented. The communities selected for the community based interviews were selected based on preliminary baseline data on the communities.2 communities were purposively selected for interviews. For each LGA, two communities with the lowest number of household latrines were selected for the study.

4.5.3 Interviews with WaterAid Staff

A total of 6 Semi structured interviews were conducted with staff of WaterAid in Nigeria working on the HWP and STS projects. The purpose of the interviews was to reveal how the two case study projects were implemented. The interviews also sought to explain the relationship between WaterAid and the state partners involved in the implementation of the projects. The interview with the STS Project Coordinator, HWP Programme Coordinator and the Jigawa State Programme Support Manager were conducted using Skype. The interviews sought to reveal the rationales for the use of CWM in project implementation, how CWM is implemented and the technologies used to achieve CWM. Skype interviews lasted for an average of two hours.

During the fieldwork, the Project Manager for Ekiti was Folake Aliyu, and that for Enugu was Jude Emessim. The Programme Support Managers for Ekiti operated from the WaterAid head office in Abuja with regular visits to project locations in Ekiti. The Programme Support Manager for Enugu was based in Enugu with regular visits to project locations within the LGA.

4.5.4 Interviews with LGA WASH unit staff

Nine semi-structured key informant interviews were conducted with staff of WASH units in 7 LGAs. Since WaterAid works through LGA WASH units to implement the two case study projects, interviews were conducted to explain the relationship between the state and INGOs. Five of the interviews were conducted with LGA staff working with the STS project while four interviews were conducted with LGA staff working with the HWP project. Seven WASH unit staff interviewed were heads of WASH units (coordinators) in their LGAs.

4.5.5 Interview with Staff of National Non-Governmental Organisations

A total of four semi structured interviews were conducted with staff of national NGOs working with the two projects. The purpose of the interviews was to understand the nature of the relationship between INGOs and state NGOs. The national NGOs were also responsible for supervising state WASH units. The interviews provided information on the dynamics of the relationships. Two interviews were conducted with two NGOs working with the HWP Programme in Plateau and Benue states. The national NGOs were the Community Based Development Non-Governmental Organization (CBD-NGO) and the Childcare Foundation. Additionally, two interviews were conducted with the Project Coordinator for the Jigawa branch of the Network for Civil Society Organisations (NEWSAN) and the Justice Development and Peace Initiative working with the STS Project. The interview with NEWSAN was carried out using WhatsApp.

4.5.6 Interviews with WASH consultants and staff of other WASH related NGOs

Five semi structured key informant interviews were conducted with independent WASH consultants that previously offered consultancy services to the two case study projects. A major strategy for implementing CWP is the capacity building of WASH unit staff and communities to enable them take responsibility for the delivery of WASH services in their communities. WASH consultants play a leading role in the production and dissemination of knowledge within the case study projects.

4.5.7 Key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGD) with project beneficiaries.

Seven focus group discussions were conducted with WASHCOMs. Convening members of WASHCOMs in five project locations was difficult because of the unavailability of WASHCOM members. FGDs were planned in these communities but could not be held.

Table 4.3: Types and numbers of project beneficiaries interviewed

S/N	Category of Project Beneficiaries	Number of interviews
1	Traditional Rulers	7
2	Natural Leaders	5
	Total	**12**

FGDs with WASHCOMs provided information on how CWP is perceived by project beneficiaries. FGDs also provided information on how CWP affects power relationships within project communities. Seven traditional rulers and five natural leaders were also interviewed. The beneficiaries interviewed did not include members of WASHCOMs. Table 4.3 shows the numbers and categories of project beneficiaries interviewed.

4.5.8 Observation of CLTS Triggering Meetings

Four triggering meetings were witnessed in January 2015.The purpose of these triggering meetings was to present the ideas and challenges of open defecation to communities, so that they could collectively decide whether they wanted to take action to stop open defecation, which actions to take and eventually to design a plan for carrying out those actions. The plans they designed and decided to carry forward or implement were expected to meet local needs and contexts. The underlying principle, as described in Chapter Two, is that sanitation is a common good requiring collective action. The sanitation behaviour of one household affects the health and wellbeing of other households within the community. Triggering meetings are decision making, consultative processes. The observations of the triggering sessions provided information on the use of knowledge as a form of power to create behavioural change. Observation of the sessions also provided information on the perception of communities of the use of public meetings as a technology for achieving CWM.

Figure 4.1: Participants at Ile Odunrin triggering meeting

The four triggering meetings were slated for 3pm, which allowed school children to participate in the activity. Farmers would have also returned from the farm. As a preamble to the meetings, 'sensitisation' meetings were held with community leaders, aimed at selecting appropriate dates and encouraging good attendance. During the sensitisation meetings, project facilitators worked with community leaders to select dates and times that did not clash with weekly marketing activities or special community events.

Triggering meetings were held in open spaces within project communities. At the meeting in Illegosi, facilitators arrived to find no one waiting. Some wooden benches had been arranged for the meeting in front of the local church. Four elderly men were however waiting in front of a house nearby. The meeting eventually started at 3:47pm.

Table 4.4: Triggering in Moba LGA, Ekiti

DATE	GROUP 1	GROUP 2	GROUP 3	GROUP 4	GROUP 5
23/01/2015	Erinmope, Ibamogun/Ipo	Erinmope Ibamaja	Erinmope Oke-Okin	Erinmope Ibido/Iawro	Erinmope Oleyo
26/01/2015	Igogo Idemo 1	Igogo Idemo 2	Igogo Ilegosi	Igogo,Idoka	
27/01/2015	Irare	Irare	Osun,Ile Odunrin		
28/01/2015	Mekiti Osan	Odo Owa Osan	Idoromi Osan	Igbede Osan	
	Osan,Apata	Osan, Iwoye Odo	Osan Ileti	Osan, Ijigbe	

The table 4.4 above shows the dates and communities that participated in each triggering meeting. The table shows which team of facilitators were responsible for the facilitation in each community. The researcher followed various teams of facilitators, which allowed the researcher to observe how different facilitation styles affected the response of the project beneficiaries.

4.5.9 Observations of WASHCOM inception training

One WASHCOM training meeting was observed in Ikole LGA in Ekiti State. The purpose of the meeting was to provide training for new members of newly created WASHCOMs. A total of 20 WASHCOMs from the 20 communities who were selected to participate in the STS project in Ikole LGA for the WaterAid 2015 project implementation year, were in attendance at this meeting. The meeting was facilitated by four staff from the Ikole LGA WASH unit. Each WASHCOM had 10 members.

Figure 4.2: Training of New WASHCOM members in Ikole LGA, Ekiti State

4.5.10 Observations of CLTS planning/sensitisation meetings.

Two CLTS sensitisation meetings were observed in February 2015. The meetings observed were in Agu-Orba and Ogbolo Nkwo communities of Ndenu LGA in Enugu State. Sensitisation meetings were carried out as preambles to CLTS triggering meetings. The meetings were facilitated by staff of LGA WASH units who were CLTS facilitators. The purpose of these sensitisation meetings was to fix a date for the CLTS triggering meetings. The meetings also provided opportunities for NGOs to encourage project beneficiaries to attend triggering meetings. Community leaders include heads of trade associations, the local chief and heads of family compounds.

Figure 4.3: CLTS sensitisation meeting in Ogbollo Nkwo (Source: fieldwork, 2015)

The subject of discussion for the meeting (sanitation) was not disclosed during the sensitisation meetings. It is a requirement of CLTS, that the triggering session is kept as a surprise, to ensure that the element of disgust is achieved.

4.5.11 Review of Project Reports and Strategy Documents

Table 4.5 below shows a list of the documents reviewed as part of the research. A total of 69 project related documents were reviewed.

Table 4.5: List of policy documents reviewed

S/No	Type of documents	Number of Documents Reviewed
1	WaterAid STS and HSBC Periodic Reports	23
2	Newspapers and periodical publications	7
3	Policy briefings	17
4	Reports on frameworks	4
5	Unpublished internal documents	13
6	Country strategy documents	2
7	Nigerian WASH policy documents	3
		69

The category of documents reviewed included WaterAid strategy reports and policy briefing documents. These documents were important for examining the rationalities for strategies used by the case study projects to implement CWM.

4.5.12 Interviews using social media (Skype, Facebook, WhatsApp chat)

The period of fieldwork provided an opportunity to establish relationships with WaterAid staff, national NGO staff and WASH consultants. A group chat room was established on WhatsApp with the five WASH consultants interviewed for the research. The chat room allowed for continuous interaction about the interview questions. It also allowed interaction in an informal way, so a lot of issues could be discussed in a relaxed environment. The process proved useful,

especially in interviews in Jigawa state, which the researcher could not visit because of security issues related to the Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria. The weakness of the use of social media was that the human impression, or the ability to observe facial expressions and body language, was lacking in the process. A major advantage of the use of social media is that it allowed the researcher to easily contact the interview participants to fill information gaps noted during the analysis of the interview results.

4.6 Methods of Data Analysis

4.6.1 Qualitative Content Analysis

Qualitative analysis involving indexing, coding, summarising, identifying and mapping patterns was used to draw out and present the relevant findings from thee research study. Qualitative content analysis as a research method is based on a systematic and objective examination of empirical data. It is a widely applicable tool for organizing and arranging various types of written documents. The aim is to get a condensed and broad description of the phenomenon by organising and classifying the data, condensing words, phrases and the like into fewer content-related categories and focusing on themes and patterns. Sentences and passages from the research data are used as the unit of analysis (World Bank, 2007). Nvivo qualitative analytical software was used to conduct content analysis of the interview documents.

4.7 Description of Project Communities

This section describes the communities where field work for the research was conducted. The communities are described with a focus on their access to WASH services. The section also provides information on their sanitation and hygiene practices. Table 4.6 shows the study locations under the STS and HWP projects.

Table 4.6: Study locations

Project	State	Selected LGA	List of communities
STS Project			
	Ekiti	Moba	Illegosi,Odunrin,Osan Ekiti and Igogo Idoka
	Enugu	Ndenu LGA	
HSBC Project			
	Bauchi	Ganjuwa	Tsiri and Tibbakko
	Plateau	Kanke	Song Song and Nekong
	Benue	Logo	Agba Town Centre and Vandikiya LGA

4.7.1 Communities where field work was conducted under HSBC Water Project

Fieldwork was carried out in the three states participating in the HWP programme. The states include Bauchi, Plateau and Benue state. Six communities were visited in the three states. The communities visited in the three states are described in table 4.7 below.

Figure 4.4: Queuing to fetch water in Agba Town Centre

Figure 4.5: Communal latrine in Vandicom

Table 4.7: Description of HSBC field work communities

Bauchi State		Plateau State		Benue State	
Tibbakko	***Tsiri***	***Song Song***	***Nekong***	***Agba Town Centre***	***Ugbende Mue***
-Mostly Fulani Nomads Predominant languages are Hausa and Fulani -Fully Islamic population -No functional improved water facilities -River runs through community but dries up during peak dry season -Water is most essential for ablutions -Majority of households have latrines	-Mostly cattle rearers -Predominant language is Hausa -Fully Islamic population -No improved water facilities -Has a river and a non-functional hand pump borehole constructed from a 2010 WaterAid Project -Water most essential for human and animal consumption -Most households have latrines	-Predominantly Christian -Has a single functional hand pump borehole constructed by Bogoro LGA -Water is of most essence for drinking and domestic activities -Has not previously witnessed a project by any INGO	-Mainly Christian -Formerly a missionary settlement for the Church of Christ in Nigeria (COCIN) -Presence of primary and secondary schools constructed by COCIN -Relatively higher literacy level -No improved water point -Most houses have latrines	-Semi Urban -Three Kilometres from LGA Capital -LGA and Hospital staff make up majority of population -Project provided a diesel run water scheme -Residents pay £0.02 for every 50 litres of water bought from water facility -Money is kept by WASHCOM and used for maintenance of water facility	-Predominantly Christians -Mostly polygamous marriage households -Women contribute to farm labour -Predominantly farming population -Yam cultivation is major source of income -No improved water facility -Households share communal latrines

Figure 4.6: CLTS sensitisation meeting in Agu-Orba

4.7.2 Communities where field work was conducted under the STS Project

Fieldwork was carried out in the two states participating in the STS project. The states include Enugu and Ekiti states. Six communities were visited in the two states. The communities visited in the two states are described in table 4.8 below.

Table 4.8: Description of STS Field work communities

Enugu State		**Ekiti State**			
Agu-Orba	***Ogbollo Nkwo***	***Igogo Idoka***	***Ilegosi***	***Odunrin***	***Osan Ekiti***
-Cassava farming is main source of income -Predominantly mud houses -Most households do not have latrines -No improved water source -Main access road is untarred and sandy	-Predominantly cassava farmers -Four wells provide water for domestic use -Strong traditional system of administration -Traditional council headed by an 'Igwe' -12 Advisors make up the traditional council -Advisors are drawn from trade associations and age groups	-Predominantly Christian population -Non-functional motorised solar borehole -High prevalence of open defecation -Communal toilets shared by several households	-Semi-rural -Households live in compounds -10-15 households in a compound Predominantly Christian population -Head of compound is oldest male in the family -27% of households had access to latrines -Dead are buried outside family compounds -No functional water point	-Nearest improved water point is 1km away -No latrines in most households -Communal latrines are built outside houses -Fear of witches and wizards limit the use of communal latrines at night	-Cocoa farming community -One functional hand pump borehole provides drinking water -Water for other domestic used fetched from a river

Figure 4.7: Non-functional borehole in Igogo Idoka



Figure 4.8: Map of Ekiti State showing LGAs

4.8 Ethical Considerations

Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the University of Reading. The Institute of Fiscal Studies in the UK also obtained ethical clearance from the Federal Ministry of Health in Nigeria, which covered data collection under the STS project. A full description of the aims, objectives and purposes of the research was given to all participants for each component of the

research, in a language readable and acceptable to them. Some interviews were held in the local languages of the interview participants. Responses were recorded verbatim as soon as they were made.

The use and circulation of the information gathered was explained to all the participants and consent was sought before the commencement of the research. The research observed the ethical principles of honesty, integrity and fair representation.

4.9 Assumptions and Risks

The study assumed that communities and other stakeholders would respond positively to the research process and be available for data collection exercises. Effective organisational and community entry processes helped to ensure the cooperation of research stakeholders. Lack of commitment by stakeholders can be mitigated by ensuring participatory consultation, regular communication, and promotion of the project's achievements and learning points (IFS, 2014). Risks that are not necessarily within the researcher's control and which may adversely affect the project include the political instability in Nigeria and violence related to the current Boko Haram insurgency in Northern Nigeria.

4.10 Limitations of the Research Methodology

A key limitation of this study is the inability of the research to conduct interviews with all sections of selected project communities. Research was focused on institutional WASH structures created to achieve CWM.

Another key limitation of the research methodology was the refusal of some interview participants to have the interviews recorded. It was not possible to record interviews with government staff especially LGA WASH staff. Some interview respondents felt recorded information they provide may be shared with WaterAid who may penalise them. This was despite the commitment to confidentiality from the researcher. Interview respondents were also unwilling to discuss certain aspects of CWM. These aspects included topics like financial strategies and the role of traditional rulers in CWM.

A further limitation was the lack of access to certain areas in Northern Nigeria because of the insurgency during the period the implementation was planned. It was not possible to visit communities in Jigawa state. Interviews with LGA staff in Jigawa was carried out using skype.

The researcher made two trips to Nigeria during the research period. It was not possible to make more trips to Nigeria to undertake interviews as the researcher would have wanted. The

limited time for the research and the limited financial resources available to the researcher meant that fieldwork had to be limited. The use of social media and telephone interviews provided alternative means for data collection.

4.11 Conclusion

This chapter described the research design for the thesis. The case study qualitative approach was used to investigate the practice of CWM in the STS and HWP projects implemented by WaterAid in Nigeria. Case study projects were purposively selected based on their use of CWM as a strategy for empowering beneficiaries to take responsibility for providing WASH services in their communities. The combination of four qualitative data collection techniques of key informant interviews, focused group discussions, observation and document review provided quality data for the research. Combining the four data collection methods allowed for triangulation of findings from each individual method. The next chapter presents the findings from the research. Chapter five will discuss decentralisation as a strategy for CWM based on data gathered from the case study projects.

Chapter 5: Decentralisation and CWM

5.0 Introduction

Chapter four presented the methodology of the thesis. The chapter introduced the case study projects and the various tools and methods used for data collection and analysis. The empirical analysis undertaken to answer the research question identifies three key strategies through which WaterAid seek to achieve participation and empowerment of local communities in the context of the two case study WASH projects in Nigeria. The first is creating decentralised institutions; the second is capacity building and lastly gender mainstreaming. This chapter examines two of these strategies – decentralization and gender mainstreaming. The chapter examines the rationale and strategies for decentralisation as deployed by WaterAid in the bid to empower local communities and divulge power towards the delivery of WASH services under the two case study projects. The main focus is on two key institutions that serve as organs of decentralisation under the projects. These are the WASH units and WASHCOMs. The analysis indicates that while WaterAid presents these institutions as relevant for successful project implementation, ownership and sustainability of the project gains, they may also serve as tools designed to enable WaterAid depoliticise and manage the complex challenges associated with the implementation of WASH in Nigeria. The complex challenges associated with WASH implementation discussed in this chapter ensure that the power dynamics inherent to governmentality do not get built up and people do not become subjects. Before delving into the analysis of the institutions as strategic tools, I begin with a discussion on the actors involved in implementing the projects and how the projects are implemented.

5.1 How the STS and HSBC Projects are implemented

In chapter four, we provided a background and rationality for designing the HSBC and STS projects (herein referred to as 'the projects'). Over the years, INGOs working in the area of water and sanitation in Nigeria have sought to harmonise the implementation of CWM and the delivery of CLTS. In 2012, a hand book entitled *'Implementation of CLTS in rural communities'* was developed by UNICEF. The hand book spells out guidelines and provides a frame work for CLTS and CWM implementation in Nigeria. The implementation plan for the two case study projects follows the guidelines spelled out in the handbook. In the next section, the stages in the implementation of the projects is described.

5.1.1 Election of beneficiary states and LGAs

The implementation of the STS and HSBC projects commenced with a selection of participating states. WaterAid selected states to participate in its projects through a vulnerability assessment, after which WaterAid signed a partnership agreement with states selected to participate in the project. At LGA level, memoranda of understanding (MOU) were developed between the LGAs and WaterAid. The partnership agreement defined the roles and responsibilities of all stakeholders involved in the project.

5.1.2 Selection of Project Beneficiary Communities

The next step after the selection of states and LGAs was completed was the selection of communities that will participate in the projects. Often the main criterion for selection of communities for participation is vulnerability, which is determined by the prevalence of open defecation practices in communities. Appendix one shows the selection criteria and ranking system for evaluating potential communities. The LGA WASH department is responsible for identifying potential beneficiary communities. Communities are invited to complete an application form. The selection of communities is conducted by a committee made up of representatives from government and civil society institutions. Under the HWP, the project is implemented in 20 communities each financial year. A financial year starts in April for the HWP Project while the financial year for the STS project commences in June. After project implementation for one financial year, WaterAid withdraws from the beneficiary communities and commences work in new communities. After recent reviews linked the lack of project sustainability to short periods of project implementation in communities, the STS project now works in project communities for two financial years.

5.1.3 Baseline Data Collection

The baseline data collection of the STS project was implemented by the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS). The IFS was commissioned by WaterAid with funds from the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation. The purpose of the baseline survey was to collect preliminary information which will serve as the basis for evaluating project performance in communities. The baseline survey was quantitative, meaning that only quantitative tools were used in the collection of WASH related information from households and village leaders. In collecting the baseline data and identifying communities for intervention, the IFS made a list of all communities in the study area. The baseline was intended to cover the entire LGA and all communities were involved in the process. Selection of beneficiary communities under the STS project was based

on randomisation. This was part of on-going research into the impact of CLTS by the Institute of Fiscal Studies in London. Measuring impact plays a key role in shaping the daily activities of NGOs and the discursive strategies they employ to think through these activities (Mueller et al, 2017).Monitoring and Evaluation is revealed as a central discursive element in the constitution of NGOs appropriate to neoliberal development. The baseline exercise provides preliminary data for evaluation.

5.1.4 Triggering meetings

The next step after selection of the beneficiary communities was the training of CLTS facilitators. This process took a week in Moba LGA of Ekiti state. The content of the training included topics on community entry process and facilitation skills. Facilitators for triggering meetings were selected from the LGA and spoke the local language. Training of CLTS facilitators was followed by community sensitisation and triggering meetings. The triggering meetings culminated in the development of action plans and the selection of natural leaders to support the work of promoting an open defecation free community. In chapter six, a more detailed description of triggering sessions is made.

5.1.5 Selection of Natural Leaders

During the triggering meeting, a Volunteer called the 'natural leader' is selected in each community. The 'natural leader' was responsible for keeping records of houses with latrines and the status of latrine construction in the village. The 'natural leader' was also responsible for mobilising project beneficiaries to carry out project activities. In addition to 'natural leaders, Village Hygiene Promoters (VHPs) responsible for promoting sanitation uptake in communities were also selected. Traditionally, the NGO sector as discussed in chapter three have relied on voluntary labour for provision of services in the sector. This has reduced overtime while the call for credentialised workers has increased (Barnes, 2006).

5.1.6 Formation and Training of WASHCOMs

A key feature of CWM is the formation of Water Sanitation and Hygiene Committees (WASHCOMs).WASHCOMs are responsible for the day to day management of water facilities and campaigns against open defecation in project communities. WASHCOMs are established after triggering meetings are completed. The LGA WASH unit provided initial inception training to the Natural leaders, WASHCOMs and local artisans. The Natural leaders received training on record keeping and community mobilisation while WASHCOMs received

training on fundraising, community mobilisation and record keeping. In Chapter six of this thesis, training of WASHCOMs is further explored.

5.1.7 Construction of Household Latrines

After triggering meetings and the development of action plans, households without access to latrines were encouraged to commence latrine construction. Recently under the STS project, a sanitation marketing component has been introduced. This makes cheap models of latrines available to communities at affordable prices. During fieldwork this component of the project was still at the planning stage. The process of constructing latrines takes place at household level. Each household is expected to own a latrine. Under the CLTS process, no form of cash or material subsidy was provided for the construction of latrines, each household was expected to source funds for its latrine and build using local processes.

The LGA WASH unit staff, Natural leaders and WASHCOMs, promoted construction of latrines, through regular visits to households and community meetings. The LGA WASH unit also paid regular visits to the communities to meet with the beneficiaries. In addition to the construction of household latrines, the communities were encouraged to construct public latrines also called institutional latrines at motor parks, market squares and other public places. The LGA, with funds from WaterAid, provided support for the construction of institutional latrines in schools and health facilities.

A community is declared open defecation free (ODF) after households change their behaviour of open defecation and build latrines. A team from the LGA inspects each community to ascertain if the community can be declared ODF. The parameters for assessment include behavioural change, construction of household and institutional latrines. Evidence of faecal matter and the level of environmental sanitation is also examined. ODF declaration is initially granted by the LGA WASH unit. Upon declaring ODF, a State Task Group on Sanitation (STGS) visits the community for inspection. The STGS certifies the community ODF if the community meets all its criteria as described above. A similar process is repeated at national level by the National Task Group on Sanitation (NTGS). The NTGS grants a national ODF certification to communities that qualify.

The foregoing account of how the STS and HSBC projects are designed to be implemented reveals a neoliberal rationality in which volunteers, associations and the state are assembled to implement WASH services beyond the state.The project design reveals a complex arrangement of trying to implement WASH beyond the state. The next section presents or discusses the

actors that are assembled together to implement the projects and the interaction/relationship between them.

5.2 International and National Non State Actors and Project delivery

Hoogesteger (2016) attributes the rise of INGOs in International development initiatives to the internationally increased attention for 'less state' and more 'bottom up; market based' development and increasing levels of civil society participation in issues concerning their own development. International NGOs have been recognised as key actors in pursuing the SDG goals of providing access to WASH services in developing countries (Brinkerhoff et al, 2007 as sited by Hoogesteger, 2016). As stated earlier in chapter two, the WASH sector in Nigeria is dominated by Non-governmental organisations who have taken a leading role in the provision of WASH services. The STS and HSBC projects are implemented by a combination of International and national non-state Actors combined in a 'multi actor networks' (ibid). Table 5.1 shows the international INGOs involved in implementing the two case study projects. They include WaterAid, the Institute of fiscal studies and the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation (BMGF).

Table 5.1: International Non-Governmental Organisations and their responsibilities

PROJECT	Name of Organisation	Role/Responsibility within the project
STS	Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation	Project Financing Evaluation of Project to ensure consistency with financing objectives and agreement.
	Institute of fiscal studies London	Research component of the project
	WaterAid UK	Financing Capacity strengthening of LGA institutions and staff Supervision of Project Implementation Direct advocacy campaign at Federal Government level.
HSBC Project	HSBC Water Programme	Project Financing Evaluation of Projects to ensure consistency with Project financing objectives and agreement.
	Evaluation company	Midterm and end of project evaluation
	WaterAid	Financing Capacity strengthening of LGA institutions and staff Supervision of Project Implementation Direct advocacy campaign at Federal Government level.

It is interesting to note the diversity of International INGOs involved in implementing the STS and HSBC programme. The level of cooperation between various actors stems beyond international borders. The table also shows a specialization in functions and responsibility in which some non-state actors like the Bill and Melinda Gates foundation focus on providing funding to other international Non state actors to implement the projects. The centre for the evaluation of development policies based at the institute of fiscal studies in London is responsible for the research component of the STS project. Under the project, they are responsible for designing and implementing a research study to document the effect of CLTS on the sanitation behaviour of project communities. Implementation is done with the support of WASH units in the respective research LGAs. The signing of partnerships between Government and WaterAid represents a shift in the administration of welfare where the pressure to increase welfare services leads to increasing involvement of NGOs like WaterAid in the provision of WASH services. Such partnerships depict a new relationship between the state and civil society (White 2006). The formalization of state-civil society relations represents a strategy for rebuilding the capacity of the welfare state in the wake of the neoliberal attack of the 1980s and 90s (ibid).

5.2.1 Decision making Structure under the projects

A major benefit or claim of decentralisation is its ability to allow for decision making at lower levels(Marcus,2007).Under the Sustainable Total Sanitation Project (STS), the three states of Jigawa, Ekiti and Enugu states where the project is implemented are managed by 3 Programme Support Managers one representing each state. The Programme support managers for Ekiti and Jigawa are based at the WaterAid headquarters in Abuja, the Nigerian capital. They make regular trips to the project locations to supervise implementation. The Programme Support Manager for Enugu is however based in Enugu. The 3 programme Support Managers are responsible for the regular management of the STS project and have authority to approve budgets and authorise expenditure for activities drawn in the project work plan. The Management functions carried out by staff of WaterAid as part of the project includes designing programmes, work plans and capacity building activities.

Programme Support Managers relate directly with the staff of National NGOs, RUWASSA, and LGAs and occasionally with WASHCOMs during capacity building exercises. They report directly to a Head of programmes, who reports to a Country Representative based in Nigeria. A Programme Support Coordinator who is also based in the head office in Abuja is responsible for coordinating the relationship between the three states and the office in Abuja. The HSBC

project maintains a similar decision-making structure as the STS project. A programme support coordinator supported by a programme assistant is responsible for project implementation for the three beneficiary states.

5.3 Roles and Responsibility of State Actors

A combination of state institutions at Federal, State and Local government levels are involved in project implementation. Table 5.2 shows the responsibility of state actors under the two case study projects.

Table 5.2: Responsibilities of State Actors

Project	Name of Organisation	Responsibility under the project
STS	Federal and state Ministries of Water resources	• Policy formulation and regulation of water resources development
	Rural Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Agency(RUWASSAs)	• Supervision of project implementation at LGA level • Capacity building of LGA staff
	Water and Sanitation Unit/Department of LGAs	• Implementation of project at community level • Capacity building and training of communities
	National Water Resource Institute	• Generation, documentation and dissemination of knowledge related to lessons learnt during project implementation
HWP	Federal Ministry of Water Resources	• Policy formulation and regulation of water resources development
	Rural Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Agency	• Supervision of project implementation at LGA level • Capacity building of LGA staff
	Water and Sanitation Unit/Department of LGAs	• Implementation of project at community level • Capacity building and training of communities

The LGA WASH units are the lowest units within which programme implementation takes place at state level. In section 5.5, the thesis presents a discussion on LGA WASH units and their responsibilities. The responsibility of state institutions under the project revolves around

policy formulation, research dissemination and programme implementation. It is interesting to note that in addition to interacting directly with RUWASSAS and LGAs towards programme implementation, the projects also relate with National state institutions to influence WASH policy at the national level. The Strategy of influencing policy at the national level, while focusing on programme delivery at community or LGA level provides an enabling environment within which WASH projects are implemented. Participatory development projects have been criticised in several literatures for focusing more on grass root implementation without influencing power dynamics and policy at the National level. The absence of enabling policies at national level limits the sustainability of WASH services at grass root levels (Eyben, 2006, Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

5.4 National NGOs as Managers of State WASH Units

Hoogesteger (2016) attributes the preference of INGOs for using National NGOs for project implementation over state agencies to be that-NGOs are more flexible and competitive than state agencies and can also be held accountable for resource spending and programme implementation. The national non state actors in the HSBC and STS projects are made up of national non-governmental organisations (referred to within the project literature as civil society organisations (CSOs)), that have an interest in water and sanitation. Such organisations are termed 'national' because they operate only within Nigeria. The findings from interviews with WaterAid staff describe the rationale for implementing the projects through CSOs:

> 'In each programme state, WaterAid engages one civil society organisation to support programme implementation. The national NGOs work with the LGA units to implement the project in communities with the support of WASHCOMs' (WaterAid staff).

> '...the use of National NGOs to promote the work of LGAs and communities is described within the project documents as a sustainability strategy' (WaterAid staff).

> '…Civil society partners are from LGAs where project implementation takes place. They understand the terrain and are sometimes able to relate faster and quicker with project beneficiaries' (WaterAid Staff).

From the quotes above, the rationality for involving National NGOs in project implementation relates to the sustainability of programme implementation since National NGOs have a constant presence in Project locations. National NGOs also have a better understanding of the local operating environment. To enable National NGOs function, WaterAid funds their activities. In addition, WaterAid provides training and capacity building to enable National

NGOs carry out responsibilities assigned to them. Under the STS and HSBC projects, National NGOs or CSOs assist WaterAid in day to day management and supervision of LGA partners, especially in Ekiti and Jigawa states, where WaterAid does not have physical offices.

Table 5.3: National non-governmental organisations and their responsibilities

PROJECT	Name of organisation	Role/responsibility within the project
STS		
	NEWSAN	• Advocacy at state and LGA level • Supervision of project implementation • Liaison office for WaterAid in the beneficiary state. • Training and capacity building of LGA WASH unit
	Justice Development and Peace Initiative	• Advocacy at state and LGA level • Supervision of project implementation • Liaison office for WaterAid in the beneficiary state. • Training and capacity building of LGA WASH unit
HWP		
	Children in Need	• Advocacy at state and LGA level • Supervision of project implementation • Liaison office for WaterAid in the beneficiary state. • Training and capacity building of LGA WASH unit
	CBD NGO	• Advocacy at state and LGA level • Supervision of project implementation • Liaison office for WaterAid in the beneficiary state. • Training and capacity building of LGA WASH unit
	NEWSAN	• Advocacy at state and LGA level • Supervision of project implementation • Liaison office for WaterAid in the beneficiary state. • Training and capacity building of LGA WASH unit
	Women Empowerment Initiative	• Advocacy at state and LGA level • Supervision of project implementation • Training and capacity building of LGA WASH unit
	National Peer Review Group	• Monitoring of sanitation project implementation across states
	State Task Group on Sanitation	• Monitoring of sanitation project at state level

Table 5.3 shows the responsibilities of national NGOs under the STS and HSBC projects. The advocacy component of the two case study projects at state and LGA level is a major responsibility of the national civil society organisations. The task of 'influencing' government is a key responsibility. National NGOs through advocacy campaigns are expected to bring legitimacy to governance processes through monitoring and evaluation activities on behalf of civil society and representing the public good (Edge and Eyles, 2015).

The suitability of CSOs to perform advocacy functions is related to their autonomy from state institutions. An LGA WASH coordinator noted:

> 'Advocacy is possible by CSOs because they are independent. They are not government institutions so they are able to speak on behalf of beneficiaries.'(National NGO staff).

> 'We are getting to do this [advocacy] with support from CSOs. We cannot talk to government directly. NEWSAN monitors WASH units and communities. When they attain ODF, NEWSAN checks if they are ODF. Anything pertaining to advocacy is handled by the CSOs. Government to government is difficult. I can only lobby but CSOs take things forward. I cannot report my superior officer because of the hierarchy' (LGA WASH unit staff).

The statements above reflects the role of civil society organisations in the projects as organisations that have the responsibility of promoting the participation of the state towards the provision of WASH services.The use of National CSOs is in line with neoliberal reforms which seeks to promote efficiency. National NGOs as project executers are often more flexible and competitive than state agencies while also being tightly held accountable for resource spending and project implementation (Andolina et al, 2009).The relationship between NGO participation and influence is however complex as they engage within imposed rule systems for conduct and governance which may affect their attempts at counter conduct.Multi-stakeholder processes like CWM can be viewed as 'technologies of power that attempt to strategically deploy possibilities of agency(Sending and Neumann,2006).

5.5 Decentralised state institutions as a Strategy for CWM

The thesis in section 5.2 introduced the various state institutions involved in the implementation of the projects. The WASH unit was mentioned as the lowest state organisation involved in delivering WASH services to communities. This section explores the rationality for creation of WASH units and how WASH units function. The relationship between WASH units and communities is fostered with support from traditional rulers and WASHCOMs. Project implementation by WASH units involves procurement, construction of WASH facilities and the training of communities. The next section presents the rationality for establishment of WASH units.

5.5.1 The Rationale for WASH Units

In Chapter two, the institutional arrangements for the delivery of WASH services in Nigeria were described. It was noted that LGAs have responsibility for the delivery of WASH services

according to the National Water policy. Their primary responsibility relates to service delivery and maintenance of WASH facilities. WaterAid implements WASH programmes through the LGA system. The WaterAid Nigeria Country Strategy for 2011-2015 summarises how its interventions are to be carried out in Nigeria.

> 'The strategy is to maintain a clear focus. We will advocate the rights based approach with emphasis on sustainability and collaboration with others. We will engage in direct partnerships and investments in local organizations and governments to both provide services and to drive demand and accountability through empowered citizens claiming their rights and exercising choice. We will also focus on equity and inclusion so that WASH reaches those who are often marginalised and missed out' (WaterAid, 2010:4).

It is clear from the above that WaterAids's approach to programme delivery is to stress to citizens that they have rights to WASH services and following on from that to seek to empower citizens through partnership and participation to claim their rights from the state. The overall objective is to attain sustainability. The country strategy defines sustainability as:

> 'making sure that communities continue to access WASH services that WaterAid contributed to providing even when the organisation discontinues its support' (WaterAid,2010:5).

This emphasis on creating and enabling local institutions is clearly spelt out in the Country Strategy document where it is stated that:

> 'WaterAid in Nigeria focuses its efforts on facilitating the establishment of functional systems such as the WASH units in the Local Government system, WASHCOMs at the community level, and the establishment of Water Consumer Associations as owners and managers of small town water schemes' (WaterAid,2010:7).

Similarly, another WaterAid report entitled *Think local act local*' stresses the point about facilitating local participation and the pursuit of community empowerment through decentralised institutions. The report states:

> 'WaterAid believes that local government authorities, who find themselves at the frontline of basic service provision, are key to the achievement of the water and sanitation Millennium Development Goal (MDG) targets to halve the proportions of people without access to clean water and safe sanitation' (WaterAid,2016:6).

It is apparent that the rationale for the creation of WASH units is borne out of a desire by WaterAid to work through proxies or what Cornwall (2008:75) calls 'intermediary institutions'

that have political legitimacy and democratic mandate to provide WASH services. The strategy is supported by the sustainability discourse on which the desirability to ensure project continuation beyond immediate international support is strongly emphasised. It is interesting to note that the creation of WASH units at the local government level is not a voluntary exercise left to the volition of the government. Rather WaterAid and indeed other INGOs require that all LGAs participating in its projects establish a WASH unit. This prescriptive approach is regular feature in many other participatory development initiatives where governments' agencies or communities are made to participate in invited spaces and pre-determined conditions set by the international NGOs or aid organizations (Summerville et al., 2008).

WaterAid often defends this prescription on the basis that the establishment of WASH units is part of the requirements of the national WASH policy. However, what is less often stated is the influential role played by WaterAid in drafting the national policy. In establishing WASH units and departments, WaterAid believe that governance and decision making powers will be brought much closer to the people resulting in more effective community participation and empowerment. In Foucauldian terms this represents a movement away from a nation-based politics towards associative democracy whereby community comes to play an active role in political decision-making (Summervile et al., 2005:4; Giddens 2000). One argument is that the existence of WASH units will reduce the bureaucratic process and enhance programme implementation in chosen communities. The vision is of a networked governance arrangement where the federal and state government focus on policy formulation, while the local governments through the WASH units champion service delivery.

Narratives from interviews with WASH consultants and WaterAid staff re-echo the vision and sentiments expressed in the policy documents as the following selection of quotes show:

> 'The LGA needs to play an important role in delivering WASH services to communities. They are closer to the people. Since the constitution gives them responsibilities for WASH, it is necessary that we have structures at the LGA that will take care of such responsibilities' (WaterAid staff).
>
> 'LGA WASH units are the vehicles through which the LGA can fulfil its responsibility to deliver WASH services to communities. We are committed to ensure not only their creation but also their effective functioning" (WaterAid Staff).

> ‘Our observation is that LGAs that do not have WASH units do not have a strong WASH activity. We believe that having WASH units is an important for implementing WASH programmes’ (WaterAid Staff).

> ‘Before the creation of WASH units, interventions in the WASH sector at LGA level were scattered. In Udenu, we had different departments during that period responsible for different aspects of WASH, this departments were works, health and community development. WASH administration was scattered. The creation of WASH units helps you to bring all WASH activities in the LGA under one roof’ (LGA WASH unit staff).

However, not everybody shares the view that the creation of WASH units in participating local governments is a necessary condition for successful implementation. Rather some critical voices opined that WASH units are created by INGOs like WaterAid, primarily to enable them to deliver services within LGAs without getting caught in the LGA bureaucratic bottleneck. A WASH consultant with a long experience working for WaterAid explained:

> ‘We do not need new units. What is the works department doing? What is the health department doing? WASH units are just duplication of responsibilities’.

Another WASH consultant was even more critical. He said:

> ‘WASH units are created to ensure the accountability of donor funds. It is not about sustainability and ownership. WaterAid insist on creating these units because it gives them power to run the programme the way they chose since they exerted plenty of influence in the creation of the units in the first place. They exercise more power with the units than they would with traditional and existing institutions in the local government’.

These critical voices are important because they appear to suggest that the Wash units are more or less instruments in the hands of WaterAid, created to help the organization achieve the purpose of gaining political legitimacy and embedding more closely with communities.

5.5.2 Operational structures of WASH units and new power relationships

Prior to the establishment of WASH units in the LGAs where the STS and HSBC projects are implemented (hereafter referred to as project LGAs), various departments within the LGA would be responsible for carrying out water and sanitation functions. Interviews with WASH staff show that WASH functions were predominantly performed by the health and works departments. The works departments were mainly responsible for construction of boreholes and latrines while the health departments of project LGAs would be responsible for hygiene and health education.

It was found that in departments where the WASH unit is domiciled, the coordinator reports to a head of department who is responsible for all units in the department. The WASH unit, which is headed by a coordinator, relates directly with WaterAid on issues related to the project. The LGA coordinator and the finance officer are directly responsible for implementing the activities of the WASH unit, reporting directly on a day to day basis to a programme manager who was based in Abuja. A committee, called a 'management committee', is responsible for overseeing decisions related to the WASH unit. A state NGO coordinator explains:

> 'There is a management committee for the project set up to provide support for the implementation of the project. The head of the department for WASH is part of the management team responsible for project implementation. Other members include traditional rulers and retired public officials in the LGA' (NGO Coordinator).

This structure is very interesting because what it means in essence is that the WASH units, while reporting and existing within the local government system, operate as autonomous units within the LGAs. However, the creation of self-functioning autonomous units within existing structures in the local government enables WaterAid to sidestep some government bureaucracies and keep tight control over project implementation.

It is evident from the account above that the creation of WASH units has reduced bureaucracy in terms of turnaround time for project implementation. Further, creation of WASH units has also served to increase the attention paid to WASH in the project LGAs. However, interviews with LGA staff, WaterAid and NGO staff also indicate that structural arrangements for the operation of the units has created new power relationships within the LGA structure.

Administration of finances under the STS and HSBC projects is managed by WaterAid. Funds for project implementation are transferred to the LGA WASH units which operates separate accounts for the project. The accounts are in the name of the LGA WASH unit. The LGA coordinator administers the delivery and use of funds with the supervision of WaterAid and the management committee. The signatories to the WASH unit account are, however, two members of the management team who are not staff of the LGA. The LGA executive committee has no direct control over project funds. A national NGO coordinator explains the arrangement:

> '...under the partners' agreement between WaterAid and the LGA, the LGAs have undertaken not to tamper with or borrow funds from the WASH unit account. The WASH unit is directly responsible for the administration of funds in the WASH unit account under the supervision of the chairman of the management team who is not a government official' (NGO staff).

He further explained:

> ‘The bank account for the WASH unit is separate from that of the LGA and has the WASH coordinator and the finance officer initiating expenditure after consultations with the WaterAid programme manager. The instructions for debiting this account comes directly from the programme support manager who is responsible for project implementation within the state’ (NGO staff).

The description above illustrates the relationship between WaterAid and a state agency (the WASH unit), in which the activity of the state agency is managed by a non-state agency, in this case the management committee. The WASH unit is, however, part of a larger department which is overseen by a director. A WASH coordinator describes his reporting arrangement:

> ‘I report to two people, my director at the LGA and WaterAid STS project coordinator’ (LGA WASH coordinator).

The study found that the reporting arrangement, where the LGA coordinator reports to the STS project coordinator and management committee directly, sets up new hierarchies thereby creating conflicts between the coordinators and their Directors. The coordinators, who are officers junior to the directors, in this arrangement have autonomous power to deal directly with WaterAid and manage funds that are meant for the WASH unit on a day to day basis without involving the directors of departments.

A national NGO staff explains:

> ‘Some decisions in the WASH are taken without the knowledge of the Directors. A good example is during the construction of institutional latrines. The directors in some LGAs were not aware of the cost of most items procured by the WASH coordinators’ (NGO coordinator).

However, WaterAid staff interviewed provided narratives that were contrary to the accounts described above. WaterAid staff stated that Directors who supervise WASH units are fully aware of the daily interactions within the WASH units and receive information on the activities of the unit, especially during the WaterAid annual round table meeting.

> ‘Every year, the STS and HSBC projects hold an annual partners review meeting during which the previous financial year is reviewed. Plans for the new financial year are made. The annual review and joint planning meeting are attended by chairmen of LGAs. It provides an opportunity for the LGA to present its needs to WaterAid’ (WaterAid staff).

Another WaterAid staff collaborated the statement:

> 'We relate directly with WASH coordinators to reduce bureaucracy and speedup programme implementation. We hold several other interactive sessions with departmental directors' (WaterAid staff).

Decentralised institutions, it is said, provide an opportunity for communities to participate in the delivery of WASH services (Boelens et al, 2013). The idea is that decentralised institutions such as the Wash Units are closer to WASH beneficiaries and provide opportunities for WASH beneficiaries to participate in the management of WASH resources under CWM (Babu, 2009). While bringing WASH services close to beneficiaries in keeping with a decentralisation agenda, WASH units also serve as instruments of control, within which donors attempt to manage project implementation without having to relinquish power to the LGA. The idea of multilevel or polycentric governance institutions has always been normatively appealing as a key tenet of advanced liberalism (Marcus, 2007).The foregoing account is another example that illustrates the complexity of implementing a WASH project in rural Nigeria which is characterised by limited state presence and capacity. Such complexities ensure that the aspirations of neoliberal governmentality are not realised. Project beneficiaries do not become subjects as prescribed in popular accounts of governmentality.

5.6 Counterpart Funding Strategy under CWM

There are several arguments in literature related to payment for water services. Some schools of thought see water as a common good that should be provided regardless of users ability to pay (Castor, 2007).This is in keeping with the discourse of water as a common good. Other thoughts in keeping with neoliberal rationalities suggest that water users should be involved in the payment for water services and also that public private partnerships should be enacted in seeking to supply water services.(Prokopy,2005).The financing and resource mobilisation strategy of the two projects is based on the later argument and involves a financial partnership arrangement in which INGOs, state and project beneficiaries are expected to contribute financially to the cost of implementing the projects. The contribution from state agencies and other project beneficiaries known as the 'counterpart fund' is deposited into the LGA WASH unit or department account. This fund is then utilised, together with funds that have been deposited in the LGA account by WaterAid for project implementation. In addition, the LGA is expected to provide the LGA WASH unit with a weekly imprest to enable the unit procure consumables and fuel motor cycles and vehicles for fieldwork.

The findings from a review of policy documents shows that demanding that the state and project beneficiaries contribute financially to the cost of constructing and maintaining WASH facilities provided by WaterAid is a way of ensuring sustainability. A WaterAid report on the sustainability of water supply in Tanzania links attaining sustainability in WASH services to the financial commitment of project beneficiaries.

> 'Sustainability today invariably depends upon communities taking financial responsibility for their schemes, which, if achieved, will enable scarce resources from government and donors to be targeted specifically on areas where there is no improved water supply' (WaterAid, 2015:11).

Similarly, Interviews with LGA staff corroborated the findings from policy documents as the following selection of quotes on financing for construction of institutional latrines indicate:

> 'Before now WaterAid funded construction of institutional latrines completely. Last year the communities agreed to dig a pits. Once communities have made contributions they will ensure that the project does not collapse. The cost of digging is about N100, 000 ($317 or £244)' (LGAWASH unit staff).

> 'Project beneficiaries need to take some responsibility for taking care of the facilities they have been provided with. One way they can take part is by sharing cost for facilities. If they have invested their money in the project, they will be committed to the project' (LGA WASH unit staff).

The two statements above presuppose a relationship between payment for services and the willingness of the project beneficiaries to play an active role in taking responsibility for the sustainability of the projects in their communities. Counterpart funding strategy illustrates another attempt to promote neoliberal rationality characterised by shared responsibilities between state and non-state actors in the provision of WASH services. This attempt is however constrained as the foregoing sections will show.

5.6.1 Counterpart funding requirements for state and community institutions

The basis for implementing counterpart funding agreements and for determining how much each sector of the government and the community should pay, is the draft National Water Policy which was discussed in chapter two. The three tiers of government are expected to make financial commitments towards the provision of WASH services.

Table 5.4: Cost sharing for capital investment in water supply in Nigeria

S/No	Agency	Rural Water Supply (%)	Small Towns Water Supply (%)	Urban Water supply (%)
1	Federal Government	50	50	30
2	State Government	25	30	60
3	Local Government	20	15	10
4	Community	5	5	-

Source: Draft National Water Supply and Sanitation policy, 2000

Table 5.4 shows the breakdown of financial contributions of the various tiers of government and communities with respect to the capital requirements for building new water schemes. The federal government has the major responsibility for capital investment in the construction of water facilities (50%).The LGA is expected to contribute 20% of the cost.

Table 5.5: Cost distribution for operation and maintenance of water supply in Nigeria

S/No	Agency	Rural Water Supply (%)	Small Towns Water Supply (%)	Urban Water supply (%)
1	Federal Government	Nil	Nil	Nil
2	State Government	10	Nil	100 –Tariff
3	Local Government	20	Nil	Nil
4	Community	70	100	Nil

Source: Draft National Water Supply and Sanitation Policy, 2000

In addition to contributing to the cost of constructing new water facilities, the various tiers of government and communities are also expected to share financial responsibility for the operation and maintenance of water schemes. Table 5.5 shows the breakdown of the distribution of the cost of operation and maintenance. Communities are expected, under this arrangement, to take the major financial responsibility for operation and maintenance of water schemes. The three tiers of government have no financial obligation for the operation and maintenance of small town water schemes; 100% of the cost is borne by communities. Similarly, communities are responsible for 70% of the cost of operation and maintenance of rural water supply schemes. The LGA has more responsibility for financing rural water supply schemes than the state arm of government.

5.6.2 LGAs and Financial Responsibilities

The preceding section made it clear that counterpart funding is a mandatory requirement for participation in the HSBC and STS projects. The findings from the study however showed that LGAs are ducking responsibility with regards to their financial contributions. State agencies and communities find it difficult to keep their obligation for counterpart funds. A WaterAid staff laments:

> 'We have not had success with getting communities and LGAs to contribute counterpart funding. They do not take it seriously. They sign agreements but nothing happens' (WaterAid HSBC staff).

Similarly, the report of the WaterAid annual round table meeting for 2015 shows that getting local governments to pay counterpart funds is a major challenge. Many LGAs have been unable to pay their contributions. During individual LGA presentations, 95% of the LGAs mentioned the unwillingness of LGAs to pay counterpart funding as a major factor affecting the implementation of the projects in their respective LGAs. The only state where the state government had paid counterpart funds was Jigawa. The four LGAs at the meeting from this state mentioned that they received counterpart funds from the state government.

Interviews with LGA staff, WaterAid staff and WASH consultants revealed several reasons why LGAs and communities are unable to pay counterpart funds. The main reason given in the interviews was linked to the lack of financial autonomy of LGAs. The findings show that that due to their lack of autonomy, the LGAs do not manage their funds.

> 'LGAs in Nigeria run joint accounts with state governments. Projects are implemented jointly with the state government. LGAs do not therefore have autonomy over their funds. This makes payments of counterpart funds difficult' (NGO staff).

Findings showed further that similar to LGAs, Communities also find it difficult to pay counterpart funds:

> 'Communities are not just able to cough up this large sum of money. Except where they approach a prominent son who happens to be a politician' (WASH consultant).

> '...the payment of counterpart funds by an illustrious son may lead to elite capture. Decisions on where to site WASH facilities may be made solely by the person that has paid the fund on behalf of the community. This may mean that marginalised members of the community are denied access to WASH services' (WASH consultant).

The payment of counterpart funding by illustrious sons from beneficiary communities enables communities to meet project requirement for counterpart funds. The interviews further showed as stated by a WASH consultant in the quote above that, where an illustrious son or a politician pays counterpart funds for a community, the illustrious son may influence the outcome of the project to his personal advantage. He could for example decide where a water point should be sited.

The preceding discussion limits the inability of communities and some LGAs to pay counterpart funds to lack of resources. This does not however tell the complete story. Interviews with some LGA staff revealed a different scenario in some LGAs. In interviews with members of WASH staff in several LGAs, it was revealed that LGAs drill boreholes through other departments instead of contributing the counterpart funding to the WASH department. The foregoing selected quotes illustrate this finding:

> '…the only funds that come to our department is the funds from WaterAid. The LGA budgets for boreholes and other WASH facilities. This money is given to the works department instead of the department for environment where the WASH unit is.'(WASH Coordinator)

> '…The LGA has constructed several boreholes this year. This was not handled by the WASH unit. It was instead handled by the works department. The works department should be responsible for all constructions. Our WASH unit is under the health department. (WASH Coordinator)

These findings show that while some LGAs fulfil WaterAid's requirement of establishing WASH units as a prerequisite to interventions in their LGA, they do not, however, implement the agreements signed under the partnership agreement which requires all WASH activities to be handled by WASH units. The requirement that LGAs pay counterpart funding is borne out of a desire by the two projects to make LGAs and communities share responsibility for services they benefit from, in keeping with neoliberal rationalities. The failure of LGAs and communities to meet their counterpart funding obligations may however lead to their exclusion from WASH services. Project literature however reveal a changing discourse with respect to counterpart funding. The state, as the 'duty bearer', is responsible for the provision of WASH services. Major funds for WASH services should come from the state. Funds from WaterAid and other stakeholders should only supplement state funds.

The account of counterpart funding illustrates the deployment of 'counterpart funding' as a governmental technology to enlist the participation of communities and the state in the

provision of WASH services. While several arguments have been advanced for the involvement of communities and the various tiers of government in the provision of WASH services, the socio economic characteristics and limited government resources coupled with poor government policies which prevents the effective separation of power between the three tiers of government ensures that the power dynamic inherent to governmentality does not get built up, and communities and state agencies WaterAid is attempting to conduct do not become subjectified.

5.7 Managing Community WASH Services through WASHCOMs

The increased participation of social actors arising from the formation of grass root institutions is expected to increase the participation of project communities in project implementation (Hoogesteger, 2016).Under the HSBC and STS projects, WASHCOMs are the primary institutions through which CWM is achieved. Findings from an examination of the case study projects showed that the formation of WASHCOMs like WASH units is borne out of a desire to promote ownership and sustainability of WASH services. A UNICEF Nigeria internal document, in describing the rationality for WASHCOMs, states:

> 'UNICEF will endeavour to ensure the overall ownership and sustainability of projects. This will primarily be attained through the community-led processes. WASHCOMs will be formed and involved in the project implementation cycle. The processes will ensure that communities are at the centre of their development taking the lead and responsibility at every level of project implementation. This will ensure social sustainability of projects and promote acceptance at the community level.' (UNICEF, 2015: 4)

This statement resonates the strategy of INGOs implementing WASH projects in Nigeria through WASHCOMs. WASHCOMs are the vehicle through which communities, which are the lowest unit of project implementation take leadership and responsibility for project implementation. The democratization of the implementation process is expected to foster ownership resulting in the sustainability of project gains. These results are relevant in the context of findings in other literatures which show that many international development projects seek to increase representation and hence participation of project beneficiaries in implementation through the formation of representative grass root organisation. Such organisations are expected to foster empowerment of communities and further develop political agency (Ostrom, 1990).

5.7.1 Rules for the Formation of WASHCOMs

Two documents, the 2014 WaterAid 'engaging the community strategy report', and the 2013 'expanded guideline for WASHCOM formation and training on community WASH', form the basis for the establishment and operations of WASHCOMs under the STS and HSBC projects. The two documents set out the guidelines for the formation and operation of WASHCOMs in Nigeria. According to the strategy report, the community general assembly, made up of all the residents of a community, is responsible for selecting members of WASHCOMs. Members of WASHCOMs are selected to represent all social classes and zones in the community. The document states:

> 'Each WASHCOM constitutes 12 to 15 members depending on the size of the community. Membership must be gender balanced, represent the different age brackets and spread across the different community units. Other WASH related committees report to WASHCOMs and are supervised by WASHCOMs' (WaterAid, engaging the community, 2013:6).

Findings from observation of communities visited show that most WASHCOMs were constituted according to these guidelines. There were however variations in some states. For instance, WASHCOMs in communities in Ganjuwa, Bauchi state had ten members out of which three were women. Several WASHCOMs visited had only one or two members responsible for managing their water points. Decisions related to project activities were made by these members. In Logo, for instance, focus group discussions showed that the water point in Agba Town Centre was managed by two people while the WASHCOM officially had 10 members.

Further to setting out guidelines for the formation of WASHCOMs, the engaging the community strategy report sets out requirements for how meetings should be conducted and the types of records the WASHCOM is expected to keep. Under the guidelines, a WASHCOM is expected to meet once a month. Furthermore, the committee is also expected to keep minutes of meetings. Other records WASHCOMs are expected to keep include financial records, equipment and labour costs, community maps and community action plans. The findings show that while most WASHCOMs visited had note books for keeping minutes of meetings, minutes were however non-existent in several WASHCOMs. A staff of WaterAid explained that WASHCOMs find it difficult to meet regularly and keep records:

> 'Minutes of meetings is the immediate evidence of activity; when you visit WASHCOMs you will be told that the last time they met was six months ago. It should be fortnightly. After a

project life span, you don't find any WASHCOM that will feed into the design I have described' (WaterAid STS project staff).

Few of the WASHCOMs visited (23%) had records of meetings that were dated within a month of the fieldwork. Attempts to ensure WASHCOMs keep records results in deliberate attempts at targeting educated members of communities to become chairmen and secretaries of WASHCOMs. While formal education is not mentioned in the guideline as a requirement for appointing officials of WASHCOMs, there is a preference for educated people. Most WASHCOMs had the required numbers of members on paper, in practice WaterAid staff reported difficulty in WASHCOMs holding regular meetings. A WASHCOM member explained why his WASHCOM did not meet as often as required by the guidelines:

> 'We do not need to meet all the time. We all have lot of things we are busy with. When there is an issue, we resolve it wherever we are. Moreover, the cost of hosting the meetings is expensive. Whoever is hosting has to prepare food for those attending from his pocket' (WASHCOM member).

A staff of WaterAid lamenting further on the difficulty of WASHCOMs to keep records and carry out responsibilities stated:

> 'Most Communities give you their commitment to act on decisions reached, but when you get back you find out that they have not carried out any activity. They never say they do not want to participate, but when you come back and find record keeping zero, and no households monitored, it then begins to tell you the communities are not interested' (WaterAid STS staff).

The statement above seems to link interest and participation in the project to adherence to 'project disciplines'. Communities and WASHCOMs that do not adhere to 'project regulations' are classified as 'not interested' in the project which may lead to their exclusion from the benefits of the project. Cooke and Kothari (2001) report that development institutions prefer, and require, various forms of participation and reporting techniques that are sometimes beyond the scope of marginalised people. Truly marginalised people and the oppressed do not usually have the capacity to organise themselves into formal institutions either due to lack of adequate skills or financial constraints. Consequently, they are left out of development. Towing in the same line, Cleaver (2011) observed that the mere setting up of formal organisations and the specification of their membership does not necessarily overcome exclusion, subordination or vulnerability. It does not do so, because the wider structural factors that shape such conditions and relations are often left untouched. Codifying the rights of the vulnerable must involve far

wider reaching measures than the requirement that they sit on a committee, or individually speak at meetings.

5.7.2 Rules for Inclusion of Women in WASHCOMs

The issue of Women empowerment is one of the major agendas of development organisations like WaterAid. The aim of such campaigns is to mainstream gender issues and ensure women's participation in all levels of development activities (Ali, 2013).In keeping with this objective, a central requirement for the constitution of membership of WASHCOMs is the representation of women on the WASHCOM committee. WaterAid, in her engaging the community strategy report, sets out guidelines for the participation of women in WASHCOMs:

> 'Conscious effort would be put in place to ensure that the situation and conditions of marginalised groups such as women, people living with or affected by disability are considered to participate in Water Consumers Association (WCA) decision making. They will also be represented in VHPs, scheme operators and artisans. Their situation would be considered in deciding WCA time of meeting, infrastructural designs, participation in WCA/WASHCOM meetings, and decision-making process in WCAs/WASHCOMs' (WaterAid Engagement strategy report: 13).

The narrative shows the desire of WaterAid to constitute WASHCOMs in such a way that women participate fully in implementing WASH activities. An LGA WASH coordinator explained how the policy is operationalised:

> 'In creating, water and sanitation committees [WASHCOMs], we usually say that there should be 50:50 representations of men and women. If that is not possible, we try to insist that a woman should be the treasurer of the committee' (LGA WASH coordinator).

The strategy document further sets out the indicators for evaluating women's participation in WASHCOMs. These include a record of women attending all, or nearly all meetings. There should also be documented examples and cases of women putting forward suggestions in meetings, suggestions from women should be heard and specific actions taken on their suggestions. The WASHCOM is also expected to seek input from other vulnerable or marginalised groups such as children and people living with disability. In addition to having female members, the strategy document recommends that women should be given official positions within the WASHCOM. In the WASHCOMs visited, women were often given treasurer positions. An LGA coordinator explained the rationale of having women as treasurers:

> 'If we have a woman in charge of money, no activity will happen without her knowing and contributing to the decision-making processes'.

Findings from focus group discussions with WASHCOMs however, showed that a woman serving as the treasurer of the WASHCOM, and by virtue of that acting as the custodian of the money collected by the WASHCOM, does not necessarily mean she has a say in the decision-making process related to how money is spent. Several narrations from female members of WASHCOMs amplifies this finding:

> 'I keep the money but I do not have the technical knowledge to know what they are trying to buy when a borehole breaks down. The money is safe with me, they tell me what they have bought and I write it down. I trust whatever decision they make' (Female WASHCOM member).

> 'The place where the decisions are made is not during the meetings we attend. Men in the course of their work on the farm or at the town square discuss and reach their decision on how matters are to be addressed' (Female WASHCOM member)

> 'Most decisions are made by the Mai Anguwa [ward head] and the local chief. During WASHCOM meetings we spend a lot of time preparing and serving refreshment' (Female WASHCOM member).

Women often face hurdles in expressing their voices in public owing to the patriarchal ideology deeply imbedded in the developing world (Ali, 2013). This accounts may imply that women do not influence decision making within the projects. It is however worthy of note that the influence exerted by women may not lie within the technical institutional arrangement prescribed by the project. For instance, WASH Consultants have reported cases where women have mobilised informally to boycott the use of certain water points because they were unhappy about where the water point was sited. White (2011) observes that a quota for the inclusion of women, and women simply being there, as is the practice in WASHCOMs, does not mean that women eventually have a real say or that they will be able to represent others and speak for them. Such measures can only be facilitated by fuller participation which may be difficult to measure. Similarly, Cleaver (2001) noted that an organisational model of participation ignores the fact that many interactions between people also take place outside formal organisations, and that the interactions of daily life maybe more important in shaping cooperation than public negotiation.

5.7.3 WASHCOMs and the willingness to assume responsibility

The previous section described the processes involved in the formation of WASHCOMs. This section goes further to examine the willingness of WASHCOMs to assume responsibilities

assigned to them under the case study projects.UNICEFs 'expanded guideline for WASHCOMs,which we earlier on reported forms the basis for the WaterAid community engagement strategy report, describes the responsibilities of WASHCOMs:

> '...WASHCOMs receive programmes and projects on behalf of the community and facilitate the endorsing of programme agreement by the community leaders... [And] oversee the operation and maintenance of WASH facilities including timely repairs and reporting of breakdown' (UNICEF expanded guidelines for WASHCOM training, 2013:21).

In order to carry out her responsibilities, WASHCOMs work through volunteers to deliver services in their communities. In addition to the members of the WASHCOM, other volunteers include village hygiene promoters (VHPs) and natural leaders. These volunteers are responsible for maintaining hygiene and sanitation in communities.

Table 5.6: Responsibilities of WASHCOMs under the STS and HSBC projects

Projects	Role/Responsibility within the Project
STS Project	• Digging and excavation of holes for construction of institutional latrines • Construction of household toilets • Reporting major repairs to the LGA WASH unit • Construction of institutional latrines • Mobilisation and attendance at public decision-making meetings • Inspections of household latrines
HWP	• Maintenance and minor repairs of water points • Digging and excavation of water points • Financial contribution towards water points • Collection of tariffs for water point maintenance • Construction of household toilets • Reporting major repairs to LGA WASH unit • Construction of public latrines • Provision of land for toilet construction or drilling of water facilities • Basic maintenance of water points

Table 5.6 summarises the role WASHCOMs play in the provision and management of WASH services in communities. An LGA staff further explains the role communities are expected to play under the HSBC project:

> 'Upon completion of a water point, the maintenance of the water point is vested in the hands of the community through the WASHCOM. They are also responsible for the security of Water points. In the case of motorised water points, it means arranging for fuelling.'

Findings from focus group discussions show that WASHCOMs and community members were willing to assume the responsibilities assigned to them. This was however easier with respect to responsibilities related to water points under the HSBC project as compared to the STS programme, which was focused on sanitation.

> 'The problem most communities have is related to the availability of water. Most communities are yet to understand the need to invest in proper sanitation. WASHCOMs are more active when you provide the community with an improved water point' (WaterAid staff).

Observations in study communities show several innovations by WASHCOMs to maintain WASH facilities. For instance, under the HSBC project in Logo, Benue state, the WASHCOM in Agba Town Centre instituted a fee per-bucket for anyone fetching water from the motorised water scheme. The money generated was used for maintenance and purchase of diesel. Similarly, some water points visited had fences and locks around them provided by communities. In such communities, WASHCOMs supervised when the project beneficiaries could fetch from the water point and set a fee for each trip made to collect water.

The preceding discussion shows that WASHCOMs are in most cases interested in carrying out responsibilities assigned to them. In chapter seven, the thesis discusses the challenges associated with WASHCOMs assuming responsibilities. Having WASHCOMs assume responsibility for the delivery of WASH services may however serve to exclude vulnerable and marginalised beneficiaries, who may not be able to afford the time and money required to meet responsibilities assigned to them. Attempt to implement WASH programmes by the case study projects through WASHCOMs illustrate an attempt to implement a neoliberal governance regime characterised by shared responsibilities between communities and the state.

5.7.4 WASHCOMs, existing community structures and power relationships

Asking whether the institutions created to enhance participation challenge or reproduce existing structures and meanings is important because some participatory approaches disrupt the order of hierarchal institutions, creating new and different spaces in which different rules of the game apply (Cornwall, 2002). A key finding from this study is that the formation of WASHCOMs create parallel committees in communities which may set up new power relations within project communities.

Recently, beginning in April 2016, as a response to the need to avoid establishing new committees in communities where existing committees can perform the duty of WASHCOMs, the HSBC and STS projects changed their approach to the formation of WASHCOMs. The new strategy involved working with existing associations within the project communities instead of creating new ones:

> '…Formation of WASHCOMs this financial year differed from last year. We used existing community structures to ensure sustainability (LGA WASH Unit staff).
>
> '…We are learning to work with existing structures within the LGA.WASHCOMs are not as efficient as they should be. Why bring in new things?'(WaterAid STS staff).

It is expected that getting existing committees in communities to perform the role of WASHCOMs will maintain local power structures and ensure sustainability. Interviews with WaterAid staff explained this rationality:

> 'Instead of having separate committees which run parallel to community development associations, we have decided to work with existing committees while defining roles and responsibilities' (WaterAid STS project staff).
>
> '…We now align now with various community self-help groups to carry out our objectives' (WaterAid STS project staff).

Further interviews with WaterAid staff revealed further that in adopting existing community institution, the projects takes several steps to ensure that such institutions conform to the requirements for formation of WASHCOMs:

> '…the existing associations are examined and made to meet the criteria set by the project. This may mean increasing the number of women on the executive committee of the associations or expanding it to accommodate other aspects of equality.'(WaterAid Programme Support Manger)

An LGA WASH staff noted further:

> 'In working with existing structures, organisational scanning is required on such structures to know why they exist, their working modalities and how they go about achieving their goals. Some existing structures may be politically partisan which may make the project politically inclined.'

While the idea of working with existing organisations within communities may serve to prevent duplication of organisations and lead to sustainability, the process of making local organisations conform to project standards may create new power relationships within the association, which may affect its effectiveness. Kyamusugulwa and Hilhorst (2015) also note that pre-existing social structures within communities may reinforce relationships of domination within communities.

The strength of collective action created by the formation of WASHCOMs has affected existing community structures, altering existing power relationships. Several interviews revealed that some WASHCOMs in project communities are authoritarian, taking over responsibilities originally intended for traditional rulers and other leaders in communities. Some WASH consultants interviewed revealed:

> '..WASHCOMs are however becoming authoritarian, forming parallel government to that of traditional rulers in communities. They usurp powers and impose fines on households and use their members to execute that' (WASH consultant).

> 'We have had cases where chairmen of WASHCOMs will ask a town crier to call for a meeting by ringing the village bell. This is the purview of the village chief and in this case the chief did not take it lightly' (WASH consultant).

WASHCOMs as representative grass root organisations are expected to strengthen local representation in the provision of WASH services by increasing the levels of democracy, transparency and accountability (Hoogesteger, 2016).The foregoing account of WASHCOMs reveal that while the formation of WASHCOMs enables communities to contribute to WASH management in their communities, it has in some cases created new power relationships despite attempts by the Projects to show sensitivity to similar institutions within communities. The foregoing accounted of complexities of trying to implement WASH programmes by WaterAid through WASHCOMs in rural areas with limited state presence and capacity ensures that the kind of power dynamics inherent to governmentality does not get built in the first place, and therby,people do not become subjects.

5.8 Conclusion

This chapter discussed the implementation strategy for the case study projects and the actors involved. It showed that WaterAid deploys CWM as a strategy towards promoting ownership and sustainability of WASH services. Since 1999, aid strategy changed from a focus on

producing replicable models to policy influence within state systems (Mosse, 2005). CWM is implemented through the fragmentation of WASH services, whereby various state and non-state actors are enlisted in the delivery of WASH services in keeping with a neoliberal regime of government. The Projects are however implemented without the direct participation of the private sector except for the sanitation marketing component of the STS project. In several developing countries, the World Bank has championed the establishment of unregulated private monopolies to solve water crisis (Castro, 2007). The LGA WASH units and WASHCOMs are the decentralised institutions created by WaterAid to promote the involvement of government and communities in WASH service delivery. The assigned responsibilities have, however, set up new dynamics and power relationships not only within state institutions but also between the state, civil society and beneficiary communities. The foregoing limits the participation of the decentralised institutions in the delivery of WASH services. The rules and structures that define the involvement of decentralised institutions (ways they are invited to participate) while seeking to ensure efficiency, may serve to prevent change in power relationships and the empowerment of communities. Local governance as a development strategy advances the idea of self-responsibility. Findings showed however that LGAs WASH units and communities are unable to keep up with assigned responsibilities. Communities do not pay for services. WASHCOMs also find it difficult to keep up with their obligations and duties assigned to them. In some cases elite power is reproduced through recentralisation and privileged access to decision making (Taylor, 2007).Such complexities ensure that the power dynamics inherent to governmentality do not get built up in the first place and people do not become subjects.

The next chapter presents findings on the attempts by WaterAid to build the capacity of WASH units and WASHCOMs in order to create active citizens who will assume responsibility for the delivery of WASH services under CWM. The chapter examines the attempts to create active citizens, the choices available to them and the techniques and strategies through which knowledge is produced.

Chapter 6: Capacity Building for CWM

6.0 Introduction

Chapter five examined attempts to create and use decentralized WASH institutions as a key advanced liberal strategy for empowerment and governing from a distance by WaterAid. This chapter follows with an examination of capacity building of individuals, communities, and government institutions as another key strategy for empowerment. The chapter also examines the processes and dynamics of knowledge production as a connecting strategy for creating behavioural change and modes of discipline WaterAid require to promote the success of her projects. It shows the various complexities of trying to implement a CWM project in rural areas in Nigeria which ensures that the kinds of power dynamics inherent to governmentality do not get built up, and, thereby, people do not become subjects.

6.1 The Need for Training and Capacity Building of Beneficiaries

A major strategy, through which WaterAid in the context of the STS and HSBC projects seek to enhance the participation and empowerment of project recipients, is capacity building. The underlying assumption which informs the strategy is that, given education and information, project beneficiaries will respond rationally and change their behaviour (Mehta, 2011). Findings from the examination of project documents and interviews show that WaterAid views lack of knowledge as a major factor in explaining poor sanitation and hygiene practices in rural communities as well as the seeming ineffectiveness of relevant government institutions in providing adequate services. Consequently, a lot of effort and resources are devoted to addressing the so-called knowledge gap, providing training and capacity building activities to project recipients. A WASH consultant, commenting on the reason for poor sanitation, stated:

> 'What makes communities take ownership is the innovation of action learning, the process in which communities are taught the reasons why they need to engage in total sanitation. When they become aware of the need for good sanitation, they will take ownership of the projects sited in their community. Such awareness further leads to innovations such as the construction of pit latrines' (water and sanitation consultant).

This above statement is very insightful because it describes the rationale for using education as a means for changing the behaviour of project beneficiaries. Again the assumption is that communities practice open defecation because they do not have information about the dangers

of poor sanitation. Making information available to project beneficiaries through action learning, it is supposed leads to behavioural change. What is interesting is that very little mention is made of the broader political economy and structural conditions which generates poverty and the prevailing ignorance under which the communities live.

In studying the two case study projects, it was very apparent that Western style capacity building is deployed almost as a mantra in response to an assumed lack of capacity, especially at the local level. The focus of WaterAid, in both projects, was local capacity building focusing on LGA WASH units and communities through WASHCOMs. The WaterAid country strategy, in discussing the need for capacity building of partners at the local level, states:

> '...evidence suggests that there are significant capacity gaps at all levels but it is more pronounced at the local level. WANG will therefore strengthen the capacity of partner organisations and service providers in project management, rights based, equity and inclusion approaches for sustainable WASH services delivery by 2015' (WaterAid in Nigeria, country strategy 2010 to 2015).

This statement reiterates the perception that there is a lack of knowledge of WASH services at community level. A WASH consultant explained this:

> '…communities lack capacity because some approaches we are bringing are new; so we need to teach them quite a lot, for example about how to maintain boreholes and how to effectively facilitate realisation of the harmful effects of defecating in the open' (WASH consultant).

Findings from the interviews with WaterAid staff and examination of project documents both reveal that capacity building is deployed in two fundamental stages. The first relates to WaterAid strengthening the capacity of LGA WASH units, and then the WASH units are expected to build the capacity of the communities. WaterAid therefore works through LGA WASH units to influence the behaviour of the project communities.

> 'Capacity building is deployed at two levels. One part relates to strengthening the capacity of the LGAs or the state. The other relates to the WASH unit strengthening the capacity of communities. The WASH unit having received enhanced capacity is expected to strengthen the capacity of communities towards service delivery' (WaterAid programme manager).

> 'Best practices are followed in the mobilisation, organisation, training and equipping of communities and their institutions in order to achieve maximum participation in the management of WASH services' (WaterAid, 2013:7).

At the 2013 WaterAid annual partners' round table meeting, the Director of people, organisation and development for WaterAid Nigeria, addressing state and LGA partners on the need for capacity building, noted:

> 'WaterAid invests in capacity strengthening to enhance, or more effectively utilise skills, abilities and resources. It is also to strengthen understanding and relationship especially roles and responsibilities in its partnerships and to transfer capacities from partners to WaterAid and from WaterAid to partners. Capacity strengthening is a change process and must be owned' **(**WaterAid partners' round table report, 2013:5).

Similarly, the WaterAid rights based approach strategy report explains the need to empower communities with the objective of training project beneficiaries:

> '...an informed and empowered community, who have been educated and trained on their rights and are confident to engage with the government and other service providers to demand that they deliver on their commitments and obligations, is an essential precondition for ensuring accountable governance in a given community' (WaterAid,2011:6).

> 'Capacity building is expected to lead to inclusive and effective participation of citizens in demanding accountability from government at the local level. The aim of strengthening capacity is to raise awareness of citizens on their rights to water, sanitation and hygiene services' (WaterAid, 2010:9).

The foregoing statements draw out the link between capacity building and the need to empower communities to access WASH services within a right based approach. A UNICEF WSSSRP document of action, however, brings out another dimension on the need for capacity building, in which capacity building is deployed as a tool for achieving sustainability.

> 'Capacity building will be deployed as a key strategy for sustainable service delivery as well as a tool for strengthening institutions and promotion of reforms. The project will support capacity transfer to the end users and ensure that there is adequate capacity at the lowest level to replicate and even scale up the project results' (UNICEF WSSSRP document of action:).

The project documents also reveal the willingness of the case study organisations to go beyond information sharing to the internalisation of information, which is expected to lead to subjectification in Foucauldian terms. The assumption is that **s**haring information and training

will help to make duty bearers willing to change power relations. The projects also assume that information which leads to knowledge has the ability to liberate the project beneficiaries from marginalisation and structural oppression. However, as several scholars writing from the governmentality perspective have noted, it is rather naïve to assume, under a rights approach that information sharing and training are sufficient to upturn traditional and long standing power balance in favour of the marginalised (Dean 2010; Ilcan and Lacey, 2006).

Interestingly even WaterAid in some places seems to acknowledge this uncomfortable truth. When seriously interrogated, some managers appear willing to admit that knowledge shared must be internalised for a new form of consciousness to occur. One WaterAid report makes this point quite well:

> 'However, information by itself does not necessarily empower – as the huge amount of information available on the net easily testifies. These vulnerable and marginalised communities must also have the ability to internalise such information and apply the same to their own lives. When this happens, they could be said to have reached the stage of knowledge' (WaterAid, 2011:8).

The report goes on to make say:

> 'Finally, vulnerable and marginalised people need to be asking the analytical question why – which in effect helps them to search for the root causes of their being deprived of their human rights. Once they have reached this stage of analysis, they can be said to have become truly aware. Furthermore, it is only when the 'other side' realises that people have awareness, at least at the level of knowledge, that there will be a change in the power equation – for in such a situation knowledge becomes power. This awareness then nudges these individuals and communities to the next degree of empowerment, i.e. voice. This refers to the ability of the community to use the awareness of their entitlements to express their claims for their rights and entitlements' (WaterAid, 2011:11).

These statements are clearly open admissions by WaterAid that capacity building is being deployed as a governmental technology for achieving the objective of empowerment and sustainability. Even though its limits are well recognised, there remains a hope that education, information sharing and capacity building would somehow empower the community to demand their rights and transform deeply embedded structural injustice that have shaped pre-existing power relations (Summerville, 2008)

6.2 Strengthening the Capacity of State Partners

As noted, at the LGA level, capacity building projects aim to strengthen the operational capacity of the LGA WASH unit to enable the unit to deliver WASH services to the project beneficiaries. The findings from the study show that in strengthening the capacity of LGA units, the focus is on enhancing both intellectual and logistical support such as the provision of office equipment deemed necessary for an effective environment for the WASH units to function efficiently. A WaterAid staff noted:

> 'The focus on logistical capacity is to provide necessary equipment and means of transportation for the unit to effectively carry out its responsibility within the communities. These include provision of motor cycles, computers and photocopiers. This equipment is purchased centrally and distributed across the various LGAs.'

He stated that intellectual capacity is strengthened through training:

> '...the project supports capacity development through orientations, workshops, trainings and exchange visits. The project will also be documenting and sharing lessons and best practices through the production of manuals, guidelines, handbooks and success stories.'

Discussions with WaterAid and LGA WASH unit staff reveal that the need for capacity building of WASH unit staff stems from the need to change the bureaucratic system which is said to be characteristic of the local government system in Nigeria. The project staff interviewed complained of poor attitude to work in the LGA system and more or less pontificated on the need for a transformation. A WaterAid programme support coordinator mentioned poor attitude to work and complacency as major issues affecting partnership and relationships between WaterAid and its LGA partners:

> 'The civil service mentality to work is very visible in the way they [LGA WASH unit staff] work. All the efforts we make to change their orientation about project management has met a lot of difficulty. You cannot undo that mentality' (Programme coordinator, STS project).

He reiterated:

> 'LGA staff show complacency to issues, poor attitude to work. They don't care. There is a general inability to understand the implications of their inactions and accept the implications of their actions' (WaterAid Staff, STS project).

Training of LGA WASH unit staff is conducted by WaterAid staff both from within and outside Nigeria. Sometimes, WaterAid hire consultants to facilitate the training of LGA WASH unit

staff. The results from the key informant interviews with LGA and WaterAid staff show that the WaterAid annual partners' round table meeting provides a forum where capacity building activities take place. WaterAid passes off these annual partners' round table as examples of efforts they are making to not only build capacity but also to make project implementation participatory. A WaterAid staff explains:

> 'Most capacity building is done at the state annual partners' round table. This is where partners agree on plans and plan how to execute those plans.' The annual round table sessions also provide an opportunity for partner organisations to present training needs and challenges related to project implementation. The meetings are held once every year. The meetings bring together all stakeholders involved in the implementation of the STS and HSBC projects.

By now the picture should have emerged of the extremely wide and inclusive conceptualization of capacity building as held by WaterAid but also the extent of faith placed on these events – such as annual meeting to empower local communities to demand and obtain their rights to water from duty bearers. The table below shows a list of training activities the LGA WASH unit staff are expected to participate in. The training is focused on enabling WASH staff to efficiently deliver project activities.

Table 6.1: List of training conducted by WaterAid for state WASH units

S/No	Title of Training	Purpose of Training	Number of Days
1	Project Management and book keeping	Understanding guidelines and steps in project implementation	5
2	Financial Management	WaterAid and project financial management guidelines	3
3	Village Level Operations and Maintenance (VLOM)	Basic hand pump operation and maintenance	5
4	Participatory Budget tracking	Understanding how to track government budget implementation	5
5	Community Led Total Sanitation	Explaining the rudiments of sanitation and the CLTS facilitation process to beneficiaries	14
6	Equity and Inclusion	Understanding equity and inclusion and how they are applied in projects	5
7	Monitoring and Evaluation	Project monitoring procedures, indicators and log frame	5

Other training, such as participatory budget tracking training, allows WASH unit staff to strengthen the capacity of communities to demand services from government in keeping with a right based approach. In addition to the generic trainings described above, each year LGA WASH units are given an opportunity to identify where they lack capacity and plans for capacity building in such areas. The attempt to strengthen the capacity of WASH unit staff is an attempt to render a government department active through training. Training provides an opportunity to render the WASH department effective by attempting to mould the agency of trainees in line with certain notions of effectiveness or appropriateness which relates in this case to effectiveness in the provision of WASH services (Dean, 2010, Merlingen, 2011).

6.3 Guiding Communities through Mentoring

A key strategy of the HSBC and the STS projects, as described earlier is to strengthen the capacity of beneficiary communities through mentoring to increase their effectiveness in the delivery of WASH services. In terms of the relationships between WASH units and Communities, mentoring is associated with a disciplinary power based on hierarchical observation and examinations. It is also associated with a co-opting power aimed at

reconstituting the subjectivities of beneficiary communities (Merlingen, 2011).A UNICEF WASH document describes what capacity strengthening means for communities:

> 'At community level, strengthening capacity involves enabling communities to choose water and sanitation service options, implement the delivery of such services and manage the facilities provided for sustainability beyond the gains of the project' (UNICEF, DOA strategy report, 2012:)

The training and mentoring of WASHCOMs is facilitated by LGA WASH unit staff and conducted when the WASHCOMs are formed in the communities selected to participate in the project.

> 'Apart from the triggering exercise, we train WASHCOMs that are members of the community. Additionally, we train natural leaders that emerge during the CLTS triggering. Natural leaders are trained alongside village hygiene promoters (VHPs). We attend community meetings and sometimes go house to house to provide training' (LGA WASH staff).

Observation of WASHCOM training showed that training of newly established WASHCOMs is held centrally for each LGA participating in the project. All the selected members of the WASHCOM attend the training. An action plan is developed at the end of the training showing how members of the WASHCOM intend to achieve ODF in their respective villages. Fig 6.1 shows the 2014 training of newly selected WASHCOM staff in Ikole LGA of Ekiti State.

Figure 6.1: Training of newly selected WASHCOM members in Ikole LGA, Ekiti State

Table 6.2 below provides a mentoring plan that is expected to be implemented for members of WASHCOMs by LGA WASH units. The strategy for delivering training in communities is mentoring. WASH units become familiar with local ways of doing things through constant surveillance and attempt to make local communities conform to international best standards (Merlingen, 2011).An examination of the training modules reveals the desire of the projects to enhance the capacity of WASHCOMs to enable WASHCOMs to independently deliver WASH services in communities by correcting local practices.

Table 6.2: Mentoring plan for members of WASHCOMs, adapted from WaterAid mentoring plan

Module	Title	Objective
1	Understanding Mentoring	To help WASHCOMs understand the need for mentoring and what is involved.
2	WASHCOM Meeting, Community Meeting and Writing Minutes	To improve the skills of WASHCOM members in keeping minutes and ensuring adequate participation and attendance.
3	Community Mobilisation and Organising Meetings	To help WASHCOM members understand how to carry out inclusive mobilisation in the community.
4	Leadership Roles and Responsibilities of WCA Executives	To help WASHCOMs members understand their collective roles and responsibilities.
5	Resource Mobilization and Record Keeping/Documentation	To ensure that members of WASHCOMs know how to keep accurate records and properly document all the resources mobilised for WASH projects, for accountability and trust building.
6	Communication and Feedback to Community General Assembly	To enable members to understand the importance of communication and feedback to the community in all their activities.
7	Developing a Community Action Plan	To develop an action plan that is realistic and implementable.
8	Safe Sanitation Monitoring	To review the monitoring strategy of the VHPs and ascertain the sanitation level of the community.
9	Safe Hygiene Promotion	To find out how the village hygiene promoters are promoting hygiene, and its wider impact.
10	Investigate Skill	To make participants understand the skills needed in investigation, and what to investigate in WASH.
11	Problem Solving/Conflict Resolution	To access ways of handling conflicts and recommend better ways.
12	Construction Supervision	To ensure the WASHCOM understands the supervision they should carry out and how to go about it.
13	User Choice of Technology Option	To allow communities to examine all the options available and the cost of using a particular type of technology.
14	Community Management of Water Facility	To know how communities have been managing water points. To know if they have the capacity and skills to manage water points.

The training and mentoring programme for communities is executed with an action learning orientation, in which communities and LGAs are encouraged to practice a mode of learning which reflects the desire of WaterAid to promote the active problem-solving ability of the communities. Ongoing problems are identified and solutions proffered by the LGA staff. Practices that do not conform to WaterAid standards are corrected.

Discussions with members of WASHCOMs during focus group discussions reveal that the opportunity to attend training meetings organised by WaterAid is considered a privilege both at LGA and community level, because of the incentives involved. WaterAid provides incentives to enable project beneficiaries to attend training meetings.

> 'When training meetings take place outside the project location, the project, in order to encourage participation, provides transport allowance to enable participants attend such meetings. Accommodation and meals are also sometimes provided where the training is planned to last more than one day' (WaterAid staff).

> 'Community members and WASHCOMs compete to be nominated to attend training and consultative meetings' (WASHCOM member).

Incentives such as those described above are seen by project recipients as benefits of participating in the projects. Conflicts sometimes arise where members of WASHCOMs think they should be nominated to participate in training activities instead of another member. The motivation for rural community members therefore is not the knowledge to be acquired from attending training session but the material incentives such as training allowances derived from attending training sessions. Such conflicts can affect the effective functioning of WASHCOMs and the potential for collective action towards WASH service delivery. The foregoing provides yet another example of the complexity of trying to do a WASH programme in rural Nigeria where the state has limited capacity and presence, where WaterAid cannot single handily compensate for this absence and in which rural dwellers are resource constrained. Such complexities ensure that the kind of power dynamics inherent to governmentality does not get built up and thereby rural dwellers do not become subjects.

6.4 The Role of Consultants in Capacity Building

Previous sections have highlighted the rationale for capacity building of WASH units and WASHCOMs, along with the process and content of capacity building initiatives under the projects. This section discusses the role of consultants in capacity building under the HSBC and STS projects. Foucauldian analyses place a lot of emphasis on (expert) knowledge in

general and the dynamics of knowledge production as a major tool for governance and the maintenance of power (Ball, 2013; Gordon and Grant, 2013; Elden, 2016). And in the politics of knowledge production and power in the context of international development assistance, consultants play a vital role (Pozzebon and Pinsonneault, 2012; Mills, 2015). Consistent with these literates the research uncovers the curtail role played by knowledge brokers and consultants who claim to wield expert knowledge.

Consultants mediate at the interphase between project operations and donor policy, interpreting each to the other. In relation to the STS and HSBC projects, they are outside experts expected to clarify policy, to train, demonstrate or guide staff in advancing specific programmes in relation to the donor. Consultants establish significance, deliver expert judgement and report progress (Mosse, 2005:134).The findings show that the STS and HSBC projects rely on consultants to implement key aspects of the WASH programmes including ensuring compliance with standards, monitoring, evaluation and capacity building for the agencies they work for. Several factors determine the decision to implement a programme of activity through a consultant. A WASH consultant provides insight into how UNICEF decides which aspects of programme implementation should be handled by consultants in WASH programmes:

> 'UNICEF assigns specialised components of their projects to external consultants, for example, training on ARC GIS, baseline surveys' (WASH consultant).

He added:

> 'If they need to step down some specialised skills, they use external consultants who train their in-house staff, and then have them trickle it down' (WASH consultant).

Interviews with WaterAid staff, WASH consultants and LGA WASH unit staff revealed further that in the two case study projects, baseline assessments and midterm evaluations are managed by consultants.

> 'Midway into the project a midterm evaluation is conducted by external consultants to determine if the project is on course to achieve the objectives set out. External consultants also conduct an end of project evaluation at the end of the projects to determine if the projects achieved their objectives and to document lessons learnt during the course of project implementation' (WaterAid staff).

The interview findings reveal that another occasion when consultants are recruited is when there is a need to speed up programme delivery. On such occasion, quality of participation of communities take a back seat as the attention turns on the overriding need to meet the deadlines

set by international donors. For instance, the 2014 report on construction of institutional latrines under the STS project reveals that the initial plan was for the LGA to manage the entire project with the direct supervision of WaterAid and the support of NEWSAN. Delays in commencing the project made WaterAid decide to appoint a consultant for the project. A WaterAid staff attributed the delay in commencing the project to coordination issues. She noted:

> '…we wanted to build latrines through our LGA partners but they were not ready. We were running out of time so we had to hire a consultant to supervise the process to save time.'

The memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the construction of institutional latrines under the STS project, an internal document, illustrates the role a consultant is expected to play in programme delivery. According to the MOU, a consultant should provide technical support and overall supervision of the construction project. Supervision includes ensuring that timelines are adhered to. The consultant is also to ensure effective collaboration between the LGA WASH unit and communities to deliver the project within the stipulated time. The consultant is further expected to work together with LGA units to decide in which communities the project is to be implemented. He is expected to ensure that construction standards are adhered to, especially with respect to ensuring a good and efficient procurement team, and specifying construction material quality standards. The consultant is also responsible for supervising the timeline of the project and ensuring that all activities related to the project are documented and reported to WaterAid on a weekly basis via email.

6.4.1 International versus National Consultants

The case study projects make distinctions between national and international consultants in recruiting Consultants for assignments. National consultants are consultants that are resident within Nigeria. International consultants on the other hand are recruited from outside Nigeria to carry out specialist functions within the projects. The findings reveal several criteria that are used by the projects to determine where consultants should be recruited from. A key determinant is the availability of the required expertise within the country. A WASH consultant explains the process of deciding where a consultant is recruited from:

> 'We look at what is available in country within the organisation… for example if we do not have expertise in ARC GIS and want to develop geospatial maps, we will outsource it, first from our UK office, before we look in country' (WASH consultant).

Sometimes, the amount of money involved in the assignment makes it an international tender as the following narratives indicate:

'I recall under WSSSRP project, certain construction work was to be outsourced. Because of the amount of money involved, it was classed an international tender. This meant it was open for international vendors to bid' (WASH consultant).

'…On the other hand, there are a number of programmes developed with certain components fixed to be sourced from outside the country, as if we do not have competent consultants to carry out the assignment' (WASH consultant).

'…and at times the nature of the assignments going by the terms from the funding agency could make hiring an international consultant a strong condition' (WASH consultant).

Table 6.3: National versus international consultants (source: fieldwork, 2015)

Project	National/International Consultant	Nature of Assignment
HWP	National	Preliminary baseline survey of selected communities
		Water quality assessment
	National	Midterm evaluation
	International	Midterm evaluation
		End of project evaluation
	National	Preliminary baseline survey of selected communities
STS	National	Assessment of latrine construction sites
		Midterm evaluation
	International	Midterm evaluation
		End of project evaluation

Table 6.3 shows the nationality of consultants and the nature of assignments they are recruited to carry out under the STS and HSBC projects. WaterAid Nigeria recruits most consultants locally. Consultants are mainly responsible for evaluation. They serve to 'police' the projects, giving an external assessment on the level of performance.

The politics of the relationship between national and international consultants, emerged as a major theme during discussions with WASH consultants. A national consultant is considered

to have an understanding of the local terrain, as national WASH consultants, comparing national and international consultants, mentioned:

> '…the local consultant has the knowledge of the local terrain and effectively complements the efforts of the international consultants in many ways' (WASH consultant).

> '…National Consultants have the advantage of local knowledge while international consultants bring in contemporary knowledge and international best practices' (WASH consultant).

> '…National consultants bring their ruggedness into play during fieldwork in communities with bad terrain. International consultants are unable to do this' (WASH consultant).

As shown by the statements above, a key advantage of national consultants is their understanding of the local environmental context where the projects operate. National consultants are also able to relate to communities in the local language. They understand the community engagement techniques necessary for relating with local communities, which allows for sensitivity to local beliefs and practices. This is expected to promote inclusion and greater participation of beneficiaries in project planning. International consultants, on the other hand, may be more familiar with best practices than national consultants, especially the use of certain technical equipment.

The findings however show differing opinions among national consultants with respect to the relevance of international consultants in WASH projects in Nigeria. While some WASH experts viewed the recruitment of international consultants as necessary for the successful implementation of WASH projects in Nigeria, other experts considered the higher cost of procuring international consultants to be unnecessary, since most expert knowledge required could be procured locally, and more money could be directed towards providing services to marginalised people. In supporting the necessity of recruiting international consultants, a national WASH consultant noted:

> 'International consultants are better exposed to international best practices... and the use of technical tools. Thus, they add credibility to and make positive contributions to the technical quality of project outputs' (WASH consultant).

Another WASH consultant had a similar opinion:

> '… Hands on experience and knowledge of sectoral issues are required to be a good consultant. There are well experienced people who, unfortunately, do not have the requisite formal training to blend the two. This is mostly available with the international consultants' (WASH consultant).

However, other WASH consultants and WaterAid staff, had different opinions:

> ‘Some international consultants come questioning what local consultants can offer... thus they limit the opportunity given to local consultants to contribute... they can be arrogant and rude... this is from personal experience’ (WASH consultant).
>
> ‘..They claim superiority because of the word international’ (WASH consultant).
>
> ‘…they claim superiority because they serve as 'report reviewers ', so the 'contributing author' has to respect them’ (WASH consultant).

The drive for creating a balance between the engagement of national and international consultants necessitated Nigeria’s development assistance policy by the National Planning Commission. The policy reiterates the findings of this study:

> ‘The design and implementation of most donor-funded projects and programmes were often done by nationals of donor countries and officials of funding agencies without adequate involvement of Nigerian officials and experts even when studies showed that the involvement of nationals in aid management is a prerequisite for aid effectiveness. This is also in spite of the United Nations Resolution No. 44/211, which assigns responsibility for aid management to nationals of recipient countries and the Paris Declaration of 2005. An analysis undertaken on the contents, procedures and manning of about 240 leading education sector studies in Africa from 1990-94 showed that all the studies were undertaken by expatriate-led teams with only nominal representation or inclusion of local researchers. Where they participated, they were never included as senior consultants or authors of documents. Apart from the high cost of implementation associated with this phenomenon, the inadequate involvement of Nigerians in the formulation and implementation of projects and programmes funded from Official Development Assistance sources often led to problems of ownership and sustainability in post-aid periods’ (Nigeria development assistance policy, 2008:3).

The politics related to the engagement of national and international consultants draws attention to the possible marginalisation of local consultants by development projects. Relying exclusively on specialist knowledge from international consultants may limit the consideration of lay knowledge and disempower national researchers (Edge and Eyles, 2015).

6.4.2 Capacity of LGA WASH Staff and the Engagement of Consultants

The study found that WASH unit staff were of the opinion that most work contracted to consultants could be effectively performed by them. Most of the staff singled out the construction of institutional latrines as a key activity which they thought best illustrates their case. A WASH coordinator expressed his concern:

> ‘We have many years of experience in building institutional latrines. We do not see why the services of a consultant should be procured as such an exorbitant price’ (WASH unit staff).

Interestingly the study found that WaterAid staff linked the need for engaging consultants to the reporting requirements of the projects. Most approvals for the release of funds and criteria for determining the progress of project activities are tied to the prompt submission of reports. A programme support manager for WaterAid explained that LGA staff are unable to produce reports to the standard required by funding agencies because of their educational level:

> ‘…we know they [LGA Staff] can build latrines and have been building these latrines for a long time. This is however a different arrangement. We will want the entire construction process reported’

However, consultants had a different opinion on how and why they should be engaged for assignments at LGA level:

> ‘There is a difference between ad-hoc consultancy assignments and routine monitoring activities involving data collection. The consultant is an analytical expert that will use the data he is collecting to do a thorough analysis and draw inferences, projections and recommendations. There is no way they (WASH units) can do that by themselves... the work of a consultant is more than just data collection and reporting’ (WASH consultant).

The level of education and literacy needed to be able to cope with the reporting system required by the projects, make the delegation of certain responsibilities to WASH units difficult. The desire to ensure that activities are reported quickly and efficiently for monitoring and evaluation purposes sometimes define the nature and type of capacity building and training provided to LGA and Community partners by the projects. It is therefore obvious that the need to write good reports to secure more funding may conflicts with the aim of strengthening the capacity of communities and WASH unit staff to be able to independently deliver WASH services. In most cases, consultants lack the capacity or influence to change behaviour or to translate ideas from an international development discourse into local practice but instead through various strategies, they provide rationalisations that help shape the way in which project practices are represented and communicated to donors (Mosse, 2005).The foregoing often provides the justifications for their engagement by donor projects like STS and HSBC. The complexities associated with the engagement, responsibilities and influence of Consultants, and the challenges of Consultants influence local practice using specialist knowledge further illustrates the complexity of trying to implement a WASH project in rural

areas in Nigeria. It shows how people do not become subjects and how the build-up of power dynamics inherent to governmentality is contained.

6.5 Facilitators, Triggering and the Transfer of Knowledge

Participatory methodologies seek to create new kinds of spaces and new forms of interactions within the spaces created (Kapoor, 2004; Elden, 2016).Triggering meetings provide new invited spaces for project communities to learn about the danger of open defecation and to thereafter collectively commit to take steps to stop open defecation in their communities. Triggering meetings attempt to reverse power relationships by involving all segments of the community in the decision-making process. The plans the project beneficiaries design and implement are expected to meet local needs and contexts. This section is based on observations of triggering meetings in Moba LGA of Ekiti state. It is also based on the findings from focus group discussions with WASHCOM members, and key informant interviews with staff of WASH units.

6.5.1 Enabling Voice and Representation at Triggering Meetings

A key reason why CLTS has been widely adopted as a strategy for addressing the challenge of poor sanitation in rural communities is its claim to provide a level playing field, where all segments of the community can come together on equal terms to arrive at a decision about how to address the sanitation challenges in their communities (Bongartz and Chambers, 2009). The argument is that CLTS, if rightly implemented, allows communities to manage themselves as opposed to being dictated for by government agencies and institutions (Green et al., 2003). However, observations of the CLTS implementation process shows realities which are far removed from this picture of liberty and self-actualization. Focus group discussions with members of WASHCOMs and LGA WASH unit staff show that CLTS implicates several deeply contested processes which seek to reframe and recast power relations in the communities. One prominent issue relates to the role of triggering meetings in either consolidating or challenging the roles and responsibility of elders and traditional rulers, and the decision making structures of communities more broadly. One WASHCOM member in Moba LGA made the point well, saying:

> '..Major decisions in our communities are made by cluster chiefs and elders. The triggering meeting is a democratic process that brings together all segments of the village in a single meeting to discuss issues and to find solutions. This is different from what the community is familiar with' (WASHCOM member).

CLTS through triggering meetings attempts to change community decision making processes thereby empowering community members that will otherwise not have been invited to the planning meeting because such decisions are made by elders and traditional rulers to be a part of the decision making process concerning sanitation in their communities. The foregoing may lead to conflict in communities as power holders see the process as an attempt to usurp their power. The sustainability of such processes also comes to question as it challenges existing community structures.

The interviews revealed a desire by facilitators to ensure participation and representation of all members of the communities during meetings by ensuring that everyone present at triggering meetings was able to express themselves. A facilitator explained:

> 'Your role as a facilitator is to have the have-nots have a say, to ensure that their suggestions are included in community plans. Every participant feels empowered when he raises his hand, is identified and his suggestion heard' (LGA WASH unit staff).

In describing how the process is managed another facilitator said:

> 'I acknowledge that they [the participants] can differ to me. I use local examples. Solutions to whatever problems are raised can be found right here with them'.

It was also found that in planning sessions, the STS project staff and facilitators took several steps to ensure that participants at triggering meetings were provided with an opportunity to understand the dangers of open defecation and to contribute to decision making. A key strategy was the use of facilitators from within the LGA or neighbouring LGAs. Sessions were also conducted in the local language in this case 'Yoruba'. A WaterAid staff explained the benefit of using the local language:

> '...we use facilitators from the LGA who speak the local language. This made the use of the local language [Yoruba] possible and made triggering sessions interactive. You can see there was lots of singing and chorus responses from participants. Participants were also eager to raise up their hands to respond to questions.'

During observation of the CLTS triggering meetings, facilitators and community members were seen exchanging pleasantries before and after the meetings indicating familiarity. Some literature on participatory processes have raised concerns about the status of facilitators who are seen as 'outsiders' by project recipients during participatory sessions. Such external facilitators use their position of authority to override existing decision-making processes within

the community (Cooke and Kothari, 2001). The use of local facilitators was an attempt to avoid this challenge. The use of facilitation as a strategy for co-opting project beneficiaries emphasis a 'with' approach which emphasises power sharing and an indirect form of rule which attempts to guide project beneficiaries to stop upon defecation instead of coercing them (Lohmeyer, 2017).

6.5.2 The use of maps and 'shaming' as techniques for creating behavioural change

Triggering meetings use various participatory techniques to enable participants play an active part in decision making. A key participatory technique used is the drawing of community maps. Maps are a form of exercise of power (Harley, 1988).The way maps are drawn and the categories of information selected to appear on them all serve to promote a certain world view (Foucault, 1984).During observation of triggering meetings, it was observed that the use of maps made triggering sessions interactive. In most of the communities visited, the youth led the process of drawing maps. This may be attributed to the physical nature of the activity. In most meetings, the more elderly participants keenly observed the process, making suggestions where necessary.

Figure 6.2: and 6.3: Drawing of maps in Odunrin during CLTS triggering

Figure 6.2 and 6.3 show the process of drawing maps in Igogo Doka. During the triggering meeting, the map was drawn by two young men and a woman. Other participants at the meeting observed the exercise with keen interest. There was protest sometimes when a project beneficiary did not agree with where a certain facility should be located on the map. The more elderly beneficiaries also watched carefully to ensure that the facilities were cited correctly. In Ile Odunrin, four young people led the process of drawing the maps. The maps the beneficiaries drew indicated major infrastructure within the communities. More importantly, they showed

the places within the community where residents go to defecate. The process of drawing maps allowed for free interaction between participants at the triggering meetings.

A primary role the drawing of maps played was to enable facilitators identify households that did not have latrines. Participants that had no latrines placed ash on the cardboard representing their household to indicate that they defecate in the open. It was observed that households with latrines were keener to volunteer themselves to indicate where they go to defecate, while some households without latrines were reluctant to come forward and had to be pushed forward by the crowd.

In all four communities where triggering was observed, the facilitators used a technique called the 'shit-in-water illustration' to describe how open defecation leads to ingestion of faeces and consequently diseases and ill health. The facilitators seem to prefer this method because of its graphic nature. Tool box 1, below, provides a detailed guidelines for facilitating a shit-in-water technique as illustrated in the WaterAid 2014, CLTS Training of Trainers Manual. The CLTS programme combines ideas from grass-roots empowerment and neoliberal self-help doctrines which places responsibility for stopping open defecation on the individual. However, the use of shaming and taunting as illustrated during drawing of community maps can both disqualify CLTS as an empowerment approach and can undermine its effectiveness in promoting long-term behaviour change (Engel and Susilo, 2014).

Steps in facilitating a shit in water tool during CLTS

- Go to community with sealed bottled water and clean disposable cup/potable water in the community may be used for the demonstration.
- During the transect walk, a member of the facilitation team would have picked some shit to the gathering point.
- Offer the bottled water to a community member to open the seal in the presence of everyone and ask if it is a safe water to drink
- The facilitator should take part of the water using a disposable cup and invite a volunteer amongst the community members to join in drinking the water. The community volunteer should be served with the water using another disposable cup. Next, the facilitator should show the community members a piece of thread and ask the community members if they can see the thread. Then touch the shit already placed at the gathering point with the thread.
- Now dip the thread in the bottled water that was opened in the presence of the community members and shake the bottle. Ask the community members if they can see anything in the bottle of water.
- Offer the bottle of water to the volunteers or any other community member close to you to drink. They will refuse. Pass the bottle of water on to other community members or ask if any community member will be interested in drinking the water. No one will like to drink the water. Ask why they refused to drink the water and the response will likely be that the water has been contaminated with shit.
- Then ask how many legs a fly has. The response might be correct if not, facilitate to get the correct answers. Ask if flies could pick up more or less shit than the thread. The response is likely to be more.
- Ask what happens when flies fall in their or their children's cups of drinking water. What do the flies bring along with them from open defecation sites? Do you throw the water and cups away when flies perch on them? Then, what are you along with the water?
- If someone says they are drinking their shit. Invite the person to explain further how they are drinking their shits.
- Then ask the whole community members if they agree with the person that they are drinking their shits. Ask if they want to continue with this practice and what can they do to stop the practice.
- Capture and manage the ignition moments by amplifying their Reactions/responses.
- Thank the community members and summarize the key points especially their reactions and responses to the use of the tool.

6.5.3 Choosing to Build Latrines

The literature on CLTS emphasises that CLTS is not about building latrines but about behavioural change (Bardosh, 2015; Adeyeye, 2011; Engel and Susilo, 2014). Participants are free to decide on a course of action towards stopping open defecation in their communities. An action plan detailing 'local' plans for stopping open defecation is produced at the end of the triggering meeting. Observations from triggering meetings, however, showed that facilitators

emphasised public declaration of willingness to build toilets as a major yardstick for documenting the success of the triggering meetings. A WASH coordinator explained the reason for this:

> 'The project recognises other ways of faeces disposal like 'dig and bury' as detailed in the action plan, but emphasis was on building latrines because latrines allows you to count progress.'

In practice, a triggering meeting is considered successful if many households publicly declare their intention to build new latrines. Table 6.4, below, presents the number of households that publicly made commitments to build latrines after the triggering exercise.

Table 6.4: Households that committed to build toilets

S/No	Community	Number of households without latrines present	Number of households that agreed to build latrines	Percentage
1	Igogo Idoka	34	13	38%
2	Ilegosi	30	15	50%
3	Odunrin Osun Ekiti	15	9	60%
4	Osan Ekiti	51	12	24%

The deliberations on the next course of action after information on the dangers of open defecation was shared with project communities took various forms. The deliberations were intended to provide participants with an opportunity to choose a course of action in response to the information received. In several villages, the initial turnout by participants to publicly commit to build latrines was low. Facilitators at the triggering meetings made several attempts to convince the participants to build latrines. For example, in Ilegosi, after a call was made for those willing to build latrines to stand up, 15 people accounting for fifty percent of those without latrines came forward (table 6.4). At the meeting in Igogo Idoka, a different scenario was seen. No participant showed interest in wanting to build a new latrine. After several facilitators made speeches aimed at convincing participants to come forward, 13 people (38%) did. In the four communities visited, a major reason for participants refusing to build toilets was related to the claim by the participants that they lacked the funds for construction of latrines

and therefore were not willing to publicly commit to building a latrine. A female participant at the triggering meeting in Igogo Idoka said:

> 'I like this idea our visitors [the facilitators] have presented to us and my household will like to construct a latrine. We however cannot afford it now. We do not have the money to do so.'

Similarly, in Osan Ekiti, another female participant stated:

> 'I do not like defecating in the bush. My family does not have money to build latrine. My daughters' school fees is more important for now.'

In all communities, a list of participants willing to build latrines was taken after they made public declarations to construct latrines. Group photographs were taken and prayers made for those willing to build latrines to live up to their commitment.

The 2015 baseline study by the Institute of Fiscal Studies on sanitation practices in Moba LGA outlined several reasons why households do not own latrines. The main reason, given by 55% of respondents, was lack of money to build toilets, and 35% of respondents mentioned tenancy arrangements with landlords as reasons for not owning latrines. A WASH unit staff member described the challenge of trying to get project recipients to change their attitudes towards open defecation:

> 'Most community members don't want to leave their old ways. Some will tell you they get fresh air while defecating outside. Aside from that, since there is no punishment for open defecation, some do not take it seriously' (LGA WASH unit staff).

The public CLTS decision-making process makes decision making technical. In Foucauldian terms, it is an attempt at making participants legible. The attempt to convince participants to openly commit to building latrines enables success to be measured. This renders communities legible for monitoring and evaluation purposes. It does not take into account the impact 'shaming' will have on the 'dignity' of households while reinforcing existing power relationships in favour of richer households who are the most likely to own latrines.

6.5.4 Motivation for attending triggering meetings

Attendance at meetings is one of the key variables for measuring participation in most development interventions (Ali, 2013).The triggering meetings are convened without the agenda of the meetings being revealed to participants. The element of surprise during the triggering session is expected to 'trigger' action towards ending open defecation. The interests

and motivations of participants for attending the planning meetings however differs. Narratives from facilitators highlight some expectations from Community Members:

> 'When you go to communities they often hold the view that you are an outsider and have come with gifts for them (WASH unit staff).
>
> 'Community members think you have brought money or some form of subsidy. We are here to help them make commitment towards stopping open defecation in their communities.' (WaterAid staff)

The communities, in attending triggering meetings, expected cash or material incentives from WaterAid since previous projects implemented by donors in such communities come with either subsidies or physical infrastructures.

> 'International NGOs always come with some form of aid. Some sanitation projects implemented in Nigeria have been subsidy based, where the project beneficiaries are either given cash to complete their latrine construction, or provided with 'cement slabs' for the floor of the latrines. CLTS, as explained earlier, does not have any form of subsidy.'(CLTS Facilitator)

The foregoing formed the basis for various responses received during deliberations at triggering meetings. During the triggering meetings, some participants left the venue as soon as they found out what the objective of the meeting was. Such participants were mostly elderly people. At the meeting in Ile Odunrin for instance, about 7 elderly women left the meeting after the presentation against open defecation was made. This may be because the women saw sanitation as a matter not requiring immediate action. This was reflected in the various statements made during the FGDs in the communities and during the triggering sessions calling on WaterAid to address more pressing community priorities like lack of pipe borne water:

> 'We need water because we have no stream. All of us are drinking from the local stream and this is affecting the health of our children. We need this more than anything else' (WASHCOM member).
>
> '…while thanking you for bringing this project to our community, I will like to repeat the appeal we made when you visited previously concerning our urgent need for water (WASHCOM member).

The projects operate under the rationale of a demand responsive approach. The foregoing evidence shows that communities are sometimes co-opted into projects without demanding for them.

6.5.5 Barriers to Mobilisation for Collective Action

Sanitation is a common good and requires collective action towards achieving results and objectives (Kyamusugulwa, 2015). A key theme that emerged from discussions on CLTS triggering was the need to have a representative population of the community during triggering meetings. A WASH consultant reiterates this:

> 'CLTS is about collective action. Unless a community decides that the fact that I have a latrine and you do not have one means that both of us do not have, then we will not have an open defecation free community' (WASH consultant).

> 'It is an affinity of brothers, if one person does not participate then it affects us all' (CLTS Facilitator)

Discussions with WaterAid and WASH unit staff however revealed that getting project beneficiaries to attend CLTS triggering meetings was a major challenge for the case study projects. This was despite the arrangements made by facilitators to ensure maximum attendance as described previously. Another concern raised, in addition to having all segments of the community and the right numbers present at triggering meetings, was the need to have key community decision makers present at meetings. A WaterAid staff member, sharing his experience stated:

> 'It is also necessary to ensure that movers and shakers of the community are present at the meeting and are involved in decision making. The community will find it difficult to take decisions when certain groups of people are not around' (WaterAid staff).

The 'movers and shakers' referred to in this statement could be influential youth leaders, elders or the traditional heads of the communities. Such persons were sometimes reported to reverse decisions taken at the triggering meetings in their absence questioning the claim of CLTS to provide a level playing ground where everyone in the community can contribute equally to the decision-making process. Where such participants were not available, the date of the meeting could be postponed, as a facilitator explained:

> 'Timing is a major issue, for example everyone could be gathered and the village head is not present, we have to wait for two to three hours. Sometimes we postpone the meeting.'

In a similar study Young and Maxwell (2013) in discussing community based targeting by traditional rulers which connects decision making with local leadership structures and hierarchies has the potential to reproduce the same forms of discrimination and exclusion that

participatory engagements seek to address. A focus on local communities without paying attention to the structures in which local communities are embedded may depoliticize participation and fail to challenge the competing interest that allows exclusion and marginalization to occur.

Discussions with LGA staff and WASHCOM members revealed several reasons why project beneficiaries were unable to attend triggering meetings. A major reason given by WASHCOM members was triggering meetings holding during the farming season. Despite attempts to avoid periods of intense farming activities by facilitators, engagement in farming activities was mentioned as a major factor contributing to poor attendance at the triggering meetings. For example, during a focus group meeting with WASHCOM members in Ile Odunrin, a community elder, explaining the reasons for the poor attendance there, said:

> 'Some people go to work on the farm and only come back in the evening. Others sleep on their farms.'

Another factor related to the farming season was weather conditions. Triggering meetings were held outside, because of the need to draw community maps on the floor in an open space. Most communities did not also have meeting rooms large enough to contain the entire community. An LGA staff explained:

> '...sometimes rain and the weather is a major challenge, we have to wait for the rain to stop before we start triggering activities.'

The triggering meetings for Ekiti and Enugu states were held in the rainy season. This was as a result of a delay in the collection of preliminary baseline information for the research component of the STS project. The triggering exercise could not commence until after the preliminary baseline data had been collected. The desire to work within the project cycle influenced the dates selected for the meetings. An LGA WASH staff member explained:

> 'The project cycle for the STS project starts in June and ends in June the next year. Funds made available are to be spent within a financial year. It is therefore necessary to ensure that triggering planning meetings take place during these periods. Finding suitable dates within the year to conclude planning and commence implementation sometimes proves challenging' (LGA staff).

A further reason given by key informants for poor attendance at triggering meetings was the project beneficiaries' perceptions of who the convenors of the meetings were, i.e. the fact that facilitators were LGA staff and were hence seen to be implementing a state government

programme. For instance, the triggering meeting scheduled for Ijielise community did not hold. The facilitators waited at the venue and left after an hour because nobody showed up. A facilitator explained the reason for the failure of project beneficiaries to attend the meeting:

> '...there are grievances between the villagers and government over the creation of political wards. The government recently created new political wards [collections of villages which serve as sub administrative heads to local government areas]. People in Ijielise expected the government to make Ijielise a political ward, but the government did not do so.'

The triggering meetings also took place during the period of Nigeria's Federal and State elections. A facilitator explained another reason for poor attendance:

> '...some people kept away because of fear of politicians turning the meetings into political campaign rallies which could sometimes be violent.'

Additionally, triggering meetings could not be held in large villages such as Afin, Odo Oja and Imayan, as planned. A facilitator explained during the FGD:

> 'CLTS does not work in urban communities because of the difficulty in mobilising larger communities to attend planning meetings. It is difficult to mobilise larger semi-urban communities because of the mixed culture and differences in the nature of occupations which limits availability.'

In addition to native citizens, semi-urban communities tend to have settlers who are not native. Such households may have a loose relationship with the traditional ruler who is usually the focal point for sending out invitations and mobilising planning activities. This serves to limit attendance and participation.

Key informant interviews show that there was no intervention under the STS project in villages where public triggering meetings were not held. The case study projects had a clearly defined procedural framework for implementing CLTS. Triggering meetings were the starting points for CLTS campaigns. A facilitator explained:

> 'The project is still considering alternative strategies for engaging with larger communities under the project.'

Where communities were unable to engage with the project under the existing framework, for reasons such as those described above, the projects were unable to promote CLTS in such communities using alternative strategies. Participative planning tools and structured

participative technologies may, in these cases, not serve to mobilise participants towards the interventions required. Frameworks such as CLTS triggering frameworks allow for a manageable sequence of procedures to be completed which could be easily monitored by WASH unit staff and used to demonstrate consensus, consent and inclusion (Mosse, 2005).Such technical frameworks do not lead to empowerment of project beneficiaries. The account of triggering in project communities is yet another example of why the complexity of trying to do something like WASH in rural areas of Nigeria where the state has limited capacity and presence, and where WaterAid cannot by itself compensate for this absence, effectively ensure that the kind of power dynamic inherent to governmentality does not get built up in the first place, and, thereby, people do not become subjects'.

6.6 Enforcement or Facilitation: The State as Facilitator of CLTS

The use of LGA WASH unit staff to facilitate CLTS sessions raises concerns about the authority of facilitators to exercise state authority in enforcing good sanitary practices. Ekiti state has a water and sanitation law which was enacted in 2013. Table 6.5 shows the relevant sections of the law related to open defecation. Section 88 subsection 6 sets out a fine of £4.89 for violating any law set out in subsections 3, 4 or 5. LGA staff have a responsibility for enforcing sanitation law as environmental health superintendents.

Table 6.5: Excerpts from Ekiti state water and sanitation law, 2013

Section	Sub Section	Law
88	3	No person shall construct any residential premises without adequate and appropriate toilet facilities in accordance with the state water supply and sanitation policy.
88	4	No person shall defecate in any public place including rivers, streams, boreholes, hand pumps, hand dug wells or any other water systems, facilities or their surroundings.
88	5	No person shall defecate or intentionally dump any waste or other pollutants into any public drains thereby causing the same to be blocked.
88	6	Any person convicted for any of the offences under subsections 3, 4 or 5 above, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a term of three months or a fine of N2000 (£4.89) or both.

Around the period of the triggering meetings, a pronouncement was made by the Ekiti state government, demanding that all property owners should provide latrines in their houses by February 2015, in keeping with the state water and sanitation law. The governor was quoted in the Vanguard newspaper as saying:

> 'If, by the end of February 2015, we still have landlords who build or live in houses without considering toilet facilities, such landlords will be apprehended and made to face prosecution under the state environmental law'(Vanguard, Nigeria, 27th December 2014).

He added:

> 'I also want to add that tenants who rent such faulty houses stand the risk of facing similar penalty with their landlords' (Vanguard, Nigeria, 27th December 2014).

LGA staff, by virtue of this decree and the existing water and sanitation law, are expected to enforce this declaration of the governor. While mention was made of it at triggering meetings, it was not from the point of view of enforcement, but advising house owners to act before the law came into effect.

> 'We are pleading with you to build your latrines now. You have all heard the announcement by Fayose [the governor], that from February the government will arrest anyone who does not have a latrine. You need to build yours now' (CLTS facilitator).

The LGA staff, by assuming the role of facilitators under the projects, play a dual function and seem to relinquish the authority they have as staff of a state agency with the sovereign power to enforce good sanitary practices as provided by law. LGA staff, as facilitators, become guides, leading a process of 'self-discovery' in the participants. In doing so, they leave their power to enforce at the corridor and wear the cap of facilitators (Cooke and Kothari, 2001).

Discussions with LGA and WaterAid staff show differences of opinion with regards to how LGA staff perceive their role within the project. Most of the LGA staff interviewed viewed the exercise they were conducting as a WaterAid exercise. An LGA staff, in explaining the approach of his unit to engaging with communities, explained:

> '…When we go into any community for programme implementation, they sign an MOU with us and we tell them that the programme is 100% an NGO runned programme and not a government programme' (WASH unit staff).

Another WASH unit staff had the same opinion:

> ‘For now, the programme we are doing is without enforcement and that is why most of the time, when we are going to the field we do not wear our uniform, we pretend we are not government workers. We try to see how to pamper them (project beneficiaries), we support them to change their behaviour’ (LGA WASH unit staff).

LGA staff during interviews found it difficult to explain whether they were working on behalf of the LGA or WaterAid under the HSBC and STS Projects. The findings show that WaterAid perceives the projects as LGA projects in which WaterAid works as a facilitator. A WaterAid staff explained:

> ‘We are in the LGA as facilitators. Our role is to provide an enabling environment for the LGA to implement her programmes.’

Similarly, LGA staff believed that as opposed to facilitation, enforcement was needed to improve the use of toilets after households construct them:

> ‘… It is one thing for them (project beneficiaries) to have latrines and it is another thing for them to use them. Enforcement will improve uptake of sanitation. There is a community where we have been working for few years who have refused to build latrines. They can be forced to build latrines through enforcement’ (LGA WASH unit staff).

The use of facilitation rather than enforcement under CWM illustrates an attempt to implement neoliberal governmentality which is more about co-opting and administering project beneficiaries rather than about ruling them through top-down laws and decrees (Merlingen, 2011).Balancing the strategy of facilitation and enforcing compliance to good sanitary practices is complex with outcomes which compromise the goal of empowerment under CWM.

6.7 Conclusion

The chapter has focused on the use of training, information dissemination and capacity building as strategies of empowerment in WaterAid projects. These tactics have been depicted as tools of governance in advanced liberal order. The chapter also examined the politics of knowledge in WASH projects. The analysis shows that individuals and communities targeted for intervention to reduce open defecation and improve water availability were more or less defined as ‘objects whose behavioural characteristics could be changed through public meetings, education and other forms of enlightenment and nudging processes. On this scheme, an attempt is made to use expert knowledge to preventively focus the potential behaviour of project beneficiaries (Kessl and Kutscher, 2008). In the case studies, specialist knowledge of sanitation was intended as a means of guiding the behaviour of project beneficiaries away from

open defecation. Knowledge-producing actors made it possible for the projects to identify groups whose behavioural patterns could be altered by acting upon causal relations (Senden and Neumann, 2006:660).

The triggering meeting to decide on a course of actions with respect to open defecation offers an opportunity for the participants to choose their own course. The options are, however, controlled and limited within a defined framework of choices. Attempts are made to guide project beneficiaries towards the established options. The training is intended to enhance the capacity of communities so that the communities take responsibility for creating change and sustaining WASH services. Training also provides an opportunity for project beneficiaries to document their activities, thereby participating in monitoring or policing themselves. Triggering planning meetings are in practice an ordered sequence of learning and action in which an attempt is made to make communities who are the objects of transformation acquire capacity for self-knowledge and self-help in keeping with neoliberal rationalities (Mosse, 2005).

The calculated administration of shame or disgust exhibited within the public decision making space in which each families are made to publicly declare whether they have toilets or not and to show the position of those toilets on the map in public view, amounts to an attempt to encourage participants to achieve normality by committing to owning toilets, which is socially worthy. Rose (1999) calls this a calculated administration of shame. This public act is thus an exercise of power designed to make participants of the participatory process conform to the goals of the facilitator or project. The attempt to create subjects is however overwhelmed by real life circumstances in which the potential subjects of participation are uncooperative. Communities do not become subjects as accounts of governmentality conceptualises or suggest. They admit during triggering meetings that it is wrong to practise open defecation but resume open defecation after some time.

The chapter has demonstrated the many complexities of implementing a WASH project in Nigeria where state institutions like WASH units have limited capacity and presence, and where WaterAid cannot by itself compensate for the absence of the state. It explains why the kind of power dynamics inherent to governmentality are not actualised. In chapter seven we examine the effectiveness of the strategies for CWM and attempt to offer explanations for why subjects are not been created and the wider implications of such narrow views.

Chapter 7: The Effectiveness of CWM

7.0 Introduction

CWM illustrates another attempt by International development practitioners to implement development programmes that are in line with neoliberal approaches which emphasis choice and responsibility (Engel and Susilo: 2014: 175).This chapter discusses the research findings drawing from Chapters five and six. The chapter examines the effectiveness of the strategies and techniques of CWM and the implications for changing power relations between INGOS, communities and government. The discussion chapter also considers the broader implications of CWM strategies in creating dependencies, ownership and long term sustainability of WASH projects.

The thesis attempts to investigate to what extent the strategies, procedures and technologies adopted by WaterAid in promoting Community WASH management (CWM) are based on advanced liberal programmes of empowerment which aim to shape the conduct of aid recipients to create active subjects of participation towards neoliberal objectives? More specifically, the thesis attempts further to identify the strategies, procedures and technologies adopted by WaterAid in promoting local participation and empowerment in the context of CWM in Nigeria and how are these enacted? (ii) The effectiveness of these strategies? (iii) Their implications on existing administrative structures and power relations between INGOs, governments, and the local communities; and (iv) their border implications for the long-term sustainability of projects.This chapter will reflect on the research questions for the study.The chapter shows that while CWM offers opportunities for communities and the state to share responsibility in the provision of WASH services along neoliberal lines, it may however not challenge, but rather maintain existing power structures-so that empowerment does not occur. The chapter also showed how agendas such as CWM is countered by those managed through it (Buley, 2013). Finally, the chapter reflects on implications on findings from the thesis on the literature on NGOs, neoliberal governance and governmentality.

7.1 Implications of CWM strategies on existing state administrative structures

Chapter five showed that WaterAid in partnership with LGA WASH units implements the STS and HSBC projects in communities. In working with communities, WaterAid and WASH units rely on WASHCOMs to implement WASH governance at community level. The attempt at decentralization by the projects through the creation of WASHCOMS and LGA WASH units

is an attempt at creating various decision making centres which allows governance to take place at lower levels. Under CWM, the welfare role of the national state is taken over from a 'central centre' and distributed to agencies, organizations, individuals and groups (Rose, 2000; Lacey and Ilcan, 2006). Instead of replacing the state (Rose and Miller, 1992), WaterAid is working through state institutions to deliver WASH services in communities.

In chapter 2, it was shown that the local governance system in Nigeria is characterised by heavy bureaucratic processes which limits the delivery of WASH services in Nigeria. The partnership between WaterAid and the State requires that the State removes bureaucratic and other bottle necks characteristics of state institutions in Nigeria and instead adopt efficient mechanisms towards effective service delivery**.** The creation of WASH units is an attempt to enhance the performance of the LGA system.

The study however found that despite attempts at enhancing the performance of LGA WASH units, there still exist inefficiency, bureaucracy and aid dependency within the LGA WASH system. Several cases described in chapters five and six revealed poor attitude to work, complacency and allegiance to civil service structures as impediments to effective partnership with LGA WASH units. Findings however further showed that attempts to create WASH units and enhance the performance of WASH units while serving to improve the performance of LGAs towards improved service delivery, also enables WaterAid to implement her own bureaucratic processes and directly manage resources provided to LGAs. This is expected to increase project efficiency and reduce misappropriation of project resources or funds.

CWM demands that the state transfers certain aspects of her traditional role to communities. Findings from the study showed that the LGA WASH units while working to promote CWM were in some cases unwilling to relinquish certain responsibilities to non-state actors like WASHCOMs. In some cases as described in chapter five, attempts by Communities to assume certain responsibilities traditionally considered state responsibilities has led to tensions between the LGA WASH units and communities. Attempts by WASHCOMs to fix water points after receiving training in Village Level Operations and Maintenance (VLOM) without consulting WASH units have in some cases caused conflict between WASH units and Communities because LGA WASH units believe they should be consulted before repairs are made. LGA WASH units do not believe communities have the technical ability to carry out repairs despite training received. Involvement of communities in this case is limited to

WASHCOMs noting repairs required and reporting such to the LGA WASH unit. The supervisory role of the state is thus still at play in the provision of WASH services.

The case of latrine construction under the STS project further drives home this point. The implementation plan for the STS institutional latrine project as described in chapter five was planned such that communities will lead the process of building latrines. They were to participate in all aspects of decision making related to constructions. These decisions ranged from deciding where latrines will be sited, procurement of materials and recruitment of artisans. Procurement of building materials was to be managed by a committee comprising of Community members. Findings from an examination of project reports and key informant interviews with WASHCOM and LGA staff showed however that in addition to the procurement of a Consultant which was detailed in chapter 6, a procurement committee was not inaugurated. The LGA coordinators were directly responsible for purchase of building materials. Key informant interviews attributed the desire by LGAs to hold onto certain activities meant to be implemented by Communities to two major reasons; one reason relates to the desire of the LGA to enforce traditional LGA operational processes. Another relates to the desire by LGA staff to benefit from the project in other ways. This is related to corruption. A WaterAid staff observed:

> '…There is wide scale corruption, or intent to misappropriate funds within the LGA system'.

The cases described in the preceding paragraphs and others illustrated in chapters five and six reveal the desire of LGAs WASH units to hold onto certain activities meant to be implemented by communities as outlined in project documents thereby limiting the participation of communities. Resistance to implementation the way WaterAid desires can be viewed as a form of resistance by LGAs to a neo-colonial attempt to capture the machinery of the state.

Another major finding of the study is that the intervention of WaterAid under the STS and HSBC projects has led to the restructuring of state processes (Sending, 2006).The LGA through the influence of WaterAid has developed a range of government techniques and tactics which are not based on legal force or open state violence but instead on 'facilitation' (Boelens et al, 2013). As shown in chapter six, LGA Environmental Health enforcement staff assume facilitator roles in a bid to influence behaviour of communities towards open defecation. This is as opposed to enforcing state laws on sanitation. It was also shown in chapter five that the creation of WASH units under the case study projects has changed reporting lines thereby

creating new hierarchies within the LGA system. Project funds are managed by a committee outside the LGA administrative system. WASH unit coordinators also report directly to WaterAid in some cases instead of through Directors and the LGA chairman.

In order to share responsibility for provision of WASH services with the state, WaterAid uses various technologies aimed at ensuring the participation of the state. A major responsibility highlighted in chapter five is that of providing counterpart funding. In keeping with neoliberal rationalities, LGAs are expected to share the financial cost of providing WASH services with WaterAid and Communities. Findings however showed that the state is docking responsibility with regards to payment of counterpart funds. This has led to the retrenchment of the state (Mckee, 2015).While in some cases, LGAs are willing to take financial responsibility, they are in most cases unable to do so due to lack of funds. In chapter five, it was noted that LGAs do not have financial autonomy since they operate joint accounts with state governments and are thus not in control of their funds. State governments decide how funds will be utilized. The foregoing makes it difficult for LGAs to contribute financially to project implementation as desired by WaterAid.The inability of the state to contribute her counterpart fund has led to loss of power by the state. The state is unable to fully supervise the activities of WaterAid for fear that WaterAid may demand that she meets her contractual agreements. A 2008 report by WaterAid reiterates the inability of LGAs to bear responsibility for service provision under a decentralised system. The following quotes from the report drive home this assertion:

> '… Transferring responsibility for service provision, with inadequate financial allocations to the local level, will not allow local governments to fulfil their roles, for example, in countries such as Burkina Faso, Mozambique and Ethiopia.'(WaterAid, 2008:6)

> '…This lack of a critical mass of resources undermines the credibility of local government as an agency of delivery, a focal point of accountability and the keystone of all decentralisation reforms. (WaterAid, Think local act local report, 2008:5)

While WaterAid scripts the language of partnership, findings showed that in practise power and responsibilities are not distributed between WaterAid and WASH units as stipulated in project design documents. A key aspect of project implementation that kept reoccurring during interviews was the area of procurements of WASH material and recruitment of project consultants. An LGA Coordinator commenting on the need for more transparent partnership noted:

> ‘Partnership should not only be on paper. Partnership should be total without dictatorship .We should talk and solve problems together for results. True and sincere partnership is when we are allowed to choose our consultants and plan our implementation process’.
>
> ‘…We have many instances where Consultants and Contractors are imposed on us’. (LGA Coordinator)

WaterAid strives to increase the capacity of LGA WASH unit staff to implement programmes of empowerment in communities. Results of interviews show that several factors may limit the ability of WASH units to gain capacity to enable them deliver WASH services in Project communities. A key factor mentioned during interviews with LGA WASH unit and WaterAid staff is the frequent transfer of LGA WASH unit staff by state authorities. The 16 LGAs that attended the 2013 Annual partners’ round table mentioned the frequent transfer of WASH unit staff as an impediment to project implementation. New staff posted to the WASH department or unit are not familiar with the project implementation process. This affects the ability of WASH staff to take responsibility for certain aspects of project implementation. Similarly, the WaterAid report on the impact and sustainability of water and sanitation programmes recognised frequent transfer of LGA staff as an impediment to project implementation:

> ‘Even where full community participation or management has been planned from the start, community-level committees and caretakers have lost interest or trained individuals have moved away. This can be a particular risk if community level organization is on a voluntary basis’ (WaterAid, 2011:4).

The foregoing discussion limits the ability of WASH unit staff to take responsibility within the project. Attempts at promoting decentralisation may not lead to a transfer of power. It may instead create new power relations thereby limiting the goal of empowerment.(Marcus, 2007).In his study of decentralisation in Madagascar, Marcus (2007) argues that universal decentralisation of water services does not improve participatory access to WASH services. It may instead serve to undermine effective governance. He calls for a ‘more nuanced view of state responsibilities and community participation that ensures both resource perpetuation and not just participation but viable choices by community members’ (Marcus, 2007: 206). While attempts can be made at LGA level to ensure that LGAs fulfils their responsibility for provision of WASH services, LGAs are often unable to do so because of reasons outlined above. The foregoing account shows that attempts by WaterAid to govern the state at a distance are in some cases compromised by the failure of WASH units to conduct their business, and by WaterAids’ own attempt to stop them from performing their responsibilities.

7.2 Influence of Non State Actors

The two case study projects implemented by WaterAid in Nigeria illustrate a case where non state actors are invited to perform governance functions (Sending and Neumann, 2006).In chapter six, it was shown that the projects rationalise the need for the involvement of government in the provision of WASH services to a 'rights based approach'. In using the right based approach, WaterAid demands commitment from state and holds the state accountable for the delivery of WASH services through Project Communities. Rights based approaches describe a form of governing from the bottom allowing for more inclusive decision making (Dean, 2010).Some WaterAid reports explain:

> 'It is in this context that WaterAid has come to believe that a people-centred rights- based approach can deliver more sustainable solutions, because if it is successful, then decisions are more likely to be focused on what marginalised communities and individuals require, understand and can manage, rather than what external agencies deem is necessary'(WaterAid, 2011: 6)

> 'WANG will work to empower citizens to be able to demand their rights and take responsibility for maintaining the services as well as supporting them to engage effectively in WASH governance' (Aim 1)(WaterAid, 2010:8)

The 'rights of communities' is deployed as a strategy from below to allow for an evaluation of state activities. (Dean, 2010). This process is expected to lead to changes in the power relationship between citizens and the state as citizens begin to ask for their rights. Individuals within communities can be supported to internalise information provided to them by National NGOs and LGA WASH units (Ranganathan, 2014). The information if internalised will lead to collective mobilisation which will enable 'right claimant' to be able to hold government accountable through various activities (Mckee, 2015). This will influence government to deliver WASH services. Under this arrangement, WaterAid as a means of remote governance relies on the individual capacity and subjectivity of project beneficiaries to be able to influence the state to perform her responsibility (Babu, 2009).

Findings from the study revealed however that attempts to implement a right based approach is ineffective. National NGOs commissioned by WaterAid as part of the project design, to play an influencing role on LGAs are sometimes unable to do so because they lack financial and material resources available to international NGOs. Findings also showed that National NGOs do not have legislative backing to hold government to account. This makes the task of

influencing difficult. During interviews with CSOs, they reported instances where state WASH units refused to submit reports meant for WaterAid through them as required. LGA staff also perceived the responsibility given to National NGOs to manage the activities of WASH Units as a case of WaterAid undermining the authority of the WASH units. A director of a National NGO under the project explained:

> 'The International NGOs are able to exercise control over LGAs to enable them carry out their functions because they provide them with finance. We manage their spending but do not directly give money to them. This makes it difficult for them to listen to us.'
>
> 'We have no responsibility to them. Why can't WaterAid deal with us directly? They should talk to us. We have the ability to deliver their work in good time' (LGA Staff).

To address this challenge, WaterAid has revisited the strategy of working with state RUWASSAs to supervise LGA WASH units. While this was already existing in Ekiti, similar strategies have been revisited in Plateau state. WaterAid delegates the responsibility for managing WASH units to CSOs without the legitimacy of national CSOs to govern state agencies.

Elber and Schulpen (2012) observed that lots of questions have been raised about the ability of NGOs to deliver empowerment programmes at a time when the development sector is focused on quick results and value for money. Findings from the study shows that there are several factors that limit the ability of WaterAid to deliver her programme of empowerment. One factor relates to reporting procedures. A key finding of the study is that project reporting procedures undermine the ability of WaterAid to allow LGA WASH units assume certain responsibilities prescribed in project documents. The task of governing WASH units and communities is achieved through reporting. Reports serve as instruments for overseeing the performance of WASH units and communities. Financial and project activity reports are sent regularly to the Head office of the projects. The financial reports are accompanied by original copies of receipt and quotations to support expenditures. At community level, responsibility for compilation of reports is vested on the Natural Leaders who are responsible for keeping demographic records, records of activities carried out, number of new household latrines, rate of breakdown of water points and rate of latrine collapse. The low educational qualification of LGA staff however made it difficult for WASH unit staff to observe reporting requirements as required by WaterAid. To address this challenge, Consultants are engaged by WaterAid to assist the State

in fulfilling this role. The foregoing limits the responsibility of LGA WASH unit within the projects.

Another key factor limiting the ability of WaterAid to implement her programme of empowerment is the time frame for implementation of the case study projects. In chapter five, the project cycle for implementation of the STS and HSBC projects was discussed. Concerns related to the duration of the projects in communities was raised in the WaterAid 2010 to 2015 Nigeria country strategy.

> 'WaterAids presence in communities is also found to be too short and hence programming is too incomplete and unsystematic to result in inclusive and sustainable community-wide behaviour change that is required to lead to healthy and productive benefits in project communities, let alone across Nigeria' (WaterAid 2010:4)

Similarly, Interviews with WaterAid and LGA staff collaborated the findings from the country strategy report and called for a change in how project activities are implemented:

> 'We are made to work in a hurry to implement programmes at the tail end of the financial year. This affects the quality of the exercise.' (LGA WASH unit staff)

> 'We should move from a project approach which is not sustainable to a programmatic approach. First six months should be spent on WASHCOM formation with very loose decision making processes that allows you to quickly explore other options of working with communities' (WaterAid Staff)

The rationality for quick implementation of project activities is related to the desire by WaterAid to meet targets set in the project log frame. The drive for efficiency and attainment of log frame targets may compromise the desire of WaterAid to empower WASH units and communities to assume responsibility for service delivery. The foregoing account reveals that WaterAid in delivering her programme of empowerment attempts to influence the State and Communities to participate in the delivery of WASH services using strategies which have the features of neoliberal governmentality in which WaterAid tries to enact governance at a distance. Attempts to influence the state and communities is however constrained by several challenges related to the inability of state institutions to form effective partnerships and also the inability of communities to respond as desired. WaterAid also compromises this attempt as a result of pressures to deliver targets set out by donors in the project documents. This factors limit the ability of WaterAid to deliver her programme of empowerment.

7.3 Limitations of the technologies of CWM in communities

The principle of Community WASH management hinges around assigning responsibility to communities (Marcus, 2007). Under the HSBC and STS projects, communities are assigned various responsibilities as discussed in chapters five and six. Findings showed however that several factors hinder the implementation of this regime of neoliberalism characterised by shared responsibilities between the state and citizens (Sangameswaran, 2010). Findings from the study also showed that the dynamics of communities and their real life situations are sometimes not considered in designing CWM programmes. This limits the empowerment of communities and places a burden on communities.

Central to this dynamics is the process of identifying project communities for intervention. As discussed in chapter five, a key step in implementing the STS and HSBC projects is the identification of 'communities' where the projects will be implemented. Project monitoring and evaluation documents also set targets on the number of communities the project is expected to intervene in within its life span. For effective results measurement and project implementation, communities have to be categorised into manageable units since the development partner seeks legibility and visibility to enable him technically manage the project (Dean, 2010). Findings from the study showed that in practice, the identification of rural communities and semi urban communities within LGAs for project implementation was a major challenge. In practice, rural communities in Africa do not have clear geographical boundaries that meet the specifications of the case study projects. To address this challenge, WaterAid identifies and creates 'development communities' based on population. Thus five thousand people within the same geographical area is considered a 'rural community'. The boundaries set based on this definition is sometimes known only to the project coordinators. It does not exist in the day to day categorisation by project beneficiaries. A WaterAid staff says:

> 'The project communities are only represented on paper for the donors but the boundaries are not clear within the communities (WaterAid staff).'

Findings showed that project recipients attach several meanings and value to existing demarcations of 'geographical communities'.The new boundaries created by the development partner sometimes set sections of the newly created 'development community' against other existing communities as initially independent communities that have been merged under a larger community to make up the population required for identification feel marginalised.A water and sanitation expert noted:

> ‘A community is more than just numbers. We have to look beyond population in defining communities’
>
> ‘We have 40 communities in Moba, these communities have been in existence from the time of our fore fathers. You should not be seen splitting up this communities as it may lead to conflict (WASHCOM member).

The desire by communities to retain existing traditional boundaries is further linked to the authority of traditional rulers. The geographical areas under the authority of traditional rulers is defined based on the existing local demarcations known to project recipients. Creating new geographical boundaries for the purpose of project management is seen to reduce the geographical coverage of land under the control of the traditional ruler and hence the subjects under his control.

These findings resonate the findings and conclusions discussed in chapter three of Cleaver, (2001), Mosse (2001) and Sharpe (1998) who asserted that participatory approaches view community as a natural social entity characterized by solidaristic, homogeneous relationships which can be assumed and channeled in simple organizational forms. They also maintained that participatory approaches focus on geographical boundaries in defining communities thereby assuming a permanent static structure. This view of community suppresses differences and tensions by ignoring class, gender, inequality, power relations and other differences within communities.

A more realistic practical view of community will be one in which ‘community’ is seen as the site of both solidarity and conflict, shifting alliances, power and social structures (Cleaver 2001).Viewing community this way will agree with the definition of community as a social construct designed to separate insiders from outsiders (Msukwa and Taylor, 2011).These perspective of community will question the consensus based decisions that are said to emanate as outcomes of participatory processes like CWM since geographical communities where projects are implemented are not homogeneous.

The study in chapter six however revealed that, HSBC and STS projects recognised the diversity within project communities and made deliberate efforts to ensure the representation of women, people living with disability and children during project implementation. In some cases, separate meetings were held for different gender categories to encourage participation. Findings however revealed that there was a lack of sensitivity by the projects to political and cultural differences within project communities. The public decision making meetings such as triggering and community council meetings assumed an absence of such differences in creating

project communities. Political differences related to membership of different political parties may limit the attempt by WaterAid to promote collective action on WASH activities. A WASH Consultant elaborates this further:

> 'There may be cultural rivalry within members of a community. If we do not factor this into project planning, we will not have cooperation' (WASH Consultant)
>
> 'In communities, people belong to different political parties...: Invitations for participation at project meetings should take this into account to allow for full cooperation of all segments of the community.' (WASH Consultant)
>
> 'The only conflict we are facing are related to political issues, if I am a member of a certain party, others from a different political party will not attend a programme I organise' (National NGO staff)

Simply creating groups for decision making based on gender or physical disability without sensitivity to individual cultural and political affiliations may deter collective action towards attainment of project objectives.

A further factor limiting the ability of project communities to assume responsibilities was the time demand for project activities which conflicts with time required for agricultural and other income generating activities. This was discussed extensively in chapters five and six. The Case study projects target 'marginalised' communities who found participation cumbersome. Some LGA Staff explained the response of communities to responsibilities assigned under the project:

> 'Our communities are agrarian with lots of farm work carried out using manual labour. WASHCOM members sometimes demand monetary compensation for participating in meetings. They also want compensation for community mobilisation activities. (LGA staff, Moba)
>
> 'Communities demand payments for their time. This is linked to suspicions that money has been provided for such activities by the donor organisations'. (LGA staff, Ikole)

Another reason why communities were unwilling to assume responsibilities under the project was the perception by communities that responsibilities, especially for provision of WASH services is the task of government. Communities should therefore not be burdened by it. Several Interviews showed that communities also felt funds for construction have been provided to the LGA but may have been misappropriated.

> 'They (Communities) have a mentality that government should provide everything' (WASH Consultant)

'..During triggering meetings, communities demand that government builds latrines on their behalf' (LGA WASH staff).

Several interviews also showed the failure of government to pay salaries as a major impediment to communities participating in project implementation. In Ekiti state for example where the STS project is implemented, an LGA staff observed:

'… Salaries have not been paid in Ekiti for the past three months. Communities do not have money for building latrines'

'..Non-payment of salaries in Ekiti has slowed down the pace of latrine uptake' (LGA WASH staff, Ndenu)

CWM under the case study projects demand that communities share the burden for provision of WASH services. The requirements for fulfilling such responsibilities may however be beyond the project communities due to socioeconomic and political constraints. Communities do not unite towards the delivery of WASH services.

The drive to assign responsibilities to communities may also be disempowering to communities. As illustrated in chapter five, some communities sometimes have to rely on more privileged members of their community to be able to meet counterpart funding responsibilities. This is likely to promote patron client relationships in communities. Further, as discussed in chapter six, triggering processes are also meant to provide level playing grounds for all members of the community, but as accounts of triggering meetings shows, such meetings are still dominated by traditional rulers and other power holders in community limiting the agency of poor people. Decisions cannot be made without certain community members present. Their mere presence during triggering sessions on the other hand prevents poor community members from voicing their opinion in keeping with cultural practices in rural Nigerian communities. Similarly the use of shaming techniques and the public display of households that own latrines or are able to build one may de-authorise resource constrained rural dwellers who are supposed to drive the WASH process in their villages.

While this account of assigning responsibilities to rural dwellers clearly illustrates the desire of WaterAid to use neoliberal strategies to bring about governance at a distance in the management of WASH services, the account also shows that communities do not become the subjects of development as is presupposed in accounts of neoliberalism or advanced liberal techniques of government as expanded in chapter three of this thesis.

7.4 Community WASH Management-sustainability or dependency

The account of CWM implementation in project communities describes accounts in which communities and individuals targeted for water and sanitation interventions are 'defined as objects whose behavioural characteristics could be changed through programmes of CWM (Sending and Neumann, 2006:660). Communities enter into contract with WaterAid through LGA WASH units. Under contract arrangements, communities are expected to exercise their freedom by contributing to decision making within the projects. The exercise of freedom is however along project requirements (Dean, 2010). Findings showed that project recipients are expected to attend public decision making meetings, recognise the need for intervention and become members of development committees. Keeping this disciplines is expected to make project beneficiaries 'responsible project recipients'. McKay and Garratt (2013) in studying the effect of disciplinary technologies on participation observes that the expanding relationships produced in the process of creating spaces for participation which seeks to produce active subjects may produce regulated, subordinated subjects. Policies like CWM speaks into existence a series of regulatory duties which through punitive sanctions attempt to construct the 'responsible project beneficiary' as a recognisable object of discourse (McKay and Garratt, 2013).The study showed however that WASH units and communities are unable to keep these disciplines and do not become 'responsible project recipients as postulated in such accounts.

The call for sustainability and ownership of WASH services is a call for self-governance in which individuals are expected to manage their individual conduct towards the attainment of sustainable WASH service (Cruikshank 1999). Sustainability which forms the bedrock for the engagement of communities in WASH services stems not only from a neoliberal rationality but also an economic rationality in which donors seek to reduce expenditure on WASH services by ensuring the maintenance and functionality of WASH facilities (Kleemier, 2000).WASHCOMs are structures through which beneficiaries are expected to become the subject of disciplinary technologies. Such technologies are expected to produce a 'subtle effect, a means of correct training' (Foucault 1977:170-194 as cited in Rose et al,2006) that operates upon beneficiaries and providers creating a context for continuous observation, examination, unremitting classification and regulation.The non-sustainability of WASHCOMS and other structures created by the projects as illustrated in chapter five however questions the effectiveness of CWM in promoting ownership of WASH services and the success of such neoliberal governmental technologies. Findings from the study showed that the vision of

WASHCOMs transcending beyond the project cycle to define decision making and the way activities are conducted in communities is seldom realized.

> 'In a field interview of existing structures, most communities cannot remember the names of members or the number of members in the WASHCOM. Functionality is directly proportional to inducement of funding and technical support. I have not seen any WASHCOM functioning actively without support,' (WaterAid staff)

> 'Minutes of meeting is the immediate evidence of activity; when you go into communities, you will be told that the last time they met was six months ago. It should be fortnightly. After a projects life span you don't find any WASHCOM feeding into the design I have described' (WaterAid staff)

The idea of promoting ownership is expected to open up new spaces for communities and the state to act (Hansson, 2015).The participation of project recipients is expected to lead to transformation of communities, thereby igniting a self-starting mechanism that will influence other communities and lead to change in behaviour towards open defecation. Communities however found it difficult to observe the disciplinary technologies that were meant to define their participation and did not become subjectified.

A major area that formed the focus of this thesis was the nature of capacity building and knowledge production under CWM. Knowledge produced under CWM is normalised and seeks to discipline towards behavioural change (Engel and Susilo, 2014; Mehta and Moviks, 2001). In chapter six, it was shown that expert knowledge instead of outright coercion is used by state facilitators to attempt to achieve ODF communities. The instruments of sovereignty which is the governmental apparatus of the sovereign state is not utilized by facilitators who are staff of state agencies in this case LGA WASH units. This may however be in contention with the role of the state as a law enforcement agency.

> 'WaterAid says we should not enforce adherence to good sanitary practices. In some other communities where the project is not implemented, we enforce sanitary laws. There is a particular community where we had to get a court order to close down a facility because they did not have sanitation facilities' (LGA WASH unit staff)

The sustainability of this approach where LGA staff become facilitators instead of enforcement officers for achieving total sanitation is however questionable. Government, as Foucault puts it in his 1977-1978 lecture titled 'Security, Territory and Population' is an activity that undertakes to conduct individuals by placing them under the authority of a guide who is responsible for them (Rose, 2000). The use of facilitators under the CLTS approach reflects an indirect technique through which an attempt is made to guide communities to make their own

decision and develop action plans for project implementation. In doing so individuals are expected to assume responsibility for the outcome of the project (Rosol, 2015). Freedom and choice is therefore connected with responsibility(ibid).An analysis of participation within the projects however showed that participation is deployed as an attempt to create the least resistance to communities taking responsibility (Rosol, 2014).It is also deployed to ensure that knowledge or information on OD is accepted with the least resistance. While there is a claim within the projects towards sensitivity to local structures, such sensitivity is also a strategy deployed to gain the cooperation of communities.

In his analysis of what he calls 'the welfare state mentality', Dean (2010:68) asserts that the 'the situation of being economically dependent on welfare benefits for one's subsistence is said to foster a culture in which individuals expect to receive such assistance, and in which the expectations become a component in the lifestyle of families, communities and neighbourhoods'. The account of a WASH consultant illustrates how the state in Nigeria is dependent on aid from INGOs like WaterAid:

> 'Whatever the NGOs are doing is so far only a fraction of what the States claim. I have for long held the view that because NGOs think they can be providers; they unknowingly contribute to the laziness of most of the States. WaterAid contributed to the "laziness" of Benue State Government in the provision of WATSAN services because of the loud noise it (WaterAid) made about its successes in that State. Today most of what was put in has been lost and the people left to fend for themselves. Lack of water and sanitation is still very high in Benue. Similarly, UNICEF is not insisting on all the terms of Agreement with States they partner. They seem more interested in construction without pursuing the software components necessary to guarantee sustainability of the services provided' (WASH consultant).

Various states under the HSBC and STS projects have set up donor relations offices and developed ways of wooing donors. In states like Bauchi which is under the HSBC project, a special adviser for donor relations has being appointed in the office of the state governor. Other states like Plateau and Benue have a donor coordination office all aimed at improving donor relations. While this can be understood as an attempt to improve efficiency in donor coordination, it also depicts how much states are dependent on Aid.

7.5 Conclusion

Using a governmentality lens, this thesis examined how the increased participation of INGOs is influencing how WASH governance in Nigeria is being conducted. Empirical findings showed that WaterAid is influenced, unintentionally by a kind of neoliberal governance regime which looks to shift responsibility away from states, relies on multi stakeholder networks independent of the state to provide WASH services normally associated with the state, and also attempts to get rural dwellers to bear some responsibilities for the provision of WASH services in their villages.

WaterAid is attempting to enact water governance through the state, as is evidenced by creation of WASH units which are responsible for implementing the STS and HSBC projects and for relating with WASHCOMs. The thesis shows attempts by WaterAid to work through the state to provide WASH services through the establishment of WASH units in LGAs, insistence on counterpart funding and promoting a right based approach in which an attempt is made to use training and mentoring as a strategy to guide rural dwellers to demand for their rights from the state based on arguments of the state as duty bearer. But as the empirical data further shows, this just doesn't really happen, there is no teleological unfolding of neoliberal governmentality, because the WASH units within the LGAs do not manage fully to capture or control government-related functions and capacities related to water provision, operations of LGA accounts managed by communities and the state is not effective and efforts to have National NGOs manage state agencies is not successful. Communities on their part can't afford to build latrines and do not fully buy into the need to eliminate open defecation. As the findings show INGOs are not a viable substitute for a state with both capacity and resources. WaterAid however publicly admits the need for the state to play a leading role in the provision of WASH services in Nigeria and her inability to take on the challenges of WASH in Nigeria without the leading participation of the state. However, her efforts to increase state efficiency leading to greater participation of the state in the WASH sector has not met with much success. In trying to implement state led processes, most development projects often overlook institutional capacity of both state agencies and grass root organisations and instead give currency to a simplified view of up-scaling, mainstreaming and fast tracking implementation reframing projects as a policy-driven technical discourse(Mosse,2005).As we have shown such aspirations do not succeed as under resourced rural dwellers grapple with various socio economic challenges which hinder their cooperation as attempts are made by INGOs to enlist them into programmes of development.

Attempting to facilitate state reforms in the WASH sector through projects like the STS and WASH which have clear timelines and for which donors require and demand strict adherence to targets and deliverables questions the promise of empowerment. Empirical findings show that the technical nature of implementation through identification and creation of 'development communities' triggering, creations of WASHCOMs,desire for legibility and other technical decision making processes limits empowerment in the way that WaterAid would envisage. The sheer lack of sustainability of WASHCOMs and other institutional structures created in project communities show that local people are not becoming subjects in processes of neoliberal governmentality. Such technical approaches to project implementation are less likely to foster development and the provisions of WASH.Donor pressure for results often has the immediate effect of turning projects into targeted oriented spending machines and reinforcing top down control over programme delivery thereby contradicting the claims over participatory development (Mosse, 2005).Calls for participation may become mechanical processes and attempts at inclusion may be hampered by the desire of INGOs to adhere to timelines and fulfil donor contractual obligations/procedures. For development efforts to be sustainable, there will need to be a focus on relationships instead of technical solutions (ibid)

Accounts in the thesis further question the partnership frameworks often celebrated in projects like the STS and HSBC projects. Often such partnerships are neo-colonial and paternalistic instead of equal (Mosse, 2005).As shown in accounts of contestations between International consultants, National consultants and state agencies like the LGA WASH units. The use of consultants to speed up project implementation, the refusal of WaterAid to hand over certain aspects of project implementation, lack of trust for local partners for fears that funds committed may be misappropriated, complains by LGA WASH units on powers/responsibilities allocated to them) all illustrate an unequal relationship. According to Mosse (2005), the power effects of donorship are far reaching. Despite claims of partnership, power inequalities are reproduced in the making and execution of policies like CWM and in the language of education and in the displacement of alternative visions in the rules of partnership (Mosse, 2005).Partnerships though well-articulated are often unequal and leave state agencies and national NGOS disgruntled. As shown in chapter six, more often than not state institutions are often coerced to align with to do the bidding of international NGOs because of the desire for more donor funding. But within this narration we showed counter conducts and subversions in which state institutions did the bidding of INGOs by setting up WASH structures only for the purpose of meeting donor requirements for funding while using other structures and approaches for

provision of WASH services in their LGAs. Mosse (2005) notes further that recipient agencies and beneficiaries defy the control of donors by giving the appearance of obeying the rules of aid exchanges without actually putting them into practice thereby making the impact of aid unpredictable. Donors must end the old competition to put their flags on a series of projects. Instead, we need shared commitments to government-led programmes investing in long term development (ibid).

As described in chapters one and two, Governmentality is a valuable resource for understanding the relationship between states and non-state actors and for studying multi actor networks. The complexities, predicaments and contestations associated with real life situations are however not taken into account by studies of NGOs and governmentality. Scholars of governmentality working on NGOs need to be giving more nuanced accounts of the conditions required for processes and power relations entailed by governmentality to get a purchase in the ways people come to organise their lives, and the internalised norms on which they base such organisation. Governmentality theory can add considerable value to the study of CWM and other policies related to WASH as demonstrated in this study. To provide more nuanced accounts, it should be combined with other analytical approaches like institutionalism and constructivism (Merlingen, 2011).

7.5.1 **Policy implications**

This thesis has several policy implications for the practice of CWM and the wider sustainability of WASH services in Nigeria. A major policy implication relates to the use of counterpart funding policies in Nigeria. As discussed in this thesis, LGAs and communities find it difficult to pay counterpart funds based on existing policy specifications. There is need to find alternative ways of assigning financial responsibility to LGAs. One approach will be for donor agencies to place the responsibility for payment of counterpart funds on state governments since LGAs in Nigeria lack financial autonomy. At community level, a key recommendation is the adoption of non-cash payments as contributions for all contributions required from communities towards management of WASH services.

Another policy implication relates to the formation of LGA WASH units and WASHCOMs as strategies for the decentralisation of power under CWM. This study has revealed the relations of power inherent in the formation of WASH units and WASHCOMs by donor institutions working in the WASH sector. A policy recommendation that emerges from the study is for WaterAid and other donor agencies working in the WASH sector in Nigeria to explore the use

of existing LGA arrangements for the provision of WASH services. At community level, in addition to the use of existing institutions for management of WASH services, power dynamics emanating from the adoption of existing institutions will need to be explored.

Additionally, WaterAid and donor agencies in seeking to empower the state and communities towards WASH management will need to look beyond the concept of power as 'zero sum' to other ways of conceptualising power. There is need in conceptualising power to examine the relational aspect of power presented in this thesis. This will allow for the development of more nuanced policies which are sensitive to the micro physics of power. This will prove valuable for understanding power relations within CLTS processes.

This thesis has provided evidence for understanding CWM in Nigeria using the governmentality approach. In the process, the study opens up more questions for further research. There is an urgent need for more empirical research that explores the strategies and techniques of CWM. This study has focused on LGAs and communities as the unit of study. Further research could examine CWM in the context of state and federal government authorities in Nigeria. This will allow for more nuanced understanding of wider power relations as they relate to CWM. A further area requiring further empirical research is on the effect of shaming techniques and other strategies used to elicit behavioural change under CWM. While this study has identified the strategies and techniques, there is need for deeper analysis of how such techniques and strategies affect the meaning of community in rural Nigeria (Engel and Susilo, 2014).

While neoliberal governance has provided a valuable tool for explaining the strategies of WaterAid for implementing the STS and HSBC projects, it does not govern the workings and outcomes of the projects. The empirical account of CWM under the Projects reveal several outcomes which are outside the control of WaterAid and reveal the complexity of doing development through INGOs.

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S/No.	Selection Criteria	Max Score		Comments
1	Existing and planned water supply and sanitation (negative)	50 (30+20)	1b, 3.0, 7.0	The greater the existing water supply with respect to the population, the less score, with 100% coverage scoring zero. Similarly, the greater the planned water supply, the less score, with 100% planned coverage scoring zero.
2	Community organization and decision making structure	10	6.1	The more organized decision making structures within the community are, the more the score they earn
3	Efforts to address existing WASH problems	10	3.3, 4.6, 5.2,	The more the efforts of communities put towards addressing existing WASH problems, the more the score they earn
4	Understanding of how project can help WASH problems	3	3.4, 4.7, 5.3	The better the understanding of the community on how and ways through which the project can help solve their WASH problems, the more the score they earn
5	Presence of organized community interest groups	7	6.2	The more visible and organized community structures and interest groups are, the more the score they earn
6	Willingness and ability to contribute to project	10	1c, 8.0	The better the willingness and zeal show by the community to contribute with respect to their wealth status, the more the score they earn
7	Participation in community decision making	3	6.3	The more the level of participation and inclusion exhibited by the community in decision making processes, the more the score they earn.
8	Procedures for transparency in implementation	3	6.4	The more open and transparent a community is, in carrying out previous community-based projects, the more score they earn
9	Accountability for community financial contributions	4	6.5	The more consistent and transparent the community is in managing finances including adequate reporting, the more the score they earn
	TOTAL	**100**		

SN	KEY COMMUNITY ACTION	DUTY/ ACTIVITY	RESPONSIBLE PERSON	SEX	POSITIO N	PHONE NO	START AND END TIME

Staff and Postgraduate Research SAGES Ethics Clearance Form

Name of researcher: **TARIYA SARAUTA YUSUF**

School: **Archaeology, Geography and Environmental Science**

Department: **GEOGRAPHY AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE**

Title of Project: **Stakeholder Participation in Climate Change Adaptation Projects**

Proposed starting date: **09/12/2014 Proposed finish date: 23/12/2014**

Brief description of Project (maximum 250 words):
Stakeholder participation which involves a process where individual groups and organisations choose to take an active role in making decisions that affect them can enhance the quality of environmental decisions due to more comprehensive information inputs (Reed,2008)
Lots of studies have been carried out to investigate the normative and pragmatic benefits of participation in Environmental Management. Most studies have however focused on evaluating participatory methodologies and methods of communicating with project recipients. Others have focused on steps in facilitating and implementing participatory processes. E.g. lots of studies have analyzed Participatory rural appraisal and other forms of participatory approaches. Few empirical studies have attempted to analyse other wider approaches or strategies for participation like institutional structures that are set up to relate with project recipients and other social factors that critically affect the success and long time sustainability of environmental policies.

AIM

- My Research seeks to examine participatory approaches in the context of climate change adaptation.
- The research project will examine what is been done in the name of stakeholder participation in selected case study organizations in Nigeria.

OBJECTIVES

- Analyze the nature and forms of participation in the study organizations.
- Study how power is conceptualized within case study projects.
- Analyze current efforts at ensuring equity and inclusion in the selected projects
- Investigate the perception of stakeholders on the participatory approaches and engagement mechanisms.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

- What is the nature and form of Stakeholder Participation in climate change adaptation projects in Nigeria.
- How are the nature and forms of Stakeholder participation shaped by different conceptions of power.

METHODOLOGY

The study is using a case study approach to study two International organizations Projects in Nigeria (UNICEF –Water Sector Reform and WaterAid-Total Sanitation Projects. Qualitative methodologies (Key informant interviews and focused groups supported by observations will be used for the study).Data will be analysed using Nvivo qualitative software.

Selection of participants in the Project [maximum 250 words]:
The general respondents for the study are staff of various organizations involved in the study and community recipients of the study. The study will visit this staff in their respective offices, during meetings or on the field during project implementation to interview them. The study has sought and obtained the approval of the two organizations in question to carry out the interviews.

The study will also interview:

Staff of International NGOs=10

Local Government staff (19)

State Level Staff for UNICEF=4

Community Members in the Project Communities (Focused Groups for WASHCOMS) =40

A semi structured open ended questionnaire will be used for the study.

Anticipated number of people that will participate in this project: 73 ☐

In submitting this form, I confirm the following:

1. To the best of my knowledge, I have made known all information relevant to the SAGES Research Ethics Committee and I undertake to inform the Committee of any such information which subsequently becomes available whether before or after the research has begun.
2. If this project is an interventional study, a list of names and contact details of the subjects in this project will be compiled and that this, together with a copy of the Consent Form, will be retained within the School for a minimum of five years after the date that the project is completed.

3. The Consent form includes a statement to the effect that the application has been reviewed by the University Research Ethics Committee and has been given a favourable ethical opinion for conduct

4. I have made arrangements for the storage and disposal of confidential information generated by my project

5. The proposed research will not generate any information about the health of participants

6. The proposed research does not involve children under the age of 16

7. The proposed research does not involve any person with learning difficulties or with any other mental impairment

8. The proposed research does not involve anyone in their capacity as an NHS patient or social services client

9. The proposed research does not involve anyone who is employed by, or is a student of, the investigator

10. I have made arrangements for expenses to be paid to participants in the research

If you are not able to confirm all of the above, please contact Maria Shahgedanova (m.shahgedanova@reading.ac.uk) as soon as possible.

Signed

Tariya Yusuf (Researcher) Date: **11/11/14**

.. .. (PG Supervisor) Date 11/11/14

This form should now be returned, electronically and in hard copy, to Carol Speight, Department of Geography and Environmental Science (c.p.speight@reading.ac.uk)

It will be reviewed at the next SAGES Research Ethics Committee meeting and you will be notified of the outcome immediately.

SAGES Research Ethics Committee meetings take place on the first Wednesday in November, February and June. If you require express approval, please contact Dr Maria Shahgedanova to discuss the possibility of arranging this.

Approved 13/11/2014